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THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE OF FRANCE

VOL. IV.

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QUEEN HORTENSE

HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON

By LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
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HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BOOK XXIII.

AUSTERLITZ.

THE tidings from the banks of the Danube had filled France with satisfaction; those from Cadiz grieved her; but neither gave her any surprise. Everything was hoped for from our land forces, constantly victorious ever since the commencement of the Revolution, and scarcely anything from our fleets, so unfortunate for the last fifteen years. But consequences of minor importance only were attached to naval events; on the contrary, our prodigious successes on the continent were regarded as completely decisive. There people beheld hostilities kept at a great distance from our frontiers, the coalition disconcerted at its outset, the duration of the war greatly abridged, and the continental peace rendered speedy, bringing with it the hope of a maritime peace. Meanwhile the army, pushing on towards Austria to meet the Russians, afforded a presage of new and great events, which were awaited with keen impatience. For the rest, confidence in the genius of Napoleon tempered all anxieties.

This confidence was needed to support credit, which was violently shaken. We have already described the embarrassing situation of our finances. An arrear, owing to the resolution of Napoleon to provide without loan for the expenses of the war; the embarrassments of the Spanish treasury, extended to the French treasury by the speculations of the company of the United Merchants; the portfolio of the treasury given up entirely to that company, by the fault of an honest but deluded minister—such were the causes of that situation. They had finally produced the crisis which had long been foreseen. An incident had contributed to hasten it. The court of Madrid,

which was debtor to the company of the United Merchants for the subsidy, the amount of which the latter had undertaken to discharge, for the cargoes of corn sent to the different ports of the Peninsula, for the supplies furnished for the Spanish fleets and armies—the court of Madrid had just had recourse in its distress to a disastrous measure. Being obliged to suspend the payments of the Chest of Consolidation, a species of bank dedicated to the service of the public debt, it had given a forced currency as money to the notes of that chest. Such a measure must necessarily cause all the specie to disappear. M. Ouvrard, who, till he could bring over the piastres of Mexico, assigned to him by the court of Madrid, had no other means of supplying the wants of his partners but the cash which he was to draw from the Chest of Consolidation, found himself suddenly stopped short in his operations. There had been promised in particular to M. Desprez four millions of piastres, which he had promised in his turn to the Bank of France, in order to obtain from it the assistance that he needed. These four millions were no longer to be depended upon. On the sums to be drawn from Mexico, a loan of ten millions had been negotiated with the house of Hope, of which two at most could be hoped for in time to be useful. These unfortunate circumstances had increased beyond measure the embarrassments of M. Desprez, who was charged with the operations of the treasury, and of M. Vanlerberghe, who was charged with the supply of provisions, and the embarrassments of both had fallen back upon the bank. We have already explained how they induced the bank to discount either their own paper or the obligations of the receivers-general. The bank gave them the amount in notes, the issue of which was thus increased in an immoderate manner. This would have been only an evil very speedily reparable if the promised piastres had arrived to bring back the metallic reserve of the bank to a suitable rate. But things had come to such a point that the bank had not more than 15 million francs in its coffers, against 72 millions in notes issued and 20 millions in running accounts, that is to say, against 92 millions demandable immediately. A strange circumstance, which had recently come to light, greatly aggravated this situation. M. de Marbois, in his unlimited confidence in the company, had granted a faculty entirely unexceptionable, which he had at first viewed only as a facility of service, and which had become the cause of a great abuse. The company having in its possession the greater part of the obligations of the receivers-general, since it discounted them to the bank, having to pay itself for services of all kinds which it executed in different parts of the territory, found itself obliged to draw incessantly upon the chests of the treasury; and for the greater convenience, M. de Marbois had ordered the

receivers-general to pay the funds which came into their hands to the mere receipt of M. Desprez. The company had immediately made use of this faculty. While on the one hand it endeavoured to procure cash at Paris by discounting with the bank the obligations of the receivers-general of which it was possessed, on the other it took from the chest of the receivers-general the money destined for the discharge of those same obligations, and the bank, when they became due, on sending them to the receivers-general, found in payment nothing but receipts of Desprez's. Thus the bank received paper in payment of other paper. In this manner it was led to so great an issue of notes with so small a reserve. A treacherous clerk, betraying the confidence of M. de Marbois, was the principal cause of the compliances of which such a deplorable use was made.

This situation, unknown to the minister, not duly appreciated even by the company, which in its embarrassment not measuring either the extent of the operations in which it had been induced to engage or the gravity of the acts which it committed—this situation revealed itself gradually by a universal scarcity of money. The public, in particular, eager after metallic specie, apprised of its rarity at the bank, thronged to its offices to convert notes into cash. Malevolent persons joining those who were alarmed, the crisis soon became general.

Circumstances so aggravated produced avowals long delayed and distressing elucidations. M. Vanlerberghe, to whom anything that there was blamable in the conduct of the company could not be imputed, for he was solely occupied with the corn trade, without knowing to what embarrassment he was exposed by his partners—M. Vanlerberghe went to M. de Marbois, and declared to him that it was impossible for him to provide both for the service of the treasury and for the victualling service, and that it was quite as much as he could do to continue the latter. He did not disguise from him that the supplies furnished for Spain, and still unpaid for, were the principal cause of his straitened situation. M. de Marbois, dreading lest the victualling service should be at a stand, encouraged, moreover, by some expressions of the emperor, who, satisfied with M. Vanlerberghe, had intimated an intention of supporting him, granted to that contractor an aid of 20 millions. He placed them to the account of former supplies which the administrations of war and the navy had not yet paid for, and he gave them by returning to M. Vanlerberghe personal engagements of his to the amount of 20 millions, contracted on account of the service of the treasury. But no sooner was this aid granted than M. Vanlerberghe came to apply for a second. This contractor had at his back a multitude of sub-contractors, who usually gave him credit, but who, no longer obtaining the

confidence of the capitalists, could not make any further advances. He was therefore reduced to the last extremity. M. de Marbois, alarmed at these communications, soon received others still more serious. The bank sent to him a deputation to acquaint the government with its situation. The piastres promised by M. Desprez were not forthcoming, and yet he applied for further discounts; the treasury, on its part, wanted discounts, and the bank had not two millions of crowns in its coffers against an amount of 92 millions demandable. What was it to do in such a predicament? M. Desprez declared, on his part, that he was at the end of his resources, especially if the bank refused its assistance. He, too, confessed that it was the counter-check given by the affairs of Spain which threw him into these distressing embarrassments. It became unfortunately evident to the minister that M. Vanlerberghe, supported on M. Desprez, M. Desprez upon the treasury, and the bank bore the burden of the affairs of Spain, which was thus transferred to France herself by the rash combinations of M. Ouvrard.

It was too late to recede, and quite useless to complain. It was requisite for the government to extricate itself from this peril, and to that end to extricate those who had imprudently involved themselves in it; for to leave them to perish would be to run the risk of perishing with them. M. de Marbois did not hesitate in deciding to support Messieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez; and he did right. But he could no longer venture to act on his sole responsibility, and a council of government, summoned at his instigation, met under the presidency of Prince Joseph. Prince Louis, the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and all the ministers attended. Some of the superior employés in the finances were sent for, and among others M. Mollien, director of the Sinking Fund. The council deliberated long on the subject. After much general and idle discussion, it was necessary to come to a conclusion, and each hesitated, in presence of a responsibility equally great, whatever course should be adopted, for it was as serious a matter to let the contractors sink as to support them. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who had sense enough to comprehend the exigencies of this situation, and influence enough to induce the emperor to admit them, led a majority to decide in favour of an immediate aid to M. Vanlerberghe, to the amount of ten millions at first, and afterwards of ten more, when an approving answer should be received from headquarters. As for M. Desprez, it was a question to be settled with the bank, for that alone could assist the latter, by continuing to discount for him. But the means proposed by it to parry the exhaustion of its coffers and to keep up the credit of its notes, without which the establishment must fall, were taken into consideration. Nobody was of opinion that it was possible

to give them a forced cash currency, both on account of the impossibility of establishing a paper money in France, and on account of the impossibility of prevailing upon the emperor to consent to such a resolution. But certain measures designed to render payments slower and the drain of specie less rapid were adopted. The minister of the treasury and the prefect of the police were left to arrange the detail of these measures with the bank.

M. de Marbois had some very warm discussions with the council of the bank. He complained of the manner in which it had managed its affairs—a very unjust reproach; for if it had been embarrassed, it was solely through the fault of the treasury. Its portfolio contained nothing but excellent commercial paper, the regular payment of which became for the moment its only effective resource. It had even diminished its discounts to individuals so far as to reduce its portfolio below the ordinary proportions. It had nothing in disproportionate quantity but M. Desprez's paper and obligations of the receivers-general, which brought back no money. It was suffering, therefore, for the sake of the government itself. But the bankers who directed it were in general so devoted to the emperor, in whom they loved, if not the glorious warrior, at least the restorer of order, that they allowed themselves to be treated by the agents of power with a harshness which at this day the most vulgar companies of speculators would not endure. On their part, it is true, this was the effect of patriotism rather than of servility. To support the government of the emperor was in their eyes an imperative duty to France, whom he alone preserved from anarchy. They would not feel irritated at very undeserved reproaches, and they showed a devotedness to the cause of the treasury worthy of serving for an example under similar circumstances. The following measures were adopted as most capable of alleviating the crisis.

M. de Marbois was to send off post, into the departments nearest to the capital, clerks with orders to the paymasters to give up all the funds which were not indispensably required for the service of the rentes, of the pay of the salaries of the functionaries, and to transmit these funds to the bank. It was hoped that in this manner five or six millions in specie would be brought in. Orders were given to the receivers-general who had not delivered to M. Desprez all the sums in their chests to pay them immediately into the bank. The clerks sent out were likewise directed to ascertain whether some of these accountable persons were not employing the funds of the treasury for their private interest. To these means of bringing in cash were added others for preventing the drain of it. Notes beginning to fall in value, the public hurried to the bank, impatient to convert them into money. Had not stockjobbers

and ill-disposed persons interfered, a loss of 1 or 2 per cent. which notes were sustaining would have been sufficient to induce the mass of holders to demand their conversion into specie. The bank was authorised not to convert into money more than five or six hundred thousand francs' worth of notes per day. This was all the specie that was needed when confidence existed. Another precaution was taken in order to retard payments: this was to count the money. The applicants for payment would gladly have dispensed with this formality, for they were not afraid that the bank would cheat the public by putting a piece short in a bag of a thousand francs. The cashiers, with an affectation of accuracy, nevertheless took the trouble to count them. It was decided, moreover, that cash should be given for a single note only to one and the same person, and that each should be admitted in turn. At length the concourse increasing every day, a last expedient was devised, that of distributing numbers to the holders of notes, in the proportion of five or six hundred thousand francs, which were intended to be paid per day. These numbers, deposited at the *maires* of Paris, were to be distributed by the *maires* among persons notoriously unconnected with the commerce in money, and having recourse to the payment of their notes merely for the purpose of satisfying real wants.

These measures put an end at least to the material disturbance about the offices of the bank, and reduced the issue of specie to the most urgent wants of the population. Jobbers, who sought to extract specie from the bank, to make the public pay 6 or 7 per cent. for it, were thwarted in their manœuvres. It was nevertheless a real suspension of payment under the guise of a more cautious system. It was unfortunately inevitable. Under these circumstances, it is not the measure itself which is to be blamed, but the anterior conduct which rendered it necessary.

The clerks sent out procured the remittance of two millions at most. The daily expiry of commercial effects brought more notes than crowns, for traders paid in specie only when they had sums of less than 500 francs to pay. The bank resolved therefore to buy piastres at any price in Holland, and thus take to its own account part of the costs of the crisis. Thanks to these conjoint means the embarrassment would soon have been surmounted, had not M. Desprez suddenly come to plead still greater necessities, and to solicit further aid.

This banker, charged by the company to furnish the treasury with the funds necessary for the service, and for this purpose to discount the obligations of the receivers-general, the bills at sight, &c., had engaged to do this discount at a half per cent. per month, that is to say, at 6 per cent. per annum. The capitalists having refused to discount them for him at less than 1 per cent.

per month, that is, at 12 per cent. per annum, he was exposed to ruinous losses. He had devised a scheme for sparing himself these losses, which was to pledge the obligations and the bills at sight to lenders, and to borrow on these securities instead of getting them sub-discounted. The speculators, desirous to make an advantage of the circumstance, had at last refused to renew this species of operations, in order to oblige him to give up the securities of the treasury, and thus to obtain them at a low price. "The embarrassments of the place," wrote M. de Marbois to the emperor, "afford many people a pretext for employing them like corsairs towards the United Merchants, and I know great patriots who have withdrawn 1,200,000 or 1,400,000 francs from the agent of the treasury in order to make a better bargain." (Letter of the 28th of September —Depôt of the Secretary of State's Office.)

M. Desprez, who had already received an aid of 14 millions from the bank, wished to obtain 30 immediately, and 70 in the month of Brumaire: consequently he wanted a sum of 100 millions. This situation, avowed at the bank, caused an absolute consternation there, and produced an explosion of complaints on the part of men who were not disposed to espouse the fortune of the government, be it what it might. They asked what M. Desprez was, and by what title such great sacrifices were claimed for him. The commercial world was ignorant of the partnership subsisting between him and the company of contractors, which was labouring at once for Spain and for France. But the directors of the bank, though ignorant of his real situation, proposed to oblige the minister to avow him as the agent of the treasury, were it only to have one security the more. The minister, apprised of their intention, had sent a note in his own handwriting to the president of the regency to say that M. Desprez was acting only on behalf of the treasury. From an oversight M. de Marbois had neglected to sign this note. He was required to sign it. He complied, and it was impossible to deny that they were in presence of the emperor himself, the creator of the bank, the saviour and master of France, begging them not to reduce his government to extremity by refusing the resources which it had urgent need of.

The voice of patriotism prevailed, and this result was chiefly owing to M. Perregaux, the celebrated banker, whose influence was always exerted for the benefit of the State. It was decided that all necessary aid should be afforded to M. Desprez; that the obligations which served for borrowing upon pledge, and which he had avoided discounting to spare himself too great losses, should be discounted, no matter at what rate, whether they belonged to M. Desprez or to the bank; that he should

take upon himself this operation, as more capable than any other to execute it; that the losses should be borne, half by the company and half by the bank; that metals should be bought at Amsterdam and Hamburg at joint cost; and that M. Desprez should be requested not to renew his engagements, in order to put an end to such a situation. It was lastly resolved to diminish the discounts to commerce, to devote all the existing resources to the treasury, and to issue no notes but for it. The daily payment of commercial paper had brought back a considerable quantity of notes, which it was at first proposed to destroy, but which were soon put into circulation again to satisfy the wants of M. Desprez. The first issue was even far surpassed, and it was raised to 80 millions, besides the 20 millions of current accounts. But the extraordinary purchases of piastres, and the effective discount of the obligations, procured the 500,000 or 600,000 francs per day which were indispensable for satisfying the public; and there appeared a flattering prospect of getting over this crisis without compromising the services, and without bringing bankruptcy upon the contractors, which would have led to that of the treasury itself.

There was, however, no preventing individual bankruptcies, which, following one another in rapid succession, added greatly to the national dejection. The failure of M. Recamier, a banker renowned for his integrity, his extensive business, and the high style in which he lived, and who fell a victim to circumstances much more than to his financial conduct, produced the most painful sensation. Malevolent persons attributed it to business transactions with the treasury, which had no existence. Many failures of less importance followed that of M. Recamier, both in Paris and in the provinces, and produced a sort of panic terror. Under a government less firm and less powerful than that of Napoleon, this crisis might have been attended with the most serious consequences. But people relied upon his fortune and upon his genius; nobody felt any uneasiness about the maintenance of public order; they looked every moment for some grand stroke which should raise sinking credit; and that detestable species of speculators who aggravate all situations by founding their calculations on the depreciation of assets, durst not venture upon the game of lowering, for fear of the victories of Napoleon.

All eyes were fixed upon the Danube, where the destinies of Europe were about to be decided. Thence were to proceed the events that could put an end to that financial and political crisis. People hoped for them with full confidence, especially after seeing in a few days a whole army taken, almost without striking a blow, by the sole effect of a manœuvre. One circumstance of this very manœuvre, however, had just pro-

duced an unfortunate complication with Prussia, and given us reason to fear an additional foe. This circumstance was the march of Marshal Bernadotte's corps through the Prussian province of Anspach.

Napoleon, in directing the movement of his columns upon the flank of the Austrian army, had not considered for a moment that any objection would be made to passing through the provinces which Prussia possessed in Franconia. In fact, according to the convention of neutrality stipulated by Prussia with the belligerent powers during the last war, the provinces of Anspach and Baruth had not been comprehended in the neutrality of the north of Germany. The reason was simple, namely, that these provinces lying in the obligatory route of the French and Austrian armies, it was almost impossible to withdraw them from their passage. All that could be required was, that they should not become a theatre of hostilities, that they should be traversed rapidly, and that both parties should pay for what they took there. If Prussia had desired that a different system should be adopted on this occasion, she ought to have said so. Besides, when, quite recently, she had entered into negotiations of alliance with France, when she had proceeded in this track so far as to listen to and assent to the offer of Hanover, she scarcely had a right to change the old rules of her neutrality in order to render them more stringent for France than in 1796. This would have been inconceivable: on this point, therefore, she had kept a silence, which, decently, she would not have ventured to break, especially to declare that, in full negotiation of an alliance, she was determined to be less condescending to us than in times of extreme coldness. Be this as it may, Napoleon, grounding himself on the old convention and on an appearance of friendship which he could not but believe, had not considered the passage through the province of Anspach as a violation of territory. What proves his sincerity in regard to this point is, that strictly he might have made shift without borrowing the roads of that province; and that, by keeping his columns closer to one another, it would have been very easy for him to avoid the Prussian territory, without losing many chances of enveloping General Mack.

But the situation of Prussia was daily becoming more embarrassing between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander. The first offered him Hanover and his alliance; the second solicited of him a passage through Silesia for one of his armies, and seemed to declare to him that he must join in the coalition, either willingly or by force. As soon as he comprehended the true state of the case, Frederick William was seized with an extraordinary agitation. That prince, sometimes swayed by the avidity natural to the Prussian power, which impelled

him towards Napoleon, sometimes by court influences, which drew him towards the coalition, had made promises to everybody, and had thus involved himself in an embarrassing position from which he saw no outlet but war with Russia or with France. He was exasperated in the highest degree at this, for he was dissatisfied both with others and with himself, and he could not contemplate war without apprehension. Indignant, however, at the violence with which Russia threatened him, he had ordered 80,000 men to be placed on the war footing. In this state of things, news of the alleged violation of the Prussian territory reached Berlin. This was a new subject of vexation to the King of Prussia, because it diminished the force of the arguments which he was opposing to the urgent representations of Alexander. It is true that there were reasons for opening the province of Anspach to the French which did not exist for opening Silesia to the Russians. But in moments of effervescence, it is not justice of argument that prevails; and on learning at Berlin the passage of the French through the territory of Anspach, the court cried out that Napoleon had offered an unworthy insult to Prussia in treating her as he was accustomed to treat Naples or Baden; that she could not possibly submit to it without dishonouring herself; that, for the rest, if they were not to have war with Napoleon, they should be obliged to have it with Alexander, for that prince would not suffer them to act in so partial a manner towards him, to refuse him what had been granted to his adversary; and finally, that if they were forced to choose, it would be extremely strange, most unworthy of the sentiments of the king, to espouse the cause of the oppressors of Europe against its defenders. Frederick William, it was added, had always professed other sentiments at Memel in his confidential intercourse with his young friend Alexander. Such was the way in which people talked openly at Berlin, and particularly in the royal family, swayed by a queen, affectionate, beautiful, and stirring.

Frederick William, though sincerely irritated at the violation of the territory of Anspach, which deprived him of his best argument against the urgent solicitations of Russia, behaved as men false through weakness are accustomed to do: he made a resource of his anger, and pretended to be more irritated than he was. His conduct towards the two representatives of France was ridiculously affected. Not only did he refuse to receive them, but M. de Hardenberg would not admit them into his cabinet to hear their explanations. Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc were laid under a sort of interdict, and cut off from all communication even with the private secretary, M. Lombard, through whom passed the confidential communications when the question either of German indemnities or of Hanover was under discussion.

The secret intermediate agents usually employed declared that, in the state of the king's mind in regard to the French, they durst not see any of them. All this anger was evidently assumed. The intention was to draw from it a solution of the embarrassments in which Prussia had involved herself; to be able to tell France that the engagements made with her were broken through her own fault. These engagements, renewed so often and substituted for various plans of alliance which had failed, consisted in promising formally that the Prussian territory should never subserve any aggression against France, that Hanover itself should be secured against all invasion. The French having forcibly passed through the Prussian territory, it was proposed thence to conclude that they had given Prussia a right to open it to whomsoever she pleased. Here was an outlet miraculously discovered to escape from the difficulties of all kinds accumulated around her. In consequence, it was resolved to declare that Prussia was, by the violation of her territory, released from every engagement, and that she granted a passage to the Russians through Silesia in compensation of the passage taken through Anspach by the French. The intention was to do much better than to get out of a great embarrassment; it was hoped to obtain a profit from all this. It was decided to seize Hanover, where no more than 6000 French were left shut up in the fortress of Hameln, and to colour that invasion by a spurious pretext, that of providing against fresh violations of territory, for an Anglo-Russian army was marching for Hanover, and by occupying it Prussia prevented the theatre of hostilities from being transferred to her provinces, by which Hanover was enclosed on all sides.

The king summoned an extraordinary council, to which the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollendorf were called. M. d'Haugwitz, drawn from his retirement for these momentous circumstances, attended it also. There the resolutions which we have just recapitulated were agreed upon, but they were left for a few days enveloped in a sort of cloud, to terrify still more the two representatives of France. Though neither they nor their master were thought to be easily frightened, it was imagined that, at a moment when Napoleon had so many enemies on his hands, the fear of adding Prussia to them, which would have rendered the coalition universal, as in 1792, would act powerfully upon their minds.

Messieurs de Laforest and Duroc had long applied in vain for an interview with M. de Hardenberg. At length they saw him, found in him the studied attitude of a man who is making an effort to repress his indignation, and obtained from him, amidst many bitter complaints, nothing but the declaration that the engagements of Prussia were broken, and that she should

thenceforth be guided solely by the interest of her own safety. The cabinet suffered the resolution of opening Silesia to the Russians, and of occupying Hanover with a Russian army, upon pretext of preventing the flames of war from spreading to the very heart of the kingdom, to reach by degrees the ears of the two French negotiators. It seemed to intimate that France ought to deem herself fortunate to get off so easily.

All this was very unworthy of the uprightness of the king and the power of Prussia. However, after this first explosion forms began to improve, not only because it was part of the Prussian plan to soften down, but also because the astonishing successes of Napoleon had suggested serious reflections to all courts.

What was passing in Berlin had been carried to Pulawi with the speed of lightning. Alexander, who had desired to see Frederick William before France had given Prussia causes of complaint, could not but be still more desirous to do so afterwards. He hoped to find that prince disposed to receive all kinds of influences. Instead, therefore, of fixing upon such a place of meeting that the distance to be travelled should be equally divided, Alexander performed the entire journey himself, and proceeded immediately to Berlin.

Frederick William, on hearing of the arrival of the czar, was sorry that he had made so much fuss, and thus drawn upon himself a flattering but compromising visit. Napoleon commenced the war in a manner so rapid and decisive as to hold out little encouragement to a connection with his enemies. However, it was not possible to refuse the attentions of a prince for whom one professed such a warm affection. The necessary orders were, therefore, given for receiving him with all befitting ceremony. On the 25th of October Alexander made his entry into the Prussian capital, amidst the thunder of the cannon, and between files of the royal Prussian guard. The young king hastening to meet him, embraced him cordially amidst the applause of the people, who, having at first been favourable to the French, began to allow themselves to be hurried away by the impulsion of the court, and by the assertion, a thousand times repeated, that Napoleon had violated the territory of Anspach out of contempt for Prussia. Alexander had promised himself to employ on this occasion all the means of seduction that he possessed to bring the court of Berlin into his interests. He did not fail to do so, and began with the beautiful Queen of Prussia, who was easy to gain, for, sprung from the house of Mecklenburg, she shared all the passions of the German nobility against the French Revolution. Alexander paid her a sort of chivalrous worship, which might be taken at pleasure for a mere homage rendered to her merit, or for a much warmer sentiment. Though at that time very attentive to a distinguished lady of the Russian

nobility, Alexander was a man and a prince to feign on a seasonable occasion a sentiment useful to his views. There was nothing, however, in these demonstrations that was capable of offending either decorum or the jealous susceptibility of Frederick William. He had not been two days in Berlin before the whole court was full of him, and extolled his gracefulness, his intelligence, his generous ardour for the cause of Europe. He had paid particular attentions to all the relations of the great Frederick: he had visited the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollendorf, and honoured in them the chiefs of the Prussian army. The young Prince Louis, who was remarkable for his violent hatred of the French and an ardent passion for glory—Prince Louis, gained over beforehand to the cause of Russia, manifested more vehemence than usual. A sort of general fascination gave up the court of Prussia to Alexander. Frederick William perceived the effect produced around him, and began to be alarmed at it. He waited with painful anxiety for the proposals that were to spring from all this enthusiasm, and he kept silence for fear of hastening the moment of the explanations. We have already said that, in his extreme embarrassment, he had summoned to him his old counsellor d'Haugwitz, whose mind, too acute for his own, sometimes annoyed him by its very superiority, but whose shrewd, evasive policy, always inclined to a neutrality, perfectly suited him. They both deplored the fatal concatenation of things which under the impassioned and unequal direction of M. de Hardenberg had brought Prussia to a point from which there was absolutely no outlet. M. de Hardenberg, at first the friend and creature of M. d'Haugwitz, soon the jealous rival of that statesman, had begun by following his policy, which consisted in keeping himself neuter between the two European parties, and in making the most of that neutrality; but he had done so with his impassioned character, sometimes overturning on one side, sometimes on the other, favourable to the French when the question concerned Hanover, to such a degree as to be disposed to give himself wholly up to them, and since the affair of Anspach so hurried away by the general movement, that he was ready to go halves with Russia in making war upon them. M. d'Haugwitz, censuring, but with delicacy, an ungrateful disciple, said that Prussia had been too French a few months before, and that now she was too Russian. But how was she to extricate herself from the dilemma? how escape from the grasp of the young emperor? The difficulty increased hourly, and it was not to be resolved by incessantly eluding it. Time was precious for Alexander, for every day that elapsed brought tidings of a new success of Napoleon's on the Danube, and a new peril for Austria, as well as for the Russian armies,

which had reached the Inn. He therefore addressed himself to the King of Prussia, and induced his minister for foreign affairs, the able and astute Count d'Haugwitz, to address him also. The theme which both of them developed may easily be inferred from what precedes. Prussia, said they, could not separate herself from the cause of Europe; she could not contribute by her inaction to render the common enemy triumphant; she had some respect paid her by him for the moment, and not a great deal, to judge from what had recently happened at Anspach, but she would soon be crushed when, delivered from Austria and Russia, he should have nobody else to settle with. Prussia, it is true, was a much nearer object for the attacks of Napoleon; but then an army of 80,000 men was marching to her assistance, and it had approached so near to her solely for that purpose. This army, assembled at Pülawi, on the frontier of Silesia, was not a threat but a generous attention on the part of Alexander, who had not desired to urge his friend into a serious war without offering him the means of defying its perils. Besides, Napoleon had many enemies on his hands; he would be in great danger on the Danube if, while the united Austrians and Russians should oppose a solid barrier to him, Prussia were to throw herself upon his rear by Franconia; he would then find himself between two fires, and be infallibly overcome. In this very probable case the common deliverance would be due to Prussia, and then there should be done for her all that Napoleon promised, all that he meant not to perform; then there should be given to her that complement of territory with which he had flattered the just ambition of the house of Brandenburg—Hanover. (Letters had actually been despatched to London to decide England to this sacrifice.) And it would be much better to receive so valuable a gift from the legitimate owner, as the price of the salvation of all, than from a usurper giving away the property of another as a reward for treachery.

To these representations was added a new influence; this was the presence of the Archduke Anthony, who had travelled in the utmost haste from Vienna to Berlin. That prince came to report the disasters of Ulm, the rapid progress of the French, the perils of the Austrian monarchy, too great not to be common to all Germany, and he earnestly solicited the reconciliation at any price of the two principal German powers.

This diplomatic machination was too well planned for the unfortunate King of Prussia to escape from it. Nevertheless, he and M. d'Haugwitz made an obstinate resistance, as if they had had a presentiment of the disasters that were soon to befall the Prussian monarchy. There were many interviews, many controversies, many bitter complaints. The king and his minister declared that the two emperors were bent on the ruin

of Prussia, that they would ruin her to a certainty, for all Europe, were it united, would be incapable of withstanding Napoleon; that if they did yield, it was because violence was done to their reason, their prudence, their patriotism, and they should not fail to recriminate against the plan which had been laid to hurry them away, either with their good will or by force, a plan of which the Russian army collected on the frontier of Silesia was to be the instrument. To this the Emperor Alexander replied by giving up his minister Prince Czartoryski. Swayed by his natural inconstancy, he began already to listen much to the Dolgoroukis, who went about asserting everywhere that Prince Czartoryski was a perfidious minister, betraying his emperor for the sake of Poland, of which he intended to make himself king, and striving, with this object, to set Russia upon Prussia. Alexander, who had not sufficient firmness for the plan that had been proposed to him, was alarmed, even at Pulawi, at the idea of marching against France by passing over the body of Prussia, were even the crown of Poland to be the price of that temerity. Enlightened by M. d'Alopeus, excited by the Dolgoroukis, he said that an attempt had been made to lead him to commit a great fault, and he even keenly reproached Prince Czartoryski, whose grave and austere character began to be annoying to him, because with the freedom of a friend and an independent minister he sometimes blamed his sovereign for his foibles and his fickleness.

By dint of application, of disavowals, and above all of accessory influences, such as the solicitations of the queen, the language of Prince Louis, the cries of the young Prussian staff, the king was at length appeased, M. d'Haugwitz overcome, and both led to enter into the views of the coalition. But swayed as Frederick William was, he determined to reserve for himself a last resource for escaping from these new engagements; and by the advice of M. d'Haugwitz he adopted a plan which could still hold forth some illusion to his vanquished integrity, and which consisted in a project of mediation, a grand hypocrisy employed at that time by all the powers to disguise the plan of coalition against France. It was the form which Prussia had thought of employing three months before, when the question of allying herself with France at the price of Hanover was under discussion; it was the form which she employed now, when discussing the question of allying herself with Alexander; and, unluckily for her honour, again at the price of Hanover.

It was agreed that Prussia, alleging the impossibility of living at peace between implacable adversaries, who did not even respect her territory, should decide to intervene for the purpose of forcing them to peace. So far, so good; but what

were to be the conditions of this peace? Therein lay the whole question. If Prussia conformed to the treaties signed with Napoleon, and by which she had guaranteed the present state of the French empire in exchange for what she had received in Germany, there was nothing to be said. But she was not firm enough to stop at this limit, which was that of honour. She agreed to propose as conditions of peace a new demarcation of the Austrian possessions in Lombardy, which would extend the latter from the Adige to the Mincio (which must lead to a dismemberment of the kingdom of Italy), an indemnity for the King of Sardinia, and besides these the conditions usually admitted by Napoleon himself in case of a general pacification, that is to say, the independence of Naples, of Switzerland, of Holland. This was a formal violation of the reciprocal guarantees which Prussia had stipulated with France, not in plans of alliance which had miscarried, but in authentic conventions signed on occasion of the German indemnities.

The Russians and the Austrians would have desired more, but as they knew that Napoleon would never consent to these conditions, they were certain, even with what they had obtained, to drag Prussia into the war.

There was another difficulty which also they passed over in order to remove all obstacles. Frederick William would not present himself to Napoleon in the name of all his enemies, especially England, after so much confidential communication with him against that power. He expressed, therefore, a desire to say not a single word relative to Great Britain in the declaration of mediation, intending, he said, to interfere only in regard to the peace of the continent. This again was assented to, as it was still thought that there was sufficient in what had been agreed upon to plunge him into the war. Further, he required a last precaution, the most captious and the most important of all, the postponement for a month of the term at which Prussia should be obliged to act. On the other hand, the Duke of Brunswick, always consulted, always heard without appeal when the matter in hand related to military affairs, declared that the Prussian army would not be ready till the first days in December, and on the other, M. d'Haugwitz recommended delay, to see how things went on the Danube between the French and the Russians. With a captain such as Napoleon, events could not lag, and in gaining a month only there was a chance of being extricated from embarrassment by some unforeseen and decisive solution. It was settled, therefore, that at the expiration of a month, reckoning from the day on which M. d'Haugwitz, commissioned to propose the mediation, should have left Berlin, Prussia should be required to take the field if Napoleon had not returned a satisfactory answer. It would be easy to add a few

days to that month, by retarding the departure of M. d'Haugwitz upon various pretexts, and besides, Frederick William trusted to that negotiator, to his prudence and his address, that the first words exchanged with Napoleon should not render the rupture inevitable and immediate.

These conditions, unworthy of Prussian honour, for they were contrary, we repeat it, to formal stipulations, the price of which Prussia had received in fine territories, contrary especially to an intimacy which Napoleon must have believed to be sincere—these conditions were inserted in a double declaration, signed at Potsdam on the 3rd of November. The text of it has never been published, but Napoleon found means subsequently to learn its purport. This declaration has retained the title of treaty of Potsdam. No doubt Napoleon had committed faults in regard to Prussia: while caressing her and benefiting her much, he had let slip more than one occasion to bind her irrevocably. But he had loaded her with solid favours, and he had always behaved honourably in his transactions with her.

Alexander and Frederick William were residing at Potsdam. It was in this beautiful retreat of the great Frederick that they reciprocally heightened each other's enthusiasm, and concluded that treaty so contrary to the policy and the interests of Prussia. The able Count d'Haugwitz was deeply grieved at it, and excused himself in his own eyes for having signed it solely in the hope of eluding its consequences. The king, bewildered, confounded, knew not whither he was going. To complete his perturbation of mind, Alexander, in concert it is said with the queen, and probably in consequence of her fondness for studied scenes, desired to see the little vault which contains the remains of the great Frederick in the Protestant church of Potsdam. There, at the bottom of this vault, hollowed out of a pillar of the church, narrow, simple even to negligence, lay two wooden coffins, the one that of Frederick William I., the other the great Frederick's. Alexander went thither with the young king, shed tears, and clasping his friend in his arms, swore to him and begged him to swear an oath of everlasting friendship on the coffin of the great Frederick. Never were they to separate either their cause or their fortunes. Tilsit was destined ere long to show the solidity of such an oath, probably sincere at the moment when it was taken.

This scene, related in Berlin, published throughout all Europe, confirmed the opinion that there existed a close alliance between the two young monarchs.

England, apprised of the change of things in Prussia, and of the negotiations so happily conducted with that court, regarded it as a capital event, which might decide the fate of Europe. She despatched immediately Lord Harrowby himself, the minister

for foreign affairs, to negotiate. The cabinet of London was not difficult with the court of Berlin; it accepted its accession, no matter at what price. It consented that England should not even be mentioned in the negotiation which Count d'Haugwitz was about to undertake in the camp of Napoleon, and it kept subsidies ready for the Prussian army, not doubting that she would take part in the war at the end of a month. With respect to the aggrandisements of territory promised to the house of Brandenburg, it was disposed to concede much, but it did not depend on the English cabinet to give up Hanover, the highly-prized patrimony of George III. Mr. Pitt would cheerfully have sacrificed it, for the British ministers have always taken it into their heads to regard Hanover as a burden to England. But they would sooner have persuaded King George to renounce the three kingdoms than Hanover. To make amends, an offer was made of something not so contiguous, it is true, to the Prussian monarchy, but more considerable—Holland itself.* That Holland, which all the courts declared to be the slave of France, and whose independence they claimed with such energy, was flung at the feet of Prussia to attach her to the coalition and to release Hanover. It is for the illustrious Dutch nation to judge what value it ought to set on the sincerity of European affections in regard to it.

These were so many points to be settled afterwards between the courts of Prussia and England. In the interim it was requisite to draw from the treaty of Potsdam its essential consequence, that is to say, the accession of Prussia to the coalition. The Austrians and the Russians urged the departure of M. d'Haugwitz, and while he was making his preparations the Emperor Alexander set out on the 5th of November, after a stay of ten days at Berlin, for Weimar, to see his sister, the grand duchess, a princess of high merit, who lived in that city, surrounded by the greatest geniuses of Germany, happy in that noble intercourse which she was worthy to enjoy. The parting of the two monarchs was, like their first meeting at the gates of Berlin, marked by embraces and demonstrations of friendship, which one of the parties at least seemed to wish to render conspicuous. Alexander set out for the army surrounded by the interest which usually attaches to such a departure. People saluted in him a young hero, ready to confront the greatest dangers for the triumph of the common cause of kings.

Meanwhile M. de Laforest, minister of France, Duroc, grand marshal of the imperial palace, were totally forsaken. The court continued to treat them with affronting coldness. Though the most profound secrecy had been promised between the Russians

* It is on authentic documents that I found this assertion.

and the Prussians relative to the stipulations of Potsdam, the Russians, unable to conceal their satisfaction, had told everybody that Prussia was irrevocably bound to them. Their joy, indeed, revealed this plainly enough, and joined to the military preparations which were making, to the bustle, rather unsuited to his age, into which the old Duke of Brunswick put himself, it attested the success which Alexander's presence at Potsdam had obtained. M. de Hardenberg, who shared with M. d'Haugwitz the direction of the foreign affairs, scarcely showed himself to the French negotiators, but M. d'Haugwitz had more frequent interviews with them. Being asked by them what importance ought to be attached to the Russian indiscretions, he defended himself against all the suppositions that were publicly circulated. He avowed a project which, he said, could have nothing new for them—that of a mediation. When they wished to learn whether that mediation was to be an armed one, which signified imposed, he evaded the question, saying that the representations of his court to Napoleon would be proportioned to the urgency of the moment. When at last they asked what were to be the conditions of this mediation, he replied that they would be just, discreet, conformable to the glory of France, and of this he had given the best proof by undertaking himself to carry them to Napoleon. He could not, the first time of his visiting that great man, expose himself to the hazard of being roughly repulsed.

Such were the explanations obtained from the cabinet of Berlin. The only thing which was evident was, that Silesia was open to the Russians as a punishment for the passage of our troops through the territory of Anspach, and that Hanover was about to be occupied by a Prussian army. As France had a garrison of 6000 men in the fortress of Hameln, M. d'Haugwitz, without saying whether orders would be given for besieging that place, promised the greatest civility to the French, adding that he hoped for the same from them.

The Grand Marshal Duroc, seeing nothing further to do in Berlin, set out for Napoleon's headquarters. At this period, the end of October and the beginning of November, Napoleon, having finished with the first Austrian army, was preparing to fall upon the Russians, according to the plan which he had conceived.

When he learned what was passing in Berlin he was confounded with amazement, for it was in perfect good faith, and believing in the maintenance of the former custom, that he had ordered troops to pass through the provinces of Anspach. He could not think that the irritation of Prussia was sincere, and he was convinced that it was assumed to cover the weaknesses of that court towards the coalition. But nothing that

he could conjecture on that subject was capable of shaking him, and on this occasion he displayed all the greatness of his character.

The reader is already acquainted with the general plan of his operations. In presence of four attacks directed against the French empire, one in the north, by Hanover, the second in the south, by Lower Italy, the two others from the east, by Lombardy and Bavaria, he had taken account of the last two only. Leaving to Massena the task of parrying that from Lombardy, and detaining the archdukes for a few weeks, he had reserved for himself the most important, that which threatened Bavaria. Taking advantage, as we have seen, of the distance which separated the Austrians from the Russians, he had by an unexampled march enclosed the former, and sent them prisoners to France. Now he was about to march upon the second, and to hurl them back upon Vienna. By this movement Italy would be released, and the attacks prepared in the north and south of Europe would become insignificant diversions.

It was, however, in the power of Prussia to give serious obstructions to this plan by throwing herself, by way of Franconia or Bohemia, upon the rear of Napoleon, while he was marching upon Vienna. An ordinary general, on the news of what was passing in Berlin, would have stopped short and fallen back, to take a position nearer to the Rhine, so as not to be turned, and would have awaited in this position, at the head of his collected forces, the consequences of the treaty of Potsdam. But in acting thus he would have rendered certain the dangers that were only probable; he would have given the two Russian armies of Kutusof and Alexander time to effect their junction, the Archduke Charles time to pass from Lombardy into Bavaria to join the Russians, the Prussians time and the courage to make unacceptable proposals and to enter the lists. He might in a month have had upon his hands 120,000 Austrians, 100,000 Russians, 150,000 Prussians, assembled in the Upper Palatinate or Bavaria, and been overwhelmed by a mass of forces double his own. To persist more than ever in his ideas, that is to say, to march forward, to fling back to one extremity of Germany the principal armies of the coalition, to listen in Vienna to the complaints of Prussia, and to give her his triumphs for an answer—such was the wisest, though apparently the rashest, determination. Let us add that these great resolutions are made for great men, that ordinary men would sink under them; that, moreover, they require not only a superior genius but an absolute authority; for to have the power of advancing or falling back according to circumstances, it is requisite to be the centre of all move-

ments, of all intelligence, of all wills; it is requisite to be general and head of the empire; it is requisite to be Napoleon and emperor.

The language of Napoleon to Prussia was conformable to the resolution which he had just taken. So far from offering excuses for the violation of the territory of Anspach, he merely referred to anterior conventions, saying that if these conventions had been set aside, he should have been informed of it; that, for the rest, these were mere pretexts; that his enemies, he clearly perceived, had the ascendency in Berlin; that it no longer became him to enter thenceforward into friendly explanations with a prince for whom his friendship seemed to be of no value; that he should leave to time and events the business of answering for him, but that on a single point he should be inflexible, that of honour; that never had his eagles put up with an affront; that they were in one of the fortresses of Hanover, that of Hameln; that if any attempt should be made to drag them out of it, General Barbou would defend them to the last extremity, and should be succoured before he would yield; that it was no new or alarming thing for France to have all Europe upon her hands; that he, Napoleon, would soon come, if he was called thither, from the banks of the Danube to the banks of the Elbe, and force his new enemies to repent, like the old ones, of having insulted the dignity of his empire. The order given to General Barbou, and communicated to the Prussian government, was as follows:—

"To the General of Division, BARBOU.

"AUGSBURG, *October* 24.

"I know not what is preparing, but whatever may be the power whose armies should attempt to enter Hanover, were it even a power that has not declared war against me, you must oppose it. Not having forces sufficient to withstand an army, shut yourself up in the fortresses, and let nobody approach within gun-shot of those fortresses. I shall come to the relief of the troops shut up in Hameln. My eagles have never yet put up with an affront. I hope that the soldiers whom you command will be worthy of their comrades, and that they will know how to preserve honour, the best and most valuable property of nations.

"You must not surrender the place without an order from me, which shall be brought to you by one of my aides-de-camp.

"NAPOLEON."

Napoleon had gone from Ulm to Augsburg, and from Augsburg to Munich, to make there his dispositions for the march. Before we follow him into that long and immense valley of the Danube, surmounting all the obstacles thrown in his way by

winter and the enemy, let us cast our eyes for a moment on Lombardy, where Massena was charged to make head against the Austrians till Napoleon had nullified their position on the Adige by advancing upon Vienna.

Napoleon and Massena were both thoroughly acquainted with Italy, since both had acquired glory there. The instructions given for this campaign were worthy of both. Napoleon had first laid it down as a principle that 50,000 French, appuyed on a river, had nothing to fear from 80,000 enemies whoever they might be; that, at any rate, he should only ask them to guard the Adige till, penetrating into Bavaria (which forms the northern slope of the Alps, as Lombardy forms the southern), he had turned the position of the Austrians and obliged them to fall back; that for this it was necessary to keep together on the upper part of the river the left wing to the Alps, according to the example which he had always given, to hurl back the Austrians into the mountains, if they should come by the gorges of the Tyrol; or, if they should pass the Lower Adige, to let them do so, and only to keep themselves concentrated, and when they should have entered the marshy country of the Lower Adige and of the Po, from Legnago to Venice, to rush upon their flank and drown them in the lagoons; that by remaining thus in a mass at the foot of the Alps, they would have nothing to fear either from above or below; but that if the enemy appeared to renounce the offensive, they must take it against him, carry by night the bridge of Verona over the Adige, and then proceed to the attack of the heights of Caldiero. The campaigns of Napoleon would furnish models for every mode of acting on this part of the theatre of war.

Massena was not a man to hesitate between the offensive and the defensive. The first system of war was alone suited to his character and genius. He had arrived at such a degree of confidence that he did not conceive himself to be doomed to keep the defensive before 80,000 Austrians, even though commanded by the Archduke Charles. In consequence, in the night between the 17th and the 18th of October, after having received news of the first movements of the grand army, he had advanced in silence towards the bridge of Château-Vieux, situated in the interior of Verona. That city, as the reader knows, is divided by the Adige into two parts. One belonged to the French, the other to the Austrians. The bridges were cut, and the approaches defended by palisades and walls. Having blown up the wall which barred the approach to the bridge of Château-Vieux, Massena on reaching the bank of the river had despatched a party of brave voltigeurs in boats, some to ascertain whether the piles of the bridge were undermined, the others to throw themselves on the opposite bank. Certain that the piles were

not undermined, he had caused a sort of passage to be made with thick planks, and then crossing the Adige, had fought, the whole of the 18th, with the Austrians. The secrecy, the vigour, the promptness of this attack had been worthy of Napoleon's first lieutenant in the campaigns of Italy. Massena found himself by this operation master of the course of the Adige, able, in case of need, to operate on both banks, and having scarcely any fear of being surprised by a passage by main force, for he was strong enough to interrupt such an operation at whatever point it might have been attempted. Before he took a determined offensive and advanced definitively into the Austrian territory, he wished to receive decisive tidings from the banks of the Danube.

These tidings arrived on the 28th of October, and filled the army of Italy with joy and emulation. Massena caused them to be communicated to his troops, accompanied with the discharge of the artillery, and resolved to march forward immediately. On the following day, the 29th of October, he took three of his divisions, Gardanne's, Duhesme's, and Molitor's, beyond the Adige, beat back the Austrians, and extended himself in the plain called St. Michael's, between the citadel of Verona and the entrenched camp of Caldiero. His design was to attack that formidable camp, though he had before him an army far superior in number, and appuyed on positions which nature and art had rendered extremely strong. The archduke, on his part, informed of the extraordinary successes of the French grand army, presuming that he should soon be obliged to retreat and march to the relief of Vienna, thought that he ought not to give up the ground as if vanquished. He purposed to gain a decisive advantage, which should enable him to retire quietly, and to take that route which was best suited to the general situation of the allies.

The two adversaries, then, were about to fall upon each other with the greater violence, since they met both with the same resolution to fight to extremity.

Massena had before him the last steeps of the Tyrolese Alps, subsiding gradually into the plain of Verona, near the village of Caldiero. On his left the heights, called the heights of Colognola, were covered with entrenchments, regularly constructed, and armed with a numerous artillery. In the centre, and in the plain, was the village of Caldiero, through which ran the highroad of Lombardy, leading through the Friule into Austria. At this point an obstacle presented itself, in grounds enclosed and built on, occupied by a great part of the Austrian infantry. Lastly, on his right, Massena saw spread out before him the flat and marshy banks of the Adige, traversed in all directions by ditches and dykes bristling with cannon. Thus,

on the left, entrenched mountains; in the centre, a highroad bordered with buildings, marshes, and the Adige; everywhere works adapted to the ground, covered with artillery, and 80,000 men to defend them—such was the entrenched camp which Massena was to attack with 50,000 men. Nothing was capable of intimidating the hero of Rivoli, of Zurich, and of Genoa. On the morning of the 30th he advanced in column on the highroad. On his left he directed General Molitor to take the formidable heights of Colognola; with Duhesme's and Gardanne's divisions he undertook himself the attack of the centre, along the highroad; and as he judged that, to dislodge an enemy superior in number and position, it was necessary to threaten him with a serious danger on one of his wings, he directed General Verdier to proceed to the extreme right of the French army, there to cross the Adige with 10,000 men, to turn the left wing of the archduke, and then fall upon his rear. If this operation was well executed, it would be worth such a detachment, but it was hazardous to commit the passage of a river to a lieutenant; and those 10,000 men, if they were not well employed on the right, would be sorely missed at the centre.

At break of day, Massena, marching vigorously upon the enemy, overthrew him at all points. General Molitor, one of the ablest and firmest officers of the army, advanced coolly to the foot of the heights of Colognola, and ascended the first steeps in spite of a tremendous fire. While Colonel Teste, advancing at the head of the 5th of the line, was ready to climb them, Count de Bellegarde, sallying from the redoubts with all his forces, came forward to overwhelm that regiment. General Molitor, instantly aware of the seriousness of the danger, without stopping to count the enemy, rushed upon General Bellegarde's column with the 6th of the line, the only regiment that he had at hand. He attacked that column with such violence, that he surprised it, and obliged it to halt. Meanwhile Colonel Teste had entered one of the redoubts and hoisted there the colours of the 5th, the eagle of which was carried away by a ball. But the Austrians, ashamed to see their positions wrested from them by so small a number of men, returned to the charge and retook the redoubt. The French at this point remained opposite to the enemy's entrenchments without being able to take them. It was miraculous to have dared so much with so few men, and without sustaining a defeat.

At the centre, Prince Charles had placed the bulk of his forces. He had put at the head a reserve of grenadiers, in whose ranks fought three archdukes. Generals Duhesme and Gardanne, sweeping the highroad, and carrying one after another the enclosures that bordered it, had already arrived near Caldiero. The Archduke Charles chose this moment for

taking the offensive. He repulsed the assailants, and marched along the road in close column, at the head of the best Austrian infantry. This column continuing to advance, as did of old that of Fontenoy, had already passed the detachments of French troops spread on the right and left in the enclosures, came on to possess itself of Vago, which was to the French what Caldiero was to the Austrians, the appui of their centre. But Massena hastened to the spot. He rallied his divisions, placed all his disposable artillery in the road, and facing the enemy, poured the grape-shot at point-blank range upon the brave Austrian grenadiers, then ordered them to be charged with the bayonet and attacked on the flanks, and after an obstinate fight, in which he was continually in the midst of the fire like a common soldier, he forced the column to retreat. He pushed it beyond Caldiero, and gained so much ground as to penetrate into the first Austrian entrenchments. If at this moment General Verdier, accomplishing his mission, had crossed the Adige, or even had Massena had the 10,000 men uselessly employed at his extreme right, he would have taken the formidable camp of Caldiero. But General Verdier, mismanaging his operation, had thrown one of his regiments beyond the river, without having it in his power to support it, and had completely failed in his design of passing. Night alone parted the combatants, and covered with its shades one of the bloodiest fields of battle of the age.

It required the character of Massena to undertake and to come off from such a conflict without check. The Austrians had lost 3000 men killed and wounded, and 4000 of them had been taken prisoners. The French had not lost more than 3000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. They bivouacked on the field of battle, mingled the one with the other, amidst terrible confusion. But in the night the archduke sent off his baggage and his artillery, and next morning, occupying the French by means of a rearguard, he commenced his retrograde movement. A corps of 5000 men, commanded by General Hillinger, was sacrificed to the interest of this retreat. It had been ordered down from the heights to alarm Verona, on the rear of our army, while the archduke was setting himself in march. General Hillinger had not time to return from this demonstration, perhaps pushed too far, and was taken with his whole corps. Thus in these three days Massena had deprived the enemy of 11,000 or 12,000 men, 8000 of whom were prisoners, and 3000 left *hors de combat.*

He immediately set out in close pursuit of the archduke. But the Austrian prince had in his favour the best soldiers of Austria to the number of 70,000, his experience, his talents, winter, overflowed rivers, the bridges over which he broke down in retiring. Massena could not flatter himself with the hope of

involving him in a catastrophe; nevertheless, he occupied him sufficiently by pursuing him, not to leave him the facility of manœuvring at pleasure against the grand army.

This other part of Napoleon's plan was therefore accomplished as punctually as the preceding; the Archduke Charles, falling back upon Austria, was obliged to maintain a running fight while going to the succour of the threatened capital.

Napoleon had not lost a moment at Munich in making his dispositions. He was anxious to cross the Inn, to fight the Russians, and to disconcert the underhand manœuvres of Berlin by fresh successes as prompt as those of Ulm. The corps of General Kutusof, which he had before him, numbered scarcely 50,000 men on taking the field, though it was to have been far more numerous according to the promises of Russia. From Moravia to Bavaria this corps had left behind 5000 or 6000 stragglers and sick, but it had been joined by the Austrian detachment of Kienmayer, which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm before the investment of that place. M. de Meerfeld had added some troops to this detachment, and taken the command of it. The whole together might amount to about 65,000 soldiers, Russian and Austrian. This was but little for saving the monarchy against 150,000 French, 100,000 of whom at least were marching in a single mass. General Kutusof commanded this army. He was an elderly man, had lost the sight of one eye in consequence of a wound on the head, very corpulent, indolent, dissolute, greedy, but intelligent; as active in mind as he was heavy in body, lucky in war, a clever courtier, and capable enough of commanding in a situation that required prudence and good fortune. His lieutenants were men of moderate talents, excepting three, Prince Bagration and Generals Doctorow and Miloradovich. Prince Bagration was a Georgian, of heroic courage, making amends by experience for the lack of early instruction, and always charged, whether at the advanced guard or at the rearguard, with the most difficult duty. General Doctorow was a discreet, modest, firm, and well-informed officer. General Miloradovich was a Servian, of brilliant valour, but absolutely destitute of military knowledge, dissolute in manners, uniting all the vices of civilisation with all the vices of barbarism. The character of the Russian soldiers corresponded with that of their generals. They had a savage, ill-directed bravery. Their artillery was clumsy, their cavalry indifferent. Altogether, generals, officers, and soldiers composed an ignorant army, but singularly formidable from its devotedness. The Russians troops have since learned the art of war by waging it with us, and have begun to add knowledge to courage.

General Kutusof had been ignorant till the last moment of the disaster of Ulm; for the Archduke Ferdinand and General

Mack, the day before their catastrophe, announced to him nothing but successes. The truth was not known till the arrival of General Mack, who came in person to report the destruction of the principal Austrian army. Kutusof, then despairing with reason of saving Vienna, did not disguise from the Emperor Francis, who had hastened to the Russian headquarters, that it was necessary to make a sacrifice of that capital. He would fain have withdrawn as speedily as possible from the danger which threatened himself by passing to the left bank of the Danube, in order to join the Russian reserves coming through Bohemia and Moravia. The Emperor Francis and his council, however, made a point of not sacrificing Vienna till at the last extremity, and flattered themselves that by retarding the march of Napoleon by all the means which defensive war was capable of furnishing, time might be given to the Archduke Charles to reach Austria, to the Russian reserves to arrive on the Danube, and to effect a general junction of the allied forces, for the purpose of fighting a battle which might perhaps prove the salvation of the capital and of the monarchy. General Kutusof, in compliance with the desires of the principal ally of his master, promised to oppose to the French every resistance that did not go so far as to involve a general action; and to slacken their movement, he determined to avail himself of all the tributaries of the Danube coming from the Alps and throwing themselves into that great river. For this purpose it was sufficient to break down the bridges, and to obstruct by strong rearguards the passages by main force which the French should attempt, passages difficult in a season when all the waters were high and laden with flakes of ice.

Napoleon had made the following dispositions for his march. He was obliged to direct his course between the Danube and the chain of the Alps, by a route cramped between the river and the mountains. To advance with a numerous army by this narrow route would have been attended with difficulty of subsisting and danger for marching, for besides the Archduke Charles, who might pass from Lombardy into Bavaria and throw himself upon our flank, there were in Tyrol about 25,000 men under the Archduke John. Napoleon, therefore, took the wise precaution to commit to Ney's corps the conquest of the Tyrol. He directed the marshal to leave Ulm, to ascend by Kempten, and to penetrate into the Tyrol in such a manner as to cut in two the troops scattered through that long country. Those which were to the right of Marshal Ney were to be flung back upon the Vorarlberg and the Lake of Constance, where Augereau's corps would arrive, after traversing the whole extent of France from Brest to Huningen. Ney, deprived of Dupont's division, which had concurred with Murat in the

pursuit of the Archduke Ferdinand, was reduced to about 10,000 men. But Napoleon, trusting to his vigour and to the 14,000 men whom Augereau was bringing, believed that he would have force enough for the task which he had to perform. The Tyrol thus occupied, he destined Bernadotte to penetrate into the country of Salzburg. He directed the latter to proceed from Munich towards the Inn, and to cross it either at Wasserburg or Rosenheim. General Marmont was to support Bernadotte. In this manner Napoleon ensured two advantages, that of covering himself completely towards the Alps, and that of gaining possession of the upper course of the Inn, which would prevent the Austro-Russians from defending its lower course against the main body of our army. As for himself, with the corps of Marshals Davout, Soult, and Lannes, with the reserve cavalry and the guard, he should take in front the great barrier of the Inn, with the intention of crossing from Mühldorf to Braunau. Murat had orders to set off on the 26th of October, with the dragoons of Generals Walther and Beaumont, General d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry, and a bridge equipage, to proceed direct to Mühldorf, following the highroad from Munich through Hohenlinden, and thus traversing the scenes of Moreau's glory. Marshal Soult was to support him at the distance of one march in rear. Marshal Davout took the route on the left, through Freisingen, Dorfen, and Neu-Oettingen. Lannes, who had contributed with Murat to the pursuit of the Archduke Ferdinand, was to march still more to the left than Davout, through Landshut, Wilsburg, and Braunau. Lastly, Dupont's division, which had proceeded far in the same direction, descended the Danube for the purpose of going to take Passau. Napoleon, with the guard, followed Murat and Soult on the highroad from Munich.

Before he left Augsburg, Napoleon prescribed there a system of precautions to which we shall find him paying more and more attention in proportion as the sphere of his operations increased, and in which he has never been equalled for the extent of his foresight and the activity of his care. The object of this system of precautions was to create upon his line of operation points of support, which should serve him alike to advance or to fall back if he should be compelled to the latter course. These points of support, besides the advantage of presenting a certain force, were to have that of containing immense stores of all kinds, very useful to an army marching forward, indispensable for a retreating army. He chose in Bavaria, on the Lech, Augsburg, which afforded some means of defence and the resources suited to a great population. He gave directions for the works necessary to secure it against a *coup de main*, and desired that corn, cattle, cloth, shoes, ammunition, and, above

all, hospitals, should be found there. He ordered commissions for cloth and shoes to be given at Nuremberg, at Ratisbon, and at Munich, requiring the speedy execution of them, and paying for the articles, of which those made up were to be collected at Augsburg. As that city became the principal point of the route of the army, all the detachments were to pass through it in order to supply themselves with what they needed. These precautions taken, Napoleon set out to follow his corps, which preceded him by one or two marches.

The movements of his army were executed as prescribed by him. On the 26th of October the whole of it was advancing towards the Inn. The Austro-Russians had not left a single bridge standing. But the soldiers, throwing themselves everywhere into boats, and crossing in large detachments, under musketry and grape, forced the enemy to evacuate the opposite bank, and set about repairing the bridges, seldom totally destroyed owing to the precipitation of nis retreat. Bernadotte, meeting with but few obstacles, passed the Inn on the 28th of October at Wasserburg. Marshals Soult, Murat, and Davout passed it at Mühldorf and Neu-Oettingen. Lannes proceeded towards Braunau, and finding the bridge broken down, sent a detachment to the other bank by means of some craft which had been seized. This detachment crossed the river and appeared at the gates of Braunau. What was the astonishment of our soldiers to find that place open, though in a perfect state of defence, completely armed, and provided with considerable resources! Immediate possession was taken, and from a fact so extraordinary it was inferred that the enemy was retreating with a precipitation bordering on disorder.

Napoleon, delighted with such an acquisition, hastened in person to Braunau, to ascertain the strength of the place and what benefit he might derive from it. Having inspected it, he ordered a great portion of the resources which he meant at first to collect at Augsburg to be removed thither, judging it to be preferable for the use to which he destined it. He left a garrison there, and gave the command of it to his aide-de-camp Lauriston, who had returned from the naval campaign which he had made with Admiral Villeneuve. It was not the mere command of a fortress that he committed to him; it was a government, comprising all the rear of the army. The wounded, the ammunition, the prisoners, the recruits coming from France, the prisoners who were going thither, were all to pass through Braunau, under the superintendence of General Lauriston.

From the 29th to the 30th of October the army had crossed the Inn, left Bavaria behind, and invaded Upper Austria. It was no longer a burden to allies, but to the hereditary States of the imperial house. It was marching forward, covered against

any movement of the archdukes by Bernadotte and Marmont at Salzburg, by Ney in the Tyrol. Napoleon, not losing a moment, resolved to proceed from the line of the Inn to that of the Traun. From the Inn to the Traun you have, as everywhere in this country, the Danube on the left, the Alps on the right. It is a magnificent country, resembling Lombardy, only more stern, because it is to the north instead of to the south of the Alps, and would be as level as a plain but for a large mountain called the Hausrück which rises abruptly in the midst of it. This mountain is peaked, totally detached from the Alps, and would form an island if the country were covered with water. But having passed the Hausrück, you have nothing before you but an undulating and wooded plain, extending to the bank of the Traun, and called the plain of Wels. The Traun runs over gravel and among fine trees, and throws itself into the Danube near Linz, the capital of the province, militarily as important as the city of Ulm, and, for that reason, bristling, since our great wars, with fortifications on a new system.

Napoleon directed Lannes by Efferding upon Linz, Marshals Davout and Soult, by the road to Ried and Lambach, upon Wels, along the foot of the Hausrück. Murat always preceded them with his cavalry. The guard followed with the headquarters. Apprehending, however, that the plain of Wels might be chosen by the enemy for a field of battle, he directed Marmont to leave Bernadotte at Salzburg, and to rejoin the main body of the army by passing behind the Hausrück, along the road through Strasswalchen and Wocklabrück to Wels, so as to take the Austro-Russians in flank if they should be disposed to halt with the intention of fighting.

The 1st chasseurs came up with them in advance of Ried, charged them gallantly, and put them to the rout. The French marched upon Lambach, which the enemy made a show of defending, solely to gain time to save their baggage. Davout overtook them and had a brilliant rearguard action with them, but preparations for a battle were nowhere perceived. The enemy covered himself with the Traun in passing it at Wels. We entered Linz without striking a blow. Though the Austrians had made use of the Danube for evacuating their principal magazines, they nevertheless left us valuable resources. Napoleon arrived and established his headquarters at Linz on the 15th of November.

Being established in this town, Napoleon moved forward his *corps d'armée* from the Traun to the Ens, which is easy, for the country between these two tributaries of the Danube offered no position of which the enemy could be tempted to avail himself. This country presents a slightly elevated plain, intersected by ravines, covered with wood, having two steep slopes, one forward,

which you must ascend when you have passed the Traun, the other at the further extremity, which you must descend if you mean to pass the Ens. Not having defended it on the side next to the Traun, the Austro-Russians could not think of defending it on the side next to the Ens, since they would have been everywhere commanded. The Ens was therefore passed without obstacle.

Having his headquarters at Linz and his advanced guards on the Ens, Napoleon made new dispositions for the continuation of this offensive march, performed, as we have said, upon a narrow road between the Danube and the Alps. The difficulty of advancing thus in a long column, the tail of which could never come to the assistance of the head if it were surprised by the enemy, with the danger always to be apprehended of an attack in flank if the archdukes should suddenly leave Italy and march into Austria—this difficulty, further increased by the scarcity of provisions, already consumed or destroyed by the Russians, required great precautions before reaching Vienna.

The most serious inconvenience of this march was certainly the possibility of a sudden appearance of the archdukes. The two belligerent masses, acting in Austria and in Lombardy, were moving from west to east, the one under Napoleon and Kutusof to the north of the Alps, the other to the south of them under Massena and the Archduke Charles. Was it possible that the Archduke Charles, suddenly stealing away from Massena, and leaving before him a mere rearguard to delude him, should cross the Alps, pick up by the way his brother John with the corps in the Tyrol, and penetrate into Bavaria, either to join the Austro-Russians behind one of the defensive positions which are met with on the Danube, or merely to throw himself on the flank of the French grand army? Though possible, this was scarcely probable. The Archduke Charles had two routes: the first, by the Tyrol, Verona, Trent, Inspruck, would have led him behind the Inn; the second, more circuitous, through Carinthia and Styria, by Tarvis, Leoben, and Lilienfeld, would have led him to the well-known position of St. Pölten, in advance of Vienna. With respect to the first, supposing that the archduke had decided at the very moment of Mack's capitulation, which took place on the 20th, which was not known at Verona by the French till the 28th, which could not be known by the Austrians before the 25th or the 26th—supposing that, before leaving Italy, the archduke had not chosen to fight a battle for the purpose of restraining the French army, he would have had from the 25th to the 28th to traverse the Tyrol and arrive upon the Inn, which Napoleon passed on the 28th and 29th. He would evidently not have time enough for such a march. As for the route through Styria, which he would have had it in his

power to take after the battle of Caldiero, he would have had to traverse the Friule, Carinthia, and Styria, and to march a hundred leagues in the Alps between the 30th of October, the day of the battle of Caldiero, and the 6th or 7th of November, the day on which Napoleon crossed the Ens to move forward. He would not have had time for such an operation either. If the Archduke Charles could not anticipate Napoleon upon one of the defensive positions of the Danube, for the purpose of opposing to him 150,000 united Austrians and Russians, he might, without anticipating him, suffer himself to be outstripped, on the contrary, and cross the chain of the Alps to attempt a flank attack upon the grand army. No doubt, with soldiers accustomed to conquer, prepared for daring enterprises, capable of clearing their way anywhere, he would have had it in his power to make such an attempt, and to produce a sudden and serious derangement in the march of Napoleon, perhaps even to change the face of events, but running the risk himself of being enclosed between two armies, that of Massena and that of Napoleon, as had formerly happened to Suwarow in the St. Gothard. This would have been one of the most hazardous of resolutions, and one does not take such resolutions when one has in one's hands an army, which is the last resource of a monarchy.

Napoleon, nevertheless, conducted himself as if such a resolution had been probable. The only position which the enemy could occupy for covering Vienna, whether the army of Kutusof was there alone, or whether the archdukes were there with it, was that of St. Pölten. This position is well known. The Alps of Styria, pushing the Danube to the north, from Mölk to Krems, throw out a spur which is called the Kahlenberg, and which subsides only at the very brink of the river, where it leaves scarcely room for a road. As the Kahlenberg covers with its mass the city of Vienna, you must cross it breadthwise to reach that capital. In advance of this spur, half-way up, is a very spacious position, which has received its name from a large village situated near it, that of St. Pölten, and upon which a retreating Austrian army might fight a defensive battle with advantage. A branch of the highroad from Italy to Vienna, running through Lilienfeld, terminates near St. Pölten, and might bring the archdukes thither. A vast wooden bridge over the Danube, that of Krems, placed this position in communication with the two banks of the river, and would have permitted the Prussian and Austrian reserves to hasten thither through Bohemia. It was there consequently that Napoleon must have met with the conjoined forces of the allies if such a junction of forces had been possible in advance of Vienna. He therefore took, in approaching this point, the precautions which might be expected of a general who has combined calculation and daring

in a superior degree to any celebrated captains. Having General Marmont's corps on his right, he resolved to send him to Leoben by a road passable for carriages, which runs from Linz to Leoben through Styria. General Marmont, if he received intelligence of the approach of the archdukes, was to fall back upon the grand army and to become the extreme right, or if the archdukes proceeded directly from the Friule into Hungary, to establish himself in Leoben in order to give a hand to Massena. Between this road, which Marmont was to take, and the high-road along the Danube, which the bulk of the army was following, there was a mountain road, which, running through Waidhofen and St. Gaming, descended to Lilienfeld, beyond the position of St. Pölten, and thus furnished the means of turning it. This Napoleon directed Marshal Davout's corps to pursue. The corps of Bernadotte was no longer necessary at Salzburg, since Ney occupied the Tyrol. Napoleon enjoined him to draw nearer to the army, detaching the Bavarians towards Ney's corps, which could not fail to be particularly gratifying to these latter, always extremely ambitious to possess the Tyrol. He reserved for himself, for the direct attack of the position of St. Pölten, the corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, besides Murat's cavalry and the guard; these were sufficient, the corps of Davout being sent to turn that position.

Napoleon did not stop there, but resolved to take some precautions on the left bank of the Danube. So far he had marched on the right bank only, taking no heed of the left bank. There was talk, however, of an assemblage of troops in Bohemia, formed by the Archduke Ferdinand, who escaped from Ulm with some thousand horse. There was also a rumour of the approach of the second Russian army, conducted into Moravia by Alexander. It was necessary, therefore, to guard himself on this side also. Napoleon, who had detached the division of Dupont to Passau, ordered him to advance upon the left bank of the Danube, keeping up with the army and sending out reconnaissances upon the roads from Bohemia to learn what was passing there. The Dutch, who had left Marmont, were to join Dupont's division. Judging this not to be sufficient, Napoleon detached Gazan's division from the corps of Lannes, and made it march with Dupont's division on the left bank. He placed both under the command of Marshal Mortier, and not to leave them cut off from the grand army, which continued to occupy the right bank, he conceived the idea of forming, with the craft collected on the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, and the Danube, a numerous flotilla, into which he put provisions, ammunition, all the fatigued men, and which, descending the Danube with the army, could in an hour throw ten thousand men on the right or on the left, connected the two banks, and

served at once for a medium of communication and of conveyance. At the head of this flotilla he put Captain Lostanges, an officer of the seamen of the guard.

It was by such a combination of precautions that Napoleon provided against the inconvenience of that offensive march, performed upon a long and narrow road between the Alps and the Danube. He had thus on the summit of the Alps Marmont's corps, half-way up Davout's corps, at their foot, along the Danube, the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte, and the cavalry of Murat; on the other side of the Danube Mortier's corps, and lastly, a flotilla to connect all the forces marching on both banks of the river, and to carry whatever it was difficult to drag along with them. It was with this imposing train that he approached Vienna.

At the moment when he was about to leave Linz, an emissary from the Emperor of Germany arrived at the headquarters. This was General Giulay, one of the officers taken at Ulm, since released, and who, having heard Napoleon speak of his pacific dispositions, had so represented the matter to his master as to make some impression upon him. In consequence, the Emperor Francis sent him to propose an armistice. General Giulay did not explain himself clearly, but it was evident that he wished Napoleon to halt before entering Vienna; and yet he offered in return no guarantee of a speedy and acceptable peace. Napoleon consented, indeed, to treat of peace immediately with a plenipotentiary sufficiently accredited and authorised to consent to the necessary sacrifices; but to grant an armistice without guarantee to obtain what was due to him as indemnification for the war, was giving the second Russian army time to join the first, and the archdukes time to join the Russians under the walls of Vienna. Napoleon was not the man to commit such a fault. He declared, therefore, that he would stop at the very gates of Vienna, and not pass them, if an envoy should come to him with sincere proposals of peace, but that otherwise he should proceed direct to his goal, which was the capital of the empire. M. de Giulay alleged the necessity of consulting with the Emperor Alexander before conditions acceptable by all the belligerent powers could be fixed. Napoleon replied that the Emperor Francis, who was in danger, would be wrong to make his resolutions dependent on the Emperor Alexander, who was not there; that he ought to think of saving his monarchy, and to that end to arrange with France, leaving it to the French army to send the Russians home. Napoleon had not entered into any explanation respecting the conditions capable of satisfying him; still everybody knew that he wanted the Venetian States. Those States formed the complement of Italy; he would not have provoked a war to acquire them; but

war having been raised by Austria, it was natural that he should claim this the legitimate price of his victories. He delivered, moreover, to M. de Giulay a mild and polite letter for the Emperor Francis, at the same time sufficiently explicit, relative to the conditions of peace.

Before he set off, Napoleon received also a visit from the Elector of Bavaria, who, unable to join him at Munich, came to Linz to express his gratitude, his admiration, his joy, and, above all, his hopes of aggrandisement.

Napoleon had stayed at Linz but three days, that is to say, precisely the time necessary for giving his orders. But his corps had never ceased marching; for after passing the Inn on the 28th and 29th of October, the Traun on the 31st, the Ens on the 4th and 5th of November, they advanced the same day upon Amstetten and St. Pölten. At Amstetten the Russians determined to have a rearguard action in order to gain time to save their baggage. The highroad to Vienna ran through a forest of firs. The Russians took position on a clearing in the forest, which left a certain space open on the right and left of the road. In the centre of this space, and in front of it, was drawn up the artillery of the Russians, supported by their cavalry; in rear, and backed upon the wood, their best infantry. Murat and Lannes, debouching with the dragoons and Oudinot's grenadiers, perceived these dispositions. It was the first time that they had met the Russians, and they were desirous to teach them how the French fought. They despatched the dragoons and the chasseurs at a gallop along the highroad, to take the enemy's artillery and cavalry. Our brave horse, in spite of the grapeshot, had soon taken the guns, cut in pieces the Russian cavalry, and cleared the ground. But it was necessary to break the infantry backed upon the fir-wood. Oudinot's grenadiers undertook that task. After an extremely brisk fire of musketry, they advanced with bayonets fixed upon the Russians. The latter, displaying extraordinary bravery, fought hand to hand, and took advantage for a long time of the thickness of the wood to resist. At last our grenadiers forced them in this position and put them to flight, after killing, wounding, or taking about a thousand men.

Murat and Lannes, proceeding together, the first with his cavalry, always going, though overwhelmed with fatigue, the second with his formidable grenadiers, continued the pursuit of the enemy on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of November, without being able to overtake him anywhere. "The Russians," wrote Lannes to Napoleon, "run away faster than we follow them; those wretches will not even stop to fight." Arriving on the 8th before St. Pölten, Lannes and Murat found them in order of battle, putting on a bold look, as if they meant to make a

serious affair of it. The two leaders of our advanced guard, notwithstanding their ardour, durst not hazard a battle without the emperor. Besides, they had not sufficient means for fighting one. The hostile troops remained in presence of each other the whole of the 8th. They were near the beautiful abbey of Mölk. That wealthy abbey, situated on the steep bank of the Danube, and overlooking the broad bed of the river, with its magnificent domes, presents one of the finest views in the world. It was reserved for the headquarters of the emperor. It contained abundant resources, especially for the sick and the wounded.

Murat was lodged at the château of Mittrau, with a Count de Montecuculli. There he learned from various reports that the Russians had no intention to make a stand at St. Pölten. They had actually taken a very important resolution. After having delayed the march of the French, either by breaking down the bridges or by rearguard fights, and complied with the wishes of the Emperor of Austria, who was desirous that the highroad to Vienna should be disputed as long as possible, the Russians conceived that they had done enough, and thought of their own safety. They repassed the Danube at Krems, the point where that river, terminating its bend to the north, resumes its eastern direction. The motive which especially instigated this determination was the intelligence that part of the French army had passed to the left bank of the Danube. They had reason to apprehend, in fact, that Napoleon, throwing by some unforeseen manœuvre the bulk of his forces on the left bank, might cut them off from Bohemia and Moravia. In consequence, they crossed the Danube at Krems, and burned the bridge after they had passed it. The works which would have enabled them to defend it, and to ensure its exclusive possession, being scarcely begun, they had no other resource but to destroy it. They effected their passage on the 9th, leaving throughout the whole archduchy of Austria frightful traces of their presence. They plundered, ravaged, even murdered, behaving like downright barbarians, so that the French were almost regarded as deliverers by the people of the country. Their conduct in particular towards the Austrian troops was anything but friendly. They treated them with extreme arrogance. affecting to impute to them the disasters of this campaign, The language of the Russian officers and generals on this subject was insultingly offensive, and by no means deserved; for if the Austrians showed less firmness than the Russian infantry, in all other respects they were far superior.

The Austrians, living on very bad terms with the Russians, separated from them to go and concur in the defence of the bridges of Vienna; and M. de Meerfeld, with his corps, retired

by the road from Steyer to Leoben. He marched, followed by Marshal Marmont, on the road from Waidhofen to Leoben, and by Marshal Davout on that from St. Gaming to Lilienfeld. The direct road to Vienna was, therefore, open to the French, and they had but two marches to make in order to be at the gates of that capital, and no enemy before them who could dispute their entry.

The temptation could not but be great for Murat. It was difficult for him to withstand the desire to dash forward and to show the Austrian capital his person, always the most conspicuous at reviews as in dangers. Never had an army from the West penetrated into this metropolis of the Germanic empire. Moreau in 1800, General Bonaparte in 1797, had signed armistices when nearly arrived there. The Turks alone had reached its walls without passing them. Murat could not resist this temptation, and marched on the 10th and the 11th for Vienna, urging Marshals Soult and Lannes to accompany him. He took care, it is true, not to enter, and halted at Burkersdorf, in the mountainous defile of the Kahlenberg, two leagues from Vienna.

This was a useless and even a dangerous haste. A change so unforeseen as that which had just manifested itself in the march of the enemy made it worth while to halt and wait for the emperor's orders. Besides, it was preceding too far the corps of Marshal Marmont, as well as the flotilla destined to keep that corps in communication with the army, and running blindly between the Russians, who had passed to the other side of the Danube, and the Austrians, who were beaten back into the mountains.

At this instant, in fact, peril threatened Marshal Mortier, placed on the left bank of the Danube, and coming near Stein into the presence of the Russians, who had crossed the river at Krems. The danger of Marshal Mortier was not precisely imputable to Murat, though the latter had contributed to produce and to aggravate it by his precipitate movement upon Vienna, but to a negligence scarcely ever to be met with in the operations directed by Napoleon, and which, nevertheless, did occur in this instance, for there are intervals even in the most unremitting and most indefatigable vigilance.

Distracted by a thousand things, Napoleon had omitted to follow one of his most invariable habits, which consisted in always assuring himself of the execution of his orders after he had given them. He had prescribed, in a general manner, the union of Gazan's, Dupont's, and Dumonceau's divisions into a single corps, the formation of a flotilla under Captain Lostanges to connect the columns marching on the left bank with those marching on the right bank, and he had depended

too much upon his lieutenants to make all these things harmonise. Murat had advanced too rapidly; Mortier, whether drawn along by Murat's movement, or whether he had not given General Dupont instructions sufficiently precise, had left the interval of a march between Gazan's division, which he had with him, and Dupont's and Dumonceau's divisions, which were to join him. The flotilla, difficult to collect, was left far behind.

Meanwhile, Napoleon, quick at discovering negligences, hastened to Mölk, and guessing the danger of Marshal Mortier, though not yet apprised of it, he stopped Marshal Soult's corps, which Murat had wanted to take with him, and sent aides-de-camp to Murat and Lannes to slacken their movement. He was fearful not only of what might happen to the corps thrown upon the left bank of the Danube, but what might befall the advanced guard itself, imprudently carried into the defiles of the Kahlenberg.

Nowhere are faults so speedily punished as in war, for nowhere do causes and effects so speedily follow each other. The Russians, guided upon the Austrian territory by an officer of the Austrian staff of the highest merit, Colonel Schmidt, soon perceived the existence of a solitary French division on the left bank of the Danube, and resolved to cut it off. Feeling secure, from the destruction of the bridge of Krems, which prevented the French army from coming to the assistance of the compromised division, not perceiving a mass of boats which might make amends for the want of a bridge, they halted to procure for themselves an apparently easy triumph. Gazan's division numbered scarcely 5000 men; the Russians, since their separation from the Austrians, were still nearly 40,000. The ground was favourable to their designs. The Danube at this point runs between steep banks, contracted by the mountains of Bohemia on the one hand, and by the Alps of Styria on the other. From Dirnstein to Stein and to Krems, the road on the left bank, narrow, frequently hewn out of the rock, is bordered by the Danube and the mountains which overlook the river. It is difficult for carriages. Marshal Mortier, who was marching upon it with Gazan's division, had therefore put into boats the only battery that he had at his disposal. The horses, led by hand, followed the division.

On the 11th of November, while Murat, on the right bank, was running to the gates of Vienna, Mortier, on the left bank, had passed Dirnstein, where are the ruins of a castle in which Richard Cœur de Lion was kept prisoner. At this point of Dirnstein the mountains recede a little, and leave a space between their foot and the river. The road runs through this space, sometimes embedded in the ground, sometimes raised above it

by a causeway. The French division having entered upon this road, perceived the smoke of the bridge of Krems, which was still burning. Presently it descried the Russians, and conjectured that they had passed the Danube over this bridge. Without considering what there might be before it, impelled by the ardour common to the whole army, it thought only of pushing forward and of fighting. Mortier gave the order for it, which was instantly executed. An officer of artillery, since General Fabvier, who commanded the battery attached to Gazan's division, had his pieces landed and placed them in position. The Russians advanced in a close mass towards the French division. The fire of the artillery made dreadful havoc in their ranks. They rushed upon the guns to take them. The infantry of the 100th and 103rd regiments of the line defended them with extreme vigour. A most obstinate fight, hand to hand, ensued in this narrow road. The cannon were taken, but immediately retaken. No sooner were they wrested from the Russians than they were fired at them, almost close to the muzzles, with terribly destructive effect. The French, posted on the slightest rising grounds, kept up a fire of musketry which did not less execution than their artillery. The fight was kept up at this point for half a day, and to judge from the wounded found on the morrow, the enemy must have sustained great loss. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken. The French were at last left masters of the ground, and thought that they might rest themselves there.

They had advanced while fighting as far as Stein. The 4th light, spread over the heights which overlook the river, kept up a well-sustained tirailleur fire, which became every moment more and more brisk. The cause of it, which it had been at first difficult to account for, was soon explained. The Russians had turned the heights. With two columns, forming a mass of twelve or fifteen thousand men, they had descended on the rear of Gazan's division and entered Dirnstein, through which this division had passed in the morning. It was therefore enveloped and separated from Dupont's division, which had been left a march behind. No part of the flotilla was to be seen on the Danube, and consequently they had very little hope of escape left them. Night was approaching; the situation was frightful, and no doubt they should have a whole army upon them. In this extremity, evident to all eyes, not one, either officer or soldier, ever thought of capitulating. To die to the last man rather than surrender was the only alternative which presented itself to these brave fellows, so heroic was the spirit which animated this army! Marshal Mortier thought like his soldiers, and like them he was resolved to perish rather than surrender his marshal's sword to the Russians. He there-

fore ordered them to march in close column and to force their way with the bayonet while retreating to Dirnstein, where they should be rejoined by Dupont's division. It was dark. The battle which they had fought with the Russians in the morning was renewed in the obscurity of night, but in an opposite direction. Again they were engaged hand to hand in this narrow road, the men being so close that they frequently seized each other by the throat. While fighting in this manner, the French gained ground towards Dirnstein. However, after penetrating through several masses of enemies, they began to despair of accomplishing their object, or of opening themselves a passage that was incessantly closed again. Some of Mortier's officers, perceiving no further chance of saving themselves, proposed to him to embark alone, and to withdraw his person at least from the Russians, that such a trophy as a marshal of France might not be left in their hands.

"No," replied the illustrious marshal, "we must not forsake such brave fellows. We must be saved or perish with them."

There he was, sword in hand, fighting at the head of his grenadiers, and making repeated assaults to get back to Dirnstein, when all at once a most violent firing was heard in the rear of Dirnstein. Hope instantly revived, for according to all probabilities this must be Dupont's division arriving. In fact, that brave division, which had marched all day, had learned in advancing the dangerous situation of Marshal Mortier, and was hastening to his assistance. General Marchand, with the 9th light, supported by the 96th and 32nd regiments of the line, the same that had distinguished themselves at Haslach, plunged into that gorge. Some pushed on direct for Dirnstein, others entered the ravines which descend from the mountains, to drive back the Russians. A battle, quite as obstinate as that which the soldiers of Gazan's division were at this moment fighting, ensued in these defiles. At length the 9th light penetrated to Dirnstein, while Marshal Mortier was entering on the opposite side. The two columns rejoined and recognised each other by the firelight. The soldiers embraced one another, overjoyed at having escaped such a disaster.

The losses were cruel on both sides, but the glory was not equal, for 5000 French had resisted more than 30,000 Russians, and had saved their colours by fighting their way through. These are examples which ought for ever to be recommended to a nation. Soldiers who have resolved to die can always save their honour, and frequently succeed in saving their liberty and their lives.

Marshal Mortier found in Dirnstein the 1500 prisoners whom he had taken in the morning. The Russians lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners about 4000 men. In that number was

Colonel Schmidt. The enemy could not sustain a more severe loss, and they soon had reason to regret it bitterly. The French numbered 3000 men *hors de combat*, either killed or wounded. Half of the effective force of Gazan's division had fallen.

When Napoleon, who was at Mölk, learned the issue of this rencounter, he was relieved from the apprehensions which he had entertained of the entire destruction of Gazan's division. He was delighted with the conduct of Marshal Mortier and his soldiers, and he sent the most signal rewards to the two divisions of Gazan and Dupont. He recalled them to the right bank of the Danube, to give time for their wounds to heal, and destined Bernadotte to succeed them on the left bank. He censured Murat for the unconnectedness which had prevailed in the different columns of the army. The character of Napoleon was indulgent, his mind stern. He preferred simple, solid, sedate bravery to brilliant bravery, though he employed all sorts, such as Nature presented them to him, in his armies. He was in general severe towards Murat, whose levity, ostentation, and restless ambition he disliked, though at the same time he did justice to his excellent heart and his transcendent courage. "My cousin," he wrote to him, "I cannot approve of your manner of marching. You go like a hare-brained fellow, without weighing the orders that I send you. The Russians, instead of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary circumstance ought to have suggested to you that you could not act without fresh instructions. Without knowing what plans the enemy may have, or inquiring what was my pleasure in this new order of things, you go and draw away my army towards Vienna. You have consulted only the petty vanity of entering Vienna. There is no glory but where there is danger. There is none in entering a defenceless capital." (Mölk, the 11th of November.)

Murat on this occasion expiated the faults of everybody. He had, it is true, marched too rapidly; but had he remained before Krems, without bridges and without boats, he would have been of no great assistance to Mortier, who had been compromised chiefly by the distance left between Dupont's and Gazan's divisions, and by the absence of the flotilla. Murat was deeply grieved. Napoleon, apprised by his aide-de-camp, Bertrand, of his brother-in-law's affliction, corrected by a few soothing expressions the effect of this harsh reprimand.

Napoleon, desirous at the moment of deriving advantage from the very fault of Murat, enjoined him, since he was in sight of Vienna, not to enter it, but to go along the walls and seize the great bridge of the Danube, which is thrown across that river outside the suburbs. This bridge occupied, Napoleon further directed him to advance with all expedition upon the road to

Moravia, in order to arrive before the Russians at the point where the road from Krems joins the highroad to Olmütz. If he secured the bridge and marched rapidly, it might be possible to cut off the retreat of General Kutusof towards Moravia, and to subject him to a disaster nearly equal to that of General Mack. Murat had now an opportunity to repair his faults, and he seized it eagerly.

Still it was scarcely to be supposed that the Austrians had committed such a blunder as to leave standing the bridges of Vienna, which must render the French masters of both banks of the river, or that, if they had left them standing, they had not made every preparation for destroying them at the first signal. Nothing, therefore, was more doubtful than the operation wished for rather than ordered by Napoleon.

The Austrians had no intention to defend Vienna. That fine and large capital has a regular enclosure, that which resisted the Turks in 1683, and as in time the city increased too much to remain shut up in that space, and extensive suburbs arose all round it, the whole was encompassed with a wall of no great height, in the form of redans, surrounding the whole of the ground built upon. All this was but a slight defence, for the wall which covers the suburbs was easy to force; and once master of the suburbs, one might with a few shells oblige the body of the place to surrender. The Emperor Francis had charged Count Würbna, a discreet and conciliatory man, to receive the French, and to concert with them for the peaceable possession of the capital. But it was decided that the passage of the river should be disputed.

Vienna is situated at a certain distance from the Danube, which runs to the left of that city, between wooded islands. The great bridge, of wood, crossing several arms of the river, forms a communication from one bank to the other. The Austrians had placed combustibles under the flooring of the bridge, and were ready to blow it up the moment that the French should make their appearance. They were posted on the left bank, with their artillery pointed, and a corps of seven or eight thousand men, commanded by Count Auersperg.

Murat had approached near to the bridge without entering the city, which, owing to the localities, it was easy to do. At this moment the rumour of an armistice was universally circulated. Napoleon having arrived at the palace of Schönbrunn, situated on the highroad before you come to Vienna, had been waited upon by a deputation of the inhabitants of that capital, who had hastened thither to implore his clemency. He received them with all the attentions due to an excellent people, and from civilised nations towards each other. He had also received and appeared to listen to M. Giulay, who came to repeat the

overtures previously made at Linz. The idea of an armistice appearing likely to lead to peace had, therefore, spread rapidly. Napoleon had, at the same time, sent General Bertrand to renew the order to Murat and Lannes to get possession of the bridges if possible. Murat and Lannes needed no spurring. They had placed Oudinot's grenadiers behind the umbrageous plantations that border the Danube, and advanced themselves with some aides-de-camp to the *tête de pont*. General Bertrand and an officer of the engineers, Colonel Dode de la Brunerie, had repaired thither also.

A wooden barrier closed this *tête de pont*. Orders were given to throw it down. Behind, at some distance, was posted an hussar, as vidette, who fired his carbine and galloped off. He was followed over the long and sinuous line of the small bridges thrown across the several arms of the river, till his pursuers came to the great bridge over the principal arm. Instead of planks, nothing was to be seen but a bed of fascines spread on the flooring. At that very moment an Austrian sub-officer of artillery appeared with a match in his hand. Colonel Dode seized and stopped him just as he was about to fire the train communicating with the fireworks placed under the arches. In this manner the French officers reached the other bank. They addressed the Austrian artillerymen, told them that an armistice was signed, or on the point of being signed, that peace was negotiating, and desired to speak with the general commanding the troops.

The Austrians, taken by surprise, hesitated, and conducted General Bertrand to Count Auersperg. Meanwhile a column of grenadiers advanced by Murat's order. It could not be seen owing to the large trees by the river and the windings of that route, which alternately crossed bridges and wooded islands. While awaiting their arrival, the French chiefs continued to converse with the Austrians under the mouths of their cannon. All at once the long-concealed column of grenadiers came in sight. The Austrians, beginning to perceive that they had been tricked, prepared to fire. Lannes and Murat, with the officers who accompanied them, rushed upon the gunners, talked to them, made them hesitate afresh, and thus gave the column time to come up. The grenadiers at length fell upon the cannon, seized them, and disarmed the Austrians.

Meanwhile Count Auersperg came up, accompanied by General Bertrand and Colonel Dode. He was painfully surprised to see the bridge in the hands of the French, and these collected in considerable number on the left bank of the Danube. He had some thousands of infantry left to dispute the possession of what they had wrested from him. But the French officers repeated to him all the stories by which they had already lulled

the guard of the bridge, and persuaded him that he ought to retire with his soldiers to a certain distance from the river. Besides, fresh French troops were every moment arriving, and it was too late to resort to force. M. Auersperg therefore withdrew, agitated, confounded, appearing scarcely to comprehend what had just occurred.

It was by means of this audacious trick, seconded by the unparalleled courage of those who played it, and with complete success, that the bridges of Vienna fell into our hands. Four years later, for want of these bridges, the passage of the Danube cost us sanguinary battles, which had well-nigh proved fatal to us.

The joy of Napoleon on hearing of this success was extreme. He thought no longer of snubbing Murat, but sent him off immediately with the reserve cavalry, the corps of Lannes, and that of Marshal Soult, to proceed by the road of Stockerau and Hollabrunn, to cut off the retreat of General Kutusof.

Having despatched these orders, he directed all his attention to the police of Vienna and the military occupation of that capital. It was a glorious triumph to enter that ancient metropolis of the Germanic empire, in the bosom of which the enemy had never appeared but as master. During the last two centuries considerable wars had been waged, memorable battles won and lost, but never had a great general been yet seen planting his standard in the capitals of mighty States. Men were obliged to go back to the times of the conquerors to find examples of such vast results.

Napoleon, for his part, took up his abode at the imperial palace of Schönbrunn. He gave the command of the city of Vienna to General Clarke, and left the police to the city militia. He ordered and enforced the observance of the strictest military discipline, and suffered no property to be touched but the public property, such as the chests of the government and the arsenals. The great arsenal of Vienna contained immense stores—100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon, ammunition of every kind. It was surprising that the Emperor Francis had not caused it to be evacuated by means of the Danube. Possession was taken of all that it contained for the account of the army.

Napoleon then distributed his forces in such a manner as to guard the capital duly, and to observe the road from the Alps by which the archdukes might soon arrive, that of Hungary, by which they might come somewhat later, lastly, that of Moravia, on which the Russians were in force.

We have seen that he had despatched General Marmont by the Leoben road to occupy the pass of the Alps, and Marshal Davout by the road of St. Gaming to turn the position of St. Pölten. The latter laboriously climbed the steepest mountains

amidst the snow and ice of a precocious winter, and thanks to the devotedness of the soldiers and the energy of the officers he had surmounted all obstacles, when near Mariazell, on the highroad from Leoben to St. Pölten, he fell in with the corps of General Meerfeld in flight from General Marmont. An action of the same kind that Massena had formerly fought in the Alps immediately ensued between the French and the Austrians. Marshal Davout overthrew the latter, took from them 4000 men, and drove the rest in disorder into the mountains. He then descended upon Vienna. General Marmont, on reaching Leoben, almost without striking a blow, halted there and waited for new instructions from the emperor.

Events were not less favourable in the Tyrol and Italy. Marshal Ney, sent after the occupation of Ulm to take possession of the Tyrol, had luckily chosen the debouché of Scharnitz, the *Porta Claudia* of the ancients, for penetrating into it. This was one of the most difficult passes of that country, but it had the advantage of leading straight to Inspruck, amidst the dispersed troops of the Austrians, which, not expecting this attack, were scattered from the Lake of Constance to the sources of the Drave. Marshal Ney had not more than 9000 or 10,000 men, intrepid soldiers like their commander, and with whom anything might be undertaken. He made them scale in the month of November the highest peaks of the Alps, in spite of the rocks which the inhabitants tumbled upon their heads; for the Tyrolese, strongly attached to the house of Austria, would not be subjects of Bavaria, to which they were threatened to be transferred. He stormed the entrenchments of Scharnitz, entered Inspruck, dispersed the surprised Austrians, and drove some of them into the Vorarlberg, the others into Italian Tyrol. General Jellachich and Prince de Rohan were beaten back towards the Vorarlberg, and from the Vorarlberg towards the Lake of Constance, along the very route by which Augereau was coming. As though Fate had decreed that none of the wrecks of the army of Ulm should escape the French, General Jellachich, the same who at the surrender of Memmingen had evaded the pursuit of Marshal Soult, came full butt upon Augereau's corps. Seeing no chance of escape, he laid down his arms, with a detachment of 6000 men. The Prince de Rohan, less advanced towards the Vorarlberg, had time to fall back. He made an audacious march through the cantonments of our troops, which after the taking of Inspruck were negligently guarding the Brenner, beguiled the vigilance of Loison, one of Marshal Ney's divisionary generals, passed close to Botzen, almost before his eyes, and then fell upon Verona and Venice, while Massena was pursuing the rear of the Archduke Charles. Massena had charged General St. Cyr,

with the troops brought back from Naples, to blockade Venice, in which the Archduke Charles had left a strong garrison. General St. Cyr, astonished at the presence of a hostile corps on the rear of Massena, when the latter was already at the foot of the Julian Alps, marched with the utmost expedition, and enveloped the Prince de Rohan, who was obliged, like General Jellachich, to lay down his arms. On this occasion General St. Cyr took about 5000 men.

Meanwhile the Archduke Charles was continuing his arduous retreat through the Friule and beyond the Julian Alps. His brother, the Archduke John, passing from the Italian Tyrol into Carinthia, followed in the interior of the Alps a line exactly parallel to his. The two archdukes, despairing with reason of arriving in useful time at one of the defensive positions of the Danube, and judging it too rash to fall upon the flank of Napoleon, had decided to meet at Laybach, the one by Villach, the other by Udine, and then to proceed to Hungary. There they might with the utmost safety join the Russians who occupied Moravia, and having effected their junction with these latter, they might resume the offensive if the allied armies had not been compromised by any fault, and if the two sovereigns of Austria and Russia had still the courage to prolong the contest.

General Marmont, placed in advance of Leoben, on the crests which separate the valley of the Danube from that of the Drave, almost saw with mortification the troops of the Archduke John filing away before him, and burned with impatience to fight them. But a precise order chained his ardour, and enjoined him to confine himself to guarding the defiles of the Alps.

Massena, after pursuing the Archduke Charles as far as the Julian Alps, had halted at the foot of them, and conceived that he ought not to venture into Hungary in pursuit of the archdukes. He gave a hand to General Marmont, and waited for orders from the emperor.

All these movements were finished by the middle of November, nearly at the same time that the grand army was performing its march upon Vienna. Assuredly, if one had devised a plan in the tranquillity of the closet, with the facilities which abound for tracing projects on the map, one would not have arranged matters with greater ease. In six weeks that army, passing the Rhine and the Danube, interposing between the Austrian posts in Suabia and the Russians arriving upon the Inn, had enveloped the one, beaten back the other, surprised the Tyrol by a detachment, then occupied Vienna, and turned the position of the archdukes in Italy, which had obliged the latter to seek refuge in Hungary. History nowhere presents such another spectacle; in twenty days from the ocean to the Rhine, in forty from the Rhine to Vienna! And though separations of forces,

so dangerous in war, are most frequently attended with reverses only; here corps had been seen detached to a distance, which, without running any risk, had accomplished their object, because at the centre a mighty mass, striking opportunely decisive blows at the principal bodies assembled by the enemy, had imparted an impulsion to which everything gave way, and had not left, either upon its rear or upon its wings, any consequences which might not easily be gathered: so that this dispersion was, in reality, nothing but a skilful distribution of accessories beside the principal action, regulated with wonderful precision. But after admiring that profound, that incomparable art which astonishes by its very simplicity, we must admire also in this manner of operating another condition, without which every combination, however judicious, may become a peril—that is, such a vigour in the soldiers and lieutenants that, when they were overtaken by an unforeseen accident, they knew how, by their energy, as the soldiers of General Dupont at Haslach, of Marshal Mortier at Dirnstein, of Marshal Ney at Elchingen, to give the supreme intelligence which directed them time to come to their assistance, and to repair the inevitable errors in even the best conducted operations. Let us repeat what we have already remarked—a great captain wants valiant soldiers, and valiant soldiers want in like manner a great captain. The glory ought to be theirs in common, as well as the merit of the great things which they accomplish.

Napoleon, at Vienna, would not feast himself there with the vain-glory of occupying the capital of the Germanic empire. He wanted to put an end to the war. If he can be reproached with having in his career abused fortune, he will never be reproached, like Hannibal, with not having known how to take advantage of it, and with having fallen asleep amidst the delights of Capua. He prepared, therefore, to speed his march against the Russians, in order to beat them in Moravia before they had time to effect their junction with the archdukes. These, however, on the 15th of November, had proceeded no further than Laybach. They would have to make a very great circuit to reach Hungary, then to traverse it, and to enter Moravia towards Olmütz. This was a long march of more than 150 leagues to make. Twenty days would not have sufficed for it. Napoleon at this period was at Vienna, and had only 40 leagues to travel to reach Brünn, the capital of Moravia.

He drew nearer to him General Marmont, who was too far off, and assigned to him a position a little in rear, on the very summit of the Alps of Styria, in order to guard the highroad from Italy to Vienna. He enjoined him, in case the archdukes should attempt to take that way back, to destroy the bridges and to break up the roads, which in the mountains enables a

corps that is not numerous to stop a superior enemy for some time. He forbade him to give way to the desire to fight, unless he was forced to do so. He drew Massena towards General Marmont, and put them into immediate communication with each other. The troops commanded by Massena thenceforward assumed the title of the eighth corps of the grand army. Napoleon placed the corps of Marshal Davout all round Vienna: one division, that of General Gudin, in rear of Vienna, towards Neustadt, where it could in a short time give a hand to Marmont; another, that of General Friant, in the direction of Presburg, observing the debouchés of Hungary; the third, that of General Bisson (which had become Caffarelli's division), in advance of Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Dupont's and Gazan's divisions were established in Vienna itself, to recover from their fatigues and their wounds. Lastly, Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat marched towards Moravia, while Marshal Bernadotte, having passed the Danube at Krems, followed the track of General Kutusof, and was preparing to rejoin, by the same route which that general had taken, the three French corps that were going to fight the Russians.

Thus Napoleon at Vienna, in the centre of a web skilfully spread around him, could give assistance wherever the slightest agitation might indicate the presence of the enemy. If the archdukes attempted anything towards Italy, Massena and Marmont, in connection with one another, were backed upon the Alps of Styria, and Napoleon, marching Davout's corps towards Neustadt, was in force to support them. If the archdukes advanced by way of Presburg and Hungary, Napoleon could despatch thither Davout's entire corps, a little after Marmont, who at Neustadt was not far off, and in case of need hasten thither himself with the bulk of the army. Lastly, if it were necessary to make head against the Russians in Moravia, he could in three days unite with the corps of Soult, Lannes, and Murat, which were already there, that of Davout, easily withdrawn from Vienna, and that of Bernadotte, quite as easily brought back from Bohemia. He was, therefore, duly prepared on every side, and fulfilled in the highest degree the conditions of that art of war which, in conversation with his lieutenants, he defined in these terms: THE ART OF DIVIDING ONE'S SELF TO SUBSIST, AND OF CONCENTRATING ONE'S SELF TO FIGHT. Never have the precepts of that formidable art which destroys or founds empires been better defined or better practised.

Napoleon had hastened to avail himself of the conquest of the bridges of Vienna to send Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Murat beyond the Danube, in the hope of cutting off the retreat of General Kutusof, and arriving before him at Holla-

brünn, where that general, who had passed the Danube at Krems, would strike off into the road to Moravia. General Kutusof directed his march towards Moravia, and not towards Bohemia, because it was upon Olmütz, the frontier of Moravia and Galicia, that the second Russian army was directing its course. While he was advancing upon Hollabrünn, having Prince Bagration at the head, he was astonished and dismayed on learning the presence of the French on the highroad which he designed to follow, and thus acquiring the certainty of being cut off. He then laid the same snare for Murat which Murat had laid for the Austrians, in order to take from them the bridges of the Danube. He had with him General Vinzingerode, the same who had negotiated all the conditions of the plan of the campaign. He despatched him to Murat to retail to him the inventions by which Count Auersperg had been deceived, and which consisted in saying that there were negotiators at Schönbrunn on the point of signing a peace. In consequence, he directed an armistice to be proposed to him, the principal condition of which was to halt both of them on the ground which they occupied, so that nothing whatever should be changed by the suspension of the operations. If they were to be resumed, six hours' notice was to be given. Murat, artfully flattered by M. de Vinzingerode, proud, moreover, of the honour of being the first intermediate agent of the peace, accepted the armistice, saving the approbation of the emperor. We must add, in order to be just, that a consideration, which was not without weight, contributed greatly to lead him into this false step. The corps of Marshal Soult was not yet on the ground, and he was fearful that, with his cavalry and Oudinot's grenadiers, he should not have a sufficient force to bar the way against the Russians. He despatched, therefore, an aide-de-camp to the headquarters with the draft of the armistice.

Next day the commanders on both sides visited one another. Prince Bagration went to see Murat, and manifested great interest and curiosity respecting the French generals, and especially respecting the illustrious Marshal Lannes. The latter, simple in his manners, without being on that account deficient in military courtesy, told Prince Bagration that if he had been alone they should have been at that moment fighting instead of exchanging compliments. At this moment, in fact, the Russian army, covering itself with Bagration's rearguard, which affected to keep motionless, marched rapidly behind this curtain and regained the road to Moravia. Thus Murat, duped in his turn, gave the enemy occasion to revenge himself for the bridge of Vienna.

Presently there arrived an aide-de-camp of the emperor's,

General Lemarrois, who brought a severe reprimand to Murat for the fault that he had committed,* and which gave an order, as well to him as to Marshal Lannes, to attack immediately, whatever the hour might be at which this communication reached them. Lannes, however, took care to send an officer to Prince Bagration to acquaint him with the orders which he had just received. Dispositions for attack were instantly made. Prince Bagration had seven or eight thousand men. Determined to cover completely the movement of Kutusof, he took the noble resolution to perish rather than stir from the spot. Lannes pushed his grenadiers upon him. The only disposition that was possible was that of two lines of infantry, deployed facing one another, and attacking on nearly level ground. For some time they exchanged a very brisk and very destructive fire of musketry, then charged with the bayonet, and, what is rare in war, the two masses of infantry marched resolutely towards each other, without either giving way before they met. They closed, and then after a fight, man to man, Oudinot's grenadiers broke Bagration's foot-soldiers and cut them in pieces. They then disputed till after nightfall, by the light of the flames, the burning village of Schöngraben, which was finally left in the hands of the French. The Russians behaved valiantly. They lost on this occasion nearly half their rear-guard, about 3000 men, more than 1500 of whom strewed the field of battle. Prince Bagration had proved himself by his resolution the worthy rival of Marshal Mortier at Dirnstein. This sanguinary action was fought on the 16th of November.

The French advanced on the following days, taking prisoners at every step, and at length entered, on the 19th, the town of Brünn, the capital of Moravia. The place was found armed and provided with abundant resources. The enemy had not even thought of defending it. They thus abandoned to Napoleon an important position where he commanded Moravia, and

* "To Prince MURAT.

"SCHÖNBRUNN, *25th Brumaire, Year* XIV.,
"*November* 16, 1805, eight in the morning.

"It is impossible to find terms to express my displeasure. You command only my advanced guard, and you have no right to make an armistice without my order. You cause me to lose the fruit of a campaign. Break the armistice immediately, and march against the enemy. Send and declare to him that the general who signed that capitulation had no right to do it; that none but the Emperor of Russia has that right.

"If, however, the Emperor of Russia would ratify the said convention, I would ratify it; but it is only a stratagem. March; destroy the Russian army; you are in a position to take its baggage and its artillery. The aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia is a . . . Officers are nothing when they have not powers: this had none. The Austrians let themselves be duped for the passage of the bridge of Vienna, you let yourself be duped by an aide-de-camp of the emperor."

could at his ease observe and await the movements of the Russians.

Napoleon, on receiving intelligence of this last combat, resolved to proceed to Brünn, for, the news from Italy announcing the protracted retreat which the archdukes were making into Hungary, he concluded that it would be with the Russians that he should chiefly have to do. He made some slight changes in the distribution of Marshal Davout's corps around Vienna. He despatched towards Presburg Gudin's division, which seemed to be no longer necessary on the road to Styria, since the retreat of the archdukes. He established Friant's division, belonging to the same corps, in advance of Vienna, on the road to Moravia. Bisson's division (which had for a moment become Caffarelli's) was detached from Davout's corps and marched to Brünn, to supply in Lannes' corps the place of Gazan's division, left at Vienna.

Napoleon on his arrival at Brünn fixed his headquarters there on the 20th of November. General Giulay, accompanied this time by M. de Stadion, came to visit him again, and to talk of peace more seriously than in his preceding missions. Napoleon expressed to both of them a desire to lay aside arms and return to France, but did not leave them in ignorance of the conditions on which he should consent to do so. He would no longer, he said, allow Italy, divided between France and Austria, to continue to be a subject of jealousy and war between them. He was resolved to have the whole of it as far as the Isonzo, that is to say, he required the Venetian States, the only part of Italy which remained for him to conquer. He entered into no explanations respecting what he should have to demand for his allies, the Electors of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden; but he declared in general terms that he must secure their situation in Germany, and put an end to all the questions left pending between them and the emperor since the new Germanic constitution of 1803. Messieurs de Stadion and de Giulay cried out vehemently against the hardness of these conditions. But Napoleon showed no disposition to depart from them, and he gave them to understand that, wholly engrossed by the duties of war, he had no desire to keep about him negotiators, who were in reality nothing but military spies, directed to watch his movements. He therefore recommended to them to go to Vienna, to M. de Talleyrand, who had just arrived there. Napoleon, caring little about the tastes of his minister, who was not fond either of business or of the fatigues of headquarters, had first summoned him to Strasburg, then to Munich, and now to Vienna. He shifted to him those interminable parleys, which in negotiations always precede serious results.

During the conferences which Napoleon had held with the

two Austrian negotiators, one of them, unable to contain himself, had dropped an imprudent word, from which it might evidently be inferred that Prussia was bound by a treaty with Russia and Austria. Something of that kind had been intimated to him from Berlin, but nothing so precise as what he had just learned. This discovery suggested new reflections, and rendered him more disposed to peace, without, however, inducing him to desist from his essential pretensions. It could not suit him to follow the Russians beyond Moravia, that is to say, into Poland, for that would be running the risk of seeing the archdukes cut off his communications with Vienna. In consequence, he resolved to await the arrival of M. d'Haugwitz and the further development of the military projects of the Russians. He was equally ready either to treat if the proposed conditions seemed acceptable to him, or to cut in a great battle the Gordian knot of the coalition, if his enemies afforded a favourable occasion for it. He therefore suffered a few days to elapse, employing himself in studying with extreme care, and in making his generals study, the ground upon which he was, and upon which a secret presentiment told him that he might be fated to fight a decisive battle. At the same time he rested his troops, worn out with fatigue, suffering from cold, sometimes from hunger, and having traversed in three months nearly 500 leagues. Hence the ranks of his soldiers were much thinned, though fewer stragglers were seen among them than in the train of any army. The effectives had lost nearly one-fifth since taking the field. All military men will acknowledge that this was very little after such fatigues. For the rest, whenever the army halted anywhere, the ranks were soon completed, owing to the anxiety of the men who remained behind to rejoin their corps.

The two Emperors of Russia and Germany, on their part, meeting at Olmütz, employed their time in deliberating upon the course which they ought to pursue. General Kutusof, after a retreat in which he had sustained only rearguard defeats, nevertheless brought back no more than thirty and odd thousand men, already inured to fighting, but exhausted with fatigue. He had, therefore, lost twelve or fifteen thousand killed, wounded, prisoners, or lame. Alexander, with Buxhövden's corps and the imperial Russian guard, brought 40,000, which made about 75,000 Russians. Fifteen thousand Austrians, comprising the wrecks of Kienmayer's and Meerfeld's corps, and a fine division of cavalry, completed the Austro-Russian army beneath Olmütz, and made it amount to a total force of 90,000 men.*

* The Russians made it amount to much less the day after their defeat, Napoleon to much more in his bulletins. After comparing a great number of testimonies and authentic accounts, we think that we here give the most accurate statement.

This is a fit place for remarking how exaggerated were at that time the pretensions of Russia in Europe, on comparing them with the real state of her forces. She affected to hold the balance between the powers, and the real number of soldiers brought by her upon the fields of battle where the destinies of the world were decided was as follows:—She had sent from 45,000 to 50,000 men under Kutusof, she brought 40,000 under Buxhövden and the Grand Duke Constantine, and 10,000 under General Essen. If we set down those acting in the north with the Swedes and the English at 15,000, and those preparing to act towards Naples at 10,000, we shall have a total of 125,000 men figuring in reality in this war, and 100,000 at most if we are to believe the accounts of the Russians after their defeat. Austria had assembled more than 200,000, Prussia could bring into line 150,000, France, by herself, 300,000. We do not speak of soldiers rated on the effectives (which makes a difference of nearly half), but of soldiers present in the fire on the day of battle. Though the Russians were steady infantry, yet it was not with 100,000 men, brave and ignorant, that one could then pretend to control Europe.

The Russians, always extremely contemptuous towards their allies the Austrians, whom they accused of being cowardly soldiers, incapable officers, continued to commit horrible ravages in the country. The eastern provinces of the Austrian monarchy were afflicted with dearth. Necessaries ran short at Olmütz, and the Russians procured themselves provisions, not with the dexterity of the French soldier, an intelligent, rarely cruel marauder, but with the brutality of a savage horde. They extended their pillage to the distance of several leagues round, and completely laid waste the country which they occupied. Discipline, usually so strict among them, was visibly affected by it, and they appeared much dissatisfied with their emperor.

In the Austro-Russian camp, therefore, people were not disposed to take wise determinations. The levity of youth concurred with a feeling of great discomfort to impel them to act, no matter how, to change their place, were it merely for the sake of change. We have said that the Emperor Alexander began to fall under new influences. He was not satisfied with the direction given to his affairs; for this war, notwithstanding the flatteries with which a coterie had surrounded him at Berlin, did not seem to turn out well, and according to the custom of princes, he was glad to throw upon his ministers the results of a policy which he had himself decreed, but which he could not uphold with the perseverance that could alone correct its faultiness. What had occurred at Berlin had confirmed him still more in his dispositions. He should have committed very different

faults, he said, if he had listened to his friends. By persisting to do violence to Prussia, he should have thrown her into the arms of Napoleon, whereas by his personal address he had induced that court to enter, on the contrary, into engagements which were equivalent to a declaration of war against France. Hence the young emperor would no longer listen to advice, for he fancied himself more clever than all his advisers. Prince Adam Czartoryski, honest, grave, having warm passions under a cold exterior, become, as we have seen, the troublesome censor of the weaknesses and the fickleness of his master, supported an opinion which could not fail to alienate him completely. According to this minister, the emperor had no business with the army. That was not his place. He had never served; he could not know how to command. His presence at the headquarters, surrounded by young, giddy, ignorant, presumptuous men, would annul the authority of the generals, and at the same time their responsibility. In a war into which they all entered with a certain apprehension, they desired nothing more than to have no opinion, to take nothing upon themselves, and to let hot-headed youth command, that they might no longer be responsible for the defeats which they expected. In this manner there would be nothing but the worst of commands for an army —that of a court. This war, moreover, would be fertile in lost battles, and to maintain it there was required perseverance, and perseverance depended on the magnitude of the means which should be provided. It was requisite, therefore, to leave the generals to act the part which belonged to them at the head of the troops, and for the emperor to perform his at the centre of the government, by upholding the public spirit, by administering with energy and application, so as to furnish the armies with the necessary resources for prolonging the struggle, the only means, if not to conquer, at least to balance fortune.

It was impossible to express a sentiment either more sensible or more disagreeable to the Emperor Alexander. He had tried to play a political part in Europe, but had not yet succeeded according to his wish. He found himself hurried into a contest which would have filled him with dismay, if the remoteness of his empire had not cheered him. He had need to drown his thoughts in the tumult of camps; he had need to silence the murmurs of his reason, by hearing himself called at Berlin, at Dresden, at Weimar, at Vienna, the saviour of kings. This monarch, moreover, asked himself whether he could not in his turn shine on fields of battle; whether with his intelligence he might not have higher inspirations there than those old generals, whose experience imprudent youth encouraged him too much to despise; lastly, whether he could not have his share in that glory

of arms so dear to princes, and at that time exclusively decreed by fortune to a single individual and to a single nation.

In these ideas he was confirmed by the military coterie which already surrounded him, and at the head of which was Prince Dolgorouki. This latter, in order to gain the better an ascendency over the emperor, was desirous to draw him to the army. He strove to persuade him that he had the qualities for command, and that he had but to show himself in order to change the fortune of the war; that his presence would double the valour of the soldiers by filling them with enthusiasm; that his generals were commonplace men without abilities; that Napoleon had triumphed over their timidity and their antiquated science, but that he would not triumph so easily over a young nobility, intelligent and devoted, led by an adored emperor. These warriors, such novices in the profession of arms, dared to maintain that at Dirnstein, at Hollabrünn, the Russians had conquered the French, that the Austrians were cowards, that there were no brave men but the Russians, and that if Alexander would but come and animate them with his presence, they should soon put a stop to the arrogant and undeserved prosperity of Napoleon.

The wily Kutusof ventured timidly to say that this was not absolutely the case; but too servile to maintain courageously his own opinion, he took care not to contradict the new possessors of the imperial favour, and had the meanness to permit his old experience to be insulted. The intrepid Bagration, the vicious but brave Miloradovich, the discreet Doctorow, were officers whose opinion deserved some attention. None of these men was heeded. A German adviser of the Archduke John at Hohenlinden, General Weirother, had alone a real authority over the military youth who surrounded Alexander. Since Frederick the Great in the last century had beaten the Austrian army by attacking it on one of its wings, the theory of oblique order, which Frederick had never thought of, had been invented, and to this theory had been attributed all the successes of that great man. Since General Bonaparte had shown himself so superior in the high combinations of war, since he had been seen so often surprising, enveloping the generals opposed to him, other commentators made the whole art of war consist in a certain manœuvre, and talked about nothing but turning the enemy. They had invented, so they asserted, a new science, and for this science a word then new, that of strategy, and they hastened to offer it to the princes who would submit to be directed by them. The German Weirother had persuaded the friends of Alexander that he had a plan, one of the most excellent and most sure, for destroying Napoleon. It consisted in a grand manœuvre, by which they were to turn the Emperor

of the French, cut him off from the road to Vienna, and throw him into Bohemia, beaten and separated for ever from the forces which he had in Austria and in Italy.

The susceptible mind of Alexander was wholly won by these ideas, wholly under the influence of the Dolgoroukis, and showed no inclination to listen to Prince Czartoryski when the latter advised him to return to Petersburg, and to govern there instead of coming to fight battles in Moravia.

Amidst this mutual agitation of the young court of Prussia, the Emperor of Germany was scarcely thought of. Neither his army nor his person seemed to be held in any estimation. His army, it was said, had compromised at Ulm the issue of that war. As for himself, they were coming to his aid; he ought to deem himself fortunate in being assisted, and not interfere in anything. It is true that he did not interfere in many things, and made no effort to stem this torrent of presumption. He looked for more lost battles, reckoned only upon time, if he then reckoned upon anything, and weighed, without saying so, what the silly pride of his allies was worth. This prince, simple and unostentatious, possessed the two great qualities of his government, shrewdness and constancy.

It may easily be conceived in what manner the grave question which was to be resolved, that is, whether it was right to give battle to Napoleon or not, would be treated by so many vain minds. Those admirable pictures which antiquity has bequeathed to us, and which represent the young Roman aristocracy doing violence by its silly presumption to the wisdom of Pompey, and obliging him to fight the battle of Pharsalia—those pictures have nothing more grand, nothing more instructive, than what was passing at Olmütz in 1805 about the Emperor Alexander. Everybody had an opinion on the question whether a battle was to be sought or shunned, and everybody expressed it. The coterie, at the head of which were the Dolgoroukis, had no hesitation. According to it, not to fight would be a cowardice, and an egregious blunder. In the first place, there was no living any longer at Olmütz; the army was perishing there of want; it was becoming demoralised. By remaining at Olmütz, they relinquished to Napoleon not only the honour of the arms, but also three-fourths of the Austrian monarchy, and all the resources in which it abounded. By advancing, on the contrary, they should recover at one blow the means of subsistence, confidence, and the ascendency, always so powerful, of the offensive. And then, was it not plain that the moment for changing parts had arrived; that Napoleon, usually so prompt, so pressing when pursuing his enemies, had suddenly stopped short, that he hesitated, that he was intimidated, for, fixed at Brünn, he durst not come to Olmütz to meet the Russian

army? It was what he thought at Dirnstein, at Hollabrünn; it was because his army was shaken like himself. It was known, beyond the possibility of doubt, that it was worn out with fatigue, reduced one-half, a prey to discontent and ever murmuring.

Such was the language held by the young courtiers with incredible assurance. Some wise men, Prince Czartoryski in particular, quite as young, but far more considerate than the Dolgoroukis, opposed to them a small number of simple reasons that must have been decisive with minds which the strangest blindness had not completely bewildered. In taking no account of those soldiers who, after all, had remained masters of the ground at Dirnstein as well as at Hollabrünn, before whom the Russians had incessantly fallen back from Munich to Olmütz; by taking no account of that general who had conquered all the generals in Europe, the most experienced at least of all living captains if he was not the greatest, for he had commanded in a hundred battles, and his present adversaries had never commanded in one; in taking no account either of these soldiers or of this general, there were two peremptory reasons for not being in haste. The first and the most striking was, that by waiting a few days longer the month stipulated with Prussia would have elapsed, and that she would be obliged to declare herself. Who knows, in fact, if in previously losing a great battle one may not furnish her with occasion to release herself? By allowing, on the contrary, the term of a month to expire, 150,000 Prussians would enter Bohemia, Napoleon would be obliged to fall back without our having to run the risk of a battle with him. The second reason for delay is, that by giving a little time to the archdukes they would arrive with 80,000 Austrians from Hungary, and one might then fight Napoleon in the proportion of two, perhaps three, to one. It was certainly difficult to live without provisions at Olmütz, but if it was true that they could not stay there a few days longer, the only thing that could be done was to march into Hungary to meet the archdukes. There they should find bread and a reinforcement of 80,000 men. By adding thus to the distances which Napoleon would have to traverse, they should oppose to him the most formidable of all obstacles. They had a proof of this truth in his inaction ever since he occupied Brünn. If he did not advance it was not because he was afraid to do so. Inexperienced soldiers only could pretend that such a man was afraid. If he did not advance it was because he found the distance already very great. He was, in fact, forty leagues beyond, not his capital, but that which he had conquered, and in removing to a distance from it, he felt it tremble under his hand.

What reply could be made to such reasons? Assuredly none.

But with prejudiced minds the quality of reasons is of no effect. Evidence irritates instead of persuading them. It was decided, therefore, about Alexander that a battle must be fought. The Emperor Francis assented to it on his part. He had everything to gain from a speedy decision of the question, for his country was suffering cruelly by the war, and he was not sorry to see the Russians pitted against the French and affording occasion for an opinion to be formed of them in their turn. It was decided to leave the position of Olmütz, which was very good, on which it would have been easy to repulse an assailing army, how superior soever in number, for the purpose of going to attack Napoleon in the position of Brünn, which he had been carefully studying for several days.

The Russians marched in five columns by the road from Olmütz to Brünn in order to approach the French army. On arriving on the 18th of November at Wischau, one march from Brünn, they surprised an advanced guard of cavalry and a small detachment of infantry placed in that village by Marshal Soult. Three thousand horse were employed to surround them, and then with a battalion of infantry the Russians penetrated into Wischau itself. About a hundred French prisoners were picked up there. The aide-de-camp Dolgorouki had the chief hand in this exploit. The Emperor Alexander had been persuaded to be present, and was made to believe that this skirmish was war, and that his presence had doubled the valour of his soldiers. This slight advantage completely turned all the young heads of the Russian staff, and the resolution to fight was thenceforward irrevocable. Fresh observations of Prince Czartoryski's were very unfavourably received. General Kutusof, under whose name the battle was to be fought, no longer commanded, and had the culpable weakness to adopt resolutions which he disapproved. It was agreed, then, to attack Napoleon in his position at Brünn, according to the plan which should be formed by General Weirother. Another march was made, and the Russians established themselves in advance of the mansion of Austerlitz.

Napoleon, who possessed extraordinary sagacity in guessing the designs of an enemy, was well aware that the allies were seeking a decisive engagement with him, and was highly pleased at it. His attention was nevertheless occupied with the projects of Prussia, which recent accounts from Berlin represented as definitively hostile, and with the movements of the Prussian army which was advancing towards Bohemia. He had no time to lose: he wanted either an overwhelming battle or peace. He had no doubt of the result of a battle; still peace would be the safer of the two. The Austrians proposed it with a certain appearance of sincerity, but always referring on the subject of the conditions to the approval of Russia. Napoleon would

fain have discovered what was passing in the head of Alexander, and sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to the Russian headquarters to compliment that prince, to get into conversation with him, and to ascertain precisely what he desired.

General Savary set out immediately, presented himself with a flag of truce at the advanced posts, and had some difficulty to gain access to the Emperor Alexander. While he was waiting to be introduced, he had opportunities to judge of the dispositions of the young Muscovite nobles, of their silly infatuation, and of their desire to be present at a great battle. They counted upon nothing less than beating the French and driving their vanquished army to the frontiers of France. General Savary listened calmly to this language, was at length admitted to the emperor, delivered his master's message, found him mild and polite, but evasive, and far from capable of appreciating the chances of the present war. On the repeated assurance that Napoleon was animated with very pacific dispositions, Alexander inquired on what conditions peace would be possible. General Savary was not prepared to answer, and advised the Emperor Alexander to send one of his aides-de-camp to the French headquarters to confer with Napoleon. He affirmed that the result of this step would be most satisfactory. After much parleying, in which General Savary, in the warmth of zeal, said more than he was commissioned to do, Alexander sent with him Prince Dolgorouki himself, the principal personage of the new coterie which disputed the favour of the czar with Messieurs de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Novosiltzoff. This Prince Dolgorouki, though one of the most vehement declaimers of the Russian staff, was nevertheless extraordinarily flattered to be charged with a commission to the Emperor of the French. He accompanied General Savary, and was presented to Napoleon at a moment when the latter, having just finished the inspection of his advanced posts, had about him nothing to strike a vulgar mind. Napoleon listened to this young man, destitute of tact and discretion, who had picked up here and there some of the ideas with which the Russian cabinet feasted itself, and which we have recapitulated in explaining the plan of the new European balance of power, expressed them awkwardly, and lugged them in unseasonably. France, he declared, must, if she desired to have an immediate peace, and if she continued the war and was not successful, would be required to restore Belgium, Savoy, and Piedmont, to form defensive barriers around and against her. These ideas, clumsily expressed, appeared to Napoleon a formal demand of the immediate restitution of Belgium, ceded to France by so many treaties, and excited in him a violent irritation, which, however, he repressed, conceiving that his dignity did not permit him to give vent to it

before such a negotiator. He dismissed him drily, observing that they should settle elsewhere than in diplomatic conferences the quarrel which divided the policy of the two empires. Napoleon was exasperated, and could think of nothing but fighting to the last extremity.

Ever since the surprise at Wischau, he had drawn back his army into a position wonderfully well chosen for fighting. He manifested in his movements a certain hesitation which contrasted with the accustomed boldness of his proceedings. This circumstance, coupled with the mission of Savary, contributed still further to work upon the weak understandings which swayed the Russian staff. There was soon but one cry for war around Alexander. Napoleon is falling back, said they; he is in full retreat; we must rush upon him and overwhelm him.

The French soldiers, who were not deficient in intelligence, perceived, on their part, clearly enough that they should have to do with the Russians, and their joy was extreme. Preparations were made on both sides for a decisive engagement.

Napoleon, with that military tact which he had received from Nature, and which he had so greatly improved by experience, had adopted, among other positions which he might have taken about Brünn, one which could not fail to ensure to him the most important results, under the supposition that he should be attacked—a supposition which had become a certainty.

The mountains of Moravia, which connect the mountains of Bohemia with those of Hungary, subside successively towards the Danube so completely, that near that river Moravia presents but one wide plain. In the environs of Brünn, the capital of the province, they are not of greater altitude than high hills, and are covered with dark firs. Their waters, retained for want of drains, form numerous ponds, and throw themselves by various streams into the Morawa, or March, and by the Morawa into the Danube.

All these characters are found together in the position between Brünn and Austerlitz, which Napoleon has rendered for ever celebrated. The highroad of Moravia, running from Vienna to Brünn, rises in a direct line to the northward, then in passing from Brünn to Olmütz descends abruptly to the right, that is, to the east, thus forming a right angle with its first direction. In this angle is situated the position in question. It commences on the left towards the Olmütz road, with heights studded with firs; it then runs off to the right in an oblique direction towards the Vienna road, and after subsiding gradually, terminates in ponds full of deep water in winter. Along this position, and in front of it, runs a rivulet, which has no name known in geography, but which in part of its course is called Goldbach by the people of the country. It runs through the

little villages of Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz, and sometimes forming marshes, sometimes confined in channels, terminates in the ponds above-mentioned, which are called the ponds of Satschau and Menitz.

Concentrated with all his forces on this ground, appuyed on the one hand upon the wooded hills of Moravia, and particularly upon a rounded knoll to which the soldiers of Egypt gave the name of the Santon, appuyed, on the other, upon the ponds of Satschau and Menitz—thus covering by his left the Olmütz road, by his right the Vienna road—Napoleon was in a condition to accept with advantage a decisive battle. He meant not, however, to confine his operations to self-defence, for he was accustomed to reckon upon greater results; he had divined, as though he had read them, the plans framed at great length by General Weirother. The Austro-Russians having no chance of wresting from him the *point d'appui* which he found for his left in high wooded hills, would be tempted to turn his right, which was not close to the ponds, and to take the Vienna road from him. There was sufficient inducement for this step; for Napoleon, if he lost that road, would have no other resource but to retire into Bohemia. The rest of his forces, hazarded towards Vienna, would be obliged to ascend separately the valley of the Danube. The French army, thus divided, would find itself doomed to a retreat, eccentric, perilous, nay, even disastrous, if it should fall in with the Prussians by the way.

Napoleon was perfectly aware that such must be the plan of the enemy. Accordingly, after concentrating his army towards his left and the heights, he left towards his right, that is, towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and the ponds, a space almost unguarded. He thus invited the Russians to persevere in their plans. But it was not precisely there that he prepared the mortal stroke for them. The ground facing him presented a feature from which he hoped to derive a decisive result.

Beyond the stream that ran in front of our position the ground spread at first, opposite to our left, into a slightly undulated plain, through which passed the Olmütz road; then opposite to our centre it rose successively, and at last formed facing our right a plateau, called the plateau of Pratzen, after the name of a village situated half-way up, in the hollow of a ravine. This plateau terminated on the right in rapid declivities towards the ponds, and at the back in a gentle slope towards Austerlitz, the château of which appeared at some distance.

There were to be seen considerable forces; there a multitude of fires blazed at night, and a great movement of men and horses was observable by day. On these appearances, Napoleon

had no longer any doubt of the designs of the Austro-Russians.* They intended evidently to descend from the position which they occupied, and crossing the Goldbach rivulet, between the ponds and our right, to cut us off from the Vienna road. But, for this reason, it was resolved to take the offensive in our turn, to cross the rivulet at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, to ascend to the plateau of Pratzen while the Russians were leaving it, and to take possession of it ourselves. In case we succeeded, the enemy's army would be cut in two; one part would be thrown to the left into the plain crossed by the Olmütz road, the other to the right into the ponds. Thenceforward the battle could not fail to be disastrous for the Austro-Russians. But, for this effect, it was requisite that they should not blunder by halves. The prudent, nay, even timid, attitude of Napoleon, exciting their silly confidence, would induce them to commit the entire blunder.

Agreeably to these ideas Napoleon made his dispositions. Expecting for two days past to be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit Iglau on the frontier of Bohemia, to leave there the Bavarian division which he had brought with him, and to hasten by forced marches to Brünn. He had ordered Marshal Davout to march Friant's and if possible Gudin's division towards the abbey of Gross Raigern, situated on the road from Vienna to Brünn, opposite to the ponds. In consequence of these orders Bernadotte marched and had arrived on the 1st of December. General Friant, being alone apprised in time, because General Gudin was at a greater distance towards Presburg, had set out immediately, and travelled in forty-eight hours the thirty-six leagues which separate Vienna from Gross Raigern. The soldiers sometimes dropped on the road exhausted with fatigue; but at the least sound, imagining that they heard the cannon, they rose with ardour to hasten to the assistance of their comrades, engaged, they said, in a bloody battle. On the night of the 1st of December, which was extremely cold,

* There has been recently published a work translated from the Russian by M. Leon de Narischkine, which contains a great number of inaccurate assertions, though proceeding from an author in a situation to be correctly informed. In this work it is alleged that before the battle of Austerlitz the plan of General Weirother was communicated to Napoleon. This assertion is totally erroneous. Such a communication would imply that the plan, communicated long beforehand to the commanders of the different corps, could have been liable to be divulged. We shall see presently, from the report of an eye-witness, that it was not till the night preceding the battle that the plan was communicated to the commanders of corps. Besides, all the details of the orders and correspondence proved that Napoleon foresaw and was not apprised of the enemy's plan. Our resolution being to avoid all controversy with contemporary writers, we shall confine ourselves to the correction of this error, without noticing many others contained in the work in question, the real merit and to a certain point the impartiality of which we are ready to acknowledge.

they bivouacked at Gross Raigern, a league and a half from the field of battle. Never did troops on foot perform so astonishing a march; for it is a march of eighteen leagues a day for two successive days.

On the 1st of December, Napoleon, reinforced by Bernadotte's corps and Friant's division, could number 65,000 or 70,000 men present under arms, against 90,000 men, Russians and Austrians, likewise present under arms.

At his left he placed Lannes, in whose corps Caffarelli's division supplied the place of Gazan's. Lannes, with the two divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli, was to occupy the Olmütz road, and to fight in the undulated plain outspread on either side of that road. Napoleon gave him, moreover, Murat's cavalry, comprising the cuirassiers of Generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty, the dragoons of Generals Walther and Beaumont, and the chasseurs of Generals Milhaud and Kellermann. The level surface of the ground led him to expect a prodigious engagement of cavalry on this spot. On the knoll of the Santon, which commands this part of the ground, and is topped by a chapel called the Chapel of Bosenitz, he placed the 17th light, commanded by General Claparède, with eighteen pieces of cannon, and made him take an oath to defend this position to the death. This knoll was, in fact, the *point d'appui* of the left.

At the centre, behind the Goldbach rivulet, he ranged Vandamme's and St. Hilaire's divisions, which belonged to the corps of Marshal Soult. He destined them to cross that stream at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, and to gain possession of the plateau of Pratzen when the proper moment should arrive A little further, behind the marsh of Kobelnitz and the château of Kobelnitz, he placed Marshal Soult's third division, that of General Legrand. He reinforced it with two battalions of tirailleurs, known by the names of chasseurs of the Po and Corsican chasseurs, and by a detachment of light cavalry, under General Margaron. This division was to have only the 3rd of the line and the Corsican chasseurs at Telnitz, the nearest point to the ponds, and to which Napoleon was desirous of drawing the Russians. Far in rear, at the distance of a league and a half, was posted Friant's division at Gross Raigern.

Having ten divisions of infantry, Napoleon therefore presented but six of them in line. Behind Marshals Lannes and Soult he kept in reserve Oudinot's grenadiers, separated on this occasion from Lannes' corps, the corps of Bernadotte, composed of Drouet's and Rivaud's divisions, and lastly, the imperial guard. He thus kept at hand a mass of 25,000 men, to move to any point where they might be needed, and particularly to the heights of Pratzen, in order to take those heights at any cost if

the Russians should not have cleared them sufficiently. He bivouacked himself amidst this reserve.

These dispositions completed, he carried his confidence so far as to make them known to his army in a proclamation imbued with the grandeur of the events that were preparing. It is subjoined, just as it was read to the troops, on the evening before the battle.

"Soldiers,—The Russian army appears before you to avenge the Austrian army of Ulm. They are the same battalions that you beat at Hollabrünn, and that you have since been constantly pursuing to this spot.

"The positions which we occupy are formidable; and while they are marching to turn my right, they will present their flank to me.

"Soldiers, I shall myself direct your battalions. I shall keep out of the fire if, with your usual bravery, you throw disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks. But if the victory should be for a moment uncertain, you will see your emperor the foremost to expose himself to danger. For victory must not hang doubtful on this day most particularly, when the honour of the French infantry, which so deeply concerns the honour of the whole nation, is at stake.

"Let not the ranks be thinned upon pretext of carrying away the wounded, and let every one be thoroughly impressed with this thought, that it behoves us to conquer these hirelings of England, who are animated with such bitter hatred against our nation.

"This victory will put an end to the campaign, and we shall then be able to return to our winter quarters, where we shall be joined by the new armies which are forming in France, and then the peace which I shall make will be worthy of my people, of you, and of myself.

"Napoleon."

On this same day he received M. d'Haugwitz, who had at length reached the French headquarters, discerned in his wheedling conversation all the falseness of Prussia, and felt more convinced than ever of the necessity of gaining a signal victory. He received the Prussian envoy most graciously, told him that he was going to fight on the morrow, and that he would see him again afterwards, if he was not swept off by some cannon-ball, and that then it would be time to arrange matters with the cabinet of Berlin. He advised him to set out that very night for Vienna, and he gave him a letter to M. de Talleyrand, taking care to let him be conducted through the field of battle of Hollabrünn, which presented a horrible sight. It is right, he wrote M. de Talleyrand, that this Prussian should learn by his own eyes in what manner we make war.

Having passed the evening at the bivouac with his marshals, he resolved to visit the soldiers and to judge for himself of their moral disposition. It was the evening of the 1st of December,

the eve of the anniversary of his coronation. The coincidence of these dates was singular, and Napoleon had not contrived it, for he accepted battle, but did not offer it. The night was cold and dark.

The first soldiers who perceived him, eager to light him on his way, picked up the straw of their bivouac and made it into torches, which they placed blazing on the top of their muskets. In a few minutes this example was followed by the whole army, and along the vast front of our position was displayed this singular illumination. The soldiers accompanied the steps of Napoleon with shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" promising to prove on the morrow that they were worthy of him and of themselves. Enthusiasm pervaded all the ranks. They went as men ought to go into danger, with hearts full of content and confidence.

Napoleon retired to oblige his soldiers to take some rest, and awaited in his tent the dawn of that day which was to be one of the most glorious of his life, one of the most glorious in history.

Those lights, those shouts, had been early distinguished from the heights occupied by the Russian army, and in a small number of discreet officers they had produced a sinister presentiment. They asked one another if these were signs of an army disheartened and in retreat.

Meanwhile the commanders of the Russian corps, assembled at the quarters of General Kutusof, in the village of Kreznowitz, were receiving their instructions for the following day. Old Kutusof was fast asleep, and General Weirother, having spread out a map of the country before those who did listen to him, read with emphasis a memorial containing the whole plan of the battle.* We have nearly explained it already in describing the dispositions of Napoleon. The right of the Russians, under Prince Bagration, faced our left, as it was destined to

* We think it useful to quote here a fragment of the manuscript memoirs of General Langeron, an eye-witness, since he commanded one of the corps of the Russian army. Here follows the account of that officer :—

"We have seen that on the 19th of November (December the 1st) our columns did not reach their destination till about ten o'clock at night.

"About eleven all the commanders of those columns, excepting Prince Bagration, who was too far off, received orders to repair to General Kutusof's quarters at Kreznowitz, to have the dispositions for the battle of the following day read to them.

"At one in the morning, when we had all assembled, General Weirother arrived, unfolded upon a large table an immense and most accurate map of the environs of Brünn and Austerlitz, and read the dispositions to us in a loud tone, and with a self-sufficient air, which indicated a thorough persuasion of his own merit and that of our incapacity. He was like a college teacher reading a lesson to young scholars. Perhaps we really were scholars ; but he was far from being a clever schoolmaster. Kutusof, seated and half asleep when we arrived, at length fell into a sound nap before our departure. Buxhövden, standing, listened, but most assuredly comprehended not a word ; Miloradovich held his tongue ; Pribyschewski kept in the background, and

advance against Lannes on both sides of the Olmütz road, to take the Santon from us, and to march direct for Brünn. The cavalry, collected into a single mass between the corps of Bagration and the centre of the Russian army, was to occupy the same plain in which Napoleon had placed Murat, and to connect the left of the Russians with their centre. The main body of the army, composed of four columns, commanded by Generals Doctorow, Langeron, Pribyschewski, and Kollowrath, established at the moment on the heights of Pratzen, was to descend from them, to cross the swampy stream which has been previously mentioned, to take Telnitz, Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, to turn the right of the French, and to advance upon their rear, to wrest the Vienna road from them. The rendezvous of all the corps was fixed under the walls of Brünn. The Archduke Constantine, with the Russian guard, 9000 or 10,000 strong, was to start from Austerlitz at daybreak, and to place himself in reserve behind the centre of the combined army.

When General Weirother had finished his lecture to the commanders of the Russian corps, only one of whom, General Doctorow, was attentive, and only one, General Langeron, inclined to contradict, the latter ventured to make some objections. General Langeron, a French emigrant, who served against his country, who was a grumbler but a good officer, asked General Weirother if he imagined that circumstances would turn out precisely as he had written, and showed himself strongly disposed to doubt it. General Weirother would never admit any other idea than that current in the Russian staff, namely, that Napoleon was retreating, and that the instructions for this case were excellent. But General Kutusof put an end to all discussion by sending the commanders of the corps to their quarters, and ordering a copy of the instructions to be forwarded to each. That experienced chief knew in what

Doctorow alone examined the map attentively. When Weirother had finished his lecture, I was the only one who spoke. 'General,' I said to him, 'this is all very well, but if the enemy should anticipate us and attack us at Pratzen, what are we to do then?' 'The case is not foreseen,' he replied. 'You know how daring Bonaparte is. If he could have attacked us, he would have done so to-day.' 'Then you do not think him strong?' I rejoined. 'It is much if he has 40,000 men.' 'In this case, he is plunging himself into ruin by awaiting our attack; but I look upon him to be too able to be imprudent, for if, as you wish and believe, we cut him off from Vienna, he will have no other retreat but the mountains of Bohemia. I conjecture, however, that he has a different design. He has put out his fires, and not a sound is heard in his camp.' 'That is because he is retiring or changing position; and even supposing he takes that of Turas, he will spare us a great deal of trouble, and the dispositions will remain the same.'

"Kutusof having then wakened up, dismissed us, ordering us to leave an adjutant to copy the dispositions which Lieutenant-Colonel Toll, of the staff, was going to translate out of German into Russian. It was three in the morning, and we did not receive copies of these famous dispositions till near eight, when we were already on march."

estimation plans of battles conceived and arranged in that manner ought to be held, and yet he suffered the thing to be done, though it was in his name that the transaction took place.

By four in the morning Napoleon had left his tent, to judge with his own eyes if the Russians were committing the blunder into which he had been so dexterously leading them. He descended to the village of Puntowitz, situated on the bank of the brook which separated the two armies, and perceived the fires of the Russians nearly extinguished on the heights of Pratzen. A very distinguishable sound of cannon and horses indicated a march from left to right towards the ponds, the very way that he wished the Russians to take. Great was his joy on finding his foresight so fully justified; he returned and placed himself on the high ground where he had bivouacked, and where the eye embraced the whole extent of that field of battle. His marshals were on horseback at his side. Day began to dawn. A wintry fog covered the country to a distance, the most prominent points only being visible, and rising above the mist like islands out of the sea. The different corps of the French army were in motion, and were descending from the position which they had occupied during the night to cross the rivulet which separated them from the Russians. But they halted in the bottom, where they were concealed by the fog, and kept by the emperor till the opportune moment for the attack.

A very brisk fire was already heard at the extremity of the line towards the ponds. The movement of the Russians against our left was evident. Marshal Davout had gone in all haste to direct Friant's division from Gross Raigern upon Telnitz, and to support the 3rd of the line and the Corsican chasseurs, who would soon have upon their hands a considerable portion of the enemy's army. Marshals Lannes, Murat, and Soult, with their aides-de-camp, surrounded the emperor, awaiting his order to commence the combat at the centre and on the left. Napoleon moderated their ardour, wishing to let the Russians consummate the fault which they were committing on our right so completely that they should not have it in their power to get back out of those bottoms which they were seen entering. The sun at length burst forth, and dispelling the fog, poured a flood of radiance upon the vast field of battle. It was the sun of Austerlitz, a sun the recollections of which have been so frequently submitted to the present generation, that assuredly they will not be forgotten by future generations. The heights of Pratzen were cleared of troops. The Russians, in execution of the plan agreed upon, had descended to the bed of the Goldbach, to gain possession of the villages of Telnitz and Sokolnitz, situated along that rivulet. Napoleon then gave the signal for the

attack, and his marshals galloped off to put themselves at the head of their respective *corps d'armée*.

The three Russian columns directed to attack Telnitz and Sokolnitz had broken up at seven o'clock in the morning. They were under the immediate command of Generals Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski, and under the superior command of General Buxhövden, an officer of inferior abilities, inactive, puffed up by the favour which he owed to a court marriage, and who no more commanded the left of the Russian army than General Kutusof commanded the whole. He marched himself along with General Doctorow's column, forming the extremity of the Russian line, and which would have to engage first. He paid no attention to the other columns, or to the harmony which ought to have been introduced into their different movements, which was very lucky for us; for if they had acted together, and attacked Telnitz and Sokolnitz en masse, as Friant's division had not yet arrived at that point, they might have gained much more ground upon our right than it would have suited us to give up to them.

Doctorow's column had bivouacked, like the others, on the height of Pratzen. At the foot of this height, in the bottom which separated it from our right, there was a village called Augezd, and in that village an advanced guard under the command of General Kienmayer, composed of five Austrian battalions and fourteen squadrons. This advanced guard was to sweep the plain between Augezd and Telnitz, while Doctorow's column was descending from the heights. The Austrians, eager to show the Russians that they could fight as well as they, attacked the village of Telnitz with great resolution. It was necessary to cross at once the rivulet running here in channels, and then a height covered with vines and houses. We had in this place, besides the 3rd of the line, the battalion of the Corsican chasseurs, concealed from view by the nature of the ground. These skilful marksmen, coolly taking aim at the hussars who had been sent forward, picked off a great number of them. They received in the same manner the Szekler regiment (infantry), and in half an hour strewed the ground with part of that regiment. The Austrians, tired of a destructive combat, and one that was productive of no result, attacked en masse the village of Telnitz with their five united battalions, but were not able to penetrate into it, thanks to the firmness of the 3rd of the line, which received them with the vigour of a tried band. While Kienmayer's advanced guard was thus exhausting itself in impotent efforts, Doctorow's column, twenty-four battalions strong, led by General Buxhövden, made its appearance an hour later than was expected, and proceeded to assist the Austrians to take Telnitz, which the 3rd of the line

was no longer sufficient to defend. The bed of the stream was crossed, and General Kienmayer threw his fourteen squadrons into the plain beyond Telnitz, against the light cavalry of General Margaron. The latter bravely stood several charges, but could not maintain its ground against such a mass of cavalry. Friant's division, conducted by Marshal Davout, having not yet arrived from Gross Raigern, our right was greatly overmatched. But General Buxhövden, after being long waited for, was obliged in his turn to wait for the second column, commanded by General Langeron. This latter had been delayed by a singular accident. The mass of the cavalry, destined to occupy the plain which was on the right of the Russians and on the left of the French, had misconceived the order prescribing that it should take that position: it had therefore gone and taken post at Pratzen, amidst the bivouacs of Langeron's column. Having discovered its error, this cavalry, in repairing to its proper place, had cut and long retarded Langeron's and Pribyschewski's columns. General Langeron having at length arrived before Sokolnitz, commenced an attack on it. But meanwhile General Friant had come up in the utmost haste with his division, composed of five regiments of infantry and six regiments of dragoons. The 1st regiment of dragoons, attached for this occasion to Bourcier's division, was despatched at full trot upon Telnitz. The Austro-Russians, already victorious at this point, began to cross the Goldbach, and to press the 3rd of the light as well as Margaron's light cavalry. The dragoons of the first regiment, on approaching the enemy, broke into a gallop, and drove back into Telnitz all who had attempted to debouch from it. Generals Friant and Heudelet, arriving with the 1st brigade, composed of the 108th of the line and the voltigeurs of the 15th light, entered Telnitz with bayonets fixed, expelled the Austrians and Russians, and drove them pell-mell beyond the channels which form the bed of the Goldbach, and remained masters of the ground, after they had strewed it with dead and wounded. Unluckily the fog, dispersed nearly everywhere, prevailed in the bottoms. It enveloped Telnitz as in a sort of cloud. The 26th light of Legrand's division, which had come to the assistance of the 3rd of the line, perceiving indistinctly masses of troops on the other side of the stream, without being able to discern the colour of their uniform, fired upon the 108th, under the impression that it was the enemy. This unexpected attack staggered the 108th, which fell back for fear of being turned. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the Russians and Austrians, having twenty-nine battalions at this point, resumed the offensive, and dislodged Heudelet's brigade from Telnitz, while General Langeron, attacking with twelve Russian battalions

the village of Sokolnitz, situated on the Goldbach, a little above Telnitz, had penetrated into it. The two hostile columns of Doctorow and Langeron then began to debouch, the one from Telnitz, the other from Sokolnitz. At the same time General Pribyschewski's column had attacked and taken the château of Sokolnitz, situated above the village of that name. At this sight General Friant, who on that day, as on so many others, behaved like a hero, flung General Bourcier, with his six regiments of dragoons, upon Doctorow's column, at the moment when the latter was deploying beyond Telnitz. The Russians presented their bayonets to our dragoons; but the charges of our horse, repeated with the utmost fury, prevented them from extending themselves, and supported Heudelet's brigade, which was opposed to them. General Friant afterwards put himself at the head of Lochet's brigade, composed of the 18th and the 111th of the line, and rushed upon Langeron's column, which was already beyond the village of Sokolnitz, drove it back to that place, entered it at its heels, expelled it again, and hurled it to the other side of the Goldbach. Having occupied Sokolnitz, General Friant committed it to the guard of the 48th, and marched with his 3rd brigade, that of Kister, composed of the 33rd of the line and the 15th light, to recover the château of Sokolnitz from Pribyschewski's column. He forced it to fall back. But while he was engaged with Pribyschewski's troops in front of the château of Sokolnitz, Langeron's column, attacking anew the village dependent on this château, had well-nigh overwhelmed the 48th, which, retiring into the houses of the village, defended itself with admirable gallantry. General Friant returned and extricated the 48th. That brave general and his illustrious chief, Marshal Davout, hastened incessantly from one point to another on this line of the Goldbach, so warmly disputed, and with seven or eight thousand foot and 2800 horse engaged 35,000 Russians. Indeed, Friant's division was reduced, by a march of thirty-six hours which it had performed, to 6000 men at most, and with the 3rd of the line formed no more than seven or eight thousand combatants. But the men who had lagged behind, arriving every moment at the report of the cannon, successively filled up the gaps made by the enemy's fire in its ranks.

During this obstinate combat towards our right, Marshal Soult, at the centre, had attacked the position on which depended the issue of the battle. At a signal given by Napoleon, the two divisions of Vandamme and St. Hilaire, formed into close column, ascended at a rapid pace the acclivities of the plateau of Pratzen. Vandamme's division had proceeded to the left, St. Hilaire's to the right of the village of Pratzen, which is deeply embedded in a ravine that terminates at the Goldbach rivulet,

near Puntowitz. While the French were pushing forward, the centre of the enemy's army, composed of Kollowrath's Austrian infantry and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich, twenty-seven battalions strong, under the immediate command of General Kutusof and the two emperors, had come and deployed on the plateau of Pratzen, to take the place of Buxhövden's three columns, which had descended into the bottoms. Our soldiers, without returning the fire of musketry which they sustained, continued to climb the height, surprising by their nimble and resolute step the enemy's generals, who expected to find them retreating.*

On reaching the village of Pratzen they passed on without halting there. General Morand, putting himself at the head of the 10th light, went and drew up on the plateau. General Thiébault † followed him with his brigade, composed of the 14th and 36th of the line, and while he was advancing suddenly received in rear a volley of musketry, which proceeded from two Russian battalions concealed in the ravine, at the bottom of which the village of Pratzen is situated. General Thiébault halted for a moment, returned at point blank range the volley which he had received, and entered the village with one of his battalions. He dispersed and took the Russians who occupied it, and then returned to support General Morand, deployed on the plateau. Varé's brigade, the second of St. Hilaire's division, passing on its part to the left of the village, drew up facing the enemy, while Vandamme, with his whole division, took a position still further to the left, near a small knoll, called Stari Winobradi, which commands the plateau of Pratzen. Upon this knoll the Russians had posted five battalions and a numerous artillery.

The Austrian infantry of Kollowrath and the Russian infantry of Miloradovich were drawn up in two lines. Marshal Soult without loss of time brought forward St. Hilaire's and Vandamme's divisions. General Thiébault, forming with his brigade tht right of St. Hilaire's division, had a battery of twelve pieces. He ordered them to be charged with balls and grape, and opened a destructive fire upon the infantry opposed to him. This fire, kept up briskly and directed with precision, soon threw the Austrian ranks into disorder, and they hurried in confusion to the back of the plateau. Vandamme immediately attacked the enemy drawn up opposite to him. His brave infantry coolly advanced, halted, fired several murderous volleys,

* Prince Czartoryski, placed between the two emperors, remarked to the Emperor Alexander the nimble and decided step with which the French were ascending to the plateau, without returning the fire of the Russians. At this sight that prince lost all the confidence which he had till then felt, and conceived a sinister presentiment which never left him during the engagement.

† The same who died lately.

and marched upon the Russians with the bayonet. It flung back their first line upon their second, put both to flight, and obliged them to retreat to the back of the plateau of Pratzen, leaving their artillery behind them. In this movement Vandamme had left the knoll of Stari Winobradi, defended by several Russian battalions and bristling with artillery, on his left. He went back to it, and directing General Schiner to turn it with the 24th light, he ascended it himself with the 4th of the line. In spite of a downward fire he climbed the knoll, overturned the Russians who guarded it, and took their cannon.

Thus in less than an hour the two divisions of Marshal Soult's corps had made themselves masters of the plateau of Pratzen, and were pursuing the Russians and Austrians, hurled pell-mell down the declivities of that plateau, which inclines towards the château of Austerlitz.

The two Emperors of Austria and Russia, witnesses of this rapid action, strove in vain to rally their soldiers. They were scarcely listened to amidst that confusion, and Alexander could already perceive that the presence of a sovereign is not, in such circumstances, worth that of a good general. Miloradovich, always conspicuous in the fire, traversed on horseback that field of battle, ploughed with balls, and strove to bring back the fugitives. General Kutusof, wounded on the cheek by a musket-ball, beheld the realisation of the disaster which he had foreseen, and which he had not the firmness to prevent. He had hastened to send for the Russian imperial guard, which had bivouacked in advance of Austerlitz, in order to rally his routed centre behind it. If this commander of the Austro-Russian army, whose merit was limited to great astuteness disguised by great indolence, had been capable of just and prompt resolutions, he would have hurried at this moment to his left, engaged with our right, drawn Buxhövden's three columns from the bottoms into which they had been plunged, brought them back to the plateau of Pratzen, and with a collected force of 50,000 men have made a decisive effort to recover a position without which the Russian army must be cut in two. If even he had not succeeded, he might at least have retired in order upon Austerlitz by a safe road, and not have left his left backed upon an abyss. But content to parry the evil of which he was an eye-witness, he did nothing more than rally his centre upon the Russian imperial guard, nine or ten thousand strong, while Napoleon, on the contrary, with his eyes riveted on the plateau of Pratzen, was bringing forward to the support of Marshal Soult, already victorious, the corps of Bernadotte, the guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, that is to say, 25,000 choice troops.

While our right was thus disputing the line of the Goldbach with the Russians, and our centre was wresting from them the

plateau of Pratzen, Lannes and Murat, on our left, were engaged with Prince Bagration and all the cavalry of the Austro-Russians.

Lannes, with Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions, deployed on both sides of the Olmütz road, was to march straight forward. On the left of the road, the same near which rose the Santon, the ground, on approaching the wooded heights of Moravia, was very uneven, sometimes hilly, sometimes intersected by deep ravines. There Suchet's division was placed. On the right, more level ground was connected by very gentle rises with the plateau of Pratzen. Caffarelli marched on that side, protected by Murat's cavalry, against the mass of the Austro-Russian cavalry.

At this point a sort of Egyptian battle was anticipated, for here were seen eighty-two Russian and Austrian squadrons, drawn up in two lines, commanded by Prince John of Lichtenstein. For this reason Suchet's and Caffarelli's divisions presented several battalions deployed, and behind the intervals of these battalions other battalions in close column, to appuy and flank the former. The artillery was spread over the front of the two divisions. General Kellermann's light cavalry, as also the divisions of dragoons, were on the right in the plain, Nansouty's and d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry in reserve in rear.

In this imposing order Lannes moved off as soon as he heard the cannon at Pratzen, and traversed at a foot pace, as though it had been a parade ground, that plain illumined by a bright winter's sun.

Prince John of Lichtenstein had not arrived upon the ground till late, owing to a mistake which had caused the Austro-Russian cavalry to run from the right to the left of the field of battle. In his absence Alexander's imperial guard had filled the gap left between the centre and the right of the combined army. When he at length arrived, perceiving the movement of Lannes' corps, he directed the Grand Duke Constantine's Hulans against Caffarelli's division. Those bold horse rushed upon that division, before which Kellermann was placed with his brigade of light cavalry. General Kellermann, one of our ablest cavalry officers, judging that he should be flung back upon the French infantry, and perhaps throw it into confusion, if he awaited, without moving, that formidable charge, drew back his squadrons, and making them pass through the intervals of Caffarelli's battalions, drew them up again on the left, in order to seize a favourable opportunity for charging. The Hulans, coming up at a gallop, no longer found our light cavalry, but encountered in its stead a line of infantry, which was not to be broken, and which, even without forming into square, received it with a murderous fire of musketry. Four hundred of these assailants were soon stretched on the ground in front of the

division. The Russian general, Essen, was mortally wounded fighting at their head. The others dispersed in disorder to the right and left. Kellermann, who had reformed his squadrons on the left of Caffarelli, seizing the opportune moment, charged the Hulans, and cut in pieces a considerable number of them. Prince John of Lichtenstein sent a fresh portion of his squadrons to the assistance of the Hulans. Our divisions of dragoons dashed off in their turn upon the enemy's cavalry, and for awhile nothing was to be seen but an awful fray, in which all the combatants were fighting hand to hand. This cloud of horsemen at length dispersed, and each rejoined his line of battle, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded, mostly Russians and Austrians. Our two masses of infantry then advanced with firm and measured step upon the ground abandoned by the cavalry. The Russians opposed to them forty pieces of cannon, which poured forth a shower of projectiles. One discharge swept away the whole group of drummers of Caffarelli's first regiment. This fierce cannonade was returned by the fire of all our artillery. In this combat with great guns, General Valhabert had a thigh fractured by a ball. Some soldiers would have carried him away. "Remain at your post," said he, "I shall know how to die all alone; six men must not be taken away for the sake of one." The French then marched for the village of Blaziowitz, situated on the right of the plain, where the ground begins to rise towards Pratzen. Of this village, seated like all those of the country in a deep ravine, nothing was to be seen but the flames that were consuming it. A detachment of the Russian imperial guard had occupied it in the morning, till Prince Lichtenstein's cavalry should arrive. Lannes ordered the 13th light to take it. Colonel Castex, who commanded the 13th, advanced with the first battalion in column of attack, and as soon as he arrived before the village he was struck by a ball in the forehead. The battalion rushed forward, and revenged with the bayonet the death of its colonel. Blaziowitz was carried, and some hundreds of prisoners, picked up there, were sent to the rear.

At the other wing of Lannes' corps the Russians, led by Prince Bagration, strove to take the little eminence, called by our soldiers the Santon. They had descended into a valley which skirts the foot of this eminence, taken the village of Bosenitz, and exchanged balls to no purpose with the numerous artillery planted on the height. But the Russians did not care to encounter the musketry of the 17th of the line, too advantageously posted for them to dare to approach too near.

Prince Bagration had drawn up the rest of his infantry on the Olmütz road, facing Suchet's division. Being obliged to fall back, he retired slowly before the corps of Lannes, which

marched without precipitation, but with imposing compactness, and kept constantly gaining ground. Blaziowitz being carried, Lannes caused the villages of Holubitz and Kruch, situated on the Olmütz road, to be taken also, and at length came upon Bagration's infantry. At this moment he broke the line formed by his two divisions. He directed Suchet's division obliquely to the left, Caffarelli's division obliquely to the right. By this diverging movement he separated Bagration's infantry from Prince Lichtenstein's cavalry, and threw back the first to the left of the Olmütz road, the second to the right, towards the slopes of the plateau of Pratzen.

That cavalry then determined to make a last effort, and rushed in a mass upon Caffarelli's division, which received it with its usual firmness, and brought it to a stand by the fire of its musketry. Numerous squadrons of Lichtenstein's, at first dispersed, then rallied by their officers, were led back against our battalions. By order of Lannes the cuirassiers of Generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty, who followed Caffarelli's infantry, filed away at full trot behind the ranks of that infantry, formed upon its right, deployed there, and dashed off at a gallop. The earth quaked under those four thousand horsemen cased in iron. They rushed sword in hand upon the mass of the new-formed Austro-Russian squadrons, overthrew them by the shock, dispersed and obliged them to flee towards Austerlitz, whither they retired, to appear no more during the engagement.

Meanwhile Suchet's division had attacked Prince Bagration's infantry. After pouring upon the Russians those quiet and sure volleys which our troops, not less intelligent than inured to war, executed with extreme precision, Suchet's division had advanced upon them with the bayonet. The Russians, giving way to the impetuosity of our battalions, had retired, but unbroken and without surrendering. They formed a confused mass bristling with muskets, which the French could only drive before them, without being able to take them prisoners. Lannes having got rid of Prince Lichtenstein's eighty-two squadrons, had hastened to bring back General d'Hautpoul's heavy cavalry from the right to the left of that plain, and directed it upon the Russians in order to decide their retreat. The cuirassiers, charging on all sides those obstinate foot soldiers who were retiring in large bodies, had obliged some thousands of them to lay down their arms.

Thus on our left Lannes had fought a real battle by himself. He had taken 4000 prisoners. The ground around him was strewed with 4000 Russians and Austrians, dead or wounded.

But on the plateau of Pratzen the conflict was renewed between the enemy and the corps of Marshal Soult, reinforced by all the reserves, which Napoleon brought up in person. General

Kutusof, without having any idea, as we have observed, of calling to him the three columns of Doctorow, Langeron, and Pribyschewski, posted in the bottoms, thought only of rallying his centre upon the imperial Russian guard. The single brigade of Kamenski, belonging to Langeron's corps, hearing a very brisk fire on its rear, had halted, and then spontaneously fallen back, in order to return to the plateau of Pratzen. General Langeron, apprised of the circumstance, had come up to put himself at the head of this brigade, leaving the rest of his column at Sokolnitz.

The French, in this renewed combat at the centre, were about to find themselves engaged with Kamenski's brigade, with the infantry of Kollowrath and Miloradovich, and with the imperial Russian guard. Thiébault's brigade, occupying the extreme right of Marshal Soult's corps, and separated from Varé's brigade by the village of Pratzen, found itself amidst a square of fires, for it had in front the reformed line of the Austrians, and on its right part of Langeron's troops. This brigade, consisting of the 10th light and of the 14th and 36th of the line, was soon exposed to the most serious danger. As it was deploying and forming itself into a square to face the enemy, Adjutant Labadie, fearing that his battalion, under a fire of musketry and grape, discharged at the distance of thirty paces, might be staggered in its movement, seized the colours, and planting himself upon the ground, cried, "Soldiers, here is your line of battle!" The battalion deployed with perfect steadiness. The others imitated it, the brigade took position, and for some moments exchanged a destructive fire of musketry at half range. These three regiments, however, would soon have sunk under a mass of cross fires had the conflict been prolonged. General St. Hilaire, admired by the army for his chivalrous valour, was conversing with Generals Thiébault and Morand on the course proper to be pursued, when Colonel Pouzet of the 10th said, "General, let us advance with the bayonet, or we are undone." "Yes, forward!" replied General St. Hilaire. The bayonets were immediately crossed, and the men, falling upon Kamenski's Russians on the right and on Kollowrath's Austrians in front, precipitated the first into the bottoms of Sokolnitz and Telnitz, and the second down the back of the plateau of Pratzen, towards the Austerlitz road.

While Thiébault's brigade, left for some time unsupported, extricated itself with such valour and success, Varé's brigade and Vandamme's division, placed on the other side of the village of Pratzen, had not near so much trouble to repulse the offensive return of the Austro-Russians, and had soon flung them to the foot of the plateau, which they strove in vain to ascend. In the ardour that hurried away our troops, the first battalion of the

4th of the line, belonging to Vandamme's division, had yielded to the temptation to pursue the Russians over the sloping ground, covered with vines. The Grand Duke Constantine had immediately sent a detachment of the cavalry of the guard, which, surprising that battalion among the vines, had overthrown it before it could form into square. In this confusion the colour-bearer of the regiment had been killed. A subaltern, endeavouring to save the eagle, had also been killed. A soldier had then snatched it out of the hands of the officer, and being himself put *hors de combat*, had not been able to prevent Constantine's horse from carrying off the trophy.

Napoleon, who had come to reinforce the centre with the infantry of his guard, the whole corps of Bernadotte, and Oudinot's grenadiers, witnessed the rash proceeding of this battalion from the height on which he was posted. "They are in disorder yonder," said he to Rapp; "that must be set to rights." At the head of the Mamelukes and the horse chasseurs of the guard, Rapp instantly flew to the succour of the compromised battalion. Marshal Bessières followed Rapp with the horse grenadiers. Drouet's division of Bernadotte's corps, formed of the 94th and 95th regiments and of the 27th light, advanced in second line, headed by Colonel Gerard, Bernadotte's aide-de-camp, and an officer of great energy, to oppose the infantry of the Russian guard.

Rapp, on making his appearance, drew upon him the enemy's cavalry, who were slaughtering our foot soldiers extended on the ground. This cavalry turned against him with four unhorsed pieces of cannon. In spite of a discharge of grape, Rapp rushed forward and broke through the imperial cavalry. He pushed on, and passed beyond the ground covered by the wrecks of the battalion of the 4th. The soldiers of that battalion immediately rallied, and formed anew to revenge the check which they had received. Rapp, on reaching the lines of the Russian guard, was assailed with a second charge of cavalry. These were Alexander's horse guards, who, headed by their colonel, Prince Repnin, fell upon him. The brave Morland, colonel of the chasseurs of the French imperial guard, was killed; the chasseurs were driven back. But at this moment the horse grenadiers, led by Marshal Bessières, came up at a gallop to the assistance of Rapp. This splendid body of men, mounted on powerful horses, was eager to measure its strength with the horse guards of Alexander. A conflict of several minutes ensued between them. The infantry of the Russian guard, witnessing this fierce encounter, durst not fire, for fear of slaughtering its own countrymen. At length Napoleon's horse grenadiers, veterans tried in a hundred battles, triumphed over the young soldiers of Alexander, dispersed them, after extending a

number of them upon the ground, and returned conquerors to their master.

Napoleon, who was present at this engagement, was delighted to see the Russian youth punished for their boasting. Surrounded by his staff, he received Rapp, who returned wounded, covered with blood, followed by Prince Repnin, a prisoner, and gave him signal testimonies of satisfaction. Meanwhile the three regiments of Drouet's division, brought by Colonel Gerard, pushed the infantry of the Russian guard upon the village of Kreznowitz, carried that village, and took many prisoners. It was one o'clock; victory appeared no longer doubtful, for Lannes and Murat being masters of the plain on the left, Marshal Soult, supported by the whole of the reserve, being master of the plateau of Pratzen, there was nothing left to be done but to fall upon the right and fling Buxhövden's three Russian columns, which had so vainly striven to cut us off from the road to Vienna, into the ponds. Napoleon, then leaving Bernadotte's corps on the plateau of Pratzen, and turning to the right with Marshal Soult's corps, the guard, and Oudinot's grenadiers, resolved himself to seize the prize of his profound combinations, and proceeded by the route which Buxhövden's three columns had taken when descending from the plateau of Pratzen to attack them in rear. It was high time for him to arrive, for Marshal Davout and his lieutenant-general, Friant, hurrying incessantly from Kobelnitz to Telnitz to prevent the Russians from crossing the Goldbach, were almost knocked up. The brave Friant had had four horses killed under him in the fight. But while he was making the last efforts, Napoleon suddenly appeared at the head of an overwhelming mass of forces. Prodigious confusion then took place among the surprised and despairing Russians. Pribyschewski's entire column, and half of Langeron's, left before Sokolnitz, found themselves surrounded without any hope of escape, for the French were coming upon their rear by the routes which they had themselves pursued in the morning. These two columns dispersed; part were made prisoners in Sokolnitz, others fled towards Kobelnitz, and were enveloped near the marshes of that name. Lastly, a third portion made off towards Brünn, but was obliged to lay down its arms near the Vienna road, the same which the Russians had appointed for rendezvous in the hope of victory.

General Langeron, with the relics of Kamenski's brigade and some battalions which he had withdrawn from Sokolnitz before the disaster, had fled towards Telnitz and the ponds, near to the spot where Buxhövden was with Doctorow's column. The silly commander of the left wing of the Russians, quite proud of having, with twenty-nine battalions and twenty-two squadrons, disputed the village of Telnitz against five or six French

battalions, continued motionless, awaiting the success of Langeron's and Pribyschewski's columns. His face, according to an eye-witness, exhibited evidence of the excess in which he was accustomed to indulge. Langeron, hastening to this point, related to him with warmth what was passing. "You see nothing but enemies everywhere," was the brutal answer of Buxhövden. "And you," replied Langeron, "are not in a state to see them anywhere." At this instant Marshal Soult's column appeared on the slope of the plateau towards the ponds, advancing towards Doctorow's column to drive it into them. It was no longer possible to doubt the danger. Buxhövden, with four regiments, which he had most unskilfully left inactive about him, endeavoured to regain the route by which he had come, and which ran through the village of Augezd, between the foot of the plateau of Pratzen and the pond of Satschau. Thither he proceeded precipitately, ordering General Doctorow to save himself as he best could. Langeron joined him with the remains of his column. Buxhövden was passing through Augezd at the very moment when Vandamme's division, descending from the height, arrived there on its side. He sustained in his flight the fire of the French, and succeeded in gaining a place of safety with a portion of his troops. The greater part, accompanied by Langeron's wrecks, was stopped short by Vandamme's division, which was in possession of Augezd. Then all together rushed towards the frozen ponds and strove to clear themselves a way there. The ice which covered these ponds, weakened by the warmth of a fine day, could not bear the weight of men, horses, and cannon. It gave way at some points beneath the Russians, who were engulfed; at others it was strong enough to afford a retreat to the fugitives who thronged across it.

Napoleon, having reached the slopes of the plateau of Pratzen, towards the ponds, perceived the disaster which he had so skilfully prepared. He ordered a battery of the guard to fire with ball upon those parts of the ice which still held firm, and completed the destruction of those who were upon it. Nearly 2000 perished beneath the broken ice.

Between the French army and these inaccessible ponds was still left Doctorow's unfortunate column, one detachment of which had escaped with Buxhövden, and another found a grave under the ice. General Doctorow, left in this cruel situation, behaved with the noblest courage. The ground in approaching the lakes rose so as to offer a sort of appui. General Doctorow, backing himself against this rising ground, formed his troops into three lines, placing the cavalry in the first line, the artillery in the second, and the infantry in the third. Thus deployed, he opposed a bold face to the French, while he sent a few squadrons in search of a route between the pond of Satschau and that of Menitz.

A last and severe combat ensued on this ground. The dragoons of Beaumont's division, borrowed from Murat, and brought from the left to the right, charged Kienmayer's Austrian cavalry, which after doing its duty retired under the protection of the Russian artillery. The latter, sticking close to its guns, poured a shower of grape upon the dragoons, who endeavoured in vain to take it. Marshal Soult's infantry marched up in its turn to this artillery, in spite of a fire at point blank range, took it, and drove the Russian infantry towards Telnitz. Marshal Davout, on his part, with Friant's division, was entering Telnitz. The Russians, therefore, had no other retreat but a narrow pass between Telnitz and the ponds. Some rushed upon them pell-mell, and shared the fate of those who had preceded them. Others found means to escape by a route which had been discovered between the ponds of Satschau and Menitz. The French cavalry pursued them along this track, and harassed them in their retreat. The sun in the daytime had converted the clayey soil of these parts from ice into thick mud, into which men and horses sunk. The artillery of the Russians stuck fast in it. Their horses, fitted rather for speed than for draught, being unable to extricate the guns, were obliged to leave them there. Amidst this rout our horses picked up 3000 prisoners and a great number of cannon. "I had previously seen some lost battles," says an eye-witness of this frightful scene, General Langeron, "but I had no conception of such a defeat."

In fact, from one wing to the other of the Russian army no part of it was in order but the corps of Prince Bagration, which Lannes had not ventured to pursue, being ignorant of what was passing on the right of the army. All the rest was in a state of frightful disorder, setting up wild shouts, and plundering the villages scattered upon its route, to procure provisions. The two sovereigns of Russia and Austria fled from that field of battle upon which they heard the French crying "*Vive l'Empereur!*" Alexander was deeply dejected. The Emperor Francis, more tranquil, bore the disaster with great composure. Under the common misfortune, he had at least one consolation: the Russians could no longer allege that the cowardice of the Austrians constituted all the glory of Napoleon. The two princes retreated precipitately over the plains of Moravia, amidst profound darkness, separated from their household, and liable to be insulted through the barbarity of their own soldiers. The Emperor Francis, seeing that all was lost, took it upon him to send Prince John of Lichtenstein to Napoleon, to solicit an armistice, with a promise to sign a peace in a few days. He commissioned him, moreover, to express to Napoleon his wish to have an interview with him at the advanced posts.

Prince John, who had well performed his duty in the engage-

ment, could appear with honour before the conqueror. He repaired with the utmost expedition to the French headquarters. The victorious Napoleon was engaged in going over the field of battle, to have the wounded picked up. He would not take rest himself till he had paid to his soldiers those attentions to which they had such good right. In obedience to his orders, none of them had quitted the ranks to carry away the wounded. The ground was in consequence strewed with them for a space of more than three leagues. It was covered more especially with Russian corpses. The field of battle was an awful spectacle. But this sight affected our old soldiers of the Revolution very slightly. Accustomed to the horrors of war, they regarded wounds, death, as a natural consequence of battles, and as trifles in the bosom of victory. They were intoxicated with joy, and raised boisterous acclamations when they perceived the group of officers which marked the presence of Napoleon. His return to the headquarters, which had been established at the post-house of Posoritz, had the appearance of a triumphal procession.

That spirit, in which such bitter pangs were one day to succeed such exquisite joys, tasted at that moment the delights of the most magnificent and the most deserved success; for if victory is frequently a pure favour of chance, it was in this instance the reward of admirable combinations. Napoleon, in fact, guessing with the penetration of genius that the Russians designed to wrest the Vienna road from him, and that they would then place themselves between him and the ponds, had by his very attitude encouraged them to come thither; since, weakening his right, reinforcing his centre, he had thrown himself upon the heights of Pratzen, abandoned by them, cut them thus in two, and flung them into a gulf, which they could not get out of. The greater part of his troops, kept in reserve, had scarcely been brought into action, so strong did a just conclusion render his position, and so well also did the valour of his soldiers permit him to bring them forward in inferior number before the enemy. It may be said that out of 65,000 French, 40,000 or 45,000 at most had been engaged; for Bernadotte's corps, the grenadiers, and the infantry of the guard had exchanged only a few musket-shots. Thus 45,000 French had beaten 90,000 Austro-Russians.

The results of the battle were immense: 15,000 killed or wounded, about 20,000 prisoners, among whom were ten colonels and eight generals, 180 pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of artillery and baggage waggons—such were the losses of the enemy and the trophies of the French. The latter had to regret about 7000 men killed and wounded.

Napoleon, having returned to his headquarters at Posoritz,

there received Prince John of Lichtenstein. He treated him as a conqueror full of courtesy, and agreed to an interview with the Emperor of Austria on the day after the next, at the advanced posts of the two armies; but an armistice was not to be granted till the two Emperors of France and Austria had met and explained themselves.

On the morrow Napoleon transferred his headquarters to Austerlitz, a mansion belonging to the family of Kaunitz. There he established himself, and determined to give the name of that mansion to the battle which the soldiers already called the battle of the three emperors. It has borne and will bear for ages the name which it received from the immortal captain who won it. He addressed to his soldiers the following proclamation:—

"AUSTERLITZ, *12th Frimaire.*

"SOLDIERS,—I am satisfied with you: in the battle of Austerlitz you have justified all that I expected from your intrepidity. You have decorated your eagles with immortal glory. An army of one hundred thousand men, commanded by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, has been in less than four hours either cut in pieces or dispersed. Those who escaped your weapons are drowned in the lakes.

"Forty colours, the standards of the imperial guard of Russia, one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, more than thirty thousand prisoners,* are the result of this ever-celebrated battle. That infantry, so highly vaunted and superior in number, could not withstand your shocks, and thenceforward you have no rivals to fear. Thus in two months this third coalition has been vanquished and dissolved. Peace cannot now be far distant, but, as I promised my people before I passed the Rhine, I will make only such a peace as gives us guarantees and ensures rewards to our allies.

"Soldiers, when all that is necessary to secure the welfare and the prosperity of our country is accomplished, I will lead you back to France; there you will be the object of my tenderest concern. My people will see you again with joy, and it will be sufficient to say, I was at the battle of Austerlitz, for them to reply, There is a brave man. NAPOLEON."

It was necessary to follow the enemy, whom all accounts represented as being in disorderly retreat. In this confusion, Napoleon, misled by Murat, conjectured that the fugitive army was directing its course towards Olmütz, and he had sent off the cavalry and the corps of Lannes to that point. But on the following day, the 3rd of December, more accurate intelligence, collected by General Thiard, apprised him that the enemy was proceeding by the road to Hungary for the Morava. Napoleon hastened to recall his columns to Nasiedlowitz and Göding. Marshal Davout, reinforced by the junction of Friant's whole

* The exact number was not yet known.

division and by the arrival in line of Gudin's division, had lost no time, thanks to his nearer position to the Hungary road. He set out in pursuit of the Russians and pressed them closely. He intended to overtake them before the passage of the Morava, and to cut off perhaps a part of their army. After marching on the 3rd, he was on the morning of the 4th in sight of Göding, and nearly up with them. The greatest confusion prevailed in Göding. Beyond that place there was a mansion belonging to the Emperor of Germany, that of Holitsch, where the two allied sovereigns had taken refuge. The perturbation there was as great as at Göding. The Russian officers continued to hold the most unbecoming language respecting the Austrians. They laid the blame of the common defeat on them, as if they ought not to have attributed it to their own presumption, to the incapacity of their generals, and to the levity of their government. The Austrians, moreover, had behaved quite as well as the Russians on the field of battle.

The two vanquished monarchs were very cool towards each other. The Emperor Francis wished to confer with the Emperor Alexander before he went to the interview agreed upon with Napoleon. Both thought that they ought to solicit an armistice and peace, for it was impossible to continue the struggle. Alexander was desirous, though he did not acknowledge it, that himself and his army should be saved as soon as possible from the consequences of an impetuous pursuit, such as might be apprehended from Napoleon. As for the conditions, he left his ally to settle them as he pleased. The Emperor Francis alone having to defray the expenses of the war, the conditions on which peace should be signed concerned him exclusively. Some time before, the Emperor Alexander, setting himself up for the arbiter of Europe, would have insisted that those conditions concerned him also. His pride was less exigent since the battle of the 2nd of December.

The Emperor Francis accordingly set out for Nasiedlowitz, a village situated midway to the mansion of Austerlitz, and there, near the mill of Paleny, between Nasiedlowitz and Urschitz, amidst the French and the Austrian advanced posts, he found Napoleon waiting for him before a bivouac fire kindled by his soldiers. Napoleon had had the politeness to arrive first. He went to meet the Emperor Francis, received him as he alighted from his carriage, and embraced him. The Austrian monarch, encouraged by the welcome of his all-powerful foe, had a long conversation with him. The principal officers of the two armies, standing aside, beheld with great curiosity the extraordinary spectacle of the successor of the Cæsars vanquished and soliciting peace of the crowned soldier, whom the French Revolution had raised to the pinnacle of human greatness.

Napoleon apologised to the Emperor Francis for receiving him in such a place. "Such are the palaces," said he, "which your majesty has obliged me to inhabit for these three months." "The abode in them," replied the Austrian monarch, "makes you so thriving, that you have no right to be angry with me for it." The conversation then turned upon the general state of affairs, Napoleon insisting that he had been forced into the war against his will at a moment when he least expected it, and when he was exclusively engaged with England; the Emperor of Austria affirming that he had been urged to take arms solely by the designs of France in regard to Italy. Napoleon declared that, on the conditions already specified to M. de Giulay, and which he had no need to repeat, he was ready to sign a peace. The Emperor Francis, without explaining himself on this subject, wished to know how Napoleon was disposed in regard to the Russian army. Napoleon first required that the Emperor Francis should separate his cause from that of the Emperor Alexander, and that the Russian army should retire by regulated marches from the Austrian territories, and promised to grant him an armistice on this condition. As for peace with Russia, he added, that would be settled afterwards, for this peace concerned him alone. "Take my advice," said Napoleon to the Emperor Francis, "do not mix up your cause with that of the Emperor Alexander. Russia alone can now wage only a *fancy war* in Europe. Vanquished, she retires to her deserts, and you, you pay with your provinces the costs of the war." The forcible language of Napoleon expressed but too well the state of things in Europe between that great empire and the rest of the continent. The Emperor Francis pledged his word as a man and a sovereign not to renew the war, and above all to listen no more to the suggestions of powers which had nothing to lose in the struggle. He agreed to an armistice for himself and for the Emperor Alexander, an armistice, the condition of which was that the Russians should retire by regulated marches, and that the Austrian cabinet should immediately send negotiators empowered to sign a separate peace with France.

The two emperors parted with reiterated demonstrations of cordiality. Napoleon handed into his carriage that monarch whom he had just called his brother, and remounted his horse to return to Austerlitz.

General Savary was sent to suspend the march of Davout's corps. He first proceeded to Holitsch with the suite of the Emperor Francis, to learn whether the Emperor Alexander acceded to the proposed conditions. He saw the latter, around whom everything was much changed since the mission on which he was sent to him a few days before. "Your master,"

said Alexander to him, "has shown himself very great. I acknowledge all the power of his genius, and as for myself, I shall retire, since my ally is satisfied." General Savary conversed for some time with the young czar on the late battle, explained to him how the French army, inferior in number to the Russian army, had nevertheless appeared superior on all points, owing to the art of manœuvring which Napoleon possessed in so eminent a degree. He courteously added that with experience Alexander, in his turn, would become a warrior, but that so difficult an art was not to be learned in a day. After these flatteries to the vanquished monarch, he set out for Göding to stop Marshal Davout, who had rejected all the proposals for a suspension of arms, and was ready to attack the relics of the Russian army. To no purpose he had been assured in the name of the Emperor of Russia himself that an armistice was negotiating between Napoleon and the Emperor of Austria. He would not on any account abandon his prey. But General Savary stopped him with a formal order from Napoleon. These were the last musket-shots fired during that unexampled campaign. The troops of the several nations separated to go into winter quarters, awaiting what should be decided by the negotiators of the belligerent powers.

Napoleon proceeded from the mansion of Austerlitz to Brünn, to which place he had required M. de Talleyrand to repair, in order to settle the conditions of the peace, which could be no longer doubtful, since the resources of Austria were exhausted; and Russia, eager to obtain an armistice, was drawing off her army in the utmost haste into Poland. While the war of the first coalition had lasted five years, that of the second coalition two, the war raised by the third had lasted three months, so irresistible had become the power of revolutionary France, concentrated in a single hand, and so able and prompt was that hand to strike those whom it purposed to reach. The course of events had actually been such as Napoleon had marked out beforehand in his cabinet at Boulogne. He had taken the Austrians at Ulm almost without striking a blow; he had crushed the Russians at Austerlitz, and extricated Italy by the mere effect of his offensive march upon Vienna, and reduced the attacks on Hanover and Naples to mere acts of imprudence. The latter, in particular, after the battle of Austerlitz, was but a disastrous folly for the house of Bourbon. Europe was at the feet of Napoleon, and Prussia, hurried away for a moment by the coalition, was soon destined to find herself at the mercy of the captain whom she had offended and betrayed.

Still it required great skill to negotiate, for if our enemies, recovering from their terror, and abusing the engagements into which they had obliged Prussia to enter, forced her to intervene

in the negotiations, they might still, being three to one, dispute the conditions of the peace, and rob the conqueror of part of the advantages of the victory. Napoleon therefore determined that the negotiations should be carried on at Brünn, far from M. d'Haugwitz, whom he had sent to Vienna, and whom he obliged to stay there by promising to meet him in that capital.

While the armies were engaged in fighting, Messieurs de Giulay and de Stadion had held conferences at Vienna with M. de Talleyrand, and they had desired to negotiate in common for Russia and Austria, under the mediation of Prussia. Since the arrival of M. d'Haugwitz, they had politely but earnestly urged him to execute the convention of Potsdam, judging that if Prussia were comprehended in the negotiation, she would be obliged either to enforce the conditions of peace settled at Potsdam or take part in the war. M. d'Haugwitz had refused to treat in that manner, on the ground of the nature of his mission, which obliged him not to take his seat in a congress, but to treat directly with Napoleon, in order to bring him into the ideas adopted by the Prussian cabinet. Besides, M. de Talleyrand had cut short these pretensions by declaring that Austria alone would be admitted to the negotiation. He signified this resolution at Vienna on the 2nd of December, the very day on which the battle of Austerlitz was fought.

That battle being won, and the armistice demanded and granted at the bivouac of the conqueror, the separate negotiation was a condition accepted beforehand. Napoleon required, as we have related, that it should be opened immediately at Brünn with M. de Talleyrand. He caused it to be intimated that he consented to admit M. de Giulay to treat, but not M. de Stadion, formerly ambassador of Austria in Russia, full of the prejudices of the coalition, and raising from the very nature of his genius incessantly recurring difficulties. He pointed out for negotiator Prince John of Lichtenstein, who had pleased him by his frank and military manners. The latter was immediately sent to Brünn with M. de Giulay. The Emperor Francis being at Holitsch, it was possible to communicate with him in a few hours, and to settle very promptly any contested points. The negotiation was, therefore, opened at Brünn between Messieurs de Talleyrand, de Giulay, and de Lichtenstein. Napoleon, after he had fixed the basis, purposed to repair immediately to Vienna, to wring from M. d'Haugwitz a confession of the weaknesses and the falseness of Prussia, and to make him bear the punishment for them.

But what were to be the bases of the peace? This was what Napoleon and M. de Talleyrand discussed at Brünn, and what had been the subject of frequent and profound conversations between them.

The moment was perilous for the wisdom of Napoleon. Victorious in three months over a powerful coalition, having seen the most renowned soldiers of the continent flee before his soldiers, though inferior in number, was he not likely to acquire from his power an exaggerated sentiment, and to conceive a contempt for all European resistances? During the consulate, when he wished to conciliate France and Europe, he had been seen at home indulging parties, abroad overcoming Austria by victories, Russia by delicate caresses, Prussia by the skilfully employed bait of Germanic indemnities, England by the state of exclusion to which he had reduced her, pacifying the world in an almost miraculous manner, and displaying the most admirable of abilities, that of the force which knows how to restrain itself. But he had soon been seen also irritated by the ingratitude of parties, no longer keeping measures with them, and striking cruelly in the person of the Duc d'Enghien. He had been seen, exasperated at the provoking jealousy of England, throwing down the gauntlet which she had picked up, and collecting all human means to overwhelm her. Now, the powers of the continent, having without sufficient motive called him away from his struggle with England, and having drawn upon themselves defeats which were absolute disasters, was he not to deal with them as with his other enemies, and set aside those courtesies indispensable even to might, and which constitute the whole art of politics? Would a man who could always draw from his genius and the bravery of his soldiers such an event as Marengo or Austerlitz be accountable to any one on earth?

M. de Talleyrand, to whose character and to the part which he played during this reign we have already adverted, again made on this occasion some efforts to moderate Napoleon, but without much success. Fonder of pleasing than contradicting, having in regard to European politics inclinations rather than opinions, incessantly patronising Austria, doing ill offices to Prussia, from an old tradition of the cabinet of Versailles, he had rendered himself suspected of complaisance for the one and aversion for the other, and had not that credit with his sovereign which a firm and convinced mind could have obtained. However, on this as on other occasions, if he had not the merit of securing the ascendency for moderation, he had that of recommending it.

M. de Talleyrand, on the day after the battle of Austerlitz, gave to the intoxicated conqueror of Europe such advice as this.

It was requisite, according to him, to treat Austria with moderation and generosity. That power, considerably diminished during the last two centuries, ought to be much less an object of our jealousy than formerly. A new power ought to take its place in our prepossessions—that was Russia, and against this

latter Austria, so far from being a danger, was a useful barrier. Austria, a vast aggregation of nations foreign to each other, as Austrians, Sclavonians, Hungarians, Bohemians, Italians, might easily fall to pieces if the bond, already feeble, that held together the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, were to be further weakened; and its wrecks would have more tendency to attach themselves to Russia than to France. We ought, therefore, to desist from inflicting blows upon Austria, nay, to indemnify her for the new losses which she was about to sustain, and to indemnify her in a manner beneficial to Europe, which was not only possible, but easy.

M. de Talleyrand proposed an ingenious combination, but premature, indeed, in the then state of Europe: it was to give Austria the banks of the Danube, that is to say, Wallachia and Moldavia. These provinces, he said, would be worth more than Italy itself; they would console Austria for her losses, alienate her from Russia, render her, in regard to the latter, the bulwark of the Ottoman empire, as she already was that of Europe. These provinces, after embroiling her with Russia, would embroil her with England, and make her thenceforward the obliged ally of France.

As for Prussia, there was no need to put one's self out of the way on her account; we were at liberty to treat her as we pleased. It was decidedly a false, faint-hearted court, on which no reliance was to be placed. In order to please it, we ought not again to estrange Austria, the only ally whom we could think of in future.

Such were the opinions of M. de Talleyrand on this occasion. The advice to spare Austria, to console her, nay, even to indemnify her with well chosen equivalents, was excellent; for the true policy of Napoleon ought to have been to conquer and to spare everybody on the morrow of the victory. But the counsel to treat Prussia slightingly was pernicious, and proceeded from a false policy, to which we have already adverted. Assuredly it would have been desirable to have it in our power to give the provinces of the Danube to Austria, and above all to make her consider them as a sufficient compensation for her losses in Italy; but it is doubtful whether she would have assented to such a combination; for Wallachia and Moldavia, by alienating Russia and England from her, would have rendered her dependent on us. It is doubtful, besides, if one could at this period have distributed European territories so freely as was done two years later at Tilsit. Be this as it may, in determining to sway Italy, it was necessary to make up one's mind to find Austria an enemy, whatever consideration might be shown for her; and then what ally would there be to choose? We have already observed more than once that, embroiled with

England from the desire of equality at sea, with Russia from the desire of supremacy on the continent, unable to derive any benefit from disorganised Spain, what was left us but Prussia—Prussia, vacillating, it is true, but much more from the scruples of her sovereign than from the natural falseness of her cabinet—Prussia, having no interest contrary to ours, since she had not yet the Rhenish provinces, already compromised in our system, having her hands full of the spoils of the Church received from us, wishing for nothing better than to receive more of them, and ready to accept any conquest that would chain her for ever to our policy?

It was an egregious mistake, therefore, not to wish to spare Austria, but to believe that we could attach her seriously and so strongly that there was no longer any danger in ill-treating or neglecting Prussia.

Napoleon did not share the errors of Talleyrand, but he committed others from the passion for dominion, which the hatred of his enemies and the prodigious success of his armies began to excite in him beyond all reasonable bounds.

He had not sought a quarrel on the continent: they had come, on the contrary, to divert him from his grand enterprise against England, to declare war against him. Those who had begun that war, and who had got beaten, ought, according to him, to bear the consequences. He resolved, therefore, to obtain by the peace the complement of Italy, that is to say, the Venetian States, then in the possession of Austria, and likewise the definitive solution of the Germanic questions in favour of his allies, Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg.

On these two points Napoleon was peremptory, and it was not wrong of him to be so. He wanted Venice, the Friule, Istria, Dalmatia, in short, Italy as far as the Julian Alps, and the Adriatic with both its coasts, which would ensure him an action upon the Ottoman empire. As to Germany, he purposed first to confine Austria within her natural frontiers, the Inn and the Salza, to take from her the territories which she possessed in Suabia, and which were designated by the title of Hither Austria, territories which afforded her the means of annoying the German States in alliance with France, and of making whenever she pleased military preparations on the Upper Danube. He meant to deprive her of the communications of the Tyrol with the Lake of Constance and Switzerland, that is to say, of the Vorarlberg. He even intended, if possible, to wrest from her the Tyrol, which gave her possession of the Alps and an ever sure passage into Italy. But this last point was difficult to be obtained, because the Tyrol was an old possession of Austria's, as dear to her affections as valuable to her interests. It was inflicting on Austria a loss of about four millions of

subjects out of twenty-four, and of fifteen million florins out of a revenue of one hundred and three. These were, therefore, cruel sacrifices to require of her.

With all that he purposed to take from her in Germany, Napoleon intended to complete the patrimony of the three German States which had been his auxiliaries—Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. He intended also to procure for himself by means of these three States an action on the Diet, a road to the Danube, and to show in a signal manner that his alliance was beneficial to those who embraced it.

He purposed also to resolve favourably for those allied princes the question of the immediate nobility, and to abolish that nobility which created them enemies in their dominions. He meant likewise to resolve all questions of paramountship, and to suppress by that means a great number of rights of the feudal kind, very slavish and onerous to the Germanic States.

Lastly, Napoleon proposed, in order to attach solidly to himself the three princes of South Germany, to add the bond of matrimony to the bond of benefit. He wanted princes and princesses to unite with members of his dynasty. He calculated on finding them in Germany, and on thus joining to princely establishments the influence of family alliances.

Prince Eugène de Beauharnais was dear to his heart. He had made him Viceroy of Italy: he was seeking a wife for him. He had cast his eyes on the daughter of the Elector of Bavaria, a remarkable princess, and worthy of him for whom she was destined. As he reserved the greater part of the spoils of Austria for Bavaria, which the situation and the dangers of that electorate sufficiently justified, he wished that part of those spoils should be the dowry for the French prince.

But the Princess Augusta was promised to the heir of Baden, and her mother, the Electress of Bavaria, a violent enemy of France, alleged that engagement for rejecting an alliance which she disliked. General Thiard, having contracted intimacies with several of the minor German courts while serving in the army of Condé, had been sent to Munich and Baden to remove the obstacles which opposed the projected unions. That officer, a clever negotiator, had made use of the Countess of Hochberg, who was united by a left-handed marriage with the reigning Elector of Baden, and who had need of France to obtain the acknowledgment of her children. Through the influence of this lady he had induced the court of Baden to a very delicate step, namely, to desist from all views on the hand of the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. This point gained, the Elector and the Electress of Bavaria were left without pretext for refusing an alliance which brought them a dowry of the Tyrol and part of Suabia.

This was not the only German union which Napoleon thought of. The heir of Baden, from whom the Princess Augusta of Bavaria had just been taken, was yet to be provided for. Napoleon destined for him Mademoiselle Stephanie de Beauharnais, a person endowed with grace and a superior understanding, and whom he intended to create imperial princess. He charged General Thiard to conclude this match also. Lastly, the old Duke of Wurtemberg had a daughter, the Princess Catherine, whose noble qualities have since been conspicuously called forth by adversity. Napoleon wished to obtain her for his brother Jerome. But a marriage contracted by the latter in America, without the authorisation of his family, was an obstacle which could not yet be removed. It was necessary, therefore, to defer this last establishment. To all the aggrandisements of territory which he was preparing for the houses of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, Napoleon purposed to add the title of king, leaving to those houses the place which they had in the Germanic confederation.

Such were the advantages which Napoleon intended to derive from his late victories. To require the whole of Italy was, on his part, natural and consistent. To seek in the Austrian possessions in Suabia means of aggrandising the princes, his allies, was extremely judicious, for Austria was thus thrust back behind the Inn, and the alliance of France was rendered manifestly beneficial. To take the Vorarlberg from Austria in order to give it to Bavaria was also wise, for she was then separated from Switzerland. But to take the Tyrol from her, though it was a good combination in reference to Italy, was filling her heart with implacable resentment; it was reducing her to a despair, which, concealed for the moment, would break forth sooner or later; it was condemning one's self more than ever to a cautious policy, clever at finding and at keeping alliances, since it rendered the principal of the powers of the continent an irreconcilable foe. To resolve the question of the immediate nobility and several other feudal questions might be a useful simplification in regard to the internal organisation of Germany. But to aggrandise in an extraordinary degree the Princes of Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, to connect them with France so closely as to render them suspected to Germany, was to create for them a false position, from which they would some day be tempted to extricate themselves by becoming unfaithful to their protector; it was making enemies of all the German princes who were not favoured; it was wounding in a new fashion Austria, already wounded in so many ways, and, what was still worse, disobliging Prussia herself; in short, it was interfering further than was becoming in the affairs of Germany, and raising up against one's self jealous spirits and petty ingrates. Napoleon

ought not to have forgotten that he had caused cannon to be pointed at the gates of Stuttgart in order to break them open; that he was obliged at that moment to make use of a foreign woman to obtain a marriage at Baden, and almost to wring from the Elector of Bavaria his daughter, who had been obtained only by appearing with the keys of the Tyrol in one hand and the sword of France in the other.

Napoleon, then, overstepped the true limit of French policy in Germany in creating for himself allies too much detached from the German system, and by no means sure, because their position would be false. But it is difficult to observe moderation in victory; besides, he was a new monarch; he was an excellent head of a family; he wanted alliances and marriages.

Such were the ideas that served for the foundation of the instructions left with M. de Talleyrand for the negotiation commenced with Messieurs de Giulay and Lichtenstein. He added one condition for the benefit of the army, which was not less dear to him than his brothers and nieces; he demanded 100 millions, for the purpose of forming a provision not only for the officers of all ranks, but also for the widows and children of those who had fallen in battle; without losing time, he signed three treaties of alliance with Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. He gave to Baden the Ortenau and part of the Brisgau, several towns on the shore of the Lake of Constance, that is to say, 113,000 inhabitants, which was an augmentation of about one-fourth to the territories of that house. He gave to the house of Wurtemberg the rest of the Brisgau, and considerable portions of Suabia, that is to say, 183,000 inhabitants, which formed an augmentation of more than a fourth, and raised the population of that principality to nearly a million. Lastly, to Bavaria he gave the Vorarlberg, the bishoprics of Eichstädt and Passau, recently allotted to the Elector of Salzburg, all Austrian Suabia, the city and bishopric of Augsburg, that is to say, a million inhabitants, which raised Bavaria from two millions to three, and added a third to her possessions. The progress of the negotiations with Austria did not admit of any mention being yet made of the Tyrol.

To these princes were, moreover, attributed all the rights of sovereignty over the immediate nobility, and they were relieved from the feudal services claimed by the Emperor of Germany on account of certain portions of their territories.

The Elector of Baden having the modesty to refuse the title of king as too superior to his revenues, the title of elector was left him; but that of king was immediately conferred on the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg.

In return for these advantages, those three princes engaged to assist France in any war which she might have to wage in

future in support of her state at this time, and in any which might result from the treaty about to be concluded with Austria. France, on her part, engaged, whenever it should be necessary, to take up arms to maintain these princes in their new situation.

These treaties were signed on the 10th, 12th, and 20th of December. They were delivered to General Thiard when he set off to negotiate the projected marriages.

Thus a portion of the territories of Austria had been disposed of beforehand, and without the consent of that power. But the conqueror gave himself little concern about the consequences to which this proceeding exposed him.

Napoleon, after attending to his wounded, after sending off for Vienna those at least who were capable of being removed, after despatching to France the prisoners and the cannon taken from the enemy, quitted Brünn, leaving M. de Talleyrand to discuss the prescribed conditions with Messieurs de Giulay and de Lichtenstein. He was impatient to have a long conversation at Vienna with M. d'Haugwitz, and to dive to the bottom of the secret of Prussia.

M. de Talleyrand entered immediately into conference with the two Austrian negotiators. They strongly remonstrated when they were made acquainted with the pretensions of the French minister, and as yet there had been no explanation respecting the Tyrol; nothing had been said but about the desire to separate Austria from Italy and Switzerland to cut short all causes for rivalry and war.

Messieurs de Lichtenstein and de Giulay communicated, on their part, the conditions to which Austria was ready to consent. She saw clearly that she must relinquish the Venetian States, the possessions which she had in Suabia, and litigious pretensions between the empire and the German princes. She consented, therefore, to cede Venice and the terra firma as far as the Izonzo; but she wished to keep Istria and Albania and to gain Ragusa, as debouchés necessary for Hungary. These were, besides, the last remains of the acquisitions obtained by the reigning emperor, and he made it a point of honour to preserve them.

As for the Tyrol, she was almost disposed to give that up, but by transferring it to the then Elector of Salzburg, the Archduke Ferdinand, who had been compensated in 1803 for Tuscany by the bishopric of Salzburg and the provostship of Berchtolsgaden. She wanted Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden in exchange, and moreover she required that the Vorarlberg, Lindau, and the shores of the Lake of Constance should be given to the same archduke, as dependencies of the Tyrol.

By this arrangement Austria would have acquired Salzburg, and kept the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, in the person of one of her archdukes.

For the rest, she consented to cede the Austrian possessions in Suabia, likewise the Ortenau, the Brisgau, the bishoprics of Eichstädt and Passau. But she demanded for the princes of her house who would lose those possessions a large compensation, which will appear singularly devised, and show with what sentiments the members of the European coalition were animated towards one another—she demanded Hanover.

Thus this patrimony of the King of England, which Napoleon had been censured for offering to Prussia, and Prussia for accepting from Napoleon, which Russia came herself to propose to Prussia in order to detach her from France, Austria, in her turn, demanded for an archduke!

M. de Talleyrand, delighted to find such claims brought forward, made no remonstrance on hearing them expressed, and promised to communicate them to Napoleon.

Lastly, with regard to the contribution of 100 millions, Austria declared it impossible for her to pay ten, so completely was she exhausted. In compensation for such a sum, she offered to give up the immense matériel in arms and ammunition of all kinds which were in the Venetian States, and which she would have had a right to carry away if she had not stipulated to leave it.

After warm debates, which lasted but three or four days, since both parties were in haste to bring matters to a close, it was agreed that the Prince de Lichtenstein should go to the Emperor Francis at Holitsch, to obtain fresh instructions, as those with which he was furnished did not authorise him to subscribe to the sacrifices required by Napoleon.

M. de Talleyrand was to remain at Brünn till his return. It was a great fault of the Austrians to lose time; for what was passing at Vienna between Napoleon and M. d'Haugwitz was about to place them in a still worse situation.

M. de Talleyrand, who from Brünn corresponded daily with Vienna, had informed Napoleon that he was not near settling with the Austrian negotiators. This resistance, which would have deserved serious attention if it had been combined with the resistance of Prussia, annoyed Napoleon. The archdukes were approaching Presburg, followed by 100,000 men. The Prussian troops were assembling in Saxony and in Franconia; the Anglo-Russians were advancing in Hanover. These conjoint circumstances did not alarm the victor of Austerlitz. He was ready, if need were, to fight the archdukes under the walls of Presburg, and then to fall upon Prussia by way of Bohemia. But it was beginning afresh a dangerous game with Europe, coalesced this time whole and entire, and he would not have been wise to expose himself to the risk for a few square leagues more or less. Though the position of Napoleon was that of an

all-powerful conqueror, it did not dispense him from the duty of behaving like an able politician. It was Prussia that it particularly behoved his skill to keep sight of; for, profiting by the terror with which the recent events of the war had filled her, he might take her away from the coalition, attach her again to France, and add to the victory of Austerlitz a diplomatic victory not less decisive. He was, therefore, extremely impatient to see and to converse with M. d'Haugwitz.

M. d'Haugwitz, who had come to impose conditions on Napoleon, under the false appearance of an officious mediation, found him triumphant and almost master of Europe. No doubt with firmness, union, perseverance, it would still be possible to make head against the Emperor of the French. But Russia had passed from the delirium of pride to the despondency of defeat. And, besides, all the allies, distrusting one another, communicated but little among themselves. M. d'Haugwitz frequented incessantly and exclusively the French legation, and carried flattery to such a length as to wear every day in Vienna the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour,* never spoke but with admiration of Austerlitz and of the genius of Napoleon, and could not help feeling a strong agitation when thinking of the reception which he was about to meet with.

Napoleon having arrived on the 13th of December at Vienna, sent the same evening for M. d'Haugwitz to Schönbrunn, and gave audience to him in the cabinet of Maria Theresa. He knew not yet all that had taken place at Potsdam; he knew more, however, than when he saw M. d'Haugwitz at Brünn, the day before the battle. He was informed of the existence of a treaty signed on the 3rd of November, by which Prussia engaged eventually to join the coalition. He was warm and easily irritated, but frequently he feigned anger rather than felt it. Striving on this occasion to intimidate his visitor, he reproached M. d'Haugwitz most vehemently for having, he, the minister, who was the friend of peace, he who had placed his glory in the system of neutrality, who had even desired to convert that neutrality into a plan of alliance with France—he reproached him for having had the weakness to unite himself at Potsdam with Russia and Austria, for having contracted with those two powers engagements which could lead him to nothing but war. He complained bitterly of the duplicity of his cabinet, of the hesitations of his sovereign, of the empire of women over his court, and gave him to understand that, being now rid of the enemies whom he had upon his hands, he was at liberty to do what he pleased with Prussia. He then asked with vehemence what the Prussian cabinet wanted, what system it calcu-

* It is M. de Talleyrand who relates these particulars in one of his letters to Napoleon.

lated on pursuing, and seemed to require complete, categorical, immediate explanations upon all these points.

M. d'Haugwitz, agitated at first, soon recovered himself, for he had not less presence of mind than intelligence. Amidst all this boisterous passion, he imagined that he could perceive that Napoleon at bottom was desirous of a reconciliation, and that if the engagements entered into with the coalition were very speedily broken, this conqueror, apparently so incensed, would consent to be appeased.

M. d'Haugwitz then gave his artful, specious, fawning explanations of the circumstances which had overpowered and hurried Prussia away; mentioned, not indiscreetly, those who had suffered themselves to be controlled by pure accident to such a degree as to depart from the true system which was suitable for their country; and concluded with insinuating plainly enough that all would be speedily repaired, and even that the alliance which had so often miscarried might become the instantaneous price of an immediate reconciliation.

Napoleon, casting a piercing look into the soul of M. d'Haugwitz, perceived that the Prussians desired nothing better than to face about and come back to him. To all the blows that he had inflicted on Europe, he had taken pleasure in adding a piece of arch raillery; and he took it into his head to offer on the spot to M. d'Haugwitz the plan which Duroc had been ordered to present at Berlin, that is to say, the formal alliance of Prussia with France, on the so oft renewed condition of Hanover. This was certainly carrying the attempt upon the honour of the Prussian cabinet to a great length; for Napoleon proposed to it, for the sake of money, one may say, to dissolve the ties recently contracted over the coffin of the great Frederick; and he proposed to it, after deserting France at Potsdam for the benefit of Europe, to desert Europe at Vienna for the benefit of France. Napoleon did not hesitate, and while uttering this proposal he kept his eyes long fixed on the face of M. d'Haugwitz.

The Prussian minister appeared neither angry nor surprised. He seemed delighted, on the contrary, to carry back from Vienna, instead of a declaration of war, Hanover, with the alliance of France, which was his favourite system. It should be observed, in excuse for M. d'Haugwitz, that, having left Berlin at a moment when people there were flattering themselves that Napoleon would not reach Vienna, he had seen, even in this supposition, the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollendorf uneasy about the consequences of a war against France, and insisting that no declaration should be issued before the end of December. Now Napoleon had taken Vienna, crushed all the allies at Austerlitz, and it was only the 13th of December. M.

d'Haugwitz had reason to apprehend that the conqueror might make a rapid incursion into Bohemia and fall like lightning upon Berlin. He thought himself fortunate, therefore, in terminating with a conquest a situation which threatened to terminate in a disaster. As for fidelity towards the coalesced powers, he treated them as they treated each other. Besides, for the line of conduct which he had pursued at Vienna, we must find fault not so much with him as with those who, in his absence, had entangled Prussia in a defile having no outlet. He accepted, therefore, the offer of Napoleon without further consideration.

The latter, gratified to see that his proposal was successful, said to M. d'Haugwitz, "Well, then, the thing is decided, you shall have Hanover. You will give me in return some patches of territory that I want, and sign a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. But on your arrival in Berlin you will impose silence on the coteries; you will treat them with the contempt which they deserve; you will make the policy of the ministry predominate over that of the court." The allusions of Napoleon pointed to the queen, to Prince Louis, and to those about them. He then enjoined Duroc to confer with M. d'Haugwitz, and to prepare immediately the draft of the treaty.

No sooner was this arrangement concluded than Napoleon, delighted with his work, wrote to M. de Talleyrand, desiring him not to bring matters to a conclusion at Brünn, to protract the negotiation for a few days longer, for he was certain of settling with Prussia, which he had conquered at the price of Hanover, and thenceforward he had no need to concern himself either about the threats of the Anglo-Russians against Holland, or the movements of the archdukes from the direction of Hungary. He added, that he would now peremptorily insist on the Tyrol, on the war contribution more resolutely than ever, and that, for the rest, he must leave Brünn and come to Vienna. The negotiation was too far from him at Brünn; he wished to have it nearer, at Presburg, for instance.

It was on the 13th of December when Napoleon had the interview with M. d'Haugwitz. The treaty was drawn up on the 14th, and signed on the 15th at Schönbrunn. The principal conditions were the following:—

France, considering Hanover as her own conquest, ceded it to Prussia. Prussia, in return, ceded to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, that province which it was so difficult to avoid passing through when at war with Austria. She ceded, moreover, to France the principality of Neufchatel and the duchy of Cleves, containing the fortress of Wesel. The two powers guaranteed all their possessions; that is to say, Prussia guaran-

teed to France her present limits, with the new acquisitions made in Italy and the new arrangements concluded in Germany; and France guaranteed to Prussia her state at that time, including the additions of 1803 and the new addition of Hanover. It was an absolute treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, which, moreover, bore that formal title, a title repudiated in all anterior treaties.

Napoleon had demanded Neufchatel, Cleves, and particularly Anspach, which he meant to exchange with Bavaria for the duchy of Berg, in order to have endowments to confer on his best servants. To Prussia these were very small sacrifices, and to him valuable means of reward; for in his vast designs he would not be great without making all about him great—his ministers, his generals, as well as his relations.

This negotiation was a master-stroke; it covered the allies with confusion; it placed Austria at the discretion of Napoleon; and above all, it secured to the latter the only desirable and possible alliance, the alliance of Prussia. But it contained a serious engagement, the engagement to wring Hanover from England, which might some day be found extremely troublesome, as it was to be apprehended that it might prevent a maritime peace, if sooner or later circumstances rendered such a peace possible.

Napoleon wrote immediately afterwards to M. de Talleyrand that the treaty with Prussia was signed, and that he must leave Brünn if the Austrians did not accept the conditions which he meant to impose upon them.

M. de Talleyrand, who would have been glad if peace had been already concluded, who disliked above all to maltreat Austria, was deeply vexed. As for the Austrian negotiators, they were thunderstruck. They brought from Holitsch fresh concessions, but not so extensive as those which had been required of them. They knew that Prussia, in order to obtain Hanover, exposed them to the loss of the Tyrol, and notwithstanding the danger of further delay, and of seeing Napoleon make perhaps fresh demands, a danger of which M. de Talleyrand took pains to convince them, they were obliged to refer to their sovereign.

They parted, therefore, at Brünn, promising to meet again at Presburg. The abode at Brünn had become unwholesome from the effluvia exhaled by a soil crowded with corpses and a town filled with hospitals.

M. de Talleyrand returned to Vienna, and found Napoleon ready to renew the war if his terms were not agreed to. He had actually ordered General Songis to repair the matériel of the artillery, and to augment it at the expense of the arsenal of Vienna. He had even addressed a severe reprimand to Fouché,

the minister of police, for having allowed peace to be announced too soon as certain.

One very recent circumstance had contributed to incense him more. He had just received intelligence of what was occurring at Naples. That senseless court, after stipulating (by the advice of Russia, it is true) a treaty of neutrality, had all at once thrown off the mask and taken up arms. When informed of the battle of Trafalgar and the engagements contracted by Prussia, Queen Caroline had concluded that Napoleon was ruined, and had determined to send for the Russians. On the 19th of November a naval division had landed on the coast of Naples 12,000 Russians and 6000 English. The court of Naples had engaged to add 40,000 Neapolitans to the Anglo-Russian army. The plan was to raise Italy in the rear of the French, while Massena was at the foot of the Julian Alps and Napoleon almost on the frontiers of ancient Poland. That court of emigrants had given way to the habitual weakness of emigrants, which is to believe always what they wish and to act accordingly.

Napoleon, when apprised of this scandalous violation of faith pledged, was at once irritated and pleased. His resolution was taken; the Queen of Naples should pay with her kingdom for the conduct which she had pursued, and leave vacant a crown which would be extremely well placed in the Bonaparte family. Nobody in Europe could tax with injustice the sovereign act that should strike this branch of the house of Bourbon; and as for its natural protectors, Napoleon had no need to care about them.

Meanwhile the Austrian negotiators at Brünn had endeavoured to obtain the insertion in the treaty of peace of some article which should cover the court of Naples, of whose secret, though yet unknown to Napoleon, they were apprised. But the latter, when once informed, gave a positive order to M. de Talleyrand not to listen to anything on that subject. I should be too weak, said he, were I to put up with the insults of that wretched court of Naples. You know with what generosity I have treated it; but that is over now; Queen Caroline shall cease to reign in Italy. Happen what will, never mention it in the treaty. That is my absolute will.

The negotiators were waiting at Presburg for M. de Talleyrand. He repaired thither. The negotiations were held at the advanced posts of the two armies. The archdukes had approached Presburg: they were within two marches of Vienna. Napoleon had collected there the greater part of his troops. He had brought Massena by the route of Styria. Nearly 200,000 French were concentrated around the capital of Austria. Napoleon, extremely incensed, had determined to resume hos-

tilities. But it would have been too great a folly on the part of the court of Vienna to permit that, especially after the defection of Prussia, and in the disheartened state of the Russian cabinet. Great as were the sacrifices required of the Austrian cabinet, though affecting at first to repel the idea, it had made up its mind to submit to them.

It was therefore agreed that Austria should give up the State of Venice, with the provinces of the terra firma, such as Friule, Istria, and Dalmatia. Trieste and the Bocca di Cattaro were also to be ceded to France. These territories were to be annexed to the kingdom of Italy. The separation of the crowns of France and Italy was anew stipulated, but with a vagueness of expression which left the faculty of deferring that separation till the general peace or till the death of Napoleon.

Bavaria obtained the Tyrol, the object of her everlasting longing, the German Tyrol as well as the Italian Tyrol. Austria, in return, obtained the principalities of Salzburg and Berchtolsgaden, given in 1803 to the Archduke Ferdinand, previously Grand Duke of Tuscany; and Bavaria indemnified the archduke by ceding to him the ecclesiastical principality of Wurzburg, which she likewise had obtained in 1803 in consequence of the secularisations.

The territory of Austria was thus rendered more compact; but with the Tyrol she lost all influence over Switzerland and Italy, and the Archduke Ferdinand, removed into the centre of Franconia, ceased to be under her immediate influence. The State granted to that prince was not, as before, a mere dependency of the Austrian monarchy.

To this indemnity, found in the country of Salzburg, was added for Austria the secularisation of the possessions of the Teutonic Order, and their conversion to hereditary property in favour of any of the archdukes whom she should point out. The importance of these possessions consisted in a population of 120,000 inhabitants, and a revenue of 150,000 florins.

The electoral title of the Archduke Ferdinand was upheld, and transferred from the principality of Salzburg to the principality of Wurzburg.

Austria, recognising the royalty of the Electors of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, consented that the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria should have the same prerogatives over the immediate nobility in their territories as the emperor had over the immediate nobility in his. This was equivalent to the suppression of that nobility in the three States in question, for the powers of the emperor over that nobility being complete, those of the three princes became equally so.

Lastly, the imperial chancellery renounced all rights of feudal origin in the three States favoured by France.

The approbation of the Diet was, however, formally reserved. France effected in this manner a social revolution in a considerable part of Germany; for she centralised power there for the benefit of the territorial sovereign, and put an end to all external feudal dependence. She continued also the system of secularisations, for with the Teutonic Order disappeared one of the last two ecclesiastical principalities remaining, and the only one then left was that of the prince arch-chancellor, Ecclesiastical Elector of Ratisbon. Conformably with what had previously been done, this secularisation also was effected for the benefit of one of the principal courts of Germany.

Austria, definitively excluded from Italy, despoiled by the loss of the Tyrol of the commanding positions which she had in the Alps, thrust back behind the Inn, deprived of every advanced post in Suabia, and of the feudal rights which subjected the States of South Germany to her, had sustained immense losses, material and political. She lost, as we have already observed, four millions of subjects out of twenty-four, fifteen millions of florins out of a revenue of 103.

The treaty was well conceived for the peace of Italy and Germany. There was only one objection to be made to it, namely, that the vanquished, too ill-treated, could not submit sincerely. It was for Napoleon, by great discretion, by judicious alliances, to leave Austria without hope and without means of revolting against the decisions of victory.

At the moment of signing such a treaty, the hands of the plenipotentiaries hesitated. They stood out on two points, the war contribution of 100 millions and Naples. Napoleon had reduced the contribution demanded to 50 millions, on account of the sums in the chests of Austria to which he had already helped himself. As for Naples, he would not hear a word about her.

In order to overcome him, a proceeding of pure courtesy was devised, namely, to send to him the Archduke Charles, a prince whose character and talents he honoured, and whom he had never seen. He was solicited to receive him at Vienna, and assented very cheerfully, but firmly resolved to abate nothing. It was expected that this prince, one of the first generals in Europe, explaining to him the resources which the Austrian monarchy still possessed, expressing the sentiments of the army, ready to sacrifice itself in rejecting a humiliating peace, joining adroit solicitations to these remonstrances, might perhaps soften Napoleon. Hence when M. de Talleyrand urged the negotiators to bring the business to a conclusion, they replied that they should be accused of having betrayed their country if they gave their signatures before the interview which Napoleon was to have with the archduke.

However, M. de Talleyrand having taken it upon himself to relinquish 10 millions more of the war contribution, they signed on the 26th of December the treaty of Presburg, one of the most glorious that Napoleon ever concluded, and certainly the best conceived; for if France afterwards obtained more extensive territories, it was at the price of arrangements less acceptable to Europe, and therefore less durable. The Austrian negotiators confined themselves to the recommendation of the reigning house of Naples to the generosity of the conqueror, in a letter signed by them both. The archduke visited Napoleon on the 27th in one of the imperial palaces, was received by him with the respect due to his rank and his renown, conversed with him on the military art, which was perfectly natural between two captains of such merit, and then retired without having said a word about the affairs of the two empires.

Napoleon made preparations for leaving Austria immediately. He ordered 2000 pieces of cannon and 100,000 muskets, found in the arsenal of Vienna, to be shipped on the Danube; he despatched 150 pieces to Palma Nova, to arm that important fortress, which commanded the Venetian States of the terra firma. He regulated the return of his soldiers in such a manner that it should take place by short marches, for he would not have them go back as they had come, on the run. The necessary arrangements were made on the route for their abundant supply. He ordered two millions to be distributed forthwith among the officers of all ranks, that every one might immediately enjoy the fruits of the victory. Berthier was appointed to superintend the return of the army to the territory of France. It was to evacuate Vienna in five days, and to repass the Inn in twenty. It was stipulated that the fortress of Braunau should remain in the hands of the French till the complete payment of the contribution of 40 millions.

This done, Napoleon set out for Munich, where he was received with transport. The Bavarians, who were one day to betray him in his defeat, and to oblige the French army to fight its way through them at Hanau, covered with their applause, pursued with ardent curiosity, the conqueror who had saved them from invasion, constituted them into a kingdom, enriched them with the spoils of vanquished Austria. Napoleon, after attending the wedding of Eugène Beauharnais and the Princess Augusta, after enjoying the happiness of a son whom he loved, the admiration of the people, eager to see him, the flatteries of an enemy, the Electress of Bavaria, set out for Paris, where the enthusiasm of France awaited him.

A campaign of three months, instead of a war of several years, as it had at first been feared, the continent disarmed, the French empire extended to limits which it ought never to have passed,

a dazzling glory added to our arms, public and private credit miraculously restored, new prospects of peace and prosperity opened to the nation under a government powerful and respected by the world—that was what the people meant to thank him for by a thousand times repeated shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur.*" With these cries he was greeted even at Strasburg on crossing the Rhine, and they accompanied him to Paris, which he entered on the 26th of January 1806. It was a second return from Marengo. Austerlitz was in fact for the empire what Marengo had been for the consulate. Marengo had confirmed the consular power in the hands of Napoleon; Austerlitz secured the imperial crown upon his head. Marengo had caused France to pass in one day from a threatening situation to a tranquil and grand situation; Austerlitz, by crushing in a day a formidable coalition, produced a not less important result. For calm and reflecting minds, if any such were left in presence of these events, there was but one subject for fear—the inconstancy of Fortune, and what is still more to be dreaded, the weakness of the human mind, which sometimes bears adversity without quailing, rarely prosperity without committing great faults.

BOOK XXIV.

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

WHILE Napoleon was staying a few days at Munich to celebrate the marriage of Eugène de Beauharnais with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria; while he was stopping one day at Stuttgart, another at Carlsruhe, to receive the congratulations of his new allies, and to conclude family alliances there; the people of Paris were waiting with the utmost impatience to testify their joy and their admiration. France, thoroughly satisfied with the conduct of the public affairs, though no longer taking any part in them, seemed to have recovered the vivacity of the first days of the Revolution to applaud the marvellous exploits of her armies and of her chief. Napoleon, who with the genius for great things combined the art to set them off, had sent before him the colours taken from the enemy. He had given orders for a distribution of them that was very skilfully calculated. He had divided them among the Senate, the Tribunate, the city of Paris, and the ancient church of Notre Dame, which had witnessed his coronation. He gave eight to the Tribunate, eight to the city of Paris, fifty-four to the Senate, fifty to the church of Notre Dame. During the whole of the campaign he had never ceased to inform the Senate of all the events of the war, and when peace was signed he had hastened to communicate to it by a message the treaty of Presburg. In this manner he repaid by continual attentions the confidence of that great body, and in acting thus he was consistent with his policy; for he kept in a high rank those old authors of the Revolution, whom the new generation was glad to get rid of when the elections furnished it with the means of doing so. These were his own aristocracy, which he hoped to melt down by degrees into the old one.

These colours passed through Paris on the 15th of January 1806, and were borne triumphantly along the streets of the capital, to be placed under the roofs of the edifices which were to contain them. An immense concourse collected to witness this spectacle.

The cool and unimpassioned Cambacérès himself says, in his

grave Memoirs, that the joy of the people resembled intoxication. And wherefore, indeed, should they rejoice if not on such occasions! Four hundred thousand Russians, Swedes, English, Austrians were marching from all points of the horizon against France, two hundred thousand Prussians promising to join them, and, all at once, a hundred thousand French, starting from the coasts of the ocean, traversing in two months a great part of the European continent, taking the first army opposed to them without fighting, inflicting redoubled blows on the others, entering the astonished capital of the ancient Germanic empire, passing beyond Vienna and going to the frontiers of Poland to break in one great battle the bond of the coalition; sending back the vanquished Russians to their frozen plains, and chaining the disconcerted Prussians to their frontiers; the dread of a war which might be expected to last long terminated in three months; the peace of the continent suddenly restored, the peace of the seas justly hoped for; all the prospects of prosperity given back to France, delighted and placed at the head of the nations—for what should people rejoice, we repeat, if not for such marvels? And as at that time none could foresee the too speedy end of this greatness, or yet discern in the too fertile genius that produced it the too ardent genius also that was destined to compromise it, one sympathised in the public happiness without any mixture of sinister presentiments.

The men who are particularly affected by the material prosperity of States, the merchants, the capitalists, were not less moved than the rest of the nation. The great commercial houses, which in victory applauded the speedy return of peace —the great commercial houses were delighted to see the double crisis of public and private credit terminated in a day, and to have reason to hope anew for that profound tranquillity which for five years the consulate had conferred on France. The Senate, on receiving the colours destined for it, ordained by a decree that a triumphal monument should be erected to Napoleon the Great. Conformably with the wish of the Tribunate this monument was to be a column surmounted by the statue of Napoleon. His birthday was placed among the national festivals, and it was, moreover, determined that a spacious edifice should be erected in one of the public places of the capital, to receive, along with a series of sculptures and paintings, dedicated to the glory of the French armies, the sword which Napoleon used at the battle of Austerlitz.

The colours destined for Notre Dame were delivered to the clergy of that cathedral by the municipal authorities. "These colours," said the venerable Archbishop of Paris, "suspended from the roof of our church, will attest to our latest posterity

the efforts of Europe in arms against us, the great achievements of our soldiers, the protection of heaven over France, the prodigious successes of our invincible emperor, and the homage which he pays to God of his victories."

It was amidst this profound and universal satisfaction that Napoleon entered Paris, accompanied by the empress. The heads of the bank, desirous that his presence should be the signal of the public prosperity, had waited till the day before his arrival to resume their payments in cash. Since the late events, reviving confidence had poured abundance of specie into its coffers. Of the temporary embarrassments of the month of December not a trace was left.

With Napoleon, joy on account of success never interrupted business. His indefatigable spirit could unite at once business and pleasure. Having arrived in the evening of the 26th of January, on the morning of the 27th he was wholly absorbed in the cares of government. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was the first personage of the empire with whom he conversed on that day. After some moments given to the pleasure of receiving his congratulations, and seeing his prudence confounded by the prodigies of the late war, he spoke to him about the financial crisis, so speedily and so happily terminated. He believed, and with reason, the accuracy, the equity, of the reports of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès; he wished, therefore, to hear him before any other person. He was extremely irritated against M. de Marbois, whose gravity had always imposed upon him, and whom he had deemed incapable of carelessness in business. He was far from suspecting the high integrity of that minister, but he could not forgive him for having delivered up all the resources of the treasury to adventurous speculators, and he was resolved to display great severity. The arch-chancellor contrived to pacify him, and to demonstrate that, instead of using rigour, it would be better to treat with the United Merchants for the transfer of all their assets, in order to wind up this strange transaction with the least possible loss.

Napoleon instantly summoned a council to the Tuileries, and desired to be furnished with a detailed report of the operations of the company, which were still obscure to him. He required the attendance of all the ministers, and also of M. Mollien, director of the Sinking Fund, whose management he approved, and whom he thought to possess in a much higher degree than M. de Marbois the dexterity necessary for the administration of funds on a great scale. He sent an authoritative order to Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard, and to the clerk who was accused of having deceived the minister of the treasury, to come to the Tuileries.

All the persons who attended were intimidated by the pre-

sence of the emperor, who did not conceal his resentment. M. de Marbois began reading a long report which he had drawn up relative to the subject under discussion. He had not read far before Napoleon, interrupting him, said, "I see how it is. It was with the funds of the treasury and those of the bank that the company of United Merchants calculated on providing supplies for France and Spain. And as Spain had nothing to give but promises of piastres, it is with the money of France that the wants of both countries have been supplied. Spain owed me a subsidy, and it is I who have furnished her with one. Now Messieurs Desprez, Vanlerberghe, and Ouvrard must give up to me all they possess; Spain must pay me what she owes them, or I will shut up those gentlemen in Vincennes and send an army to Madrid."

Napoleon appeared cold and stern towards M. de Marbois. "I esteem your character," said he, "but you have been the dupe of men against whom I warned you to be upon your guard. You have given up to them all the effects in the portfolio, over the employment of which you ought to have been more watchful. I regret to find myself obliged to withdraw from you the administration of the treasury, for after what has happened I cannot leave it to you any longer." Napoleon then ordered the members of the company, who had been summoned to the Tuileries, to be introduced. Messieurs Vanlerberghe and Desprez, though the least reprehensible, melted into tears. M. Ouvrard, who had compromised the company by hazardous speculations, was perfectly calm. He endeavoured to persuade Napoleon that he ought to permit him to wind up himself the very complicated affairs in which he had involved his partners, and that he should bring over from Mexico by way of Holland and England considerable sums, and far superior to those which France had advanced.*

It is probable that he would have managed the winding up of these affairs much better than any other person; but Napoleon was too incensed, and too impatient to get out of the hands of speculators, to trust to his promises. He left M. Ouvrard and his partners the alternative of a criminal prosecution or the immediate surrender of all they possessed, whether stores, paper

* In justice to the memory of my deceased friend, M. Gabriel Julien Ouvrard, I feel called upon to state that, in his Memoirs, published in 1826, he gives a very different version of these transactions and of his interview with Napoleon on the above occasion. M. Ouvrard expired in London on the 21st of October 1846, aged seventy-six years. The manuscript memoirs which he has left, and which form the sequel of his published autobiography, are replete with interesting matter, and contain some startling disclosures respecting the French Revolution of 1830, and the intrigues which preceded, attended, and followed it. It is likely that the English public will soon be enabled to peruse in print these piquant revelations.—D. F. C.

securities, immovables, or pledges received from Spain. They submitted to this cruel sacrifice.

This was sure to prove a ruinous liquidation for them, but they had rendered themselves liable to it by abusing the resources of the treasury. The most to be pitied of the three was M. Vanlerberghe, who without intermeddling in the speculations of his partners had confined himself to the operations of a corn trade, carried on actively and honestly throughout all Europe for the service of the French armies.*

On dismissing the council, Napoleon detained M. Mollien, and without waiting either for any observation from him or for his consent, he said, "You will to-day take the oath as minister of the treasury." M. Mollien, intimidated, though flattered by such confidence, hesitated to reply. "Have you any objection to be minister, then?" added Napoleon, and required him to take the oath the same day.

It was requisite to get out of the embarrassments of all sorts created by the company of the United Merchants. M. de Marbois had already withdrawn the service of the treasury from the hands of that company, and had committed it for a few days to M. Desprez, who had continued it from that moment for the account of the State. He had finally entrusted it to the receivers-general, on moderate but temporary conditions. The course to be definitively pursued on this subject was not yet decided: nothing was fixed but the resolution not to charge speculators, how able or how upright soever they might be, with a service so extensive and so important as the general negotiation of the assets of the treasury.

This service consisted, as we have seen, in discounting the obligations of the receivers-general, the bills of the customs and *coupes de bois*, papers which had all twelve, fifteen, and eighteen months to run. Till the institution of the company of the United Merchants, the only practice was to make partial and specific discounts of those papers, to the amount of twenty or thirty millions at a time. In exchange for the effects themselves, the funds proceeding from the discount were immediately received. It was gradually, under the growing empire of necessity, which soon supersedes confidence, that this service had successively been wholly relinquished to a single company, that the portfolio of the treasury had been left in some measure

* I borrow this account from the most authentic sources; in the first place, from the Memoirs of Prince Cambacérès; next from the interesting and instructive Memoirs of M. le Comte Mollien, which are not yet published; and lastly, from the archives of the treasury. I have had in my hands, and read myself with great attention, the documents of the proceedings (*procès*), and especially a long and interesting report which the minister of the treasury drew up for the emperor. Here, then, I advance nothing but from official and incontestable evidence.

at its discretion, and that, so great was the infatuation, the chests of accountable persons were placed at its disposal. Had the minister merely transferred to it specific sums in paper for equivalent sums in cash, allowing it to receive the amount of the discounted effects only when they became due, no confusion would have taken place between its affairs and those of the State. But there had been given up to the United Merchants so much as 470 millions at once, in obligations of the receivers-general, bills at sight, bills of the customs, which they had got discounted either by the bank or by French and foreign bankers. At the same time, for greater convenience, they had been authorised to take directly from the chests of the receivers-general all the funds paid into them, to be afterwards accounted for; so that the bank, as we have seen, when it presented the effects which it had discounted and which were due, had found in the chests nothing but receipts of M. Desprez's, attesting that he had already been paid them. But these strange facilities had not stopped there. When M. Desprez, acting for the United Merchants, discounted the effects of the treasury, he furnished the amount not in cash, but in paper, which he had been allowed to introduce, and which was called M. Desprez's bills. Thus the company had been enabled to fill the chests of the State and of the bank with these bills, and to create a circulating paper, by the aid of which it had for some time met its speculations as well with France as with Spain.

The real fault of M. de Marbois had been to lend himself to this confusion of affairs, in consequence of which it was no longer possible to distinguish the property of the State from that of the company. Add to this abusive complaisance the dishonesty of a clerk, who alone was in the secret respecting the portfolio, and who had deceived M. de Marbois by exaggerating continually to him the need that he had of the United Merchants, and we shall have an explanation of this incredible financial adventure. For this that clerk had received one million, which Napoleon ordered to be thrown into the general mass of the assets of the company. The terror excited by the emperor was so great that the parties readily confessed and restored everything.

However, in order to be just towards every one, we must say that Napoleon had himself a share in the faults committed on this occasion, by persisting in leaving M. de Marbois under the pressure of enormous charges, by deferring too long the creation of extraordinary means. It would have been requisite, in fact, that M. de Marbois should provide for a first arrear, resulting from anterior budgets and the insolvency of Spain, who, not paying her subsidy, was the cause of a fresh deficit of about

50 millions. It was under the weight of these different burdens that this upright but too inconsiderate minister had become the slave of adventurous men, who rendered him some services, who might even have rendered him very great ones if their calculations had been made with greater precision. Their speculations were, in fact, based on a real foundation, namely, the piastres of Mexico, which absolutely existed in the chests of the captains-general of Spain. But these piastres could not be so easily brought to Europe as M. Ouvrard had hoped, and this had led to the embarrassments of the treasury and the ruin of the company.

What proves the height of the confusion to which things had arrived, was the difficulty that was found to fix the amount of the debit of the company to the treasury. It was at first supposed to be 73 millions. A new examination raised it to 84. Lastly, M. Mollien, resolving on his entry into office to make a strict investigation into the state of the finances, discovered that the company had contrived to possess itself of the sum of 141 millions, for which it remained debtor to the State.

This enormous sum of 141 millions was made up in the following manner:—The United Merchants had drawn directly from the chests of the receivers-general so much as 55 millions at once; and by means of various repayments, their debt to the accountable persons was reduced on the day of the catastrophe to 23 millions. There were in the chest, to the amount of 73 millions, bills of M. Desprez's, a species of money which M. Desprez gave instead of cash, and which was current so long as his credit, upheld by the bank, remained intact, but which had now become worthless paper. The company owed 14 millions more for bills of the central cashier. (We have adverted elsewhere to these effects, devised for the purpose of facilitating the movements of funds between Paris and the provinces.) These 14 millions, taken from the portfolio, had not been followed by any payment either of M. Desprez's bills or any other assets. M. Desprez, for his personal management during the few days of his particular service, remained debtor of 17 millions. Lastly, among the commercial effects with which the company had furnished the treasury for various payments made at a distance, there was bad paper to the amount of 13 or 14 millions. These five different sums of 23 millions, taken directly from the accountable persons, 73 millions in Desprez's bills, now worth nothing, 14 millions in bills of the central cashier, for which no equivalent had been furnished, 17 millions of M. Desprez's personal debit, lastly, 14 millions in protested bills of exchange, composed the 141 millions of the total debit of the company.

The State, however, was not doomed to lose this important

sum, because the operations of the company, as we have just said, had a real foundation, the commerce in piastres, which had lacked nothing but precision in the calculations. It had furnished supplies to the French land and naval forces to the amount of 40 millions. The house of Hope had bought about 10 millions' worth of those famous piastres of Mexico, and was at this moment transmitting the amount to Paris. The company possessed, besides immovable property, Spanish wool, corn, some good credits, the whole amounting to about 30 millions. These various sums comprehended real effects to the worth of 80 millions. Thus 60 millions yet remained to be found in order to balance the debt. The equivalent of this sum really existed in the portfolio of the company in credits upon Spain.

Napoleon, after obliging the United Merchants to give up to him all that they possessed, required that the French treasury should be put into the company's place in regard to Spain. He enjoined M. Mollien to treat with a particular agent of the Prince of the Peace, M. Isquierdo, who had been for some time in Paris, and performed the functions of ambassador, much more than Messieurs d'Azara and Gravina, who had nothing but the title. The court of Madrid had no refusal to oppose to the conqueror of Austerlitz; besides, it was really debtor to the company, and consequently to France herself. Negotiations were therefore commenced with her to secure the repayment of those 60 millions, which represented not only the subsidies left unpaid, but the provisions with which her armies had been supplied, and the corn which had been sent to her people.

The treasury was likely, in consequence, to be entirely reimbursed, thanks to the 40 millions in anterior supplies, the 10 millions coming from Holland, the stores existing in the warehouses, the immovables seized, and the securities which Spain was about to give, and part of which the house of Hope offered to discount. There remained, nevertheless, a double gap to fill, arising from the old arrear of the budgets, which we have estimated at 80 or 90 millions, and from resources which the company had absorbed for its use. But everything had become easy since the victories of Napoleon, and since the peace, which had been the fruit of them. The capitalists who had ruined the company by requiring 1½ per cent. per month (that is to say, 18 per cent. per annum) to discount the effects of the treasury, offered to take them at ¾ per cent., and soon began to dispute them with each other at ½, that is to say, at 6 per cent. per annum. The bank, which had withdrawn part of its notes from circulation since it had done with M. Desprez, which, besides, saw the metals ordered to be purchased all over Europe during the great distress pouring into its coffers—the bank was enabled to discount all that was desired at a moderate, yet sufficiently

advantageous rate. Though a certain amount of the effects of the treasury belonging to 1806 had been previously alienated for the use of the company, the greater part of the effects corresponding to that service remained intact, and were about to be discounted on the best conditions. But victory had not only procured credit for Napoleon; it had also procured for him material wealth. He had imposed upon Austria a contribution of 40 millions; adding to this sum 30 millions, which he had taken directly from the chests of that power, the sum which the war had brought him in may be computed at 70 millions. Twenty millions had been expended on the spot for the subsistence of the army, but at the charge of the treasury, with which Napoleon purposed to make a regulation, the spirit and dispositions of which we shall presently explain. There remained, then, 50 millions, which were coming, partly in gold and silver, in the artillery waggons, partly in good bills of exchange on Frankfort, Leipzig, Hamburg, and Bremen. As the garrison of Hameln was to return to France in consequence of the cession of Hanover to Prussia, it was ordered to bring along with the English matériel taken in Hanover the produce of the bills of exchange due at Hamburg and Bremen. An imposition of 4 millions had been laid on the city of Frankfort, instead of the contingent which it should have furnished like Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria. France was, therefore, about to receive, besides considerable effects, large quantities of the precious metals, and in regard to specie as to everything else, abundance was about to succeed the momentary distress, which the sincere alarms of commerce and the affected alarms of jobbers had produced.

Napoleon, whose organising genius would never leave to things the character of accident, and tended incessantly to convert them into durable institutions, had projected a noble and beneficent creation, founded on the most legitimate profits of his victories. He had resolved to create with the war contributions a fund for the army, which he would not touch from any motive whatever, not even for his own use; for his civil list, administered with perfect order, was adequate to all the expenses of a magnificent court, and even to the formation of a particular fund. It was from this army fund that he proposed to take pensions for his generals, for his officers, for his soldiers, and for their widows and children. He desired not to enjoy his victories alone; he purposed that all those who served France and her vast designs should acquire not glory only, but prosperity; that those who by dint of heroism had got so far as to have no concern for themselves on the field of battle, should have none on account of their families. Finding in the inexhaustible fertility of his mind the art of multiplying the utility of things, Napoleon had

invented a combination, which rendered that fund quite as profitable to the finances as to the army itself. What had hitherto been wanting was a lender, to lend to the government on good conditions. The army fund would be that lender, whose demands upon the State Napoleon would himself regulate. The army was to have 50 millions in gold and silver, besides 20 millions which the budget owed it for arrears of pay; and lastly, besides a large amount in matériel of war conquered by it. The artillery waggons were bringing from Vienna 100,000 muskets, 2000 pieces of cannon. The whole of the matériel of war and contributions formed a sum of about 80 millions, of which the army was the proprietor, and which it could lend to the State. Napoleon purposed that all that was disposable should be paid over to the Sinking Fund, which should open a separate account, and employ this sum either in discounting obligations of receivers-general, bills at sight, bills of customs, when the capitalists should require more than 6 per cent., or in buying up national domains when they were at a low price, or even in taking rentes, if it thought fit to make a loan to fill up the arrear.

This combination, therefore, was to have the double utility of procuring for the army an advantageous interest for its money, and for the government all the sums that it should have need of, at a rate which would not be usurious.

Napoleon immediately gave orders for the execution of various important measures by means of the funds which he had at his disposal. One consisted in collecting a dozen millions in cash at Strasburg, in case of the renewal of military operations; for if Austria had signed the peace, Russia had not begun to negotiate; Prussia had not yet sent the ratification of the treaty of Schönbrunn, and England continued to be actively engaged in her diplomatic intrigues. He enjoined, moreover, that some millions should be kept in reserve at the Sinking Fund, and that the number of these millions should remain unknown, to be employed on a sudden whenever speculators were disposed to be extortionate. He thought that the treasury ought to take upon itself this sort of expense, as a man submits to that of a spare granary in order to be provided against the seasons of dearth, and that the interest lost by this kind of hoard would be a useful sacrifice, and one by no means to be regretted. Lastly, the foreign moneys which were brought back requiring to be recoined and converted into French money, he ordered them to be divided among the different mints, in proportion to the want of specie in each locality.

These first dispositions commanded by the moment being carried into effect, Napoleon desired that attention should be paid without delay to a new organisation of the treasury, to a

new constitution of the Bank of France, and gave this twofold commission to M. Mollien, who had become minister of the treasury. M. Gaudin, who still retained the portfolio of the finances, for we must bear in mind that, at this period, the treasury and the finances formed two distinct ministries—M. Gaudin received orders to present a plan for liquidating the arrear, for definitively equalising the receipts and the expenditure, in the double hypothesis of peace and war, even though for this purpose it should be necessary to recur to the imposition of new taxes.

After attending to the finances, Napoleon busied himself about bringing the army back to France, but slowly, so that it should not march further than four leagues a day. He had ordered that the wounded and the sick should be kept till spring in the places where they had received the first attendance, and that officers should stay with them to superintend their cure; and for this essential object he had recourse to the chests of the army. He had left Berthier at Munich with instructions to attend to all these details, and to preside over the exchanges of territory, always so difficult among the German princes. On this latter point Berthier was to concert with M. Otto, our representative at the court of Bavaria.

Napoleon then thought of taking measures against the kingdom of Naples. Massena, taking with him 40,000 men drawn from Lombardy, received orders to march through Tuscany and the southernmost part of the Roman State to the kingdom of Naples, without listening to any proposal of peace or armistice. Napoleon, uncertain whether Joseph, who had refused the viceroyalty of Italy, would accept the crown of the two Sicilies, gave him only the title of his lieutenant-general. Joseph was not to command the army; it was Massena alone who had that commission; for Napoleon, though he sacrificed the interests of policy to family considerations, did not so easily sacrifice to them the interests of military operations. But Joseph, once introduced into Naples by Massena, was to seize the civil government of the country, and to exercise there all the powers of royalty.

General Molitor was at the same time despatched towards Dalmatia. On his rear he had General Marmont to support him. The latter was commissioned to receive Venice and the Venetian State from the hands of the Austrians. Prince Eugène had orders to go to Venice, and to take upon himself the administration of the conquered provinces, without yet annexing them to the kingdom of Italy, though they were subsequently to be united with it. Before he decided upon this definitively, Napoleon wished to conclude various arrangements with the representatives of the kingdom of Italy, which would have run counter to an immediate union.

Lastly, Napoleon, wishing to excite the spirit of his soldiers and to communicate that excitement to all France, ordered that the grand army should be assembled at Paris, to receive there a magnificent fête, which was to be given by the authorities of the capital. It was impossible to convey a better conception of the nation treating the army than by charging the citizens of Paris to treat the soldiers of Austerlitz.

While he was thus engaged in the administration of his vast empire, and attending to the concerns of peace, after having been engaged in those of war, Napoleon had also his eyes fixed on the consequences of the treaties of Presburg and Schönbrunn. Prussia, in particular, had to ratify a treaty most unforeseen by her, since M. d'Haugwitz, who came to Vienna to dictate conditions, had submitted on the contrary to receive them, and instead of any constraint imposed upon Napoleon, had brought back a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with him, all this compensated, it is true, by a rich present, that of Hanover.

It would be difficult to form a conception of the astonishment of Europe, and of the different sentiments, satisfaction and chagrin, gratified avidity and confusion, which prevailed in Prussia when made acquainted with the treaty of Schönbrunn. Hints had frequently been thrown out to the public in Berlin that, at one time France, at another Russia, was offering to the king the Electorate of Hanover, which besides having the advantage of rounding the so irregularly defined territory of Prussia, had the advantage of securing to her the control of the Elbe and the Weser, as well as a decisive influence over the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg. This offer, so frequently announced, was now a realised acquisition, a certainty. It was a subject of great satisfaction for a country which is one of the most ambitious in Europe. But to counterbalance this gift, what confusion—we must not mince the matter—what disgrace would attend the conduct of the court of Prussia! While yielding against its will to the solicitations of the coalition, it had engaged to unite itself with it, if in a month Napoleon had not accepted the mediation of Prussia, and submitted to the conditions which she pretended to impose upon him, and this was equivalent to an engagement to declare war against him. And all at once, finding Napoleon in Moravia, not embarrassed, but all-powerful, she had turned to him, accepted his alliance, and received from his hand the fairest of the spoils of the coalition —Hanover, the ancient patrimony of the kings of England.

We must confess that honour is banished from the world if such things are not punished with a signal reprobation. Accordingly, the Prussian nation, we must do it this justice, felt how severely such conduct was to be condemned, and notwithstanding the value of the present brought by M. d'Haugwitz, received

it with chagrin in its heart and humiliation on its brow. The disgrace, however, would have been effaced from the memory of the Prussians, and would have left place only for pleasure at the conquest, if other sentiments had not come and mingled with that of remorse, to poison the satisfaction which they ought to have felt. Though profoundly jealous of the Austrians, still the Prussians, seeing them beaten, felt themselves Germans; and as Germans are not less jealous of the French than the Russians or the English, they beheld our extraordinary triumphs with mortification. Their patriotism, therefore, began to awake in favour of the Austrians, and this sentiment, united with that of remorse, filled the nation with intense discomfort. Of all the classes, the army was the one which manifested these dispositions the most openly. In Prussia, the army is not impassible as in Austria; it reflects the national passions with extreme vividness; it represents the nation much more than the army represents it in the other countries of Europe, France excepted; and it then represented a nation whose opinion was already very independent of its sovereigns. The Prussian army, which felt to a high degree the sentiment of German jealousy, which had hoped for a moment that the career of war would be opened to it, and which found it suddenly closed by an act difficult to be justified, censured the cabinet without reserve. The German aristocracy, which saw the Germanic empire ruined by the peace of Presburg, and the cause of the immediate nobility sacrificed to the sovereigns of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden—the German aristocracy, occupying all the high military ranks, contributed greatly to excite discontent in the army, and carried back the exaggerated expression of this discontent either to Berlin or to Potsdam. These passions burst forth more especially about the queen, and had converted her coterie into a focus of boisterous opposition. Prince Louis, who reigned in this coterie, launched out more than ever into chivalrous declamations. All is not done for the alliance of two countries when their interests do not agree: the self-love of both ought also to harmonise, and this last condition is not very easily realised. The Prussians were then the only people in Europe whose policy could agree with ours, but great indulgence would have been needed for the excessive pride of these heirs of the great Frederick, and unluckily, the weak, ambiguous, sometimes dishonourable conduct of their cabinet did not command that respect which their susceptibility required.

Napoleon, after six years' fruitless relations with Prussia, had accustomed himself to have no consideration for her. He had recently proved it by passing through one of her provinces (authorised, it is true, by precedents) without even giving her notice. He had just proved it still more strongly in appear-

ing so little hurt by her wrongs, that, after the convention of Potsdam, when he would have had a right to be incensed, he gave her Hanover, thus treating her as fit only to be bought. She was, and ought to have been, deeply wounded by this proceeding.

The human conscience feels all the reproaches that it has deserved, especially when it is spared them. All the severe things to which she had exposed herself on the part of Napoleon, Prussia imagined that he had expressed. It was asserted in Berlin that he had said to the Austrian negotiators, when they propped themselves upon the support of Prussia—"Prussia! why she is to be had by the best bidder; I will give her more than you, and bring her over to my side." He had thought so, perhaps said so to M. de Talleyrand, but he affirmed that he had not said so to the Austrians. Be this as it may, this expression was repeated everywhere in Berlin as true. The fault of Prussia in all this was not to have deserved the respect which she desired to obtain; that of Napoleon, not to grant it her without her having deserved it. One has not allies any more than friends, unless upon condition of sparing their pride as much as their interest, upon condition of perceiving their faults, nay, of feeling them deeply, and not committing the like against them.

M. d'Haugwitz, though he came with full hands, was therefore received with very different feelings, with anger by the court, with pain by the king, with a mixture of content and confusion by the public, and by nobody with complete satisfaction. As for M. d'Haugwitz himself, he made his appearance without embarrassment before all these judges. He brought back from Schönbrunn what he had invariably advised, the aggrandisement of Prussia founded on the alliance of France. His only fault lay in having given way for a moment to the empire of circumstances, which subjected him to the grievous contrast of being now the signer of the treaty of Schönbrunn. But it was his unskilful successor, his ungrateful disciple, M. de Hardenberg, who had brought about these circumstances by so complicating the relations of Prussia in the space of a few months that she could not extricate herself from these complications but by clashing contradictions. Besides, M. d'Haugwitz, if he had been hurried away for a moment, had been less so than anybody; and after all, he had just saved Prussia from the abyss into which she had been well-nigh plunged. Neither must it be forgotten that at Potsdam, seduced as the court was by the presence of Alexander, it had been strongly recommended to M. d'Haugwitz not to hurry Prussia into a war before the end of December, and that on the 2nd of December he had found him whom he came to control or

to fight, victorious, irresistible. He had been placed between the danger of a fatal war and a contradiction amply paid for: what would they have him do? For the rest, he said, nothing was compromised. Grounding himself on the extraordinary nature and the unforeseen circumstances of the situation, he had entered with Napoleon into such engagements only as were conditional, subject more expressly than usual to the ratification of his court. People might, if they were as bold as they boasted of being, as alive to honour, as insensible to interest as they pretended to be—they might refuse to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn. He had forewarned Napoleon; he had told him that, treating without having instructions, he treated without binding himself. They might choose between Hanover and war with Napoleon. The position was still the same as it had been at Schönbrunn, save that he had gained the month which had been declared necessary for the organisation of the Prussian army.

Such was the language of M. d'Haugwitz, exaggerated on a single point, namely, where he alleged that he had been placed between the acceptance of Hanover and war. He would, in fact, have been able to reconcile Prussia with Napoleon without accepting Hanover. It is true that Napoleon would have distrusted this demi-reconciliation, and that from defiance to war it was but a step. The enemies of M. d'Haugwitz censured him on another point. In keeping himself at Vienna, they said, less aloof from the Austrian negotiators, in making common cause with them, he would have been better able to withstand Napoleon, and to desert less ostensibly the European interests espoused at Potsdam, or not to desert them but with the consent of all. But that presupposed a collective negotiation, and to this Napoleon objected so strongly that to have insisted upon this point would have been another way to lead to a war. It was therefore war, and nothing but war, with a terrible adversary, before the fixed term of the end of December, against the well-known wish of the king, and against the most positive interests of Prussia, that, as M. d'Haugwitz alleged, had stared him in the face at Schönbrunn.

The embarrassment of this position, then, was much greater for others than for himself; and besides, he had an imperturbable firmness, mixed with tranquillity and urbanity, which would have sufficed to support him in presence of his adversaries, had he even committed the blunders which he had not.

Thus M. d'Haugwitz, without being disconcerted by the cries that rang around him, without even insisting on the adoption of the treaty, as a negotiator attached to the work of which he was the author might have done, never ceased repeating that the cabinet was free, that it could choose, but with a perfect

knowledge that it must choose between Hanover and war. He left to others the embarrassment of the contradictions of Prussian policy, and reserved for himself nothing but the honour of having brought back his country into the track from which it ought never to have been made to swerve. Happy this minister had he continued in that line, and not subsequently marred that situation himself by inconsistencies which ruined him and well-nigh ruined his country.

The enthusiasts, whether sincere or affected, of Berlin, said that this gift of Hanover was a perfidious gift, which would involve Prussia in an everlasting war with England, and ruin the national commerce; that it was purchased, besides, by the sacrifice of fine provinces long attached to the monarchy, such as Cleves, Anspach, and Neufchatel. They asserted that Prussia, which, in ceding Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel, had ceded a population of 300,000 inhabitants to obtain one of 900,000, had made a bad bargain. According to them, if she had obtained Hanover without giving up anything, without losing either Neufchatel, or Anspach, or Cleves, and even acquired something to boot, the Hanseatic cities, for instance, then there would be nothing to regret. The defection, thus paid for, would have been worth the while; but Hanover was nothing since they had it. At any rate, they added, Prussia was disgraced, covered with infamy in the eyes of Europe. The common country, Germany, was given up to foreigners. These last censures were more specious; but yet it might have been urged in reply that still worse things had been done in the last partition of Poland, and almost as bad in the recent partition of the Germanic indemnities. And yet nobody had cried shame upon them!

Moderate persons, very numerous among the wealthy population of Berlin, without repeating all these declamations, dreaded the reprisals of England upon Prussian commerce, were pained for the character of Prussia, felt real mortification at the triumph of the French armies over the German armies, but dreaded above all a war with France.

Such were at bottom the sentiments of the king, who, with the heart of a sound, patriotic, but moderate German, hesitated between these contrary considerations. He was racked with regret at the thought of the fault which he had committed at Potsdam, which reduced him to the necessity of an absolutely disgraceful inconsistency, the only objection that could be alleged against the fine present of Napoleon. And then, though he was not deficient in personal courage, he dreaded war as the greatest of calamities; he beheld in it the ruin of the treasure of Frederick, foolishly squandered by his father, carefully collected again by himself, and already broken into by the late

armament; above all, he beheld in it, with a sagacity which fear often imparts, the ruin of the monarchy.

Frederick William besought Count Haugwitz to enlighten him with his intelligence, and Count Haugwitz incessantly repeated to him, not knowing what else to say, that they had the choice between Hanover and war, and that, in his opinion, any war against Napoleon would be attended with disaster; that the Russian and Austrian armies were not inferior, whatever people might say, to the Prussian army, which would not do better, perhaps not so well as they, for at this moment it was much less habituated to war.

A council was held, to which were summoned the principal personages of the monarchy, Messieurs d'Haugwitz, de Hardenberg, de Schulenburg, and the two most illustrious representatives of the army, Marshal de Mollendorf and the Duke of Brunswick. The discussion was very animated, though without any mixture of court passions; and yielding to the force of the everlasting argument of Count Haugwitz, which consisted in repeating that they could refuse Hanover if they chose to go to war, the council adopted a middle course, that is to say, the very worst they could have done. They decided to adopt the treaty with modifications. M. d'Haugwitz strongly opposed this resolution. He said that he had taken advantage of circumstances at Schönbrunn, and that he had obtained of Napoleon what he should not obtain a second time; that the latter would regard the modifications made in the treaty as a last success of the party inimical to France; that he would at last cease to reckon at all upon the Prussian alliance; that he would act in consequence; and that, holding himself to be disengaged by a ratification given with reservations, he would place Prussia between worse conditions and war.

M. d'Haugwitz was not listened to. It was alleged that the modifications introduced, whether good or bad, saved the honour of Prussia, for they proved that they did not draw up treaties from the dictation of Napoleon. This reason, of so little value, made an impression upon those who had need to deceive themselves; and after several alterations had been made in it, the treaty was adopted.

The first of these alterations plainly indicated the sentiments of those who had proposed them, and the nature of their embarrassment. The expression *offensive and defensive* given to the alliance contracted with France was struck out of the treaty, in order that the Prussian cabinet might appear before Russia with less confusion. Comments were added to explain in what cases it would deem itself obliged to make common cause with France. It demanded information concerning the late arrangements projected in Italy, and which were to be comprehended in the reciprocal guarantees stipulated by the treaty of Schönbrunn;

for it made a point of not formally approving what was about to be consummated at Naples, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons, the clients and protégés of Russia.

These modifications signified that, though obliged to enter into the policy of France, Prussia would not enter frankly into it; that above all, she would not enter into it so far as not to be able to explain her conduct at St. Petersburg and at Vienna. The intention was too visible to be favourably interpreted at Paris. To these modifications were added some others still less honourable. These were not written, it is true, in the new treaty, but M. d'Haugwitz was commissioned to propose them verbally. The Prussian cabinet desired, in gaining Hanover, not to cede Anspach, which was the only concession of any importance required by Napoleon, and which formed the Franconian patrimony of the house of Brandenburg. It desired the annexation of the Hanseatic cities, a valuable accession from its commercial importance, and in thus filling the measure of the greediness of the Prussian nation, it flattered itself that it should stifle the voice of honour in it and disarm the public opinion.

This done, M. de Laforest, minister of France, charged as such with the exchange of the ratifications, was sent for. This minister knew his sovereign too well to venture to ratify a treaty in which such alterations had been made. He refused at first to do so, but the solicitations addressed to him became so pressing, and M. d'Haugwitz represented to him so forcibly the necessity of chaining the court of Berlin, to save it from its continual variations, and to snatch it from the suggestions of the enemies of France, that M. de Laforest consented to ratify the modified treaty, *sub spe rati*, a usual precaution in diplomacy, when one is desirous to reserve the pleasure of the sovereign.

It was, therefore, necessary to refer to Paris, to obtain the approval of these new tergiversations of the court of Prussia. M. d'Haugwitz seemed to have succeeded with Napoleon, and he was considered as the fittest person to be sent to France to allay the storm that was foreseen. M. d'Haugwitz long declined such a mission; but the king assailed him with such urgent entreaties, that he could not forbear to make up his mind to go to Paris, and to confront a second time that crowned and victorious negotiator with whom he had treated at Schönbrunn. He set out, therefore, sending before him letters couched in the mildest and most obsequious language, to prepare for himself a less unfavourable reception than that which he had reason to apprehend.

Napoleon, when apprised of these last shuffling tricks of Prussian politics, saw in them what he could not help seeing, new weaknesses towards his enemies, new efforts to keep on good terms with them, while taking occasion at the same time to make some advantage by him. He felt on account of this

policy less consideration than before, and what was a great misfortune for Prussia and for France, he utterly despaired from this time of a Prussian alliance. Add to this, that upon reflection he was sorry for what he had granted at Schönbrunn. The gift of Hanover, indeed, had been granted with too great precipitation, not that it could be better placed than in the hands of Prussia, but to dispose of it definitively was rendering the struggle with England more rancorous; it was adding to irreconcilable interests at sea irreconcilable interests on land, for old King George III. would have sacrificed the richest colonies of England rather than his German patrimony. Assuredly, if it was ascertained that England was for ever implacable, and could not be pacified but by force, it would then be right to go all lengths against her, and Hanover would be extremely well bestowed if it were to cement a powerful and sincere alliance, capable of rendering continental coalitions impossible. But none of these suppositions appeared actually true. There were rumours of great discouragement in England, of the speedy death of Mr. Pitt, of the probable accession of Mr. Fox, and an immediate change of system. Napoleon, therefore, on learning the last proceedings in Prussia, was disposed to replace everything on the old footing with her; that is to say, to restore Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel, and to take back Hanover from her, to be kept in reserve. At the point to which things had arrived, either through the fault of men or through the fault of events, the best thing that could be done was, in fact, to revert to terms of civility without intimacy, and to take back what each had given to the other. Napoleon, in recovering Hanover, would have in his hands the means of treating with England, and of seizing the only occasion that was likely to present itself for putting an end to an inauspicious war, the permanent cause of universal war.

This was his first idea, and would to Heaven that he had acted upon it! He gave instructions in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand. He desired that he might be represented to M. d'Haugwitz as more irritated than he was at the liberties taken with France; that France should be declared to be completely disengaged, and that she would keep herself free, either to take back Hanover, to make it a pledge of peace with England, or to place everything on a new footing with Prussia for concluding a more comprehensive and more solid treaty with her.*

* We quote the following letter, which precisely expresses the idea of Napoleon on this occasion:—

"To M. DE TALLEYRAND.

"PARIS, *Feb.* 4, 1806.

"The ministry in England has been entirely changed since the death of Mr. Pitt; Mr. Fox has the portfolio of the foreign affairs. I desire you to present to me this evening a note founded on this idea:

M. d'Haugwitz arrived at Paris on the 1st of February. He employed, both with M. de Talleyrand and with the emperor, all the art with which he was endowed, and that art was great. He laid great stress on the embarrassments of his government placed between France and coalesced Europe, inclining more frequently toward the first than hurried away sometimes towards the second by court passions; which must be comprehended and excused. He exhibited the Prussian government painfully returning from the fault committed at Potsdam, needing for this to be supported, encouraged, by the courtesy of the French government; he so well depicted himself as the man who was striving alone in Berlin to bring back Prussia to France, and having a right on this account to be aided by the kindness of Napoleon, that the latter gave way, and unfortunately consented to renew the treaty of Schönbrunn, but on somewhat harder conditions than those which King Frederick William had just refused.

"'The undersigned minister of foreign relations has received express orders from his majesty the emperor to inform M. d'Haugwitz, at his first interview, that his majesty cannot consider the treaty concluded at Vienna as existing, from default of ratification within the prescribed time; that his majesty does not allow to any power, and least of all to Prussia—for experience proves that he must speak plainly and without circumlocution—a right to modify and interpret according to its own interest the different articles of a treaty; that it is not exchanging ratifications to have two different versions of the same treaty, and that the irregularity appears still greater if one considers the three or four pages of memorial added to the ratifications of Prussia; that M. de Laforest, his majesty's minister charged with the ratifications, would be culpable had he not himself observed all the irregularity of the proceeding of the court of Prussia, but that he had accepted the exchange only on condition of the approbation of the emperor.

"'The undersigned is, therefore, charged to declare that his majesty does not approve it, in consideration of the sanctity due to the execution of treaties.

"'But at the same time, the undersigned is charged to declare that his majesty is still desirous that the differences which have arisen in recent circumstances between France and Prussia should be amicably settled, and that the old friendship which existed between them should subsist as formerly; he is even desirous that the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, if it is compatible with the other engagements of Prussia, should subsist between the two countries and ensure their connection.'

"This note, which you will present to me this evening, shall be delivered to-morrow in the conference, and on no pretext whatever do I leave you at liberty to omit to deliver it.

"You comprehend yourself that it has two objects; to leave me free to make peace with England, if, a few days hence, the accounts which I am receiving are confirmed, or to conclude a treaty with Prussia on a wider basis.

"Let the wording be stern and plain, but you will add *vivâ voce* all the modifications, all the softenings, all the illusions, which shall make M. d'Haugwitz believe that it is an effect of my temper which is irritated at this form, but that at bottom I am in the same sentiments as ever towards Prussia. My opinion is that, in the present circumstances, if Mr. Fox is really at the head of the foreign affairs, we cannot cede Hanover to Prussia but by a comprehensive system, capable of securing us from the fear of a continuance of hostilities."

"I will not constrain you," said Napoleon to M. d'Haugwitz; "I still offer you to replace things on their former footing; that is, to take back Hanover, and to restore Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel to you. But if we treat, if I cede Hanover to you anew, I shall not cede it on the same conditions, and I shall require you, moreover, to promise me to become a faithful ally of France. If Prussia is frankly, publicly on my side, I have no more European coalitions to fear, and without a European coalition on my hands, I will soon settle matters with England. But I want nothing short of this certainty to induce me to make you a present of Hanover, and to feel convinced that I act wisely in giving it to you."

Napoleon was right, saving on one point, that was in making Prussia pay for Hanover by new compensations, in not giving it to her, on the contrary, on the most advantageous conditions; for there are no better allies than those who are fully satisfied. M. d'Haugwitz, who was sincere in his desire to unite France and Prussia, promised Napoleon all that he required, and promised it with all the appearances of the greatest sincerity. To his promises he added some very pertinent insinuations respecting certain slights of Napoleon towards Prussia, the necessity of paying some regard to the dignity of the king, in the first place for the sake of the king himself, who, notwithstanding his timidity, was at bottom susceptible and irritable, and also for the sake of the nation and the army, which identified themselves with the sovereign, and took highly amiss whatever looked like a want of respect for him. M. d'Haugwitz said that the violation of the territory of Anspach in particular had on this account an effect that was to be extremely regretted, and caused the nation to go halves with the court in the excitement which had led to the deplorable treaty of Potsdam.

These observations were just and striking. But if Prussia needed to have respect paid her, Napoleon needed to be satisfied with her before he paid her respect, and to experience esteem before he showed it. Here was a double difficulty, which none had yet found means to surmount: would they be more successful after this accommodation? That was unfortunately very doubtful.

A second treaty, more explicit and more stringent than the former, was drawn up. Hanover was given to Prussia as formally as at Schönbrunn, but on condition of occupying it immediately and in right of sovereignty. A new and arduous obligation was the price of this gift: it consisted in closing the Weser and the Elbe against the English, and in closing those rivers as straitly as the French had done when they occupied Hanover. In exchange, Prussia granted the same cessions as at Schönbrunn; she gave the Franconian principality of Anspach, the

remnant of the duchy of Cleves, situated on the right of the Rhine, and the principality of Neufchatel, forming one of the cantons of Switzerland. An advantage promised to the King of Prussia in the treaty of Schönbrunn was suppressed in this for the benefit of the King of Bavaria. According to the first treaty, the Franconian principality of Baruth, contiguous to that of Anspach, and to be retained by Prussia, was to be limited in a more regular manner by taking out of that of Anspach a district containing 20,000 inhabitants. There was no further question about this district. Lastly, the obligations imposed upon Prussia were extended. She was obliged to guarantee not only the French empire as it was, with the new arrangements concluded in Germany and Italy, but she was further required to guarantee explicitly the future results of the war commenced against Naples, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons and the then presumed establishment of a branch of the Bonaparte family on the throne of the two Sicilies. This was certainly the most disagreeable of the recent conditions imposed upon Prussia, for it rendered the situation of the king towards the Emperor Alexander more difficult than ever, on account of the professed protectorship of Russia in respect to the Bourbons of Naples. It is unnecessary to say that the guarantees were reciprocal, and that France promised to support Prussia with her armies, and to ensure to her all her acquisitions past and present, including Hanover.

This second treaty was signed on the 15th of February.

Thus all that Prussia had gained by attempting to modify the treaty of Schönbrunn was to be deprived of the additions of territory which were at first to have been added to Baruth, to be compelled to a very dangerous act, the closing of the Elbe and Weser, lastly, to be obliged to avow publicly what was about to be consummated at Naples. The only results, in short, were more obligations and fewer advantages.

M. d'Haugwitz could not have done better, unless he had placed things in their former state, which would assuredly have been preferable, for he would have spared Prussia the embarrassing engagements of a patched up and insincere alliance. It is true that he would then have deprived her of the illusion of a brilliant acquisition, extremely useful for covering in a moment all the meanness of Prussian policy. Be this as it may, M. d'Haugwitz would not himself carry to Berlin this bitter fruit of the tergiversations of his court, and he resolved to send thither M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia in Paris. It did not suit him to solicit the adoption of a spoiled work, and to take upon himself alone the responsibility of the resolution which was proposed to be adopted. He wished to leave to his sovereign, to his colleagues, and to the royal family, who interfered

in so indiscreet a manner in affairs of State, the business of choosing between the treaty of Schönbrunn, made a great deal worse, and war; for it was evident this time that Napoleon, put out of patience by a new rejection, if he did not take fire immediately on account of a refused alliance, would treat Prussia in such a manner in all the European arrangements that war would very soon become inevitable.

He therefore sent M. de Lucchesini, whose superior he was, to Berlin, and for a few days took his place as minister at Paris. He charged him to carry the treaty to his court, to explain to it the exact state of things in France, to represent the real dispositions of Napoleon, who was ready to become, according to the manner in which it behaved, either a powerful and sincere ally, though embarrassing from his spirit of enterprise, or a formidable enemy, if he was forced to regard Prussia as a second Austria. M. d'Haugwitz did not commission M. de Lucchesini to solicit in his name the adoption of the new treaty. He wished for nothing more, for he was already disgusted with a task which had become too ungrateful, and with the fatigue of a responsibility that was too vexatious.

He remained therefore in Paris, treated with the highest distinction by Napoleon, studying attentively that extraordinary man, and persuading himself more and more every day of the justice of his own policy, and of the present and future interests which Prussia and France alike compromised by not knowing how to agree.

In Europe, everything was going on according to the wishes of the fortunate victor of Austerlitz. The army which he had sent to Naples, under the apparent command of Joseph Napoleon, and under the real command of Massena, marched directly for the goal. The Queen of Naples, striving once more to dispel the storm gathered by her faults, implored all the courts, and successively despatched Cardinal Ruffo and the heir-apparent to the crown to meet Joseph, and to try to make a treaty, whatever might be the conditions. Joseph, bound by the imperative commands of his brother, refused Cardinal Ruffo, received with respect the solicitations of Prince Ferdinand, but did not halt for a moment in his march for Naples. The French army, 40,000 strong, passed the Garigliano on the 8th of February, and advanced, formed into three corps. One, that of the right, under General Reynier, went to blockade Gaeta; another, that of the centre, under Marshal Massena, marched upon Capua; the third, that of the left, under General St. Cyr, directed its course through Apulia and the Abruzzi towards the Gulf of Taranto. On this intelligence the English embarked with such precipitation that they had well-nigh brought their allies, the Russians, into danger. The former fled to Sicily, the latter to

Corfu. The court of Naples took refuge at Palermo, after having completely emptied the public coffers and even those of the bank. The prince royal, with the best troops that were left in the Neapolitan army, had betaken himself to the Calabrias. Two Neapolitan gentlemen were sent to Capua to treat for the surrender of the capital. A convention was signed, and Joseph, escorted by Massena's corps, appeared before Naples. He entered the city on the 15th of February without any disturbance of order, the population of the lazzaroni having made no resistance.

The fortress of Gaeta, though included in the convention of Capua, was not surrendered by the Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, who was governor of it. He declared that he would defend himself there to the last extremity. The strength of this place, a sort of Gibraltar, connected only by an isthmus with the continent of Italy, rendered it, in fact, capable of a long resistance. General Reynier carried the external positions with great boldness, and strove to coop up the enemy closely in the place till he should be supplied with the material necessary for undertaking a regular siege.

Joseph, master of Naples, was only at the beginning of the difficulties which he had to encounter. Though he assumed as yet only the quality of Napoleon's lieutenant, he was not the less in all eyes the designated sovereign of the new kingdom. There was not a ducat in the chests; all the military stores had been carried off; the principal functionaries were gone. It was requisite to create at once finances and an administration. Joseph had good sense, mildness, but no part of that prodigious activity with which his brother Napoleon was endued, and which would have been necessary here to found a government.

He fell nevertheless to work. The grandees of the kingdom, more enlightened than the rest of the nation, as is the case in all countries at all civilised, had been ill-treated by the queen, who reproached them with being too much inclined to liberal opinions, and who kept them in fear of the lazzaroni, ignorant and fanatic, whom she incessantly threatened to let loose upon them: the usual conduct of royalty, which everywhere props itself upon the people against the aristocracy, when symptoms of resistance appear among the latter. The grandees, therefore, gave a good reception to the new government, for which they hoped for a discreetly reforming administration, and one determined to afford equal protection to all classes. Joseph, finding them animated with favourable sentiments, studied still more to draw them to him, and restrained the lazzaroni by the dread of severe executions. Besides, the name of Massena made disturbers tremble. A gale drove a Neapolitan frigate and cutter, with several transports, into Naples. In this manner some military

stores and other things of considerable value were recovered. The forts were armed, contributions were levied, and a very clever Corsican, M. Salicette, sent by Napoleon to Naples, was placed at the head of the police. Joseph applied to his brother for assistance in money, to enable him to overcome these first difficulties.

Eugène, viceroy of Upper Italy, had received the Venetian States from the hands of Austria. He had entered Venice, to the great satisfaction of the inhabitants of that ancient queen of the seas, who found in their annexation to an Italian kingdom, constituted on wise principles, a certain compensation for their lost independence. General Marmont's corps, descending from the Styrian Alps into Italy, had proceeded to the Izonzo, and formed a reserve ready to penetrate into Dalmatia, if this junction of forces should become necessary. General Molitor, with his division, had made a rapid march towards Dalmatia, to take possession of a country to which Napoleon attached great value, because it was contiguous to the Turkish empire. That general had entered the town of Zara, the capital of Dalmatia. But he had still a great extent of coast to traverse before he reached the celebrated mouths of the Cattaro, the southernmost and the most important of the positions of the Adriatic, and he hastened his march in order to awe by the terror of his approach the Montenegrins, who had long been in the pay of Russia.

For the rest, the court of Vienna, sighing for the retreat of the French army, was disposed to execute faithfully the treaty of Presburg. That court, exhausted by the last war, which was the third since the French Revolution, terrified by the blows which it had received at Ulm and at Austerlitz, had undoubtedly not renounced the hope of raising itself again some day; but for the present it was resolved to introduce some order into its finances, and to let many years elapse before it again tried the fortune of arms. The Archduke Charles, having again become minister of war, was directed to seek a new system of military organisation, which without too great a reduction of force should produce savings that could be no longer deferred. The government, therefore, lost no time in executing the late treaty of peace, in paying the contribution of 40 millions, either in specie or bills of exchange, in seconding the removal of the cannon and of the muskets taken at Vienna, that the successive retreat of the French troops might speedily be accomplished. This retreat was to terminate on the 1st of March with the evacuation of Braunau.

Napoleon, who had left Berthier at Munich to superintend the return of the army, a return which he purposed to render slow and commodious, had enjoined that faithful performer of his orders to repair to Braunau, and not to restore that fortress till

he had received positive intelligence of the delivery of the mouths of Cattaro. He had established Marshal Ney with his corps in the country of Salzburg, that he might live there as long as possible at the expense of a province destined to become Austrian. He had established Marshal Soult's corps on the Inn, *à cheval* on the archduchy of Austria and Bavaria, and living upon both. The corps of Marshals Davout, Lannes, and Bernadotte being too great a burden to Bavaria, whose inhabitants began to be weary of it, were marched towards the new countries ceded to the German princes our allies; and as no term was fixed for the delivery of these countries, still dependent on litigious arrangements, there was a founded pretext for keeping them there for some time. Bernadotte's corps was therefore removed into the province of Anspach, ceded by Prussia to Bavaria. It there had space to extend itself and to subsist. Marshal Davout's corps was transferred to the bishopric of Eichstädt and the principality of Oettingen. The cavalry was divided among the different corps. Those which had not sufficient space to supply them with subsistence had permission to spread themselves among the petty princes of Suabia, whose existence was rendered problematical by the treaty of Presburg, which required new changes in the Germanic constitution. The troops of Lannes, divided between Marshal Mortier and General Oudinot, were quartered in Suabia. Oudinot's grenadiers proceeded through Switzerland towards the principality of Neufchatel, to take possession of it. Lastly, Augereau's corps, reinforced by Dupont's division and General Dumonceau's Batavian division, was cantoned around Frankfort, ready to march for Prussia if the last arrangements concluded with her were not followed up by sincere and definitive proceedings.

These different corps were in excellent condition. They began to feel the effect of the rest which had been granted them; they were recruited by the arrival of young conscripts, incessantly setting out from the banks of the Rhine, where the depôts had been united under Marshals Lefebvre and Kellermann. Our soldiers were fitter, if possible, for war than before the late campaign, and excessively proud of their recent victories. They proved themselves humane towards the people of Germany, rather boisterous, it is true, prone to boast of their exploits; but this noise over, sociable to the highest degree, and presenting a singular contrast to the German auxiliaries, who were much harder towards their countrymen than we ourselves were. Unfortunately Napoleon, from a spirit of economy, useful to his army, detrimental to his policy, allowed the soldiers to be paid only part of their pay, retaining the remainder for their benefit, to be paid them subsequently after their return to France. He required that provisions should be furnished

them by the countries in which they were encamped in lieu of that part of their pay which was withheld, and this was a very heavy burden to the inhabitants. If the provisions had been paid for, the presence of our troops, instead of being a burden, would have become an advantage; and Germany, which knew that they had been brought upon its soil through the fault of the coalition, would have had on that account none but kindly feelings towards us. It was, therefore, an ill-judged saving, and the benefit resulting from it for the army was not equivalent to the inconveniences that were liable to arise from the sufferings of the occupied countries. Napoleon likewise caused the expenditure for clothing to be deferred, in order to new clothe the soldiers when they should repass the Rhine, and come to participate in the festivities which he was preparing for them. They, for their part, were perfectly satisfied, and cheerfully submitted to wear their old clothes and to receive but little money, saying that when they returned to France they should have new clothes and plenty of savings to spend.

For the rest, if the people complained of the prolonged stay of our troops, the petty princes had finally invoked their presence as a benefit, for nothing was to be compared with the violence and the spoliations committed by the German governments, especially those which possessed any strength. The Grand Duke of Baden and the King of Bavaria had laid their hands on the possessions of the immediate nobility, and though they acted without any consideration, their haste was humanity compared with the violence of the King of Wurtemberg, who carried rapacity to such a length as to cause all the fiefs to be seized and plundered, as at the time when the cry in France was, War with the mansions, peace with the cottages. His troops entered the domains of princes enclosed in his kingdom upon pretext of seizing the possessions of the immediate nobility. Having a right to a portion only of the Brisgau, the King of Wurtemberg had occupied nearly the whole of it. But for the French troops, the Wurtembergers and the Badeners would have come to blows.

Napoleon had appointed M. Otto, minister of France at Munich, and Berthier, major-general of the grand army, arbiters of the differences which he foresaw between the German princes, great and small. These latter had all hastened to Munich, whither the Diet of Ratisbon appeared to have transferred its seat, and there solicited the justice of France, and even the presence, how burdensome soever it might be, of French troops. On all sides arose inextricable disputes, which apparently it would be impossible to settle without new moulding the Germanic constitution. Meanwhile detachments of our soldiers held possession of the places in litigation, and everything was

referred to the arbitration of France and her ministers. At any rate, Napoleon did not make a handle of these disputes to prolong the stay of his troops in Germany, for he was impatient to order the return of the army, and to collect it around him at Paris; and for this he awaited only the entire occupation of Dalmatia and the definitive answer of the court of Prussia.

That court, obliged to decide definitively upon the modified treaty of Schönbrunn, at length took its resolution. It accepted this treaty, which had become less advantageous since its double remodelling in Berlin and in Paris, and received, with confusion on its brow, with ingratitude in its heart, the gift of Hanover, which at any other time would have filled it with joy. What, indeed, could be done? There was no other course to take but to close the business by acceding to the proposals of France, or to make up its mind at once to war—war, for which the Prussian army boastingly cried out, and which its leaders, more considerate, and above all the king, dreaded as a ruinous experiment.

As for choosing war, it ought to have decided on this when Napoleon quitted Ulm to bury himself in the long valley of the Danube, and to have fallen upon his rear while the Austro-Russians, concentrated at Olmütz, were drawing him into Moravia. But the Prussian army was not ready then; and after the 2nd of December, when Count Haugwitz conversed with Napoleon, it was too late. It was much later now that the French, assembled in Suabia and Franconia, had but a step to take to invade Prussia, now that the Russians were in Poland and the Austrians in a completely disarmed state.

To accept the gift of Hanover on the conditions attached to it by France was, therefore, the only possible resolution. But this was a singular mode of commencing an intimate alliance. The treaty of the 15th of February was ratified on the 24th. M. de Lucchesini set out immediately for Paris with the ratifications. M. d'Haugwitz, on his part, left Paris to return to Berlin, highly pleased with the personal treatment which he had received from Napoleon, promising him anew the faithful alliance of Prussia, but anticipating most arduous trials at sight of all the difficulties which then swarmed in Germany, at the sight, more especially, of those petty German princes prostrate at the feet of France, to save themselves from the exactions with which they were overwhelmed by the more powerful or the more favoured princes.

On his arrival in Berlin, M. d'Haugwitz found the king deeply dejected at his situation, deeply afflicted by the difficulties opposed to him by the court, more excited and more intemperate than ever. The audacity of the discontented was carried to such a length that one night all the windows in

the house of M. d'Haugwitz were broken by rioters, who were generally believed to belong to the army, and who were publicly, but falsely, said to be agents of Prince Louis. M. d'Haugwitz affected to disdain these manifestations, which, very insignificant in free countries, where one winks at while despising these excesses of the multitude, were strange and serious in an absolute monarchy, especially when they could be imputed to the army. The king considered them as a serious matter, and declared publicly his intention to be severe. He gave formal orders for a search after the culprits, whom the police, either from being implicated itself or powerless, did not succeed in discovering. The king, driven to extremity, manifested a firm and decided determination, which overawed the discontented, and particularly the queen. He gave the latter to understand that his resolution was taken, that the welfare of the monarchy had commanded him to take it, and that everybody about him must assume an attitude conformable to his policy. The queen, who for the rest was devoted to the interests of the king, her husband, was silent, and for a moment the court presented a decorous aspect.

M. de Hardenberg quitted the ministry. This personage had become the idol of the opposition. He had been the creature of M. d'Haugwitz, his partisan, his imitator, and the most zealous advocate of the French alliance, particularly in 1805, when Napoleon, from his camp at Boulogne, offered Hanover to Prussia. Then M. de Hardenberg regarded it as the most brilliant of glories to ensure this aggrandisement to his country, and complained to the French ministers of the hesitations of his sovereign, who was too backward, he said, in attaching himself to France. Since then, having seen that scheme miscarry, he had thrown himself, with the impetuosity of an intemperate character, into the arms of Russia, and unable to extricate himself from this error, he loudly declaimed against France. Napoleon, informed of his conduct, committed a great fault in regard to him, which he repeated more than once, and which was to mention him in his bulletins, by making an offensive allusion to a Prussian minister seduced by the gold of England. The imputation was unjust. M. de Hardenberg was no more seduced by the gold of the English than was M. d'Haugwitz by the gold of the French: it was most indecent in an official document, and bespoke too strongly the licence of the soldier conqueror. It was this attack which procured for M. de Hardenberg the immense popularity which he enjoyed. The king allowed him to retire with testimonies of consideration, which did not take the character of a political disgrace from this retirement.

But while he removed M. de Hardenberg, Frederick William

associated with M. d'Haugwitz a second, who was not much better: this was M. de Keller, whom the court considered as one of its own, and who gave himself out publicly as inspector over his superior. It was a sort of satisfaction granted to the party hostile to France; for in absolute governments rulers are frequently obliged to give way to opposition, just as in free governments. Frederick William did still more; he endeavoured to keep on good terms with Russia, to explain honourably to her the interested inconsistencies which he had committed.

Since Austerlitz, the cabinet of Berlin had been very chary of communications with St. Petersburg. After all the boastings of Potsdam, Russia could not but be ashamed of her defeat, and Prussia of the manner in which she had kept the oath sworn on the tomb of the great Frederick. Silence was for the moment the only fitting relation between the two courts. Russia, however, had once broken it to declare that her forces were at the disposal of Prussia, if the treaty of Potsdam, divulged, should bring a war upon her. Since that time she had said nothing, nor Prussia either.

It was requisite at last to come to an explanation. The king pressed the old Duke of Brunswick to go to St. Petersburg, to oppose his glory to the censures which the conduct pursued at Schönbrunn and continued in Paris could not fail to call forth. This respectable prince, devoted to the house of Brandenburg, set out, therefore, notwithstanding his age, for Russia. He went not to declare frankly that Prussia had at length espoused the French alliance, which would have been difficult, but yet preferable to a continuation of ambiguities, already very pernicious: he went to say that if Prussia had taken Hanover, it was that it might not be left in the hands of France, and to spare herself the mortification and danger of seeing the French appear again in the north of Germany; that if she had accepted the term alliance, it was to avoid war, and that this term was intended to signify nothing but neutrality; that neutrality was the best course for both of them; that Russia and Prussia had nothing to gain by war; that by persisting in that system of implacable hostility against France, they fostered the commercial monopoly of England, and that it was not very sure that they were not also fostering the continental domination of Napoleon.

Such was the language which the Duke of Brunswick was to hold at St. Petersburg.

We must return to the young emperor, who, hurried into war by vanity and against the secret whispers of his reason, had served at Austerlitz such a sorry apprenticeship to arms. He had given little cause for being talked of during the last three months, and had hidden in his distant empire the confusion of his defeat.

A general outcry was raised in Russia against the young men who, it was alleged, governed and compromised the empire. These young men, placed, some in the army, others in the cabinet, had fallen out with one another. The party of the Dolgoroukis accused the party of the Czartoryskis, and reproached it with having ruined everything by its misbehaviour towards Prussia. They would have done violence to her, said the Dolgoroukis; they had, therefore, estranged instead of drawing her nearer, and her refusal to join the coalition had prevented its success. It was in a particular interest that they had so acted; it was to wrest the Polish provinces from Prussia, and to reconstitute Poland, a mischievous dream, for which the Polish Prince Czartoryski was evidently betraying the emperor.

Prince Czartoryski and his friends maintained with much more reason that it was those presumptuous soldiers, who could not wait at Olmütz for the expiration of the term fixed for the intervention of Prussia, that had insisted prematurely on giving battle, and opposing their twenty-five years' experience to the skill of the most consummate general of modern times—that it was these presumptuous and incapable soldiers who were the real authors of the disasters of Russia.

The old Russians, dissatisfied, condemned both the youthful parties; and Alexander, accused of allowing himself to be guided sometimes by the one, sometimes by the other, had become at this period an object of little consideration for his subjects.

He had been deeply dejected in the first days after his defeat, and if Prince Czartoryski had not several times roused him to a sense of his own dignity, he would have manifested too plainly the profound despondency of his spirit. Prince Czartoryski, though he had his share in the inexperience common to the young men who governed the empire, was nevertheless consistent and serious in his views. He was the principal author of that system of European arbitration which had led Russia to take arms against France. That system, which with Russian statesmen was in reality but a mask thrown over their national ambition, was with that young Pole a sincere and cordially embraced idea. He wished Alexander to persevere in it; and if it was a great presumption in men so young to pretend to control Europe, especially in presence of the powers which were then disputing the empire over it, it was a still greater levity to give up so soon what had been so rashly undertaken.

Prince Czartoryski had addressed to the young emperor, once his friend and beginning to become again his master, noble and respectful remonstrances which would do honour to a minister of a free country, which must do him much more honour where resistance to power is an act of rare devotedness and destined to remain unknown. Prince Czartoryski, recapitulating to

Alexander his hesitations, his weaknesses, said—"Austria is abased, but she detests her conqueror; Prussia is divided between two parties, but she will finally yield herself up to the German sentiment which predominates in her. In managing these powers, wait till the moment arrives when one or the other shall be ready to act. Till then you are out of reach: you can remain some time without making either peace or war, and thus wait till circumstances permit you either to resume arms or to retreat with advantage. Cease not to be allied with England, and you will oblige Napoleon to concede to you what is your due."

Deeply sensible of the greatness of Napoleon since he had met him on the field of battle of Austerlitz, Alexander thus replied to Prince Czartoryski: "When we pretend to assail this man we are children presuming to tackle a giant." And he added that without Prussia it would be impossible to renew the war, for without her there was no chance of maintaining a successful war. Alexander had conceived a singular esteem for the Prussian army, for this single reason, that it had not yet been beaten by Napoleon. That army, in fact, was then the illusion and the hope of Europe. With that Alexander was ready to commence the struggle afresh, but not without it. As for England, he ceased to hope for any very efficacious support from her. He feared that, after the death of Mr. Pitt, announced as certain, after the accession of Mr. Fox, announced as near at hand, hatred of France would be extinguished, if not in the hearts of the English, at least in their policy. However, the remonstrances of Prince Czartoryski, stimulating the pride of Alexander, had raised his spirit, and he was resolved, before he delivered his sword to Napoleon, to make him wait for it. But though useful, the lessons of his young censor were annoying to him, and that to such a degree as to induce him to seek among the aged persons of his empire a complaisant servant without capacity, to cover with a great age and to execute with submission his personal will. It was already said that his favour was fixed on General Budberg.

The conduct recommended by Prince Czartoryski was nevertheless followed very punctually. Russia again placed herself in communication with Austria; she seemed to have forgotten the coolness of Holitsch, expressed to that court great sympathy in its misfortunes, and high consideration for the power that was yet left it; she even undertook to negotiate in London to obtain payment for her of a year's subsidy, though the war had lasted only three months. As for Prussia, she avoided everything that could have offended her, abstaining nevertheless from approving her acts. The Duke of Brunswick had arrived in the first days of the month of March. He was most

cordially received, he was loaded with attentions, which seemed to be addressed to his person, to his age, to his military glory, and by no means to the court of which he was the representative. His reception was cooler when he began to converse on political affairs. He was told that Russia could not approve of the conduct of Prussia in accepting Hanover from the hand of the enemy of Europe; that, for the rest, the peace which she had made with France was a false peace, neither solid nor durable; that Prussia would soon be forced to adopt a resolution too long delayed, and at last to draw the sword of the Great Frederick—"Then," said the Emperor Alexander to the Duke of Brunswick, "I will serve under your command, and glory in learning the art of war in your school."

An attempt, however, was made to commence with the old duke a negotiation destined to be kept profoundly secret. Upon pretext that the conditions would not be faithfully kept by France, it was proposed to conclude a sub-alliance with Russia, by means of which Prussia, if she were dissatisfied with her French ally, might have recourse to her Russian ally, and would have at her disposal all the forces of the Muscovite emperor. What was offered was nothing less than treason against France. The Duke of Brunswick, wishing to leave behind at St. Petersburg dispositions favourable to Prussia, consented not to conclude such an engagement, but to propose it to the king. It was agreed that this negotiation should be left open, and that it should be carried on secretly and unknown to M. d'Haugwitz through the medium of M. de Hardenberg, the same minister who was apparently disgraced, and who continued underhand to treat upon the most important affairs of the monarchy.

While Prussia was thus seeking to explain her conduct to Russia, she attempted also to excuse herself in London for the occupation of Hanover. Nothing was more singular than her manifesto to the Hanoverian people and her despatch to the court of London. To the Hanoverians she said that it was with pain she took possession of that kingdom—possession for which she paid by a severe sacrifice, that of her provinces on the Rhine, in Franconia, and in Switzerland; but that she did so to ensure peace to Germany, and to spare Hanover the presence of foreign armies. After addressing to the Hanoverian people these words without frankness and without dignity, she said to the English cabinet that she did not take Hanover from England, but that she received it from Napoleon, whose conquest Hanover was. She received it, she added, against her will, and as an exchange that was forced upon her for provinces which were the object of her keenest regret; that it was one of the consequences of the imprudent war which Prussia had always blamed, which had been undertaken contrary to her advice, and the consequences of

which the allies must impute to themselves, for in combating it unseasonably, they had raised up that colossal power which took from one to give to another, and which did violence as well to those whom it favoured with its gifts as to those whom it despoiled.

England was not to be satisfied with such reasons. She replied in a manifesto, in which she overwhelmed the court of Prussia with invectives, declared it miserably fallen under the yoke of Napoleon, unworthy of being listened to, and as contemptible for its greediness as for its dependence. Still the British cabinet, that it might not appear in the eyes of the nation to bring an additional enemy upon its hands for an interest belonging exclusively to the royal family, said that it would have suffered this new invasion of Hanover, the inevitable result of the continental war, if Prussia had confined herself to a mere occupation; but that this power, having announced the closing of the rivers, had committed a hostile act, an act supremely injurious to English commerce, and that in consequence it declared war against her. Orders were given to all the ships of the royal navy to take all vessels sailing under the Prussian flag. Great was the consequent perturbation in Germany; for the vessels of the Baltic usually covered themselves with that flag, which was more respected than the others by the lords of the sea.

The ascendency of the battle of Marengo had reconciled England with Napoleon, the ascendency of that of Austerlitz brought her back to him once more, for the victories of our land armies were means of disarming her quite as sure though less direct. The first of these victories had produced the resignation of Mr. Pitt, the second caused his death. This great minister, having resumed his seat in the cabinet in 1803, for no more than two years, appeared there only to drink deeply of mortifications. Having returned without Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville, his former colleagues, without Mr. Fox, his recent ally, he had had to fight in Parliament his old and his new friends, in Europe Napoleon, become emperor, and more powerful than ever. At his voice, so well known to the enemies of France, the cry of arms had rung on all sides; a third coalition had been formed, and the French army had been drawn away from Dover to Vienna. But this third coalition once dissolved at Austerlitz, Mr. Pitt had seen his plans frustrated, Napoleon at liberty to return to Boulogne, and the keen anxieties of England about to be renewed.

The idea of again seeing Napoleon on the shores of the Channel engrossed all minds in England. Reliance was still placed, it is true, on the immense difficulty of the passage, but people began to fear that nothing was impossible with the extraordinary man who shook the world; and they asked if it was worth while to risk such chances for the sake of acquiring an island more, when they already had all India, when they held the Cape of

Good Hope and Malta too firmly to be dispossessed of them. They said to themselves that the battle of Trafalgar had definitively ensured the superiority of England on the seas, but that the European continent was left to Napoleon, that he was about to close all its outlets, that this continent, after all, was the world, and that one could not live cut off from it for ever; that the most splendid naval victories would not prevent Napoleon taking advantage some day of some accidental circumstance from leaving that continent to invade England. The system of war to the utmost extremity was, therefore, universally discredited among rational Englishmen, and though that system was subsequently successful, yet they were then sensible of the danger which was great, too great for the advantages that might be gained by a prolonged struggle.

Now, as men are the slaves of Fortune, and readily take her momentary caprices for eternal, they were cruel towards Mr. Pitt: they forgot the services which for twenty years that minister had rendered to his country, and the degree of greatness to which he had raised it by the energy of his patriotism, and by the parliamentary talents by which he had subjugated the House of Commons. They considered him as vanquished, and treated him as such. His enemies railed at his policy and the results which it had produced. They imputed to him the faults of General Mack, the precipitation of the Austrians in taking the field without waiting for the Russians, and the precipitation of the Russians in giving battle without waiting for the Prussians. All this they imputed to the vehement impatience of Mr. Pitt; they affected great sympathy for Austria, while they accused him of having ruined her, and of having ruined in her the only genuine friend of England.

Mr. Pitt nevertheless was a stranger to the plan of the campaign, and had participated in nothing but the coalition. It was he who had principally knitted it, and in knitting it he had prevented the Boulogne expedition. People gave him no thanks for it.

A singular circumstance had rendered the effect of Napoleon's late victory more painful. On the day after Austerlitz, as on the day after Marengo, it was asserted for a few moments, before the truth was known, that Napoleon had lost in a great battle twenty-seven thousand men and all his artillery. But accurate information had very soon been circulated, and the members of the opposition, getting the French bulletins translated and printed, distributed and sent them to the door of Mr. Pitt and the Russian ambassador.

In order to the enjoyment of all his glory, Napoleon would have had only to pass the Strait, and listen to what was said of him, of his genius, of his fortune. Melancholy vicissitudes of

this world! what Mr. Pitt underwent at this period, Napoleon had to undergo later, and with a greatness of injustice and of passion proportioned to the greatness of his genius and of his destiny.

Twenty-five years' parliamentary conflicts, consuming conflicts, which wear out soul and body, had ruined the health of Mr. Pitt. An hereditary disorder, which business fatigues and recent vexations had rendered mortal, caused his premature end on the 23rd of January 1806, after having governed his country more than twenty years, with as much power as can be exercised in an absolute monarchy; and yet he lived in a free country, and yet he enjoyed not the favour of his sovereign, and had to conquer the suffrages of the most independent assembly in the world.

If we admire those ministers who in absolute monarchies have the skill to chain for a long time the weakness of the prince, the instability of the court, and to reign in the name of their master over an enslaved country, what admiration ought we not to feel for a man whose power, established over a free nation, lasted twenty years! Courts are extremely capricious, no doubt: they are not more so than great deliberative assemblies. All the caprices of public opinion, excited by the thousand stimulants of the daily press, and reflected in a parliament where they assume the authority of the national sovereignty, compose that variable will, alternately servile and despotic, which it is necessary to captivate in order to reign one's self over that multitude of heads which pretend to reign. To hold sway there, it requires not only that art of flattery which wins success in courts, but also that very different art of public speaking, sometimes vulgar, sometimes sublime, which is indispensable to obtain a hearing from an assembly; it requires, further, that which is not an art, which is a gift, the temper with which one succeeds in quelling and controlling the excited passions. All these natural or acquired qualities Mr. Pitt possessed in the highest degree. Never in modern times has there existed a more able leader of an assembly. Exposed for a quarter of a century to the impetuous vehemence of Mr. Fox, to the cutting sarcasms of Mr. Sheridan, he bore himself up with imperturbable composure, spoke at all times justly, opportunely, temperately, and when the ringing voice of his adversaries was joined by the still more powerful voice of events, when the French Revolution, incessantly disconcerting the most experienced statesman and general in Europe, flung across his way either Fleurus, or Zurich, or Marengo, he always knew how to restrain the excited minds of the British Parliament by his firmness and by the pertinence of his answers. It is for this more particularly that Mr. Pitt was remarkable, for he had not, as we have elsewhere observed, either the organising genius or the profound faculties of the statesman. With the

exception of some financial institutions of disputed merit, he created nothing in England; he was often mistaken respecting the relative strength of the European powers and the course of events, but to the talents of a great political orator he added ardent love of his country, and a passionate hatred of the French Revolution. Representing in England not the titled aristocracy, but the commercial aristocracy, which lavished its treasures upon him in the way of loans, he resisted the greatness of France and the contagion of democratic disorders with immovable perseverance, and maintained order in his country without diminishing liberty. He left it burdened with debt, it is true, but quiet possessor of the seas and of India. He used and abused the strength of England, but she was the second power in the world when he died, and the first, eight years after his death. And what would the strength of nations be good for unless to endeavour to control one another! Vast dominations are among the designs of Providence. What a man of genius is to a nation, a great nation is to mankind. Great nations civilise, enlighten the world, and accelerate its progress in every way. Only it is necessary to counsel them to unite with strength the prudence which gives success to strength and the justice which honours it.

Mr. Pitt, so prosperous for eighteen years, was unfortunate in the last days of his life. We were avenged, we French, on that cruel enemy; for he had reason to conclude that we should be victorious for ever, to doubt the excellence of his policy, and to tremble for the futurity of his country. It was one of the least gifted of his successors, Lord Castlereagh, who was destined to enjoy our disasters.

Amidst accusations the most diverse and the most violent, Mr. Pitt had the good fortune not to see his integrity assailed. He lived upon his emoluments, which were considerable, and without being poor, was reputed to be so. When his death was made known, one of the old ministerial majority proposed to pay his debts. This motion being submitted to Parliament, was received with respect, but resisted by his old friends, who had become his enemies, and particularly by Mr. Wyndham, who had so long been his colleague in the ministry. His noble antagonist, Mr. Fox, refused to support the motion, but with grief. "I honour," he exclaimed, in a tone that moved the assembled Commons, "I honour my illustrious adversary, and I account it the glory of my life to have been sometimes called his rival; but for twenty years I have opposed his policy, and what would the present generation say of me if it were to see me approving a proposal designed to be the last and the most signal homage to that policy which I have believed, which I still believe, to be prejudicial to England." Everybody com-

prehended the vote of Mr. Fox, and applauded the noble spirit of his language.

A few days afterwards, the motion having assumed another character, Parliament unanimously voted £50,000 sterling (1,250,000 francs) to pay Mr. Pitt's debts. It was decided that he should be buried at Westminster.

Mr. Pitt left vacant the offices of first lord of the treasury, chancellor of the exchequer, lord warden of the Cinque ports, chancellor of the University of Cambridge, and several others of less importance.

It was very difficult to supply his place, not in these different offices, for which numerous ambitions were ready to dispute, but in that of prime minister, in which there was something awful in presence of Napoleon, conqueror of the European coalition. One idea had taken possession of all minds immediately after the renewal of the war in 1803, and at the sight of the weak ministry of Mr. Addington, who then governed. The concerted opposition of Pitt and Fox against the Addington cabinet rendered this coalition of talents more natural and more easy. Mr. Pitt desired it, but not so strongly as to overcome George III. He entered upon the ministry without Mr. Fox, and by a sort of compensation, without his staunchest friends in the old Tory system, without Lord Grenville and Mr. Wyndham, whom he had found too ardent to associate them again with himself.

These, left out by Mr. Pitt, had been gradually drawing nearer to Mr. Fox by the way of opposition, though from the nature of their opinions they were further from him than Mr. Pitt himself. A common struggle of two years had contributed to unite them, and few differences divided them when Mr. Pitt died. A general opinion called them together to the ministry, to replace by their combined talents the great minister whom the country had just lost; to endeavour to make peace by means of the friendly relations between Mr. Fox and Napoleon; and to continue the struggle with all the known energy of the Grenvilles and the Wyndhams, if they did not succeed in arranging with France.

If in 1803 George III. had taken Mr. Pitt whom he disliked, in order to dispense with Mr. Fox, whom he disliked still more, he was forced after Mr. Pitt's death to submit to the empire of public opinion, and to call into one and the same cabinet Fox, Grenville, Wyndham, and their friends. Lord Grenville had the office of first lord of the treasury, that is to say, prime minister; Mr Wyndham, that which he had always occupied, the administration of war; Mr. Fox, the foreign affairs; Mr. Grey, the admiralty. The other departments were distributed among the friends of these political personages,

but in such a manner that Mr. Fox numbered most votes in the new ministry.

This cabinet, thus formed, obtained a great majority, notwithstanding the attacks of the ousted colleagues of Mr. Pitt, Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning. It directed its immediate attention to two essential objects, the organisation of the army, and the relations with France.

As for the army, it was not possible to leave it as it had been since 1803, that is to say, composed of an insufficient regular force, and of 300,000 volunteers, as expensive as they were ill disciplined. It was an organisation of emergency, devised for the moment of danger. Mr. Wyndham, who had always been sarcastic upon the volunteers, and maintained that nothing great could be done but with regular armies, which had furnished him with occasion to speak in magnificent terms of the French army—Mr. Wyndham could less than any other retain the present organisation. He proposed, therefore, a sort of disguised disbanding of the volunteers, and certain changes in the troops of the line, which were designed to facilitate the recruiting of the latter. We have already seen that the English army, like all mercenary armies, was recruited by voluntary enlistment. But this enlistment was for life, and rendered recruiting difficult. Mr. Wyndham proposed to convert it into temporary enlistment for a term of seven to twenty years, and to add to it considerable advantages of pay. He contributed thus to procure a much stronger organisation for the English army; but he had to contend with the prejudice which standing armies excite in all free nations, with the favour which the volunteers had acquired, and above all, with the interests created by that institution; for it had been necessary to form a corps of officers for the volunteers, which government was now obliged to dissolve. An attempt had been made to set Mr. Wyndham at variance with his new colleague, Mr. Fox, who, participating in the popular prejudices of his party, had formerly shown a greater predilection for the institution of the volunteers than for the extension of the regular army. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the ministerial plan was adopted. A large augmentation to the regular army was voted; till the complete development of the new system, it was to consist of 267,000 men, 75,000 of whom were local militia, and 192,000 troops of the line, distributed throughout the three kingdoms and the colonies. The total expense of the budget still amounted to about 83 millions sterling, that is, more than two thousand million francs, made up by taxes to the amount of 1500 millions, and a loan, to be contracted in the course of the year, for 500.

It was with these mighty resources that England purposed to appear before Napoleon in order to negotiate. From Mr. Fox,

from his situation, from his friendly relations with the emperor, were expected facilities which no other could possess for tendering pacific overtures. A fortunate accident, which Providence owed to that honest man, furnished him with a most honourable and most natural opportunity. A wretch, judging of the new English administration from the preceding, introduced himself to Mr. Fox, and offered to assassinate Napoleon. Mr. Fox indignantly ordered him to be seized by the doorkeepers, and delivered up to the English police. He wrote immediately a very noble letter to M. de Talleyrand, denouncing the odious proposal which he had just received, and offering to place at his disposal all the means for prosecuting the author if his scheme appeared to involve anything serious.

Napoleon was touched, as well he might be, at so generous a procedure, and ordered M. de Talleyrand to address to Mr. Fox such an answer as the latter deserved. "I have laid your excellency's letter before his majesty," wrote M. de Talleyrand. "There," he exclaimed, "I recognise the principles of honour and virtue which have always animated Mr. Fox. Thank him in my name, he added, and tell him that, whether the policy of his sovereign causes us to continue much longer at war, or whether as speedy an end as the two nations can desire is put to a quarrel useless for humanity, I rejoice at the new character which, from this proceeding, the war has already taken, and which is an omen of what may be expected from a cabinet of the principles of which I am delighted to judge from those of Mr. Fox, who is one of the men most fitted to feel in everything what is excellent, what is truly great."

M. de Talleyrand said nothing more, and this was sufficient to produce a continuation of communications so nobly commenced. Mr. Fox immediately answered by a frank and cordial letter, in which, without circumlocution, without diplomatic quirk, he offered peace on safe and honourable conditions, and by means as simple as they were prompt. The bases of the treaty of Amiens were much changed, according to Mr. Fox; they were so in consequence of the very advantages obtained by France and England on the two elements which were the ordinary theatre of their successes. It was therefore necessary to seek new conditions, which should not hurt the pride of either of the two nations, and which should procure for Europe guarantees of future tranquillity and safety. These conditions, if both sides chose to be reasonable, were not difficult to be found. According to anterior treaties, England could not negotiate separately from Russia, but, till the latter could be consulted, it was allowable to commit to chosen agents the task of discussing the interests of the belligerent powers, and paving the way to their adjustment. Mr. Fox offered to appoint immediately

the persons who should be charged with this mission, and the place where they were to meet.

This proposal delighted Napoleon, who at bottom wished for a reconciliation with Great Britain, for from her every war proceeded, like water from its source, and there were few direct means of conquering her, one alone excepted, extremely decisive, but extremely precarious, and practicable for him only, an invasion. He was sincerely rejoiced at this frank overture, and accepted it with the greatest cordiality.

Without entering into any explanation of the conditions, he intimated in his reply that France would not dispute much with England the conquests which she had made (she had retained Malta, as it will be recollected, and taken the Cape), that France, on her side, had said her last word to Europe in the treaty of Presburg, and that she claimed nothing further; that it would therefore be easy to lay down the bases, if England had not particular and inadmissible views relative to commercial interests. "The emperor is persuaded," said M. de Talleyrand, "that the real cause of the rupture of the peace of Amiens was no other than the refusal to conclude a commercial treaty. Be assured that the emperor, without refusing certain commercial advantages, if they are possible, will not admit of any treaty prejudicial to French industry, which he means to protect by all duties or prohibitions that can favour its development. He insists on having liberty to do at home all that he pleases, all that is deemed beneficial, without any rival nation having a right to find fault with him."

As for the intervention of Russia in the treaty, Napoleon directed a positive declaration to be made that he would not permit it. The principle of his diplomacy was that of separate peace, and this principle was equally just and ably conceived. Europe had always employed the medium of coalitions against France; it would be favouring them to admit of collective negotiations, for it would be lending one's self to the essential condition of every coalition, that which forbids its members to treat separately. Napoleon, who in war strove to meet his enemies separated from each other, in order to beat them in detail, could do no other than strive in diplomacy to meet with them in the same position. Accordingly, he had opposed absolute refusals to all offers of negotiating collectively, and he was right, with the salvo to depart from this principle of conduct in case Mr. Fox should be bound by engagements which would not permit him to treat without Russia. Napoleon, after he had laid down the principle of a separate negotiation, enjoined his minister to intimate further that he was ready to choose for the place of the negotiation, not that Amiens which reminded

one of bases of peace henceforward abandoned, but Lille, and to send a minister plenipotentiary thither immediately.

Mr. Fox instantly replied that the first condition which had been agreed upon at the outset of these parleys was that the peace should be equally honourable for both nations, and that it would not be so for England if she treated without Russia, for she had formally engaged by an article of a treaty (that which had constituted the coalition of 1805) not to conclude a separate peace. This obligation was absolute, according to Mr. Fox, and could not be eluded. He said that if France had a principle, that of not authorising coalitions by her manner of negotiating, England had another, that of not suffering herself to be excluded from the continent by lending herself to the dissolution of her continental alliances; that on this point people in England were quite as jealous as they could be in France on the subject of coalitions. Mr. Fox, who accompanied each of his official despatches with a private letter full of frankness and honour, an example which M. de Talleyrand followed on his side—Mr. Fox finished with saying that the negotiation would perhaps be stopped by an absolute obstacle, which he sincerely regretted, but that, at any rate, the war would be honourable and worthy of the two great nations which waged it. He added these remarkable words: "I am sensible to the highest degree, as I ought to be, to the obliging expressions which the great man whom you serve has used in regard to me. Regret is unavailing, but if he could see, with the same eye that I behold it, the true glory which he would have a right to acquire by a just and moderate peace, what happiness would not result from it for France and for all Europe!

"C. J. Fox.

"LONDON, *April* 22, 1806."

Amidst this rancorous, one might say ferocious contest, when one reviews the sanguinary scenes which have marked it, the mind loves to dwell on that noble and kindly intercourse, to which a man as generous as he was eloquent gave rise for a moment, between the two greatest nations of the globe, and the heart is filled with painful, inconsolable regret.

Napoleon was himself deeply touched by the language of Mr. Fox, and he was sincerely desirous of peace. M. de Talleyrand, though mistaken in regard to the system of our alliances, was never wrong on the main point of the policy of the time, and he ceased not for a moment to believe that, at the height of greatness to which we had attained, peace was our primary interest. He found a courage to say this which he had not in general, and he earnestly pressed Napoleon to seize the unique occasion offered by the presence of Mr. Fox in office to negotiate with

Great Britain. For the rest, he had no difficulty to gain a hearing, for Napoleon was not less disposed than himself to profit by this alike fortunate and unexpected occasion.

Circumstances, moreover, assisted to overcome the obstacle which seemed to stop the negotiation at its outset. There was more than one reason to believe, from reports which came from the Duke of Brunswick and from the consul of France at St. Petersburg, that Alexander, uneasy about the consequences of the war, mistrusting the silence of the British cabinet towards him, and the personal dispositions of Mr. Fox, wished for the re-establishment of peace. The consul of France had sent to Paris the chancellor of the consulate to report what he had learned, and everything seemed to encourage a hope of opening a direct negotiation with Russia. In this case, Mr. Fox could no longer insist on the principle of a collective negotiation, since Russia would herself have set the example of renouncing it.

It was determined, therefore, to prosecute the parleys commenced by Mr. Fox, and for this purpose there was employed an agent whom a lucky chance had just presented. To the generous words exchanged with Mr. Fox were added proceedings not less generous. Ever since the apprehension of the English, ordered by Napoleon at the time of the rupture of the peace of Amiens, by way of reprisals for the seizure of French vessels, many members of the highest families in England had been detained at Verdun. Mr. Fox had applied for the release of several of them on parole. His solicitations had been cheerfully complied with, and though not daring to insist upon all of them in an equal degree, he had classed them according to the interest which he felt for them. Napoleon resolved to grant them all, and the English designated by him had been released without any exception. In return for this noble proceeding, Mr. Fox had selected, for the purpose of releasing them, the most distinguished prisoners taken at the battle of Trafalgar, the unfortunate Villeneuve, Captain Lucas, the heroic commander of the *Redoutable*, and many others, equal in number to the English set at liberty.

Among the prisoners restored to Mr. Fox was one of the richest and one of the cleverest English noblemen, Lord Yarmouth, afterwards Marquis of Hertford, a staunch Tory, but an intimate friend of Mr. Fox's, a decided partisan of peace, which enabled him to live abroad and enjoy the pleasures of the continent, of which he was deprived by the war. This young nobleman, acquainted with the most brilliant of the youth of Paris, in whose dissipations he partook, was well known to M. de Talleyrand, who liked the English nobility, especially such of them as had talents, elegance, and dissolute habits. Lord

Yarmouth was pointed out to him as particularly connected with Mr. Fox, and as well worthy of the confidence of both governments. He sent for him, told him that the emperor was sincerely desirous of peace, that they must set aside the ceremony of diplomatic forms, and come to a frank explanation upon the conditions acceptable on both sides; that these conditions could not be very difficult to find, since France would no longer dispute with England what she had conquered, that is to say, Malta and the Cape; that the question, therefore, was reduced to a few islands of little importance; that, in regard to France, she spoke out in a clear and straightforward manner; she desired that, besides her natural territory, the Rhine and the Alps, no power should henceforth contest with her the whole of Italy, including the kingdom of Naples, and her alliances in Germany, on condition of restoring their independence to Switzerland and Holland, as soon as peace should be signed; that consequently there was no serious obstacle to an immediate reconciliation of the two countries, since both must be disposed to concede the things just specified; that, relative to the difficulty arising from the form of the negotiation, collective or separate, they should soon find a solution of that, thanks to the inclination shown by Russia to treat directly with France.

There was one capital point on which no explanation was given, but respecting which France gave to understand that in the end she should tell her secret, and tell it in such a manner as to satisfy the royal family of England—that was Hanover.

Napoleon had actually determined to restore it to George III., and it was the recent conduct of Prussia which had provoked him to this serious resolution. The hypocritical language of that court in its manifestoes, tending to represent it to the Hanoverians and to the English as an oppressed power which had been forced with the sword at its throat to accept a fine kingdom, had transported him with anger. He was for tearing that moment the treaty of the 15th of February, and obliging Prussia to replace everything on the former footing. But for the reflections which time and M. de Talleyrand suggested, he would have made a disturbance. Another more recent circumstance had contributed to detach him entirely from Prussia, that was the publication by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt's retiring colleagues of the negotiations of 1805. The latter were intent on avenging the memory of their illustrious leader, by showing that he had had nothing to do with the military operations, though he had had the greatest share in the formation of the coalition of 1805, which had saved England by causing the breaking up of the camp of Boulogne. But in defending the memory of their leader they had compromised most of the courts. Mr. Fox had reproached them with it in

the House of Commons with extreme vehemence, and had attributed to them the change in all the relations of England with the European powers. There was, in fact, a universal outcry against English diplomacy in the cabinets, which found themselves denounced to France by this imprudent publication. On this occasion an unlucky light had been thrown on the conduct of Prussia. Her hypocritical and recent declarations to England relative to Hanover, the hopes which she had held out to the coalition before and after the events of Potsdam, were all divulged. Napoleon, without complaining, had ordered the insertion of these documents in the *Moniteur*, leaving every one to guess what he ought to think of them.

But the opinion of Napoleon in regard to Prussia was formed. He no longer considered her worth the trouble of a prolonged contest with England; he was determined to restore Hanover to the latter, and to offer Prussia one of two things, either an equivalent to Hanover to be found in Germany, or the restitution of what he had received from her, Anspach, Cleves, and Neufchatel. There the cabinet of Berlin would reap what it had sown, and would meet with no more fidelity than it had manifested. Still Napoleon was ignorant of the secret negotiation begun with Russia through the medium of the Duke of Brunswick and M. de Hardenberg.

Without completely explaining, the French government gave Lord Yarmouth to understand that the peace would not depend on Hanover, and he set out, promising to return soon with the secret of Mr. Fox's intentions.

A singular event, which for some days imparted to things a strong appearance of war, contributed on the contrary to turn them to peace, by accelerating the resolutions of the Russian cabinet. The French troops ordered to occupy Dalmatia had hastened their march to the mouths of the Cattaro, to preserve them from the danger with which they were threatened. The Montenegrins, whose bishop and principal chiefs subsisted on the bounty of Russia, were greatly agitated on learning the approach of the French, and had sent for Admiral Siniavin, the same who had conveyed from Corfu to Naples and from Naples to Corfu the Russians sent to overrun the south of Italy. That admiral, informed of the opportunity which offered to seize the mouths of the Cattaro, had hastily embarked a few hundred Russians, joined them to a body of Montenegrins who had descended from their mountains, and appeared before the forts. An Austrian officer who occupied them, and a commissioner charged by Austria to surrender them to the French, declaring that they were constrained by a superior force, delivered them up to the Russians. This allegation of a superior force was wholly unfounded, for in the forts of Cattaro there

were two Austrian battalions, very capable of defending them even against a regular army possessing the means of siege, of which the Russians were destitute. This perfidy was chiefly the deed of the Austrian commissioner, Marquis de Ghisilieri, a most artful Italian, blamed afterwards by his government, and put upon his trial for this dishonourable act.

When the report of this fact, transmitted to Paris by an extraordinary courier, reached Napoleon, he was extremely irritated, for he attached infinite importance to the mouths of the Cattaro, not so much on account of the advantages, though very positive, of their maritime position, as for their vicinity to Turkey, on which they enabled the holder to exercise an influence, either protective or repressive. But he was angry with the cabinet of Vienna alone, for it was that cabinet which ought to deliver the territory of Dalmatia to him, and which was the only debtor in regard to him. The corps of Marshal Soult was on the point of repassing the Inn and evacuating Braunau. Napoleon ordered it to halt on the Inn, to rearm Braunau, to re-establish itself, and to create an absolute *place d'armes* there. At the same time, he declared to Austria that the French troops should turn back, that the Austrian prisoners on their march home should be detained, and that, if need were, that things should be carried so far as the renewal of hostilities, unless one of these two satisfactions were given him; either the immediate restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro, or the despatch of an Austrian military force to retake them from the Russians in conjunction with the French. This second alternative was not the one that he should have liked least, for it would set Austria at variance with Russia. When these declarations, made with the peremptory tone usual with Napoleon, had reached Vienna, they produced real consternation there. The Austrian cabinet was in no wise implicated in this treachery of an inferior agent. The latter had acted without order, thinking to please his government by a perfidy against the French. Letters were immediately despatched from Vienna to St. Petersburg, to inform the Emperor Alexander of the new perils to which Austria found herself exposed, and to declare that, unwilling on any account to see the French again at Vienna, she would rather submit to the painful necessity of attacking the Russians in the forts of the Cattaro.

Admiral Siniavin, who had taken possession of the mouths of the Cattaro, had acted without orders, as well as the Marquis de Ghisilieri, who had delivered them. Alexander was grieved at the position in which his ally the Emperor Francis had been placed; he was grieved at the position in which he was himself placed, between the embarrassment of restoring and that of retaining. He was more and more annoyed by the solicitations

of his young friends, who talked to him incessantly about perseverance in conduct; he was uneasy respecting the negotiations begun by Napoleon with England; and though the latter had at length broken the silence which she had observed during the ministerial crisis, he distrusted his allies, and was inclined to follow the general example and to reconcile himself with France. Accordingly, he took occasion from the very circumstance of the mouths of the Cattaro, which seemed rather an occasion for war than for peace, to commence a pacific negotiation. He had at hand the former secretary of the Russian legation at Paris, M. d'Oubril, who had conducted himself there to the satisfaction of both governments, and who had, moreover, the advantage of being well known in France. He was directed to proceed to Vienna, and to apply there for passports to Paris. The ostensible pretext was to be business relating to the Russian prisoners, but his real errand was to treat of the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, and to include it in a general settlement of all the questions which had divided the two empires. M. d'Oubril had orders to delay as long as possible the restitution of the mouths of the Cattaro, to give them up, nevertheless, if there were no means of preventing a renewal of hostilities against Austria; and to manage above all to re-establish an honourable peace between Russia and France. It will be thought honourable, he was told, if something, no matter what, is obtained for the two habitual protégés of the Russian cabinet, Naples and Piedmont; for the two empires had, for the rest, nothing to dispute with each other, and were carrying on merely a war of influence. Before he set off, M. d'Oubril conversed with the Emperor Alexander, and it became manifest to him that this prince was visibly much more disposed to peace than the Russian ministry, which besides was tottering, and on the point of being dismissed. He set out, therefore, inclining to that side to which his master inclined. He was furnished with double powers, the one limited, the other complete, and embracing all the questions that he could have to resolve. He had orders to concert with the English negotiator relative to the conditions of peace, but without requiring a collective negotiation, which, in fact, did away with the difficulties that had arisen between France and England.

M. d'Oubril set out for Vienna, and by his presence restored composure to the Emperor Francis, who feared that he should either see the French come back to his country, or that he should have to fight the Russians. The second alternative alarming him much less than the first, that prince had sent off an Austrian corps for the mouths of the Cattaro, with orders to second the French troops if necessary. M. d'Oubril cheered him by showing his powers, and applied for passports through

Count Rausmousky, in order to proceed as speedily as possible to Paris.

Napoleon desired that an immediate and favourable answer should be given to the demand of M. d'Oubril, but at the same time he took care to make a distinction between the affair of the mouths of the Cattaro and that of the re-establishment of peace. The affair of the mouths of the Cattaro, according to what was said on his behalf, could not be the subject of any negotiation, since it related to an engagement of Austria's which remained unexecuted, and respecting which France had nothing to discuss with Russia. As to the re-establishment of peace, the French government was ready to listen most cheerfully to the proposals of M. d'Oubril, for it was sincerely desirous to put an end to a war, alike without object and without interest for the two empires. The passports of M. d'Oubril were immediately despatched to Vienna.

Napoleon thus saw Austria, exhausted by three wars, striving to avoid any new hostility against France; Russia disgusted with a contest too lightly undertaken, and determined not to prolong it; England, satisfied with her naval successes, thinking it not worth while to expose herself again to some formidable expedition; lastly, Prussia, stripped of all respect, of no value in the estimation of any one, and in this state the whole world desirous to preserve or to obtain peace, on conditions, it is true, which were not yet clearly defined, but which, whatever they were, would leave France in the rank of the first power in the world.

Napoleon keenly enjoyed this situation, and had no inclination whatever to compromise it even to gain new victories. But he meditated vast projects, which he conceived that he could cause to spring naturally and immediately from the treaty of Presburg. These projects seemed to him to be so generally foreseen, that upon the single condition of accomplishing them forthwith he hoped to get them comprehended in the double peace which was negotiating with Russia and England. Then his empire, such as he had conceived it in his mighty mind, would be definitively constituted and accepted by Europe. These results obtained, he considered peace as the completion and the ratification of his work, as the prize due to his labours and to those of his people, as the accomplishment of his fondest wishes. He was a man, in short, as he had already sent word to Mr. Fox, and he was far from being insensible to the charms of repose. With the powerful versatility of his mind, he was as much disposed to enjoy the sweets of peace and the glory of the useful arts as to transport himself again to fields of battle, to bivouac among his soldiers upon the snow.

Lord Yarmouth had returned from London with a private letter from Mr. Fox, attesting that he possessed the entire confidence of that minister, and that he might be talked to without

reserve. This letter added that Lord Yarmouth should receive powers as soon as there should be a well-founded hope of an arrangement. M. de Talleyrand had then informed him of the communications established with Russia, and had thus proved the inutility of insisting on a collective negotiation, when Russia lent herself to a separate negotiation. As for the pretension of England not to be excluded from the affairs of the continent, M. de Talleyrand offered Lord Yarmouth an official recognition of *an equal right for both powers of intervention and guarantee in continental and maritime affairs.** Thus the question of a separate negotiation seemed to be a question no longer, and the conditions of peace themselves appeared to present no further insoluble difficulties. England wished to retain the Cape and Malta; she also showed a desire to keep our establishments in India, such as Chandernagor and Pondicherry, the French islands of Tobago and St. Lucia, and above all the Dutch colony of Surinam, situated on the American continent. Among these different possessions Surinam alone was of any importance, Pondicherry being but a mere wreck of our ancient power in India; Tobago and St. Lucia were not of sufficient value to induce a refusal. Respecting Surinam, England did not absolutely insist. As for our continental conquests, assuredly as important as our maritime conquests, she was ready to concede all of them to us, without excepting Genoa, Venice, Dalmatia, and Naples. Sicily alone appeared to form a difficulty. Lord Yarmouth, explaining himself confidentially, said that England was tired of protecting those Bourbons of Naples, that imbecile king, that mad queen; that, nevertheless, since they possessed Sicily *de facto*, for Joseph had not yet conquered it, one would be obliged to demand it for them, but that this would be a question which would depend on the result of the military operations already undertaken. In case, however, Sicily should be taken from them, Lord Yarmouth added that an indemnity must somewhere be found for them. It was tacitly implied that, in return for these various concessions, Hanover should be restored to England. But on both sides the matter was reserved without being formally mentioned.

Sicily, therefore, was the only serious difficulty, and yet the immediate conquest of the island, upon condition of an indemnity however insignificant it might be, would be capable of arranging everything. Passports had been sent to M. d'Oubril; it was not known what pretensions he might bring, but they could not be essentially different from the English pretensions.

Napoleon clearly perceived that, by not hurrying the negotiations, and by accelerating, on the other hand, the execution of his plans, he should attain his twofold aim, that of constituting

* The words of the despatch.

EUGENE DE BEAUHARNAIS.

his empire as he pleased, and of obtaining the confirmation of its establishment by the general peace.

From the first, in preferring the title of emperor to that of king, he had conceived a vast system of empire, on which vassal royalties should be dependent, in imitation of the Germanic empire, an empire so enfeebled that it no longer existed but in name, and which held out a temptation to replace it in Europe. The late victories of Napoleon had heated his imagination, and he dreamt of nothing else but of reviving the Empire of the West, placing its crown on his head, and thus re-establishing it for the advantage of France. The new vassal royalties were all found, and they were to be distributed among the members of the Bonaparte family. Eugène de Beauharnais, adopted as son, become the husband of a Bavarian princess, was already Viceroy of Italy, and this viceroyalty comprehended the more important half of the Italian peninsula, since it extended from Tuscany to the Julian Alps. Joseph, elder brother of Napoleon, was destined for King of Naples. Nothing more was required but to procure Sicily for him, in order to put him in possession of one of the finest kingdoms of the second order. Holland, which had great difficulty to govern itself as a republic, was under the absolute dependence of Napoleon; and he thought that he could include it in his system, by constituting it a kingdom in favour of his brother Louis. These made three kingdoms to be placed under the paramountship of his empire. Sometimes, when he extended the dream of his greatness further, he thought of Spain and Portugal, which were daily giving him signs, Spain of a secret hostility, Portugal of an open hostility. But this was yet placed at a great distance in the wide horizon of his imagination. It was requisite that Europe should oblige him by some new startling achievement, like that of Austerlitz, to decide upon the complete expulsion of the house of Bourbon. It is certain, however, that this expulsion began to be a systematic idea with him. Since he had been led to proclaim the dethronement of the Bourbons of Naples, he considered the family of Bonaparte as destined to replace the house of Bourbon on all the thrones of the south of Europe.

In this vast hierarchy of vassal States dependent on the French empire he planned a second and a third rank, composed of great and small duchies, after the model of the fiefs of the Germanic empire. He had already constituted for the benefit of his eldest sister the duchy of Lucca, which he purposed to augment by the addition of the principality of Massa, detached from the kingdom of Italy. He projected the creation of another, that of Guastalla, by detaching it also from the kingdom of Italy. These two dismemberments were very insignificant in comparison with the magnificent accession of the Venetian States.

Napoleon had just obtained from Prussia, Neufchatel, Anspach, and the remnant of the duchy of Cleves. He had given Anspach to Bavaria, in order to procure the duchy of Berg, a fine country situated on the right of the Rhine below Cologne, and comprehending the important fortress of Wesel. Strasburg, Mayence, and Wesel, said Napoleon, are *the three bridles* of the Rhine.

He had still in Upper Italy, Parma and Piacenza, in the kingdom of Naples, Ponte Corvo and Benevento, fiefs disputed between Naples and the Pope, who gave him at this moment the most serious causes of displeasure. Pius VII. had not carried with him from Paris the satisfactions which he expected. Flattered by the attentions of Napoleon, he had deceived himself in his hopes of a territorial compensation. Besides, the invasion of all Italy by the French, now that they had spread themselves from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, had appeared to him to complete the dependence of the Roman States. He was excessively mortified at this, and showed it in all ways. He would not organise the Church of Germany, which was left without prelates, without chapters, ever since the secularisations. He admitted of none of the religious arrangements adopted for Italy. On occasion of the marriage which Jerome Bonaparte had contracted in the United States with a Protestant, and which Napoleon wished to get dissolved, the Pope opposed an insincere but obstinate resistance, thus employing his spiritual arms in default of temporal arms. Napoleon had sent him word that he considered himself as master of Italy, including Rome, and that he would not suffer any secret enemy there; that he should follow the example of those princes who, continuing faithful to the Church, had known how to control it; that he was a real Charlemagne for the Church of Rome, for he had re-established it, and he claimed to be treated as such. Meanwhile, he expressed his displeasure by taking Ponte Corvo and Benevento. This was the deplorable commencement of a baneful misunderstanding, to which Napoleon then conceived that he could set any bounds he pleased, for the interests of religion and the empire.

Thus, besides several thrones to give away, he had Lucca, Guastalla, Benevento, Ponte Corvo, Piacenza, Parma, Neufchatel, and Berg to distribute among his sisters and his most faithful servants, with the titles of principalities or duchies. While giving kingdoms, such as Naples, to Joseph, augmentations, such as the Venetian States, to Eugène, he thought of creating a score of minor duchies, destined as well for his generals as for his best servants of the civil order, to form a third rank in his imperial hierarchy, and to reward in a signal manner those men to whom he owed the throne, and to whom France owed her greatness.

While, in placing the imperial crown on his head, he had adjudged to himself the prize of the marvellous exploits performed by the contemporary generation, he had raised longings in the companions of his glory, and they, too, aspired to obtain the reward of their exertions. Unfortunately, they no longer imitated the abstinence of the generals of the Republic, and frequently took what he was in no haste to give them. In Italy, and especially in the Venetian States, had recently been committed scandalous extortions, which Napoleon made a point of repressing with the utmost rigour. He had, with incredible vigilance, sought and discovered the secret of those exactions, summoned before him the persons who had been guilty of them, wrung from them a confession of the sums appropriated, and required the immediate restitution of those amounts, beginning with the general-in-chief, who was obliged to pay a considerable sum into the chest of the army.

But he meant not to impose strict integrity on his generals without rewarding their heroism. Tell them, he wrote to Eugène and to Joseph, about whom were employed several of the officers whose conduct he had just corrected—tell them that I will give them all much more than they could ever take themselves; that what they would take would cover them with shame, that what I shall give them will do them honour, and will be an everlasting testimony of their glory; that in paying themselves with their own hands they would vex my subjects, make France the object of the maledictions of the conquered, and that what I shall give them, on the contrary, accumulated by my foresight, will not be a robbery of any one. Let them wait, he added, and they shall be rich and honoured, without having to blush for any extortion.

Profound ideas were mingled, as we see, with his conceptions, apparently the most vain. He was, therefore, resolved to gratify the desire of his generals for enjoyments, but to direct it towards noble rewards legitimately acquired. Under the consulate, when everything still had the republican form, he had devised the Legion of Honour. Now that all about him assumed the monarchical form, and that he was perceptibly growing greater, he wished every one to grow great along with him. He meditated the creation of kings, grand dukes, dukes, counts, &c. M. de Talleyrand, a warm advocate for creations of this kind, had during the last campaign assisted Napoleon much in his business, and had conversed with him on this subject as well as upon the arrangement of Europe, which he was commissioned to negotiate at Presburg. They two had conceived an extensive system of vassalage, comprehending dukes, grand dukes, kings, under the paramountship of the emperor, and possessing not empty titles but real principalities, either in territorial domains or in ample revenues.

The new kings were, for the sake of the greater conformity with the Germanic empire, to retain upon the thrones which they were about to occupy their quality of grand dignitaries of the French empire. Joseph was to remain grand elector, Louis constable, Eugène arch-chancellor of State, Murat grand admiral, when they should become kings or grand dukes. Supplementary dignitaries, such as a vice-constable, a vice grand elector, &c., taken from among the principal personages of the State, were to perform their functions when they were absent, and would thus multiply the offices to be distributed. The kings, who continued dignitaries of the French empire, were to reside frequently in France, and to have a royal establishment in the Louvre appropriated to their use. They were to form the council of the imperial family, to perform certain special functions in it during minorities, and even to elect the emperor in case the male line should become extinct, which sometimes happens in reigning families.

The assimilation with the German empire was complete, and that empire falling to ruin on all sides, liable itself to be swept away by a mere effect of the will of Napoleon, the French empire would be there, quite ready to take its place in Europe. The empire of the Franks might again become what it was under Charlemagne, the Empire of the West, and even assume that title. This was the final wish of that immense ambition, the only one which it did not realise, that for which it tormented the world, for which perhaps it perished. M. de Talleyrand, who while recommending peace sometimes flattered the passions which lead to war, frequently presented this idea to Napoleon, knowing what a profound emotion it excited in his soul. Whenever he mentioned it to him, he saw all the fire of ambition flashing in his eyes, sparkling with genius. Swayed, however, by a sort of modesty, as on the day before that when he assumed the supreme power, Napoleon durst not avow the full extent of his desires. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, to whom he opened himself more, because he was more sure of his absolute discretion, had been half entrusted with his secret wishes, and had taken care not to encourage them, because in him attachment never silenced prudence. But it was evident that, at the summit of human greatness, having arrived at that point beyond which Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, had not passed, the restless and insatiable spirit of Napoleon longed for something more, and that was the title of Emperor of the West, which nobody in the world had borne for a thousand years.

Between the nations of the south and the west, the French, the Italians, the Spaniards, all children of Roman civilisation, there exists a certain conformity of genius, manners, interests, sometimes of territory, which is not found beyond the Channel,

the Rhine, and the circle of the Alps, among the English and the Germans. This conformity is an indication of a natural alliance, which the house of Bourbon, by uniting under its royal sceptre Paris, Madrid, Naples, and sometimes Milan, Parma, Florence, had partly realised. If that was what Napoleon meant, if, master of France, of that which terminated at the mouths of the Meuse and of the Rhine and at the summit of the Alps, if, master of all Italy, having it in his power soon to become so of Spain, he purposed only to reconstitute that alliance of nations of Latin origin, by giving to it the symbolical form, sublime for its memorials, of the Empire of the West, the nature of things, though strained, was not much outraged. The family of Bonaparte stepped into the place of the house of Bourbon, to reign in a more complete manner over the extent of the countries which that ancient house had aspired to rule, in order to attach them by a simple bond of paramountship to the head of the family, a bond which left each of the southern nations its independence, by giving greater strength to the useful bundle of their alliance. With the genius of Napoleon, by transfusing into his policy the prudence which he displayed in war, with a very long reign, it might not perhaps have been impossible to realise this conception. But that nature of things which always avenges itself severely on those who disregard it was foolishly outraged when, in his ambition, Napoleon ceased to respect the boundary of the Rhine, when he set about uniting the Germans to the Gauls, subjecting the nations of the north to the nations of the south, placing French princes in Germany, in spite of the invincible antipathies of manners; and he then set before all eyes the phantom of that universal monarchy which Europe dreads and detests, which it has combated, which it will do well to combat incessantly, but to which it will some day perhaps be subjected, by the nations of the north, after having refused to submit to it from the hand of the nations of the west.

A concatenation of events, unforeseen even by the vast and provident ambition of Napoleon, led at this moment to the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and was about to render vacant that noble title of Emperor of Germany, which had been assumed by the successors of Charlemagne instead of the title of Emperor of the West. It was a new and fatal encouragement for the projects which Napoleon cherished in his soul, without yet daring to reveal them.

When Napoleon, in his late treaties with Austria, thought of recompensing his three allies of South Germany, the Princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, and of putting an end to all subject of collision between them and the head of the empire by the solution of certain questions left undecided in 1803, he

had pronounced, but without being aware of it, the speedy dissolution of the old German empire. The providential, sometimes involuntary, almost always misconceived instrument of that French Revolution which was to change the face of the world, he had prepared, unknown to himself, one of the greatest European reforms.

It will be recollected how in 1803 France had been called upon to interfere in the internal government of Germany; how the princes, who had lost all or part of their territories by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine, had resolved to indemnify themselves by secularising the ecclesiastical principalities. Unable to agree about the division of these principalities, they had called Napoleon to their aid, in order to effect with equity and decision that partition which otherwise was impossible. Prussia and Austria had received possessions of the Church from his own hand, with a single motive for displeasure—that they had not received more. The suppression of the ecclesiastical principalities had led to the modification of the three colleges composing the Diet. About the college of the electors they had agreed, but not about that of the princes, in which Austria claimed a greater number of Catholic votes than had been granted to her. They had also agreed respecting the college of the cities, reducing the number to six, and almost entirely destroying their influence. Nothing had been decided respecting a new organisation of the circles charged to uphold respect for the laws in each great German province, relative to a new religious organisation, rendered necessary since the suppression of a great number of sees, and indefinitely deferred through the ill-will of the Pope. Lastly, the serious question respecting the immediate nobility had not been resolved, because it interested the whole German aristocracy, and particularly Austria, which had in the members of that nobility vassals dependent on the empire, independent of the territorial princes, and rendering a number of services, of which the recruiting, authorised in their possessions, was not the least.

The mediating powers of France and Russia, tired of this long mediation, occupied elsewhere by other circumstances, had no sooner withdrawn their hands, leaving Germany half remodelled, than anarchy seized that unhappy country. Austria, upon pretext of a right of waifs, had usurped the dependencies of the ecclesiastical possessions given as indemnities, and had deprived the indemnified princes of a considerable portion of what was their due. These princes, on their part, had seized the lands of the immediate nobility, and had availed themselves for this of the uncertainties of the last recess.

The war of 1805 having again brought Napoleon beyond the Rhine, he had taken advantage of the occasion to resolve the

questions left undecided for the benefit of the princes, his allies, and he had thus created in the countries of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria a sort of dissonance with the rest of Germany. But the greediness of these same allies had given rise to difficulties which extended to the whole of Germany. The King of Wurtemberg, observing no moderation, had usurped the lands of the immediate nobility, as well those which had that quality as those which had not. He had arrogated to himself more than the rights of the territorial sovereign, and had seized many of the mansions of the nobility, as if he had been their real owner. Of all those rights of feudal origin, which Austria had insisted on exercising in Suabia, and the nature of which was dangerously arbitrary, he had declared himself the new possessor in virtue of the possession of certain feudal chief towns which the partition of Austria and Suabia had procured him, and he began to exercise them with greater vigour than the Austrian chancellery itself. The houses of Baden and Bavaria, annoyed by him, and authorised by his example, committed the like excesses in their territories. The contempt of right had been carried so far as to penetrate into the sovereign principalities enclosed in the dominions of the three princes, upon pretext of searching in them for domains of the immediate nobility, which could not in any case belong to them, for if those domains belonged to any other than the immediate nobles themselves, it must have been to the sovereign prince on whom they were immediately dependent.

Napoleon had charged M. Otto, his minister at Munich, as umpire, and Berthier, as head of the executive power, to settle all disputes between Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria arising out of the partition of the Austrian territories in Suabia. The difficulties becoming more complicated, Napoleon had associated with them General Clarke, to assist them in reducing this chaos to order. This all of them alike despaired of accomplishing. The princes who had suffered this violence first carried their complaints to Ratisbon; but the ministers at the Diet, having neither courage nor authority since Austria no longer gave it to them, declared themselves unable to check the disorder spreading on all sides. Austria herself had almost reduced them to this impotence, of which they complained, by refusing in the preceding year to authorise any serious deliberation, so long as the college of princes was not reconstituted according to her pleasure, and the number of Catholic votes which she claimed were not added to it. And now definitively conquered, wholly engrossed with her own welfare, she completed the annihilation of the Diet, by showing that she was no further to be relied on for any efficacious aid. The Diet, therefore, was a destroyed body, receiving at most the communications that were made to it,

scarcely acknowledging the receipt of them, but not deliberating on any subject whatever.

At this sight, the petty sovereign princes, the immediate nobles, exposed to all sorts of usurpations, the free cities, reduced to six or five by the gift of Augsburg to Bavaria, the secularised ecclesiastical princes, whose pensions were not paid, hastened to Munich to claim from Messieurs Otto, Berthier, and Clarke the protection of France. These gentlemen, indignant at the spectacle of oppression which they witnessed, had at first formed a sort of congress to reconcile all interests, and to prevent the commission of unjust acts under the shadow of the protection of France. M. Otto had conceived a plan of arrangement, which France was to submit to the principal oppressors, the sovereigns of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. But he had soon discovered that he had done nothing less than frame a new plan for a Germanic constitution; and, moreover, the agents of the King of Wurtemberg, when he had submitted this plan to them, had loudly cried out against it, and declared that their master would never consent to the proposed concessions. One would have said that this prince, whom France had just made a king, whose dominions she had augmented, whose sovereign prerogatives she had doubled, was robbed by her, because she required some respect for property, and some neighbourly regard for the weakest of his neighbours. Not knowing what more to do, M. Otto had sent all to Paris, both claims and claimants, and the plan of arrangement which he had devised with the intention of justice. This reference had taken place at the end of March.

Ever since that period, oppressed and oppressors were at the foot of the throne of Napoleon. It became evident that the sceptre of Charlemagne had passed from the Germans to the French.

This was what had been said and written in all forms by the prince arch-chancellor, the last ecclesiastical elector retained by Napoleon, and transferred by him, as it will be recollected, from Mayence to Ratisbon. This prince, whose amiable and fickle character and whose sumptuous propensities we have elsewhere sketched, seeking force where it existed, never ceased to beseech Napoleon to take in hand the sceptre of Germany; and if any one had made the dangerous name of Charlemagne ring in Napoleon's ears, it was certainly he. You are Charlemagne, said he to him; be then the master, the regulator, the saviour of Germany. If that name, which was not the one that best pleased the pride of Napoleon, for he had in Alexander and Cæsar rivals more worthy of his genius, but which particularly flattered his ambition, because it established more relations with his plans relative to Europe—if that name was always

blended with his own, it was less from his doing than from the doing of all those who had recourse to his protecting power. If the Church wanted something of him, You are Charlemagne, said she, give us what he gave us. When the German princes of all the States were oppressed, they said to him, You are Charlemagne, protect us as he would have done.

Thus ideas were suggested to him which his ambition might not so soon have conceived, if it had been slow in its desires. But the wants of nations and his ambition then kept pace with one another.

In all ages, the princes of Germany, besides the Germanic confederation, a legal authority and recognised by them, had formed particular leagues to defend such rights or such interests as were common to certain of them. All that were left of these leagues addressed themselves to Napoleon, soliciting him to interfere in their favour, both as author and guarantee of the act of mediation of 1803, and as the signer and executor of the treaty of Presburg. Some proposed to form new leagues under his protection, others to form a new Germanic confederation under his imperial sceptre. The princes whose possessions were usurped, the immediate nobles whose lands were seized, the free cities threatened with suppression, proposed various plans, but were ready, on condition of protection, to adopt the plan that should be most generally approved.

The prince arch-chancellor, fearing lest his ecclesiastical electorate, the last relic of the wreck, should be swept away in this second tempest, devised a plan to save it; this was to form a new Germanic confederation, called to deliberate under his presidency, and comprehending all the German States excepting Prussia and Austria. In order to interest Napoleon in this creation, he invented two expedients. The first consisted in creating an electorate attached to the duchy of Berg, which was known to be destined for Murat, and the second to appoint immediately a coadjutor for the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and to choose him from the imperial family. This coadjutor, being archbishop elect of Ratisbon, future arch-chancellor of the confederation, would, of course, place the new Diet under the control of Napoleon. The member of the Bonaparte family was plainly pointed out by his ecclesiastical profession—it was Cardinal Fesch, Archbishop of Lyons, ambassador at Rome.*

* We quote the curious document which was addressed to Napoleon :—

"RATISBON, *April* 19, 1806.

"SIR,—The genius of Napoleon is not limited to creating the happiness of France; Providence grants the superior man to the universe. The estimable German nation groans under the miseries of political and religious anarchy: be, sir, the regenerator of its constitution. Here are some wishes dictated by the state of things; let the Duke of Cleves become elector, let him obtain the

Without waiting for such a plan to be proposed, discussed, and accepted, the arch-chancellor, anxious to ensure the preservation of his see by an adoption which would render its destruction impossible, unless Napoleon chose to do an injury to the interests of his family, which it would not quietly endure, and which he was not fond of doing, the arch-chancellor, without consulting any person, to the great astonishment of his co-estates, chose Cardinal Fesch coadjutor of the archbishopric of Ratisbon, and wrote to Napoleon to acquaint him with this choice.

toll of the Rhine on the whole of the right bank; let Cardinal Fesch be my coadjutor; let the annuities settled on twelve States of the empire out of the toll be founded on some other basis. Your imperial and royal majesty will judge in your sublimity whether it is conducive to the general welfare to realise these ideas. If any ideologic error misleads me on this point, my heart at least attests the purity of my intentions.

"I am, with an inviolable attachment and the most profound respect, sir, your imperial and royal majesty's most humble and most devoted admirer,

"CHARLES, elector arch-chancellor."

"The Germanic nation needs that its constitution should be regenerated; the greater part of its laws consist only of words devoid of meaning, since the tribunal, the circles, the Diet of the empire, no longer possess the means necessary to uphold the rights of property and the personal safety of the individuals who compose the nation, and since these institutions can no longer protect the oppressed against the encroachments of arbitrary power and rapacity. Such a state is anarchical; the people bear the burdens of the civil condition, without enjoying its principal advantages—a disastrous position for a nation thoroughly estimable for its loyalty, its industry, its primitive energy. The Germanic constitution can be regenerated only by a head of the empire of a great character, who shall restore vigour to the laws by concentrating the executive power in his hands. The States of the empire will enjoy their domains all the better, when the wishes of the people shall be expressed and discussed in the Diet, the tribunals better organised and justice administered in a more efficacious manner. His majesty the Emperor of Austria, Francis the Second, would be a reputable individual for his personal qualities, but in point of fact the sceptre of Germany is slipping out of his hands, because he has now the majority of the Diet against him; because he has violated his capitulation by occupying Bavaria, by introducing the Russians into Germany, by dismembering portions of the empire to pay for faults committed in the private quarrels of his house. *Let him be Emperor of the East to withstand the Russians, and let the Empire of the West revive in the Empire of Napoleon, such as it was under Charlemagne, composed of Italy, France, and Germany!* It appears not impossible that the evils of anarchy may render the majority of the electors sensible of the necessity of such a regeneration: it was thus that they chose Rodolph of Hapsburg after the troubles of a long interregnum. The means of the arch-chancellor are extremely limited, but it is at least with a pure intention that he reckons upon the understanding of the Emperor Napoleon, particularly on matters likely to agitate the south of Germany, more especially devoted to that monarch. The regeneration of the Germanic constitution has always been the object of the wishes of the elector arch-chancellor; he neither asks for nor would accept anything for himself; he thinks that if his majesty the Emperor Napoleon could for a few weeks every year personally meet the princes who are attached to him at Mayence, or some other place, the seeds of Germanic regeneration would soon be developed. M. d'Hedouville has gained the entire confidence of the elector arch-chancellor, who would be glad if he would be pleased to submit these ideas in all their purity to his majesty the Emperor of the French, and to his minister M. de Talleyrand.

"CHARLES, elector arch-chancellor."

Napoleon had no reason to love Cardinal Fesch, a vain and obstinate man, who was not the least troublesome of his relations, and he had no particular desire to place him at the head of the German empire. However, he permitted this strange appointment without explanation. It was a striking symptom of that disposition of the oppressed German princes to put the new imperial sceptre into his hands.

Napoleon had no intention to take, in a direct manner, that sceptre from the head of the house of Austria. It was an enterprise which seemed to him too great for the moment, though there was little that would have frightened him since Austerlitz. But he was enlightened as to how far he might venture at that moment in Germany, and fixed as to what it was proper for him to do. For the present, he resolved to dislocate, to weaken the German empire in such a manner that the French empire alone should shine in the West. He purposed then to unite the princes of South Germany, situated on the banks of the Rhine, in Franconia, Suabia, Bavaria, and to form them into a confederation under his avowed protectorship. This confederation should declare its connection with the German empire dissolved. As for the other princes of Germany, they might either continue in the old confederation, under the authority of Austria, or, what was more probable, they would leave it and group themselves at pleasure, some about Prussia, others about Austria. Then the French empire, having under its formal paramountship Italy, Naples, Holland, perhaps some day the Spanish peninsula, under its protectorship the south of Germany, would comprehend nearly the same States which belonged to Charlemagne, and would take the place of the Empire of the West. To give it this title was no longer a mere affair of words, but yet a serious one on account of the jealousies of Europe, but to be realised some day by victory or successful negotiation.

To accomplish such a project there was but little to do, for Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, were then treating at Paris, in order to arrive at some settlement of their situation, aggrandised but uncertain. All the other princes applied to be included, no matter under what title, no matter upon what condition, in the new federative system, which was foreseen and descried as inevitable. To be comprehended in it was to live, to be excluded from it was to perish. It was therefore unnecessary to negotiate with any others than with the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, and care was taken to consult them only with a certain degree of caution, and to exclude all excepting them from the negotiation. It was proposed to present the treaty ready drawn up to such of the princes as one was desirous to retain, and to admit them to sign purely and simply. The new

confederation was to bear the title of Confederation of the Rhine, and Napoleon that of Protector.

M. de Talleyrand was charged, with a very clever first clerk, M. de Labesnaudière, to draw up the plan of the new confederation, and then to submit it to the emperor.*

Such was, as we see, the chain of events which led France twice to intermeddle in the affairs of Germany. The first time, the inevitable partition of the ecclesiastical possessions threatening Germany with a convulsion, its princes came themselves to solicit Napoleon to make this partition himself, and to add such changes as were to result from it in the Germanic constitution. The second time, Napoleon, called away from the shores of the ocean to the banks of the Danube, by the irruption of the Austrians into Bavaria, obliged to create allies for himself in the south of Germany, to recompense them, to aggrandise them, to restrain them at the same time when they attempted to abuse his alliance, was again obliged to interfere in order to regulate the situation of the German princes who geographically interested France.

If he had any personal view in all that he did on this occasion, it was to render vacant an august title, by the dissolution of the Germanic empire, and to suffer the French empire alone to exist in the eyes of the nations. Nevertheless, the essential causes of his intervention were no other than the violence of the strong, the cries of the weak, and the twofold desire, reasonable enough, to repress injustice committed in his name, and to remodel Germany in a manner conformable to the suggestions of his good sense, since he could no longer withhold his interference.

This intervention in the affairs of Germany, carried beyond certain bounds, was none the less a grievous fault on the part of Napoleon; to pretend to exercise a predominant influence over the south of Europe, over Italy, even over Spain, was consistent with French policy in all ages; and vast as was this ambition, signal victories might justify its magnitude. But to attempt to extend his power to the north of Europe, that is to say, into Germany, was driving the despair of Austria to extremity; it was kindling in Prussia a species of jealousy which France had not yet excited in her. It was taking upon himself the difficulties which were arising from the dissensions of all those petty princes among themselves; it was passing for the supporter and accomplice of the oppressors, when he was the defender of the oppressed; it was setting against him those who were not favoured, without setting for him those who were;

* It is from M. de Labesnaudière himself, the only confidant of this new creation, that we derive all these particulars, supported besides by a multitude of authentic documents.

for these latter already expressed themselves in such a manner as to foreshow that, after they had enriched themselves by us, they would be capable of turning against us, in order to purchase the preservation of what they had acquired. And as for the assistance which he anticipated finding in their troops, it was a dangerous deception; for he might be induced to consider as auxiliaries soldiers quite ready upon occasion to turn traitors. It was a still greater fault to change the old combinations of Germany, which made Prussia an ever jealous rival of Austria, and consequently an ally of France, and all the petty princes of Germany, filled with envy of each other, thenceforward clients of our policy from which they sought support. Had France added something to the influence of Prussia, and retrenched something from that of Austria, that would have been doing enough for a century, nay, it would have been all that Germany needed. Beyond this, there was nothing but an overturning of European policy, baneful rather than beneficial. If these changes were carried so far as to render Prussia all-powerful, it would be merely removing the danger from one place to another, transferring to Berlin the enemy whom we had always had at Vienna: if they went so far as to destroy Prussia and Austria, the effect would be to rouse all Germany; and as for the small States, all that went beyond a just protection for certain second-rate princes, as Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, usually allies of France, all that went beyond, given after a war for their alliance, was a dangerous interference in the affairs of others, a gratuitous acceptance of difficulties not our own, and under an apparent violation of foreign independence, an egregious cheat. There was but one greater fault to commit, that was to found French kingdoms in Germany. Napoleon had not yet arrived at this degree of power and of error. The old Germanic constitution, modified by the recess of 1803, with some additional solutions, neglected at the time of that recess, with the former influences modified merely in their proportion, was all that was suitable for France, for Europe, and for Germany. We undertook more for the welfare of Germany than for our own; she cherished a deep resentment for it, and awaited the moment of our final retreat to fire in rear upon our soldiers, overwhelmed by numbers. Such is the price that must be paid for faults!

Napoleon left M. de Talleyrand and M. de Labesnaudière to arrange in secret the details of the new plan of Germanic confederation with the ministers of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, before he began to proceed to the execution of his general plan, particularly relative to Italy and Holland, in order that the English and Russian negotiators, treating each on their own part, might find consummated and irrevocable

resolutions relative to the new royalties which he purposed to create.

The crown of Naples had been destined for Joseph, that of Holland for Louis. The institution of these royalties was for Napoleon at once a political calculation and a gratification of feeling. He was not only great, he was good, and sensible to the affections of blood, sometimes even to weakness. He did not always reap the reward of his sentiments; for there is nothing so exigent as an upstart family. There was not one of his relations, who, though acknowledging that it was the conqueror of Rivoli, of the Pyramids, and of Austerlitz, who had founded the greatness of the Bonapartes, nevertheless fancied that he was somebody, and looked upon himself as treated unjustly, hardly, or in a manner disproportioned to his merits. His mother, incessantly repeating that she had given him birth, complained that she was not surrounded with sufficient homage and respect; and she was nevertheless the most moderate and the least intoxicated of the females of that family. Lucien Bonaparte had placed, he said, the crown upon the head of his brother, for he alone had been unshaken on the 18th of Brumaire, and for the reward of this service he lived in exile. Joseph, the meekest and the most sensible of all, said in his turn that he was the eldest, and that the deference due to that title was not paid him. He was even somewhat disposed to believe that the treaties of Luneville, of Amiens, of the Concordat, which Napoleon had complaisantly commissioned him to sign, to the detriment of M. de Talleyrand, were the work of his personal ability, as well as the great exploits of his brother. Louis, sickly, mistrustful, filled with pride, affecting virtue, pretended that he was sacrificed to an infamous office, that of cloaking, by marrying her, the weaknesses of Hortense de Beauharnais for Napoleon—an odious calumny, invented by the emigrants, repeated in a thousand pamphlets, and by which Louis wrongfully showed himself to be so prepossessed, as to cause it to be supposed that he himself believed it. Thus each of them conceived himself to be a victim in some way, and ill paid for the part which he had taken in his brother's greatness. The sisters of Napoleon, not daring to have such pretensions, were restless around him, and by their rivalries, sometimes by their discontent, ruffled his spirit, a prey to a thousand other inquietudes. Caroline was incessantly soliciting for Murat, who, with all his levity, at least repaid the bounty of his brother-in-law with an attachment which at that time afforded no reason to augur his subsequent conduct, though, it is true, one may expect anything from levity. Elisa, the eldest, transferred to Lucca, where she aspired to the personal glory of well managing a little State, and who

really conducted it with great ability, desired an augmentation of her duchy.

In this whole family, Jerome as the youngest, Pauline as the most dissipated, were exempt from those exigencies, those resentments, those jealousies, which disturbed the interior of the imperial house. Jerome, the irregularities of whose youth had frequently provoked the severity of Napoleon, considered him as a father rather than a brother, and received his bounty with a heart full of unmixed gratitude. Pauline, given up to her pleasures like a princess of the family of the Cæsars, beautiful as an antique Venus, sought in the greatness of her brother only the means of gratifying her amorous nature, desired no higher titles than those of the Borgheses, whose name she bore, was disposed to prefer fortune, the source of pleasure, to greatness, the satisfaction of pride. She was so fond of her brother that when he was at war the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, commissioned to govern the reigning family and the State, was obliged to send this princess news the moment he received it, for the least delay threw her into the most painful anxiety.

It was the fear of seeing the children of the Beauharnais family preferred to themselves that had urged the Bonapartes to be enemies to Josephine. In this they paid no regard even to the heart of Napoleon, and tormented him in a thousand ways. The precocious greatness of Eugène, who had become viceroy and destined heir to the fine kingdom of Italy, singularly eclipsed them, and yet this crown had been offered to Joseph, who had declined it because it placed him too immediately under the control of the Emperor of the French. He wanted to reign, he said, in an independent manner. We shall see by-and-by into what difficulties this fondness for independence, common to all the members of the imperial family, combined with the tendencies of the nations over whom they were called to reign, was destined to bring the government of Napoleon, and what new causes of misfortune it added to our misfortunes.

It was among all the members of this family that he had to distribute the kingdoms and the duchies of new creation. The crown of Naples ensured to Joseph a situation sufficiently independent, and was, besides, brilliant enough to be accepted. One feels some surprise to be obliged to employ such words to characterise the sentiments with which these fine kingdoms were received by princes born so far from the throne, and so far even from that greatness which individuals sometimes owe to birth and fortune. But it is one of the singularities of the fantastic spectacle exhibited by the French Revolution and by the extraordinary man whom it placed at its head, that these refusals, these hesitations, almost this disdain of anticipated satiety, should be expressed for the fairest crowns by per-

sonages who in their youth could never have expected to wear them. Napoleon, who had seen Joseph disdain at one time the presidency of the Senate, at another the viceroyalty of Italy, was not sure that he would accept the throne of Naples, and had at first conferred on him only the title of his lieutenant.* Having afterwards ascertained his acceptance of it, he had inserted his name in the decrees destined to be presented to the Senate.

As for Holland, he had designated Louis, who has since told all Europe, in a book reflecting upon his brother, how highly he was offended because he had scarcely been consulted upon this arrangement. In fact, Napoleon, without concerning himself about Louis, whose will seemed to him not to be an obstacle to foresee and to conquer, had sent word to some of the principal citizens of Holland, particularly to Admiral Verhuel, the valiant and able commander of the flotilla, to dispose Holland to renounce at length its ancient republican government, and to constitute itself a monarchy. This is another trait of the

* We quote the following letters, which show how Napoleon gave crowns and how they were received:—

"To the Minister of War.

"MUNICH, *January* 6, 1806.

"Despatch General Berthier, your brother, with the decree appointing Prince Joseph to the command of the army of Italy. He will observe the most profound secrecy, and he must not deliver the decree till the prince arrives. I say he must observe the most profound secrecy, because I am not sure that Prince Joseph will go thither, and on this point I desire that nothing may be known."

"To Prince JOSEPH.

"STUTTGART, *January* 12, 1806.

"My intention is that in the first days of February you should enter the kingdom of Naples, and that I should be informed in the course of February that my eagles float over that capital. You will not make any suspension of arms or capitulation. My intention is that the Bourbons should have ceased to reign in Naples; and I wish to seat on that throne a prince of my house, you in the first place, if that suits you, another if that does not suit you.

"I repeat to you not to divide your forces; let all your army cross the Apennines, and let your three *corps d'armée* proceed direct for Naples, so as to meet in one day on the same field of battle.

"Leave a general of the depôts, of victualling, and a few artillerymen at Ancona to defend that place. When Naples is taken, the extremities will fall of themselves; all that shall be in the Abruzzi must be taken *en revers*, and you will send a division to Taranto and one towards Sicily, to complete the conquest of the kingdom.

"My intention is to leave under your command during the year, till I have made new dispositions, fourteen regiments of infantry, completed to the full complement of war, and twelve of French cavalry, also at the full complement.

"The country must supply you with provisions, clothing, remounts, and all that is necessary, so as not to cost me a sou. My troops of the kingdom of Italy shall remain there no longer than you shall judge necessary, after which time they shall return home.

"You will raise a Neapolitan legion, into which you will admit none but Neapolitan officers and soldiers natives of the country, willing to attach themselves to my cause."

picture which we are here presenting of that French Revolution, setting out with endeavouring to convert all thrones into republics, and now exerting itself to convert the most ancient republics into monarchies. The republics of Venice and Genoa, become provinces of different kingdoms, the free cities of Germany absorbed into various principalities, had already demonstrated that singular tendency. The royalty of Holland was its last and most striking phenomenon. Holland, after throwing herself into the arms of France to escape the Stadtholder, was discontented to find herself doomed to an everlasting war, and was deficient in gratitude to Napoleon, who had made at Amiens and daily renewed the greatest efforts for ensuring to her the restitution of her colonies. The Dutch, half English by their religion, their manners, their mercantile spirit, though enemies of England in consequence of their maritime interests, had no sympathy with the government of Napoleon and his exclusively continental greatness. The most insignificant victory at sea would have charmed them much more than the most splendid victory on land. They showed sufficient disdain for the semi-monarchical government of a grand pensionary, which Napoleon had induced them to adopt when he was instituting a sort of first consul in all the countries under the influence of France. This grand pensionary, who was M. de Schimmelpenninck, a good citizen and an honourable man, was in their eyes nothing but a French prefect, charged to commit extortions, because he demanded taxes and loans in order to defray the expenses of a war establishment. The dislike excited by this government of a grand pensionary was the only facility which the situation of Holland afforded for procuring the acceptance of a king. Though overtaken by that weariness which at the end of revolutions renders people indifferent to everything, the Dutch experienced a painful feeling on finding themselves deprived of their republican system. However, the assurance that their laws, especially their municipal laws, should be left them, the favourable reports made to them of Louis Bonaparte, of the regularity of his manners, of his disposition to economy, of the independence of his character, lastly, the usual resignation to things long foreseen, decided the principal representatives of Holland to accede to the institution of royalty. A treaty was to convert the new situation of Holland in regard to France into an alliance between State and State.

The Venetian provinces, which Napoleon had not immediately united to the kingdom of Italy, that he might be more at liberty to study their resources and to employ them according to his designs—the Venetian provinces, including Dalmatia, were annexed to the kingdom of Italy, upon condition of ceding the country of Massa to the Princess Elisa, to augment the

duchy of Lucca, and the duchy of Guastalla to the Princess Pauline Borghese, who had not yet received anything from her brother's munificence. The latter would not keep her duchy, and sold it back to the kingdom of Italy for some millions.

It was now, perhaps, the time to think of the Pope and the real cause of his discontent. At the moment when Italy was a twelfth-cake, divided with the sword, it would have been easy to reserve a share for St. Peter, and to conciliate by some temporal advantages that spiritual power, which it is dangerous to quarrel with, even in our times of doubtful faith, and which is far more to be dreaded when it is oppressed than when it oppresses. These new monarchs ought to have been very glad to receive their States, even with a province the fewer; and Pius VII., indemnified, might have been induced to submit with more patience to be completely invested by the French power, as he was after the establishment of Joseph at Naples. At any rate, Napoleon had still Parma and Piacenza to give away, and he could not have made a better use of them than by employing them to console the court of Rome. But Napoleon began to care much less for either physical or moral resistance since Austerlitz. He was extremely displeased with the Pope for his hostile underhand proceedings against the new King of Naples, and he felt more disposed to reduce than to augment the patrimony of St. Peter. Besides, he reserved Parma and Piacenza for a use which had also its merit. He thought to make them an indemnity for some of the princes protected by Russia or England, such as the sovereigns of Naples and Piedmont, old dethroned kings, to whom he meant to throw a few crumbs from the sumptuous board around which the new kings were seated. This idea was certainly good, but there was still the fault of leaving the Pope discontented, ready to break out with vehemence, and whom it would have been so easy to satisfy, without any great detriment to the recently instituted kingdoms.

It was necessary to provide for Murat, the husband of Caroline Bonaparte, and who had at least deserved by war what was about to be done for him on the score of relationship. But he, too, had his exigencies, which were rather his wife's than his own. Napoleon had thought of giving them the principality of Neufchatel, which neither husband nor wife would accept. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, who usually interposed between Napoleon and his family with that conciliatory patience which allays reciprocal irritations, which listens to everything and repeats nothing but what is fit to be repeated—the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès was informed in confidence of their violent displeasure. They thought themselves treated with a cutting inequality. Napoleon then thought of the duchy of Berg, ceded to France by Bavaria in exchange for Anspach, increased

by the remnant of the duchy of Cleves, a fine country, happily situated on the right of the Rhine, containing 320,000 inhabitants, producing, all costs of administration paid, a revenue of 400,000 florins, allowing two regiments to be kept on foot, and capable of conferring on its possessor a certain importance in the new confederation. The fertile imagination of Murat and of his wife failed not, in fact, to dream of some very distinguished part decorated externally by some renewed high title of the Holy Empire.

The reigning family was provided for. But the brothers and sisters of Napoleon were not all that he loved. There yet remained his companions-in-arms and the fellow-labourers in his civil toils. His natural kindness, in accordance here with his policy, took delight in paying those for their blood, these for their vigils. He required them to be brave, laborious, upright, and for this he thought that he ought to reward them amply. To see the smile on the countenance of his servants, the smile, not of gratitude, upon which he reckoned but little in general, but of content, was one of the greatest pleasures of his noble heart.

He consulted the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès upon the distribution of the new favours, and he, seeing how great soever might be the booty to be divided, the extent of the services and of the ambitions was still greater, guessed the embarrassment of Napoleon, and began by putting an end to that embarrassment as far as concerned himself. He begged Napoleon not to think of him for the new duchies. No man knew so well that when one has attained a certain degree of fortune, it is better to preserve than to acquire; and an empire, having him to direct its policy, Napoleon to direct the administration and the armies, would have continued the greatest of all, after it had become so. The arch-chancellor desired but one thing, to retain his present greatness; and the certainty of retaining it appeared to him preferable to the finest duchies. He had acquired this certainty on the following occasion. For a moment he had feared, when he saw Napoleon requiring that the new kings should retain their French dignities, that it was his intention to have kings exclusively for dignitaries of the empire, and that the titles of arch-chancellor, which he possessed, and of arch-treasurer, which Prince Lebrun enjoyed, would soon be transferred to one of the monarchs newly created, or to be created. Wishing to ascertain the intention of Napoleon on this point, he said to him, "When you have a king quite ready to receive the title of arch-chancellor, let me know, and I will give my resignation." "Be easy," replied Napoleon, "I must have a lawyer for that post, and you shall keep it." In fact, among the crowned heads which formerly composed the Germanic empire, there were three

places for mere prelates, the Electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne. In like manner, amidst those kings, dignitaries of his empire, Napoleon took pleasure in reserving one place for the first, the gravest magistrate of his time, called to introduce into his councils that wisdom which could not always enter them along with kings.

Nothing more was required to give complete content to the prudent arch-chancellor. Thenceforward desiring, soliciting nothing for himself, he assisted Napoleon most usefully in the distribution which he had to make. They both agreed about the first personage to be largely recompensed: this was Berthier, the most assiduous, the most punctual, the most enlightened, perhaps, of Napoleon's lieutenants, he who was always about him amidst the balls, and who submitted without any appearance of displeasure to a life, the perils of which were not above his great courage, but the fatigues of which he began to dislike. Napoleon felt sincere satisfaction in having it in his power to pay him for his services. He granted to him the principality of Neufchatel, which constituted him a sovereign prince.

There was one of his servants who occupied a higher rank in Europe than any other, M. de Talleyrand, who served him much more by his art in treating with foreign ministers and the elegance of his manners than by his abilities in the council, in which, however, he had the merit of always recommending a moderate policy. Napoleon was not fond of him, and he mistrusted him; but he was grieved to see him dissatisfied, and M. de Talleyrand was so because he had not been included among the grand dignitaries. Napoleon, to compensate him, conferred on him the fine principality of Benevento, one of the two which had recently been taken from the Pope as districts enclosed in the kingdom of Naples.

Napoleon still had left that of Ponte Corvo, likewise enclosed in the kingdom of Naples, and like the preceding, taken from the Pope. He determined to give it to a personage who had rendered no considerable service, who had treachery in his heart, but who was the brother-in-law of Joseph—this was Marshal Bernadotte. In granting this dignity, Napoleon was obliged to do violence to himself. He made up his mind to it, influenced by expediency, family motives, and oblivion of injuries.

It would have been doing but little to reward these three or four servants, if Napoleon had not thought of others, more numerous and more deserving, Berthier excepted, whom he had about him, and who expected their share of the fruits of victory. He provided for what concerned them by means of an institution very cleverly conceived. In giving kingdoms, he granted them to the new kings on one condition, namely, to institute

duchies with ample revenues, and to give up to him a certain portion of the national domains. Thus, in adding the Venetian States to the kingdom of Italy, he reserved the creation of twelve duchies, under the following titles: Duchies of Dalmatia, Istria, Friule, Cadore, Belluno, Conegliano, Treviso, Feltre, Bassano, Vicenza, Padua, and Rovigo. These duchies conferred no power, but they ensured a yearly income, taken out of the reserved fifteenth of the revenues of the country. He gave the kingdom of Naples to Joseph, on condition to reserve six fiefs in it, of which the two principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, already mentioned, formed a part, and which were completed by the duchies of Gaeta, Otranto, Taranto, and Reggio. In adding to the principality of Massa that of Lucca, Napoleon stipulated the creation of the duchy of Massa. He instituted three others in the countries of Parma and Piacenza. One of the three was granted to the Arch-Treasurer Lebrun. Among all these titles which we have just enumerated, we find those figuring which were soon borne by the most illustrious servants of the empire, and which are still borne by their children, the last and living memorials of our past greatness. All these duchies were instituted on the same conditions as the twelve which had been created in the Venetian States, without any power, but with a share in the fifteenth of the revenues. Napoleon designed that there should be rewards for every rank, and he required that there should be assigned to him in each of these countries national domains and annuities, in order to create endowments. Thus he secured 30 millions' worth of national domains in the State of Venice, and an inscription of rente to the amount of 1,200,000 francs in the great book of the kingdom of Italy. He reserved for himself, for the same purpose, the national domains of Parma and Piacenza, a rente of a million upon the kingdom of Naples, and four millions' worth of national domains in the principality of Lucca and Massa. The whole formed 22 duchies, 34 millions in national property, 2,400,000 francs in rentes, and added to the treasure of the army, which a first war contribution had already raised to 70 millions, and which new victories were about to increase indefinitely, would serve for granting pensions to all ranks, from the common soldier to the marshal. The civil functionaries were to have their share in these pensions. Napoleon had already discussed with M. de Talleyrand a plan for the reconstitution of the nobility, for he found that the Legion of Honour and the duchies were not sufficient. He purposed to create counts, barons, believing in the necessity of these social distinctions, and desiring that every one should grow great with him, in proportion to his merits. But he intended to correct the profound vanity of these titles in two ways, by making

them the reward of great services, and by endowing them with revenues, securing a permanent provision to the families.

These various resolutions were successively presented to the Senate, to be converted into articles of the constitutions of the empire, in the months of March, April, and June.

On the 15th of March, in this year 1806, Murat was proclaimed Grand Duke of Cleves and Berg. On the 30th of March Joseph was proclaimed King of Naples and Sicily; Pauline Borghese Duchess of Guastalla; Berthier Prince of Neufchatel. On the 5th of June only (the negotiations with Holland having occasioned some delay) Louis was proclaimed King of Holland, M. de Talleyrand Prince of Benevento, Bernadotte Prince of Ponte Corvo. One might have imagined one's self carried back to the times of the Roman empire, when a mere decree of the Senate took away or conferred crowns.

This series of extraordinary acts was terminated by the definitive creation of the new confederation of the Rhine. The negotiation had secretly passed between M. de Talleyrand and the ministers of Bavaria, Baden, and Wurtemberg. From the visible agitation of the German princes, everybody suspected that another new constitution for Germany was preparing. Those who, from the geographical situation of their territories, could be included in the new confederation, solicited the favour of being admitted into it, in order to preserve their existence. Those who were likely to border upon it, strove to fathom the secret of its constitution, in order to ascertain what would be their relations with this new power, and desired nothing better than to become members of it on condition of certain advantages. Austria, for some time past considering the empire as dissolved, and thenceforth useless for her, beheld this spectacle with apparent indifference. Prussia, on the contrary, which regarded the fall of the old Germanic confederation as an immense revolution, would fain have shared at least with France the imperial power wrested from the house of Austria, and had the patronage of the north of Germany, while France arrogated to herself that of the south—Prussia was listening to find out what was going forward. The manner in which she had just taken possession of Hanover, the despatches published in London, had so cooled Napoleon towards her, that he did not even take the trouble to apprise her of things which ought not to have been done but in concert with her. Not only was she excluded from the affairs of Germany, which were her own, a thousand rumours were circulated of changes of territory, changes by which provinces were taken from her and others given to her, but always smaller than those that were taken.

Two Germanic princes, the one as ancient as the other was new, gave rise to all these rumours by their impatient ambition.

The one was the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, a wily prince, avaricious, rich, from the produce of his mines and the blood of his subjects sold to foreigners, striving to keep on good terms with England, where he had large capitals deposited, with Prussia, whose neighbour he was and one of her generals, lastly, with France, which at this moment was building up or throwing down the fortune of all the sovereign houses. There was no artifice that he did not employ with M. de Talleyrand to be comprehended in the new arrangements, and to gain some advantage by them. Thus he offered to join the projected confederation, and to place in consequence under our influence one of the most important portions of Germany, namely, Hesse, but on one condition, that of putting him in possession of a great part of the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt, which he detested with that hatred of the direct branch for the collateral branch so frequent in German families. He insisted strongly on this point, and had submitted a very extensive and very detailed plan. At the same time, he wrote to the King of Prussia to denounce to him what was scheming at Paris, to tell him that a confederation was preparing, which would ruin the influence of Prussia as much as that of Austria, and that they were employing all sorts of means to induce him to enter into it.

The new German prince, Murat, took a different course. Not content with the fine duchy of Berg, containing, as we have said, 320,000 inhabitants, and yielding a revenue of 400,000 florins, which furnished him with the means of keeping two regiments, and put into his hands the important fortress of Wesel, he wanted to be at least the equal of the sovereign of Wurtemberg, or of Baden, and to attain this end he desired that a State with a million of inhabitants should be created for him in Westphalia. For this purpose he beset M. de Talleyrand, who was always extremely solicitous to please members of the imperial family. He framed plans upon plans for composing a territory for him. Of course Prussia furnished the materials with Münster, Osnabrück, and East Friesland. It was contemplated, it is true, to give this power in exchange the Hanseatic cities, which would form a fine compensation, if not in territory, at least in wealth and importance.

All these plans, prepared without the knowledge of Napoleon, were disapproved by him as soon as he was made acquainted with them. He had it not so much at heart to gratify the ambition of Murat as to set about fresh dismemberments in Germany: he was determined in particular not to incorporate the Hanseatic cities with any great European State. His last combinations had already swept away Augsburg, and were about to sweep away Nuremberg, cities through which passed the commerce of France with the centre and the south of Germany. Our

commerce with the north passed through Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck. Napoleon would take good care not to sacrifice cities whose independence interested France and Europe. French wines and stuffs penetrated into Germany and into Russia under the neutral flag of the Hanseatic cities, and under the same flag were returned naval stores, sometimes corn, when the state of the crops in France required it. To shut up these cities by the custom-houses of a great State would have been fettering their trade and ours. It was quite enough to deprive ourselves of Nuremberg and Augsburg, which sent their mercery and their hardware to France, and took back our wines, our stuffs, our colonial produce, which they afterwards distributed over the whole south of Germany.

Napoleon, firmly resolved not to sacrifice the Hanseatic cities, rejected every combination that would have tended to give them to any State whatever, great or small. Of course, he approved of none of Murat's plans. As for the Elector of Hesse, he detested that false, greedy prince, cloaking an implacable enemy under the exterior of a sort of indifference, and purposed on the first occasion to repay the sentiments which he cherished for France. Napoleon would not, therefore, bind himself towards him by introducing him into the confederation which he was organising, for it would have been rendering impossible an eventual plan for bringing about the speedy and well merited ruin of that prince. If France were induced to restore Hanover to England, it would be necessary to find a compensation for Prussia, and Napoleon was determined to offer her Hesse, which she would certainly have accepted, as she had accepted the ecclesiastical principalities and Hanover, as she would have accepted the Hanseatic cities, for which she was applying every day. This scheme, which was kept a secret from European diplomacy, and which was the price of the continual intrigues of the house of Hesse-Cassel with the enemies of France, was the cause of the refusals, unexplained at the time, given to the solicitations of the elector to be admitted into the new confederation, and of the false fidelity towards Prussia which he soon made a boast of.

Everything being agreed upon with the sovereigns of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, the only princes who were consulted, the treaty was presented for signature to the other princes, who were comprehended at their request in the new confederation, but without taking their opinion on the nature of the act by which it was constituted. This treaty, dated the 12th of July, contained the following dispositions:—

The new confederation was to bear a restricted and well-chosen title, that of Confederation of the Rhine, a title which excluded the pretension of comprehending all Germany, and

applied exclusively to the States bordering on France, and having incontestable relations of interest with her. The title, then, corrected in some degree the fault of the institution. The princes who signed it formed a confederation under the presidency of the prince arch-chancellor, and under the protectorship of the Emperor of the French. All disputes among them were to be settled in a Diet meeting at Frankfort, and composed of two colleges only, one called the college of the kings, the other the college of the princes. The first corresponded with the old college of the electors, which would have had no meaning now that there was no longer an emperor to elect; the second, by the title and the thing, was the old college of the princes. There was no college answering to the former college of the cities.

The confederated princes were in a perpetual state of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. Any war in which the confederation or France might be engaged should be common to both. France was to furnish 200,000 men, and the confederation 63,000, in these proportions: Bavaria 30,000, Wurtemberg 12,000, the grand duchy of Baden 8000, the grand duchy of Berg 5000, that of Hesse-Darmstadt 4000; lastly, the petty States 4000 among them. On the death of the prince arch-chancellor, the Emperor of the French had the right of nominating his successor.

The confederates declared themselves separated for ever from the German empire, and were to make an immediate and solemn declaration to that effect to the Diet of Ratisbon. They were to govern themselves in their relations with each other, and relatively to their German affairs, upon which the Diet of Frankfort would be called speedily to deliberate.

By a special article, all the German houses had the faculty of adhering in the sequel to this treaty, upon condition of a pure and simple adhesion.

For the present, the Confederation of the Rhine comprehended the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the Prince Arch-Chancellor Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Grand Dukes of Baden, Berg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Dukes of Nassau-Usingen and Nassau Weilburg, the Princes of Hohenzollern-Hechingen and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, of Salm-Salm and Salm-Kirburg, of Isenburg, Aremberg, Lichtenstein, and de la Leyen.

The Hohenzollerns and the Salms were admitted into the new confederation on account of the long residence of several of the members of those families in France, and of the attachment which they had professed to our interests. Prince Lichtenstein obtained his admission, and thus retained his quality of reigning prince, though an Austrian prince, on account of the treaty of Presburg, which he had signed. To his principality

and to several of those which were preserved, greedy claims had been preferred but rejected by France.

The geographical boundaries of the Confederation of the Rhine included the territories situated between the Sieg, the Lahn, the Mayn, the Neckar, the Upper Danube, the Isar, and the Inn, that is to say, the countries of Nassau and Baden, Franconia, Suabia, the Upper Palatinate, and Bavaria. Any prince comprehended within these boundaries, if he was not named in the Constitutive Act, lost the quality of reigning prince. He was mediatised, an expression borrowed from ancient Germanic law, signifying that a prince ceased to depend immediately on the supreme head of the empire, so as to depend on him only mediately, that he fell in consequence under the authority of the territorial sovereign in whose territories he was enclosed, and was thus stripped of his sovereignty.

The mediatised princes and counts retained certain princely rights, and lost only the sovereign rights, which were transferred to the prince whose subjects they became. The transferred sovereign rights were those of legislation, of supreme jurisdiction, of high police, of taxation, and of recruiting. The lower and middle justice, the forest police, the rights of fishing, hunting, pasturage, the working of mines, and all dues of a feudal nature, without including personal property, composed the prerogatives left to the mediatised.

They retained the right to be tried by their peers, called austrégues in the ancient German constitution.

The immediate nobility was definitively incorporated.

The mediatised, reduced from the state of reigning princes to that of privilised subjects, were very numerous, and would have been more so but for the intervention of France. Among the number were the Princes of Fürstenberg, attached to Austria, of Hohenlohe to Prussia, the Prince of Tour and Taxis, who was deprived of the monopoly of the German posts, the Princes of Löwenstein-Wertheim, Linange, Loos, Schwarzenberg, Solms, Wittgenstein-Perleburg, and some others. The house of Nassau-Fulda, that of the late stadtholder, lost some portions of its domains in consequence of its contiguity of territory to the new confederation. The court of Berlin, independently of the serious uneasiness which such a confederation could not fail to excite in it, found two causes of personal mortification in the losses sustained by the two houses of Nassau-Fulda and Tour and Taxis, whose near relationship to the royal family of Prussia we have already explained.

To these fundamental dispositions, the treaty added the regulations of territory which were necessary to produce harmony between the sovereigns of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, irreconcilable co-sharers in Austrian Suabia, in the domains of the

immediate nobility, in the territories belonging to the mediatised princes.

The free city of Nuremberg, the condition of which one knew not how to regulate, what with a restless population of citizens which agitated it, and what with a patrician nobility which ruined it by the most expensive administration, was given to Bavaria, as well as the city of Ratisbon, in return for some cessions made in the Tyrol to the kingdom of Italy. The prince arch-chancellor found an ample compensation in the city and territory of Frankfort. It was in Frankfort that the new Diet was to be held.

This celebrated treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine put an end to the ancient German empire, after an existence of 1006 years, from Charlemagne, crowned in 800, to Francis II., dispossessed in 1806. It furnished the new model after which modern Germany was to be constituted: it was on this ground the social reform of it, and for the present it placed the States of the south of Germany under the temporary influence of France, leaving those of the north to wander among the protectors whom they should think fit to choose.

This treaty, published on the 12th of July with great ceremony, caused no surprise, but completed obviously to all eyes the European system of Napoleon. Holding all the south of Europe under his imperial paramountship by the family royalties, having the princes of the Rhine under his protectorship, he lacked nothing of the Empire of the West but the title.

It was necessary to communicate this result to the parties interested, that is, to the Diet of Ratisbon, to the Emperor of Austria, and to the King of Prussia. The declaration to the Diet was simple: it merely notified that it was no longer acknowledged by the confederation. To the Emperor of Austria was addressed a note, in which, without dictating to him the conduct which he had to pursue, and which was clearly foreseen, the German empire was spoken of as an institution as completely worn out as the republic of Venice, crumbling to ruin in all its parts, no longer giving protection to weak States, influence to strong States, not corresponding either with the wants of the time or with the relative proportion of the German States to each other; lastly, conferring on the house of Austria itself but an empty title, that of Emperor of Germany, which had released the court of Vienna from all dependence in regard to the electoral houses. The confederation seemed, therefore, to hope, without demanding it, that the Emperor Francis would abdicate a title which was about to cease *de facto* in a great part of Germany, in all that comprising the Confederation of the Rhine, and which would be no longer recognised by France.

As for Prussia, the French cabinet congratulated her on being

delivered from the trammels of that German empire, usually under the control of Austria, and to compensate her for having taken the south of Germany under its dependence, it recommended to her to place the north under the like dependence. "The Emperor Napoleon," wrote that cabinet, "will see without pain, nay, even with pleasure, Prussia ranging under her influence all the States of the north of Germany by means of a confederation similar to that of the Rhine." The princes were not designated, consequently none of them were excluded, but the number could not be great, and their importance not greater. They were Hesse-Cassel, Saxony, with its various branches, the two houses of Mecklenburg; lastly, the petty princes of the north, whom it would be superfluous to enumerate. A promise was given not to throw any impediment in the way of a confederation of that kind.

Napoleon, however, had not ventured upon such things without taking energetic and ostensible precautions. Watching with his usual activity what was passing at Naples, at Venice, in Dalmatia, without taking off his attention from the internal administration of the empire, he had applied himself to putting the grand army on a formidable footing. That army, scattered, as we have seen, over Bavaria, Franconia, and Suabia, living in good cantonments, had rested itself, and was ready to march again, either if it was obliged to pour back through Bavaria towards Austria, or to traverse Franconia and Saxony, and fall upon Russia. Napoleon had strengthened his ranks with the two reserves formed at Strasburg and Mayence under Marshal-Senators Kellermann and Lefebvre. It was an increase of about 40,000 men, perfectly disciplined, trained, prepared for fatigue. Some of them even, who belonged to the reserves of the preceding years, had attained the age of full strength, that is to say, twenty-four or twenty-five years. The army, diminished in consequence of the late campaign by about 20,000 men, a fourth of whom had rejoined the ranks, found itself, thanks to this reinforcement, augmented and invigorated. Napoleon, taking advantage of the circumstance that part of his troops were subsisted abroad, had raised the total force of France to 450,000 men, 152,000 of them in the interior (the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, and depôts being included in that number), 40,000 at Naples, 50,000 in Lombardy, 20,000 in Dalmatia, 6000 in Holland, 12,000 at the camp of Boulogne, and 170,000 at the grand army. These latter, collected into a single mass, on the complete war footing, numbering 30,000 horse, 10,000 artillerymen, and 130,000 foot, had arrived at the highest degree of perfection which it is possible to attain by discipline and war, and was under the direction of the greatest of captains. It should be observed that from this army General

Marmont had been detached to Dalmatia, and the Dutch to Holland, and that it no longer included any Bavarians in its ranks, which explains why it was not more numerous after the junction of the reserves.

In this imposing situation, Napoleon could await the effects produced in Berlin and Vienna by the whole of his plans, and the result of the negotiations opened at Paris with England and Russia.

For the rest, he had no inclination to prolong the war, if he were not obliged to do so for the execution of his designs. He was impatient, on the contrary, to assemble his soldiers about him at the magnificent entertainment which the city of Paris was to give to the grand army. It was a happy and a fine idea to let that heroic army be feasted by that noble capital, which feels so strongly all the emotions of France, and which, if it does not feel them in a more powerful manner, communicates them at least more rapidly and more energetically, thanks to the might of number and to the habit of taking the lead in all things, and of speaking for the country on all occasions.

Disposed to greatness by nature and also by success, which elevated his imagination, Napoleon, amidst those negotiations, so vast and so varied, those military cares, which extended from Naples to Illyria, from Illyria to Germany, from Germany to Holland, devoted himself with ardent fondness to magnificent creations of art and of public utility. Having visited during the brief snatches of leisure left him by war almost all the places of the capital, he had not beheld one of them without being struck at the moment by some grand, moral, or useful idea, the realisation of which we see at this day on the soil of Paris. He had been to St. Denis, and finding that ancient church in a deplorable state of dilapidation, especially since the violation of the royal tombs, he ordered by a decree the repair of that venerable edifice. He decided that four chapels should be erected: three for the kings of the first races, and one for the princes of his own dynasty. Marbles bearing the names of the kings buried there, and whose sepulchres had been profaned, were to replace their dispersed relics. He instituted a chapter of ten aged bishops to pray perpetually in that funeral asylum of our royal races.

After he had visited St. Geneviève, he ordered that beautiful church to be finished and restored to public worship, but retaining the destination which the Constituent Assembly had assigned to it, that of receiving the illustrious men of France. The chapter of the cathedral, augmented, was to chant the service there every day.

A triumphal monument had been ordered by the Senate on the proposition of the Tribunate. After many rejected plans,

Napoleon fixed upon the idea of erecting in the finest place in Paris a bronze pillar, similar in form and dimensions to Trajan's pillar, consecrated to the grand army, and displaying on a long basso-relievo winding round its magnificent shaft the exploits of the campaign of 1805. It was decided that the cannon taken from the enemy should furnish the material for it. The statue of Napoleon, in imperial costume, was to surmount the capital. It is that very column in the Place Vendôme, at the foot of which pass and will pass the present and future generations, the subject of a generous emulation for them so long as they shall cherish the love of national glory, the subject of everlasting reproach if they were ever capable of losing that noble sentiment.

Napoleon afterwards settled the plan of a triumphal arch on the Place du Carrousel, the same that exists at this day. That arch formed part of the plan for completing the Louvre and the Tuileries. He purposed to join those two palaces, and to compose out of them but one, which should be the most extensive ever seen in any country. Placing himself one day under the porch of the Louvre, and looking towards the Hôtel de Ville, he conceived the idea of an immense street, which was to be uniformly built, wide as the Rue de la Paix, running to the Barrière du Trône, so that the eye might penetrate on one side to the Champs Elysées, on the other to the first trees of Vincennes. The name destined for this street was that of Rue Imperiale. A monument had long ago been decreed on the site of the ancient Bastille. Napoleon proposed that it should be a triumphal arch, spacious enough to afford a passage through the centre portal to the great projected street, and placed at the intersection of that street and the canal of St. Martin. The architects having declared it to be impossible to erect such a structure on such a base, Napoleon determined to transfer that arch to the Place de l'Etoile, that it might face the Tuileries, and become one of the extremities of the immense line which he meant to form in the heart of his capital. Though the present generation has completed most of the monuments which Napoleon had not time to finish, it has neither completed the Louvre nor created that magnificent street which he projected.

It was not to works of mere embellishment that he limited his cares for the city of Paris. He deemed it unworthy of the prosperity of the empire that the capital should be destitute of water while a fine limpid stream ran through the heart of it. The fountains were open in the daytime only: he ordered works to be executed immediately at the pumps of Notre-Dame, of the Pont-Neuf, of Chaillot, and of Gros-Chaillot, to make the water run day and night. He ordered, moreover, the erection of fifteen new fountains. That of the Château d'Eau was

included in this creation. In two months a part of these orders was executed, and the water sprang up night and day from the sixty-five ancient fountains. On the site of those which were recently decreed temporary channels distributed the water till the fountains themselves should be erected. It was the public treasury which furnished the funds necessary for this expense.

Napoleon prescribed the continuation of the quays of the Seine, and decided that the bridge of the Jardin des Plantes, then building, should bear the glorious name of Austerlitz. Having, lastly, perceived, when visiting the Champ de Mars, to determine the plan of the fêtes for which preparations were making, that a communication between the two banks of the Seine was indispensable at this point, he ordered the construction of a stone bridge, which was to be the finest in the capital, and has borne the name of the Bridge of Jena.

The most distant departments of the empire shared in his munificence. He decreed this year the canal from the Rhone to the Rhine, the canal from the Scheldt to the Rhine, and ordered surveys for the canal from Nantes to Brest. He devoted funds to the continuation of the canals of the Ourcq, of St. Quentin, and of Burgundy. He prescribed the construction of a highroad, sixty leagues in length, from Metz to Mayence, through the valley of the Moselle. He gave orders for commencing the road from Roanne to Lyons, where there is that fine descent of Tarare, almost worthy of the Simplon; the celebrated road of La Corniche, running from Nice to Genoa, along the flanks of the Apennines, between the sea and the summits of those mountains. He directed that of the Simplon, already nearly finished, those of Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre, that along the banks of the Rhine, to be continued. Napoleon ordered, besides, new works at the arsenal of Antwerp.

It seems as if victory had fecundated his spirit, for most of his great creations date from this memorable year, placed between the first half of his career, that so glorious half, when wisdom almost always guided his steps, and that second half, so extraordinary and so sad, when his genius, intoxicated by success, overleaped all the limits of the possible, to perish in an abyss.

The Legislative Body, which was assembled, quietly adopted the plans projected by Napoleon and discussed by the Council of State. None of those stormy scenes of the Revolution were now witnessed, neither were yet the scenes of a free parliament. The assembly was seen adopting with confidence plans which it knew to be as ably conceived as they were ably explained.

A new code was presented this year, the fruit of long conferences between the tribunes and the councillors of State, under the direction of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès: it was the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing the manner of proceeding

before our tribunals, in consequence of their new form and the simplification of our laws. This code was adopted without difficulty, the questions liable to produce disputes having been settled beforehand in the preparatory discussions of the Council of State and the Tribunate.

A great improvement was made in the organisation of the Council of State. Hitherto that body had examined the *projets de loi*, discussed great measures of government, such as the Concordat, the coronation, the Pope's journey to Paris, the grave diplomatic question of St. Julien's preliminaries not ratified by Austria. Initiated into all the affairs of State, it was rather a council of government than a council of administration. But these high questions became every day more rare in its bosom, and gave place to purely administrative questions, which the progress of time and the increasing extent of the empire were incessantly multiplying. The councillors of State, important personages, almost the equals of the ministers, were too high in rank and too few in number to trouble themselves with all the reports. While the quantity of business increased, and they assumed the exclusively administrative character, another necessity was felt, that of training persons for the Council of State, of creating a ladder for them to climb to it, and above all, for employing young men of high rank, whom Napoleon was desirous to draw to him by all ways at once, those of war and of civil functions. After conferring on the subject with the arch-chancellor, he created masters of requests, holding an intermediate rank between the auditors and the councillors of State, charged with the greater number of the reports, having the faculty of deliberating upon the questions on which they had reported, and receiving a salary proportioned to the importance of their attributions. Messieurs Portalis, junior, Molè, and Pasquier, then very young, and nominated immediately masters of requests, indicated the utility and the intention of the plan. The emperor cherished that merit to which recollections were attached, without excluding that merit which awakened none.

To this wise innovation, which has created a nursery of able administrators, Napoleon immediately added another. There was no jurisdiction for the contractors who treated with the State, whether they executed public works, furnished supplies, or made financial engagements. It was the affair of the United Merchants which had revealed this deficiency; for Napoleon, not knowing to whom to consign it, had thought for a moment of sending it before the Legislative Body. This jurisdiction could not be attributed to the tribunals, as well on account of the special knowledge which it presupposes as the turn of mind which it requires, and which ought to be administrative rather than judicial. It was for this reason that all the bargains made

by the government were referred to the Council of State. This was the principal origin of the contentious attributions. Hence there were at the same time created advocates to the council, charged to defend by written memorials the interests of the parties about to be summoned before this new jurisdiction.

To all these creations Napoleon added one more, the best perhaps of his reign, the University. We have seen what system of education he adopted in 1802, when he laid the foundations of new French society. Amidst the old generations, which the Revolution had made enemies of, some of which regretted the old system, while others were disgusted with the new without being disposed to return to the old, he purposed to form by education a young generation made for our modern institutions and by them. Instead of those central schools, which were public courses, attended by youths brought up at home or in private boarding-schools, and in which they heard professors teach, at the pleasure of their caprice, or of the caprice of the time, the physical sciences much more than letters, Napoleon instituted, as we have seen, houses where youth, lodged and fed, received from the hands of the State instruction and education, and where letters resumed the place which they ought never to have lost, and where the sciences had nevertheless not lost the place which they had gained. Napoleon, clearly foreseeing that prejudice and malevolence would assail the establishments which he was instituting, had founded six thousand exhibitions, and had thus composed by authority (but by the authority of bounty) the population of the new colleges, called by the name of Lyceums. Some, very recently opened, others being only old houses transformed, exhibited already in 1806 the spectacle of order, good morals, and sound studies. There were twenty-nine of them. Napoleon purposed to extend the number, and to raise it to a hundred. Three hundred and ten secondary schools established by the communes, a like number of secondary schools opened by individuals, the former restricted to follow the rules of the Lyceums, the latter to send their pupils thither, made up the whole of the new establishments. This system had completely succeeded. The masters of private schools, parents infatuated with old prejudices, priests dreaming of the conquest of the public education, calumniated the Lyceums. They said nothing was taught in them but mathematics, because the government desired to train up soldiers only, that religion was neglected, and that morals were corrupt there. Nothing was further from the truth, for government had the express intention to bring letters into credit again, and had attained the proposed end. Religion was taught there by chaplains as seriously as the will of the author of the Concordat could cause it to be done, and with as much success as the spirit of the age permitted. Lastly,

a hard, almost military life, and continual exercises, preserved youth there from precocious passions; and in regard to morals, the Lyceums were certainly preferable to private schools. For the rest, notwithstanding the slanders of the peevish partisans of the past, these establishments had made rapid progress. Youth, brought by the bounty of the exhibitions and by the confidence of parents, began to throng to them.

But, according to Napoleon, the work was scarcely begun. It was not enough to attract pupils, it was necessary to give them professors: a corps of teachers was to be created. This was a great question, on which Napoleon was fixed with the same firmness of mind that he applied himself to everything. To resign education again to priests was inadmissible in his eyes. He had restored public worship, and had done so with a deep conviction that a religion is necessary for every society, not as an additional instrument of police, but as a satisfaction due to the noblest wants of the human soul. Nevertheless, he would not relinquish the duty of forming the new society to the clergy, who by their obstinate prejudices, by their fondness for the past, by their hatred of the present, by their dread of the future, could only propagate in youth the sad passions of the generations that were dying off. It is requisite that youth should be formed after the model of the society in which it is destined to live; it is necessary that it should find in the college the family spirit, in the family the spirit of society, with purer morals, more regular habits, more steady diligence. It is requisite, in short, that the college should be society itself improved. If there is any difference whatever between the two, if youth hear masters and parents speaking discordantly, and hear these praise what those censure, there arises a mischievous contrast which disturbs the mind, and which causes them to despise their masters if they have more confidence in their parents, their parents if they have more confidence in their masters. The second part of life is in this case employed in believing nothing of what has been learned in the first. Religion itself, if it is imposed with affectation, instead of being professed with respect in the presence of youth—religion becomes nothing but a yoke, from which the young man, as soon as he is free, hastens to escape, as from all the college yokes. Such were considerations which made Napoleon averse to the idea of giving up youth to the clergy. Another reason completely decided him. Was the clergy fit to educate Jews, Protestants? Certainly not. Then one could not have Jews, Protestants, Catholics educated together, to compose with them an enlightened tolerant youth, fond of its country, fit for all careers, one, in short, as new France ought to be.

If, however, the clergy had not the qualities necessary for this task, it had some which were highly valuable, and which

one ought to strive to borrow from it. A regular, laborious, sober, modest life was an indispensable condition for educating youth; for one ought not to be content, for such a charge, with the first comers, formed by the hazards of the times and of a dissipated society. But was it impossible to give to laymen certain qualities of the clergy? Napoleon thought not, and experience has proved that he was right. Studious life has more than one analogy with religious life; it is compatible with regularity of manners and mediocrity of fortune. Napoleon conceived that one might, by regulations, create a corps of teachers who without observing celibacy would bring to the education of youth the same application, the same perseverance, the same professional constancy as the clergy. There is every year in the generations arriving at the adult state, like crops growing on the ground arriving at maturity, a portion of young minds having a fondness for study, and belonging to families without fortune. To collect these minds, to subject them to preparatory trials, to a common discipline, to draw them and to retain them by the attraction of a moderate but sure provision—such was the problem to be resolved; and Napoleon did not consider it incapable of being solved. He had faith in the *esprit de corps*, and he was fond of it. One of the expressions which he most frequently repeated, because it expressed one of the ideas by which he was most frequently struck, was that society was in the dust. It was natural that he should feel that sentiment at the sight of a country where there existed no longer either nobility, or clergy, or parliament, or corporations. He was continually saying to the men of the Revolution, Learn to constitute yourselves, if you would defend yourselves, for see how the priests and the emigrants, animated by the last breath of the great bodies destroyed, defend themselves! He designed, therefore, to commit to a body which would live and defend itself the office of educating future generations. He has resolved it, he has done it, and he has succeeded.

Napoleon established the University on the following principles:—A special education for the men destined for the professorship; preparatory examinations before becoming professors; the entry after these examinations into a vast body, by whose sentence alone their career could be either suspended or cut short, and in which they would rise in time and by their merits to the head of that corps, a superior council composed of professors, who should have distinguished themselves by their talents, applying the rules, directing the instruction; lastly, the privilege of public education attributed exclusively to the new institution, with an endowment in rentes on the State, which would add to the energy of the *esprit de corps* and to the energy of the spirit of property. Such were the ideas according to

which Napoleon designed the University to be organised. But he had too much experience to insert all these dispositions in a law. Availing himself with profound intelligence of the public confidence, which permitted him to present very general laws, which he afterwards completed by degrees when experience called for them, he charged M. Fourcroy, the administrator of public instruction under the minister of the interior, to draw up a *projet de loi*, which should be comprised in three articles only. By the first, it was said that there should be formed, under the name of Imperial University, a teaching body, charged with the public education throughout the whole empire; by the second, that the members of the teaching body should contract obligations, civil, special, and temporary (this word was employed to exclude the idea of monastic vows); by the third, that the organisation of the teaching corps, modified from experience, should be converted into a law in the session of 1810. It is only with this latitude of action that great things are to be accomplished.

This *projet*, presented on the 6th of May, was adopted, like all the others, with confidence and silence. We shall not advise the adoption in this manner of laws, but when there shall be such a man, such acts, and what is still more cogent, such a situation.

This brief and fertile session was terminated by the financial laws. Napoleon justly considered the finances as a foundation quite as indispensable as the army to the greatness of an empire. The late crisis, though past, was a serious warning to decree at length a complete system of finances, to raise the resources to the level of the necessities, and to establish a service of the treasury, which should render it needless to resort to jobbing men of business. As for the creation of the resources necessary to defray the expenses of the war, Napoleon persisted in his determination not to make a loan. In fact, even amidst the prosperity which he caused France to enjoy, the 5 per cent. rente had never risen above 60. Had a loan been announced, the course would have sunk lower, perhaps to 50, and there would have been a perpetual interest of 10 per cent. to provide for. It was necessary, however, to make up the deficit of the last budgets, and to place the resources definitively in equilibrium with the state of war, which for fifteen years past seemed to have become the usual state of France. It was a bold attempt, which has never been realised, to defray the expenses of an obstinate struggle with the permanent imposts. Napoleon had not renounced it, and he had the courage to propose to the country, or rather to impose upon it, the burdens which were to furnish the means of attaining that result.

The arrear of the last budgets might be liquidated with 60

millions, the debt to the Sinking Fund being deducted from it. This debt consisted, as it will be recollected, of securities which had been disposed of, and produce of the sale of national domains, which the treasury had absorbed for its use, though they belonged to the Sinking Fund. It was necessary, therefore, to provide for these 60 millions, for the debt contracted with the Sinking Fund, and for an annual budget, which from the experience of 1806 could not amount to less than 700 millions in time of war (820 with the costs of collection).

The means devised were the following:—

It was perceived that the Sinking Fund had sold, very advantageously, the domains, the alienation of which had been entrusted to it by way of experiment. At that time, instead of selling for itself the 70 millions' worth which the law of the year IX. attributed to it, with a view to indemnify it for the rentes then created, and for which it was to be paid at the rate of 10 millions per annum, those domains themselves had been given up to them. As to the securities for reimbursing it, government had decided to pay them to the same amount, that is to say, in domains, on condition that it should dispose of them with the necessary precautions, which had already been so eminently successful. This same observation had led Napoleon, who was the inventor of that liquidation, to find the means of covering the 60 millions of arrear.

He had endowed the Senate, the Legion of Honour, the Public Instruction, and certain institutions with the remainder of the national domains. His intention in acting thus had been to save them from the waste of disadvantageous alienations. But, on the one hand, it had been perceived that the alienations could be effected in an advantageous manner by entrusting them to the Sinking Fund; and on the other, there had been discovered in that system of endowments the vice peculiar to estates in mortmain, the condition of which is to be ill-cultivated and far from productive. Napoleon resolved to take back those domains from the Senate and the Legion of Honour, and to give them an equivalent by creating three millions of rentes at 5 per cent. to the capital of 60 millions. If the rentes delivered to the public were threatened with an immediate depreciation, assigned as endowments to permanent bodies which would not alienate them, they would have none of the inconveniences of loans, they would occasion no fall of the course, and they would even procure an advantage for the public establishments which should receive them, that is, to ensure them an income of 5, instead of an income of $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 per cent., which the national domains yielded. These domains, transferred afterwards to the Sinking Fund, which would dispose of them gradually, would procure the 60 millions which were needed.

It is true that the amount of these 60 millions was required immediately to pay the arrears of anterior budgets. The idea was conceived of creating temporary effects, yielding from 6 to 7 per cent. according to the period of their payment, due at a fixed term, payable to the Sinking Fund at the rate of a million per month, from the 1st of July 1806 to the 1st of July 1811, mortgaged on the capital of the said fund, which would have, with what it already possessed, and what it was going to acquire, about 130 millions' worth of national domains, and which, lastly, combined a well-established credit with this immovable property.

These effects, bearing an advantageous but not usurious interest, and repayable at short fixed terms, could not fall like a rente, for their monthly and sure expiration for the period of five years would tend to raise them by the certainty of recovering the entire capital from month to month. It is a combination which has since succeeded several times, and which was excellent.

The process for liquidating the arrear consisted, then, in taking back the domains assigned to the great bodies, in giving them rentes instead, which gave them the advantage of an immediate increase of revenue, in causing these domains to be sold by the Sinking Fund, which it could accomplish with success in five years, and in realising their value beforehand by means of paper due at a fixed term, which could not be depreciated, thanks to the certain and not distant reimbursement, thanks, in short, to an interest of 6 or 7 per cent.

The only difficulty, and that not a very serious one, of this combination, was that the sum of the rentes composing the public debt was about to be increased to 51 millons instead of 50, as prescribed by anterior laws. But the infraction was unimportant, and government satisfied the law by establishing a more rapid extinction for that surplus million.

There was still left to provide for future budgets, by creating sufficient resources either for peace or war. Napoleon made a bold and at the same time a very wise declaration, in a financial point of view, to the Legislative Body and to Europe. He was desirous of peace, for he proudly said that he had exhausted military glory; he was desirous of peace, for he had given it to Austria. He was ready at this moment to conclude it with Russia, and he was engaged in negotiations with England. But the powers had become accustomed to consider treaties as truces, which they could break at the first signal from London. It was requisite till they could be brought to respect their engagements, and to endure with resignation the greatness of France—it was requisite to be ready to bear the charges of war, so long as it should be necessary. Great Britain pretended to defray

them by loans: let her do so while she continued to hold that resource in her hands. It behoved France to provide for them in a different manner, with means which were her own, that is to say, with the taxes, a resource far otherwise durable, and which left no burden behind it. In consequence, he declared that the sum of 600 millions was required for peace, 700 millions for war (720 and 820 millions including the costs of collection). The budget of the most peaceful year of the present government, that of 1802, had confined itself to an expenditure of 500 millions. But since 1802 the increase of the debt, the extension given to works of public utility, the endowment of the clergy consequent on the Concordat, the re-establishment of the monarchy which had led to the creation of a civil list, augmented to 600 millions the fixed expenses of a state of peace. The ordinary resources far exceeded that sum. As for the expenses of a state of war, which Napoleon was determined to keep up as long as it should be necessary, they raised the budget to 700 millions. At this rate 130 millions could be devoted annually to the navy, about 300 millions to the army, 50 armed ships kept, and 450,000 men always ready to march. France, on this footing, was able to face all dangers. Now she could without injuring herself impose this burden, for her ordinary revenues already supplied above 600 millions. The kingdom of Italy furnished 30 millions of that sum for the French army which attended to its safety, and it would be easy to obtain 60 or 70 millions more by the ordinary taxes.

After this bold declaration, Napoleon had the courage to develop the great resource of the indirect contributions, which he had already restored to the country, and to create a new resource, not less useful, not less abundant, and which had no other inconvenience but that of affecting the generality of the people, but affecting them slightly, the tax on salt. In consequence, he proposed, besides the duty on liquors, called *droit d'inventaire* (a duty levied at the proprietor's at the moment of their being taken away), another duty on the wholesale trade and on the retail sale, and for that purpose the exercise, that is to say, the superintendence, over liquors upon the roads, and the admission of agents of the excise into the cellars of the dealers in wine. The indirect taxes, which already produced 25 millions, were expected to produce more than 50 in consequence of this extension.

As for the tax on salt, its re-establishment was occasioned by the suppression of another tax which had become insupportable, the turnpike toll on the roads. This tax was so incongruous with our habits, and so annoying to agriculture, that all the councils-general had solicited its abolition. It brought in but 15 millions, which was insufficient for the maintenance of the roads of the empire, which cost the State an additional 10 millions

a year, and still the roads were not brought into a desirable condition; for the sum necessary for keeping them in a proper state was estimated at 35 millions at least. By imposing a very light tax, two decimes per kilogramme (two sous per pound), on salt, to be levied at the salt-marshes by the custom-house officers surrounding those marshes, almost all of them situated on the frontier, one might hope for a produce of 35 millions, that is to say, sufficient to keep the roads in a real state of repair, and to ease the treasury of an expense of 10 millions. This tax was of a totally different nature from the ancient gabelles, unequally assessed, aggravated by the collection, and sometimes raising salt to 14 sous per pound; a price which for the lower class of people was exorbitant.

With the annually increasing produce of these new taxes, and with some accidental resources, which enabled the government to wait for their complete development, France would find herself capable of supporting a state of war so long as it should last, and as soon as it was over to bestow on the people of the empire the blessings of peace by the diminution of the land-tax, the only one that was really burdensome.

By this creation Napoleon completed the re-establishment of our finances, which the suppression of the indirect taxes had ruined in 1789; and he exhibited to Europe a picture discouraging to our enemies, that is to say, 50 ships, 450,000 men, maintained without loan, and for the whole time that the war should last.

The budget of 1806 was, therefore, fixed at 700 millions for expenditure and receipts (820 with the expenses of collection). An accidental circumstance, the restoration of the Gregorian calendar, raised it to 15 months instead of 12, and to 900 millions instead of 700. In fact, the preceding budget, that of the year XIII., stopping at the 21st of September 1805, it was necessary, in order to comprehend the time to January 1, 1806, to add about three months, which must of course raise the budget of 1806 to fifteen months, and to 900 millions.

There was yet left a task to be performed, that was to organise the treasury and the Bank of France. Enlightened by recent events, Napoleon resolved to reform both.

We have already repeated several times in this history that the amount of the taxes was sent to the treasury in the form of obligations at a certain date, or bills at sight, signed by the receivers-general, and payable month by month at their office. The discount of this paper procured cash when there was a necessity to anticipate its falling due. To leave this discount to a company had proved an unsafe course. It had been entrusted anew to an agency of the receivers-general, which acted in Paris for the whole body. Ever since the return of credit, capitals

were plentiful, and the receivers-general could procure for the State, by discounting their own engagements, all the funds that it needed. Nevertheless, a long discussion took place before Napoleon, in the council of finances, whether this service ought not to be assigned to the bank, more powerful than the agency of the receivers-general ever could be. Napoleon was at first of opinion that for this and for other services the bank was not constituted strongly enough. He resolved, therefore, to double its capital by raising the number of shares from 45,000 to 90,000, which, at 1000 francs per share, would form a capital of 90 millions. He resolved, moreover, to render its organisation monarchical, by converting the elected president who was at its head into a governor nominated by the emperor, who would direct it for the twofold interest of commerce and of the treasury, to place three receivers-general in its council, to connect it more closely with the government; lastly, to suppress the regulation according to which the discounts were proportioned to the number of shares held by the presenters of effects, and to adopt in its stead a much more judicious arrangement, consisting in proportioning these discounts to the known credit of the mercantile men who applied for them. These changes, proposed in a law, were adopted by the Legislative Body, and under this strong and excellent constitution the Bank of France is become one of the most solid establishments in the world, for it has been seen in our days assisting the Bank of England itself, and getting over, without flinching, the greatest political catastrophes.

Even after he had thus enlarged it, Napoleon would not consign, in a constant and definitive manner, the service of the treasury to the Bank of France. He intended, in case of need, and accidentally, to make use of the new power which he had ensured to himself for discounting this or that sum in obligations of the receivers-general or bills at sight, but he could not decide to deliver up to it definitively the portfolio of the treasury. It was a company of commercial men, deliberating, it is true, under a president appointed by him, but placed out of his government, and he would not, he said, commit to them the secret of his military operations, in committing to them the secret of his financial operations. "I will have it in my power," he added, "to move a body of troops without the bank knowing it, and it would know it if it were acquainted with my pecuniary wants.

However, he had a trial made, but only a trial, of a new system for payment of funds by accountable persons. Though the system of obligations had rendered great services, it was not the last term of perfection in the way of recovery. It frequently happened that the receivers-general had considerable funds in hand, of which they made a profit, till their obligations

became due. These obligations, moreover, gave rise to a very active jobbing. A mere account current kept between the State and the accountable persons, by means of which every amount that entered their chests should belong to the State, should bear interest for its profit, and every amount that came out of the chest should bear interest for the profit of the accountable person who had paid it. An account current so regulated was a much more simple, more true system, which did not prevent granting to the receivers-general the advantages which it had been deemed necessary to allow them to enjoy. But there was required, in the first place, a system of entry which admitted not of error; there was required in the accounts of the treasury the introduction of double entry, which is employed by commerce. M. Mollien proposed the account current and the double entry. Napoleon readily assented to it, but he wished this system to be tried with some of the receivers-general, in order to judge of its merit from experience.

Such were the civil labours of Napoleon in that memorable year 1806, the most glorious of the empire, as 1802 was the most glorious of the consulate; years fecundated the one by the other; in which France was constituted a dictatorial republic in 1802, and a vast federative empire in 1806. In this latter year Napoleon founded at once vassal royalties for his brothers, duchies for his generals and his servants, rich endowments for his soldiers, suppressed the German empire, and left the French empire to fill the West by itself. He continued the roads, the bridges, the canals, the works, already begun, and commenced still more important ones, the canals from the Rhone to the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Scheldt, the roads of La Corniche and Tarare, and from Metz to Mayence. He projected the great monuments of the capital, the column of the Place Vendôme, the arch of l'Etoile, the completion of the Louvre, the street to be called Rue Imperiale, and the principal fountains of Paris. He commenced the restoration of St. Denis, he ordered the finishing of the Pantheon; he promulgated the Code of Civil Proceeding, improved the organisation of the Council of State, created the University, liquidated definitively the financial arrears, completed the system of the taxes, reorganised the Bank of France, and prepared the new system of the French treasury. All this, undertaken in January 1806, was finished in July the same year. What mind ever conceived more things, more vast, more profound, and ever realised them in less time. It is true that we approach the acme of this prodigious reign, a height of elevation that has not been equalled, and of which one may say, while surveying the entire catalogue of human greatness, that none surpasses, if there be any that come up to it.

Unfortunately this incomparable year, instead of concluding amidst peace, as one might have hoped, concluded amidst war, half through the fault of Europe, half through that of Napoleon, and also through a cruel stroke of Death, which carried off Mr. Fox in this very same year that he had already carried off Mr. Pitt.

The negotiations opened with Russia and England had been continued during the labours of all kinds, of which we have just given a sketch. Lord Yarmouth, the conferences with whom had been purposely prolonged, adhered to the first proposals. England purposed to keep most of her maritime conquests, gave up to us our continental conquests, Hanover always excepted, and confined herself to inquiring what we should do to indemnify the King of Naples. As for the new royalties, as for the Confederation of the Rhine, she appeared not to care about them. Napoleon, who no longer had reason to defer the term of the negotiations, his principal projects being accomplished, pressed Lord Yarmouth to procure powers, in order to come to a conclusion. Lord Yarmouth had at length received them, but with orders not to produce them till he should perceive a possibility of arranging with France, and after he had come to an understanding with the Russian negotiator.

M. d'Oubril had arrived in June, with powers in due form, and with double instructions, first to gain time for the mouths of the Cattaro, and thus to spare Austria the military execution with which she was threatened; secondly, to put an end to all existing differences by a treaty of peace, if France acceded to conditions which would save the dignity of the Russian empire. One circumstance had confirmed M. d'Oubril in the idea of settling matters by a treaty of peace. While he was on the way, the Russian ministry had been changed. Prince Czartoryski and his friends, being desirous that Russia should connect herself more closely with England, not precisely to continue the war, but to treat with greater advantage, Alexander, weary of their remonstrances, dreading too strict engagements with the British cabinet, had at length accepted the resignations so frequently offered, and replaced Prince Czartoryski by General Budberg. The latter had formerly been the governor of the emperor, a friend of the empress-mother's, and had neither energy nor humour to resist his master. M. d'Oubril, having found the emperor more inclined to peace than his ministers, could not but deem himself authorised by this change to incline more towards a pacific conclusion.

M. de Talleyrand had no difficulty to persuade M. d'Oubril, when he maintained that there was no serious interest to discuss between the two empires, at most only a question of influence to consider on account of two or three petty powers, which Russia

had taken under her protection. But as for these latter, Russia, beaten at Austerlitz, and not disposed to begin again, since Austria had surrendered her sword, since Prussia was dependent, and since England appeared wearied out—Russia could not be very exigent. She desired merely to save her pride from too rude a shock. She was ready, therefore, to take no notice of the new arrangements made in Germany, and those relative to the annexation of Genoa and the Venetian States; she was even determined to be silent respecting the conquest of Naples, for the arming of the Neapolitans after a convention of neutrality justified all the severity of Napoleon. Still, in regard to Piedmont and the Bourbons of Naples, Russia had written engagements, and she could do no less than demand something for them, were it ever so little. The engagements in regard to Piedmont began to be antiquated, but those which had been contracted with Queen Caroline and pushed her into the abyss, were too recent and too authentic for Russia not to interfere in her favour.

Hence this was the essential and difficult question to resolve between M. de Talleyrand and M. d'Oubril. The latter would have wished to obtain some compensation, however small, for the King of Piedmont, to ensure Sicily to the Bourbons of Naples, and to introduce into the treaty certain expressions, which should give Russia an appearance of useful and honourable intervention in the affairs of Europe. Though Napoleon had at first purposed to have a dry and empty treaty, which should purely and simply re-establish peace between the two empires, in order to demonstrate that he did not recognise the influence which Russia pretended to arrogate to herself, this rigorous intention could not but give way before the possibility of an immediate peace, which by its reaction would bring England perforce to treat on reasonable conditions. Napoleon, therefore, permitted M. de Talleyrand to grant all the semblances of influence which could save the dignity of the Russian cabinet. Accordingly, that minister was authorised in the patent treaty to guarantee the evacuation of Germany, the integrity of the Ottoman empire, the independence of the Republic of Ragusa, to promise the good offices of France for reconciling Prussia and Sweden, and lastly, to accept the good offices of Russia for the re-establishment of peace between France and England. Here was sufficient to form a treaty less insignificant than that which Napoleon had at first contemplated, and consequently more flattering for the pride of Russia. But some compensation or other was required for the Kings of Piedmont and Naples. With respect to the King of Piedmont, Napoleon gave a positive refusal, and Russia was obliged to renounce that. As for Naples, he would never consent to cede Sicily, and he required

that island to be restored to Naples, now possessed by Joseph. By dint of seeking a combination to reconcile the opposite pretensions, a middle term was hit upon, which consisted in giving the Balearic Islands to the Prince Royal of Naples, and a pecuniary indemnity to the dethroned king and queen. The Balearic Islands belonged, it is true, to Spain, but Napoleon had wherewithal to furnish an equivalent for the latter, by aggrandising the little kingdom of Etruria with some fragments of the duchies of Parma and Piacenza. He had, moreover, an excellent and highly moral lesson to impress upon the court of Madrid, namely, that the Prince Royal of Naples had become the son-in-law of Charles IV. on the same day that a princess of Naples had married the Prince of the Asturias. To crown his excellent reasons, Napoleon possessed power. He could therefore venture to contract a serious engagement respecting the Balearic Islands.

This combination devised, it was requisite to bring the affair to a conclusion. M. d'Oubril had placed himself in communication with Lord Yarmouth, who, though professing very friendly sentiments towards France, nevertheless thought that there was weakness in conceding everything that M. de Talleyrand demanded. Like a good Englishman as he was, he would have had Sicily left to Queen Caroline, for to preserve it for that queen was giving it to England. Accordingly, he did not fail to urge M. d'Oubril to prolong the resistance of Russia.

But M. de Talleyrand had an expedient, which Napoleon had suggested to him, and of which he skilfully availed himself, namely, to threaten Austria to act immediately unless the mouths of the Cattaro were given up. Napoleon, as we have said, set a great value on these mouths of the Cattaro, for their happy situation in the Adriatic, and above all, for their vicinity to the Turkish frontiers. He was therefore fully determined to require their restitution, and it was the easier for him to threaten because he had the resolution to act. For this purpose, moreover, he had but a step to go, for his troops were still on the Inn, and occupied Braunau. In consequence, M. de Talleyrand declared to M. d'Oubril that he must conclude the business and sign the treaty which would lead to the surrender of the mouths of the Cattaro, or leave Paris, after which Austria would be attacked, unless she united her efforts with those of France to retake the position so dishonourably delivered up to the Russians.

M. d'Oubril, intimidated by this peremptory declaration, communicated his embarrassment to Lord Yarmouth, saying that his instructions enjoined him to save Austria from immediate constraint, and that he was obliged to conform to them; that, for the rest, nothing would be gained by delay with such a character as that of Napoleon, for every day he committed some

fresh act, which was afterwards to be considered as a decided thing if one did not choose to break with him; that if one had treated before the month of April, Joseph Bonaparte would not have been proclaimed King of Naples; if one had treated before the month of June, Louis Bonaparte would not have become King of Holland; that, lastly, if one had treated before the month of July, the German empire would not have been dissolved. M. d'Oubril therefore made up his mind, and signed on the 20th of July, notwithstanding the solicitations of Lord Yarmouth, a treaty of peace with France.

In the patent articles were stipulated, as we have already shown, the evacuation of Germany, the independence of the republic of Ragusa, the integrity of the Turkish empire. In these same articles were promised the good offices of the two contracting powers for putting an end to the difference which had arisen between Prussia and Sweden; and France formally accepted the good offices of Russia for the re-establishment of peace with England, all of them things which gave Russia an appearance of influence which she was desirous not to lose. The independence of the Seven Islands and the immediate evacuation of the mouths of the Cattaro were promised anew. In the secret articles, the Balearic Islands were given to the Prince Royal of Naples, but upon condition of not admitting the English into them in time of war; a pension was ensured to his mother and father; and there was a stipulation that Swedish Pomerania should be assured to Sweden in the engagements which were to be negotiated between Sweden and Prussia.

This treaty, in the situation of Europe, was acceptable on the part of Russia, unless, for the sake of the Queen of Naples, she preferred war, which could bring her nothing but disasters.

M. d'Oubril, after concluding it, set out immediately for St. Petersburg, in order to obtain the ratifications of his government. He imagined that he had cleverly performed his task; for, if the peace which he had concluded were rejected by his cabinet, he had at least delayed for six weeks the execution with which Austria was threatened. On this point, there is ground for asserting that the peace was not signed with perfect sincerity.

M. de Talleyrand had now to deal with Lord Yarmouth only, who was much weakened since the return of M. d'Oubril. The French minister understood how to follow up his advantages, and to make the most of the treaty with Russia in order to oblige Yarmouth to produce his powers, which he had always refused to do. M. de Talleyrand told him that it was impossible to prolong this kind of comedy of an accredited negotiator, who would not show his powers; that if he deferred producing them much longer, one would be authorised to believe that he had

none, and that his presence in Paris had but a delusive object, that of gaining the bad season, in order to prevent France from acting either against England or against her other enemies. Those enemies were not specified, but some movements of troops towards Bayonne might excite apprehension that Portugal was one of them. M. de Talleyrand added that he must come to an immediate decision, quit Paris, or give a serious character to the negotiation by producing his powers, for they had at last awakened the suspicions of Prussia, who required a satisfactory declaration in regard to Hanover; that, unwilling to lose such an ally, the French cabinet was ready to make the declaration demanded, and that, once made, it would not be possible to recede from it; that the war then would be everlasting, or that peace must be concluded without the restitution of Hanover; that, for the rest, nothing would be gained by fresh delays, and that two or three months later England would be obliged to consent perhaps to the conquest of Portugal, as she had consented to the conquest of Naples.

Overcome by these reasons, by the signature given by M. d'Oubril, by the love of peace, and also by the very natural ambition of writing his name at the foot of such a treaty, Lord Yarmouth at length determined to exhibit his powers. It was the first advantage that M. de Talleyrand desired to gain, and he hastened to make it irrevocable by getting a French plenipotentiary nominated to negotiate publicly with Lord Yarmouth. Napoleon chose General Clarke, and conferred on him formal and patent powers. From that moment, the 22nd of July, the negotiation was officially opened.

General Clarke and Lord Yarmouth conferred, and with the exception of Sicily, the two negotiators were agreed. France granted Malta, the Cape, and the conquest of India; she insisted on the restitution of the factories of Pondicherry and Chandernagor, consenting to limit the number of troops that she should keep there; she demanded also that St. Lucia and Tobago should be restored to her, but she made an especial point only of the restitution of Surinam, a point on which the instructions of the English negotiator were not peremptory. The only serious difficulty still consisted in Sicily, which Lord Yarmouth was not formally authorised to cede, especially for so insignificant an indemnity as the Balearic Islands. Napoleon was desirous to obtain Sicily for his brother Joseph, for very weighty reasons. According to him, so long as Queen Caroline should reside at Palermo, Joseph would not be firmly established in Naples: there would be everlasting war between those two portions of the late kingdom of the two Sicilies; the Calabrias would always be exposed to underhand excitement, and what was still worse, Queen Caroline, confined at Palermo, unable to

stand her ground in her island without the support of the English, would give it up entirely to them. It would therefore be securing the enjoyment of Sicily to the English to leave it to the Bourbons, an infinitely disastrous consequence for the Mediterranean.

Lord Yarmouth, on his part, notwithstanding his desire to conclude, durst not venture. But a new obstacle soon intervened to fetter his good will.

The British cabinet, when apprised of the conduct of M. d'Oubril, was extremely irritated, and hastened to send couriers to St. Petersburg, to complain of the Russian negotiator for having deserted the English negotiator. It did not stop there, but blamed Lord Yarmouth, its own negotiator, for having so soon produced his powers. Fearful even of the influences to which he might be exposed by his personal intimacy with the French diplomatists, it made choice of a Whig, Lord Lauderdale, a personage very hard to please, to associate him in the negotiation. This second plenipotentiary was immediately despatched with precise instructions, but which nevertheless left certain facilities relative to Sicily with which Lord Yarmouth was not furnished. Lord Lauderdale was an exact and formal diplomatist. He had orders to require the fixing of a basis of negotiation, the *uti possidetis*, which covered the maritime conquests of the English, and particularly Sicily, which had not yet been conquered by Joseph Bonaparte. It is true that this same basis excluded the restitution of Hanover, but that kingdom was out of the discussion, the English having always declared that they would not even allow any debate on that point. The basis being admitted, Lord Lauderdale was to agree that the *uti possidetis* should be applied in an absolute manner, especially in regard to Sicily, and that this island might be relinquished for a compensation. Thus a sacrifice in Dalmatia, added to the cession of the Balearic Islands, might furnish a medium of accommodation.

Lord Lauderdale proceeded without delay to Paris. He was a Whig, consequently a friend, rather than a foe, to peace. But he had been warned to be on his guard against the seductions of M. de Talleyrand, which, it was feared, Lord Yarmouth was not capable of resisting.

Lord Lauderdale was received politely and coldly, for it had been guessed that he was sent over to serve as a corrective of Lord Yarmouth's too easy temper, as it was judged to be. Napoleon, in reply to the mission of Lord Lauderdale, appointed M. de Champagny second French negotiator. From that moment they were two against two—Messieurs Clarke and Champagny against Lord Yarmouth and Lord Lauderdale.

No sooner had Lord Lauderdale entered this congress than he set out with a long, absolute note, in which he recapitulated the confidential and official negotiation, and required, before pro-

ceeding any further, that the principle of the *uti possidetis* should be admitted. Napoleon was frankly desirous of peace, and imagined that he had it in his grasp ever since he had guided the hand of M. d'Oubril so far as to sign the treaty of the 20th of July. But it was wrong, nevertheless, to provoke his susceptible and by no means patient temper. He caused the answer to be deferred as the first sign of dissatisfaction. Lord Lauderdale did not consider himself beaten, and repeated his declaration. He was then answered in an energetic and dignified despatch, in which he was told that so far the negotiation had proceeded with frankness and cordiality, and without those pedantic forms which the new negotiator desired to introduce into it; that if the intentions were changed, if all this diplomatic parade disguised a secret intention of breaking off, after procuring a few papers to produce to parliament, the sooner Lord Lauderdale was gone the better, for the French cabinet was not disposed to lend itself to the parliamentary calculations of the British cabinet. Lord Lauderdale had no desire to produce a rupture; he was awkward, that was all. Explanations ensued. It was understood that the production of Lord Lauderdale's note was an affair of mere formality, which at bottom excluded none of the conditions previously admitted by Lord Yarmouth; that even the relinquishment of Sicily on condition of a more extensive indemnity than the Balearic Islands had become more explicit since the arrival of Lord Lauderdale, and the negotiators then began to confer on the subject of Pondicherry, Surinam, Tobago, and St. Lucia.

The English negotiators seemed persuaded that Russia, touched by the representations of the British cabinet, would not ratify d'Oubril's treaty. Napoleon, on the contrary, could not believe that M. d'Oubril would have gone so far as to conclude such a treaty if his instructions had not authorised him to do so; still less did he believe that Russia dared cancel an act which she had authorised her representative to sign. He thought, therefore, that it would be advantageous to wait for the new Russian ratifications, which to him appeared certain, and that England would then be obliged to submit to the conditions which he had it so much at heart to see her accept. In consequence, he ordered the two French negotiators to continue to gain time, till the day when the answer from St. Petersburg should reach Paris. M. d'Oubril had set out on the 22nd of July; that answer must arrive by the end of August.

Napoleon was mistaken, and this was one of the very rare occasions on which he had not divined the thoughts of his adversaries. Nothing, in fact, was more doubtful than the Russian ratifications, and besides, the then failing health of Mr. Fox was a new peril for the negotiation. If this generous friend of

humanity were to sink under the cares of government, to which he had long been unaccustomed, the war party might get the better of the peace party in the British cabinet.

But at the moment a serious circumstance put peace in much greater jeopardy than the temporising enjoined by Napoleon. Prussia had fallen into a melancholy state of despondency. Since her occupation of Hanover, and the publication in London of her communications with England, Napoleon, as we have said, had taken no account of her, and treated her as an ally from whom there was nothing to hope for. Thus every creature in Europe knew that he was engaged in the organisation of the new Germanic body, and Prussia was as uninformed on this subject as the petty German powers. Everybody knew that France was negotiating with England, that consequently the question of Hanover must come under discussion, and she had not received a single communication on this subject capable of rendering her easy. King Frederick William was obliged to appear informed of that which he was ignorant of, that he might not make the state of neglect in which he was left too evident. Though keeping up secret and not very honourable relations with Russia, he was treated by the latter without much consideration, and he could perceive that she prized him less every day, in proportion as she became more reconciled with France. In coldness with Austria, who did not forgive him for having deserted her on the eve of Austerlitz, at war with England, which had just seized three hundred Prussian merchantmen, he found himself alone in Europe, and so little respected that even the King of Sweden himself had not been afraid to offer him the most grievous of affronts. When the Prussian troops had appeared to occupy the dependencies of Hanover bordering on Swedish Pomerania, the King of Sweden, who held them, as he said, on behalf of the King of England, his ally, had defended himself there, and fired upon the troops that were sent. It was the last degree of humiliation to be thus treated by a prince who had no other strength but his insanity, protected by his alliances.

This situation produced in the Prussian cabinet reflections equally painful and alarming. Russia, England herself, were at this moment taking steps towards France. The coalition must soon find itself dissolved, and as Prussia had been courted only because she formed the necessary complement of that coalition, what would become of her at the time of the general disarming? Would she not be delivered up defenceless to Napoleon, who, highly dissatisfied with her conduct, would treat her as he pleased, either in order to purchase peace with England and Russia, or to aggrandise the States that he should think fit to found? and whatever he might do, he was sure not

to have one disapprover in Europe, for nobody now felt the slightest interest for Prussia.

The strangest reports confirmed these cutting reflections. The idea of restoring Hanover to England in order to have a maritime peace was so natural and so simple that it sprang up in all minds at once. So little was Prussia esteemed that, notwithstanding the virtues of her king, it was not taken amiss that Napoleon should act thus towards a court which knew not how to be either friend or enemy to any one. The allies of France, Spain in particular, who suffered cruelly by the war, said aloud that Prussia did not deserve to have the calamities of war prolonged a single day on her account. General Pardo, ambassador of Spain in Berlin, repeated this so publicly, that people everywhere inquired the cause of such bold language. Thus, without being informed on the subject, every one related circumstances as they were passing in Paris between Lord Yarmouth and M. de Talleyrand.

Then came the malevolent, who, adding the improbable to the probable, took delight in the most mischievous inventions. Some pretended that France was about to reconcile herself with Russia by reconstituting the kingdom of Poland in behalf of the Grand Duke Constantine, and that for this purpose the Polish provinces, ceded to Prussia at the time of the last partition, would be taken from her. Others maintained that Murat was about to be proclaimed King of Westphalia, and that it was in contemplation to give him Münster, Osnabrück, and East Friesland.

It is a mixture of falsehood and truth of which all rumours are usually composed, and there is always sufficient of the latter mingled with them to gain belief for the lie. This may be perceived in the present instance, when accurate but distorted facts had served for a foundation to the falsest reports. Napoleon was, in fact, thinking of restoring Hanover to England, since Prussia no longer seemed to him an ally that could be relied on, but securing an indemnity for the latter or restoring to her all that he had received from her. The plan for taking the Polish provinces from her had been entertained for a moment, but by the Russians and not by the French. Lastly, Murat's pretended kingdom was an invention of M. de Talleyrand's clerks, for the purpose of flattering the imperial family; and as yet Napoleon had thought of this only on condition of giving Prussia the Hanseatic cities, which she eagerly coveted. At any rate, he had never wished to hear such a scheme talked of.

But it is not with this scrupulous accuracy that newsmongers construct their inventions. To ridicule those whom they suppose to be deceived, to affect indignation against those whom they suppose to be deceivers, is sufficient for their malevolent idleness, and this is a species of persons not more rare in the

diplomatic circles than in the curious and ignorant public of great capitals.

Soldierly imprudences gave a certain probability to these rumours. Murat kept in his duchy of Berg a military court, where the most extraordinary language was used.

His was, observed his comrades in war, who had become his courtiers—his was a very small State for a brother-in-law of the emperor's. By-and-by, no doubt, he would be King of Westphalia, and a fine kingdom would be composed for him at the expense of that scurvy court of Prussia, which betrayed everybody. It was not only those about Murat who talked thus. The French troops, brought back into the country of Darmstadt, into Franconia and Suabia, had but a step to take to overrun Saxony and Prussia. All these military men, who had a desire to continue the war, and who attributed the same desire to their master, flattered themselves that they should soon begin it again, and enter Berlin as they had entered Vienna. The new Prince of Ponte Corvo, Bernadotte, established at Anspach, devised plans, ridiculous enough, which he showed publicly, and which he ascribed to Napoleon. Augereau, caring still less what he said, drank at table with his staff to the success of the approaching war with Prussia.

These extravagances of idle soldiers, reported in Berlin, naturally produced the most unpleasant sensation. Related at court, they were then transmitted to the entire population, and excited the pride, always ready to take fire, of the Prussian nation. The king was more especially affected by them, on account of the effect which they could not fail to produce on the public opinion. The queen, distressed about what had befallen her sister, the Princess of Tour and Taxis, who had been included in the recent mediatisation, said nothing, having for some time made up her mind to be silent, and quite aware that she had no claim upon Napoleon to induce him to favour the princes of her family. But her silence was significant. M. d'Haugwitz was more disheartened than he chose to confess to his master. The faults committed during his absence, and contrary to his advice, at length produced their irresistible consequences. He was nevertheless blamed for all events, as though he had been their real cause. The seizure of three hundred vessels, so injurious to Prussian commerce, was imputed to him as one of his works. The minister of the finances had reproached him with it in full council, and with the greatest asperity. A general of renown in the army, General Ruchel, had carried rudeness towards him to the length of insult. Public opinion in Prussia rose from hour to hour against M. d'Haugwitz, who, however, had done nothing wrong but in returning to business at the solicitation of the king, when his system of alliance with France

was so compromised that it was rendered impossible. The sentiment of German patriotism combined with all the rest to hasten a crisis. Some booksellers of Nuremberg having circulated pamphlets against France, Napoleon had ordered them to be apprehended, and applying to one of them the severity of the military laws, which treat as an enemy any one who endeavours to excite a country against the army that occupies it, had caused him to be shot. This deplorable act had inflamed the public opinion against the French and their partisans.

King Frederick William and M. d'Haugwitz had reckoned upon a success for calming the public mind: they hoped that a confederation of the German powers of the north, under the protectorship of Prussia, would form a counterpoise to the Confederation of the Rhine—Napoleon himself had suggested the idea of it. An aide-de-camp of the king had been sent to Dresden to decide Saxony to enter into this confederation, and the chief minister of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel had come himself to Berlin to confer on the subject. But these two courts manifested extreme coldness towards the proposal. Saxony, the most honest of the German powers, had a natural mistrust of Prussia, and if she had resolved to join any new confederacy, she would rather have inclined to Austria, which had never coveted her States, than Prussia, which, surrounding them on all sides, was evidently longing for them. She was, therefore, not disposed to do what was asked of her, and regulated her conduct by that of the other powers of the north of Germany. Hesse, dissatisfied with Prussia, which in 1803 had caused the country of Fulda to be given to the house of Nassau-Orange, dissatisfied with France, which had refused to include her in the Confederation of the Rhine, and at the same time to aggrandise her, deceiving, besides, all those with whom she treated, would not decide in favour of Prussia any more than of France, for to her the danger appeared equal. To excuse herself to Prussia, to whom she owed an at least apparent attachment, she had invented an odious lie, and pretended that France had thrown out violent underhand threats if she joined the confederation of the north. This was not the case; the most secret despatches of the French government * enjoined its agents on the contrary not to oppose any obstacle to the formation of this confederation, to be silent on the subject, and if consulted, to declare that France would see it without displeasure. It was the Hanseatic cities only to which France resolved to forbid that accession, for purely commercial reasons; and this she had not concealed.

* I have read all these despatches with the greatest attention; and as I tell the truth in regard to all the courts, great and small, I should tell it in regard to Hesse, were that truth favourable to it, and unfavourable to France.

The Hessian minister, then, carried to Berlin the falsest assertions; and all that his sovereign had demanded of France when offering to join the Confederation of the Rhine, he pretended that France had offered him to draw him away from the confederation of the north. He even accused M. Bignon, our minister at Cassel, of language which the latter had not used, and which he contradicted most energetically. It is possible that M. Bignon, before the confederation of the north was contemplated, and when all the German diplomatists were talking of the Confederation of the Rhine, had extolled in general terms the advantages to be derived from the French alliance, that in his language he had even gone beyond his instructions, but this was from indiscreet zeal; and a proof that he acted without orders is that Napoleon had enjoined M. de Talleyrand by a letter to refuse the junction of the Elector of Hesse.* Nevertheless, the minister of the Elector of Hesse, sent extraordinarily to Berlin with a view to justify an unexpected refusal, came to report in the falsest manner the pretended threats and the pretended offers between which France had placed the petty court of Hesse.

On this utterly false representation, the King of Prussia conceived that he discovered the blackest treachery in the conduct of Napoleon, thought himself tricked, oppressed, and gave way to a violent irritation. While these reports were reaching him from the court of Cassel, a despatch from M. de Lucchesini arrived from France. That ambassador, a man of talent, but unsteady, insincere, living in Paris with all the enemies of the government, and being nevertheless one of the most assiduous courtiers of M. de Talleyrand, had picked up some days before the reports circulated respecting the lot reserved for Prussia. A confidential intimation obtained from the English negotiators relative to Hanover, the restitution of which had been tacitly promised, appeared to him to crown all the threatening circumstances of the moment, and as, in his ambiguous conduct, alternately the adversary or the partisan of the system of M. d'Haugwitz, he had very recently supported the treaty of the 15th of February, as he had even carried it to Berlin, he considered his responsibility as deeply involved if the last attempt at an alliance with France turned out ill. He therefore exaggerated in his reports in the most imprudent manner. An agent ought to conceal nothing from his government, but he ought to weigh his assertions, to add nothing to the truth, to retrench nothing from it, especially when baneful resolutions may be the consequence.

The courier who left Paris on the 29th of July arrived at

* This letter exists in the depôt of the Secretary of State's office in the Louvre.

Berlin on the 5th or the 6th of August. He caused an extraordinary sensation there. A second, bringing the despatches of the 2nd of August, who arrived on the 9th, only added to the effect produced by the first. The explosion was instantaneous. As a heart full of long-repressed sentiments suddenly breaks forth if a last impression comes to aggravate what it has felt, the king and his ministers burst into sudden passions against France. Both of them equalled in their external demonstrations the most violent members of the party which desired war. M. d'Haugwitz, usually so calm, certainly could, in reviewing the past, call to mind the faults of the court of Berlin, explain to himself the consequences of those faults on the irritable mind of Napoleon, comprehend from that time the neglect with which the latter repaid an unfaithful alliance, reduce thus to their true value the alleged plans with which Prussia was threatened, and wait for more accurate reports, before the Prussian cabinet proceeded to form an opinion and to decide upon a line of conduct. Here commence the real faults of M. d'Haugwitz. Believing only a part of what was told him, but desiring to cover his responsibility, and above all flattering himself that he could control the violent party by putting himself at the head of the military demonstrations, he assented to all that was proposed in this moment of agitation. His system being thus overthrown, he ought to have retired and left to others the chances of a rupture with France, which he foresaw must be disastrous. But he gave way to the general movement of minds, and all the partisans he had about the king, M. Lombard in particular, studiously imitated him. We shall discover that there is no need of a free government for nations to furnish the spectacle of the most inconceivable popular excitements.

A council was called at Potsdam. The old generals, such as the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal de Mollendorf, formed part of it. When these men, who till then had shown such discretion, saw the king and M. d'Haugwitz himself consider the treachery attributed to France as possible, and even as true, they hesitated no longer, and the resolution to replace the whole Prussian army on the war footing, as it had been six months before, was unanimously adopted. The majority of the council, the king included, regarded this as a measure of safety, M. d'Haugwitz as an answer to all those who alleged that Prussia was given up to Napoleon.

All at once a report was circulated in Berlin, on the 10th of August, that the king had decided to arm, that great difficulties had arisen between Prussia and France, that hidden dangers had even been discovered, a sort of meditated treachery, which accounted for the stay of the French troops in Suabia, Fran-

conia, and Westphalia. The opinion frequently agitated, but always repressed by the example of the king, in which people had confidence, was violently expressed. The hearts of the subjects overflowed like that of the princes. We may well say, was the cry on all sides, that France would not spare Prussia any more than Austria; that she is determined to overrun and ravage all Germany; that the partisans of French alliance were either dupes or traitors; that it was not M. de Hardenberg who was sold to England, but M. d'Haugwitz to France; that it was well to find him out at last, only it was finding him out too late; that it was not to-day, but six months ago, on the eve or the morrow of Austerlitz, that Prussia ought to have armed; that, besides, it was of little consequence, if they must, though late, defend themselves or perish; that England and Russia would no doubt hasten to the assistance of any one who would resist Napoleon; that, after all, the French had vanquished the Austrians without energy, the Russians without instruction, but that they would find it a more difficult task to beat the soldiers of the great Frederick.

Persons who saw Berlin at this period say that there never was an instance of such fermentation and excitement. M. d'Haugwitz already perceived with dread that he had been urged far beyond the goal which he meant to reach, for he had contemplated mere demonstrations, and the nation demanded war. The army in particular called aloud for it. The queen, Prince Louis, the court, recently controlled by the express will of the king, now broke out without restraint. According to them, they were not German, they were not Prussian, till that day; people listened at last to the voice of interest and honour; they were throwing off the illusions of a perfidious and disgraceful alliance; they were worthy of themselves, of the founder of the Prussian monarchy, of the great Frederick. Never has such infatuation been witnessed, but where the multitude leads the wise, where courts lead weak kings.

Yet what had happened to justify this outburst? Prussia, on the point of signing in 1805 a treaty of close alliance with France, had, under the false pretext of the violation of the territory of Anspach, yielded to the solicitations of the European coalition, to the cries of the German aristocracy, to the caresses of Alexander, which was a sort of treachery. Finding France victorious at Austerlitz, she had abruptly changed sides, and accepted Hanover from Napoleon, after accepting it from Alexander a few days before. Napoleon had sincerely desired to attach her to himself by such a gift, and he waited for this last trial to see whether she could be trusted. But this gift, accepted with confusion, Prussia had not dared to avow to the world; she had almost excused herself to the English for the

occupation of Hanover; she had not taken that frank position between Napoleon and his enemies which she ought to have taken to inspire confidence. Disgusted with such relations, Napoleon had formed the secret design to take back Hanover in order to obtain from England a peace, which he had no longer any hope of imposing on her by the alliance of Prussia. But he had thought of a compensation, he had prepared it in his mind, but he had said nothing, fearful of opening himself to a court for which he no longer felt any esteem. Was this a proceeding to be compared to the conduct of Prussia, continuing in secret connection with Russia through M. de Hardenberg, notwithstanding the formal treaty of alliance signed at Schönbrunn, and renewed at Paris on the 15th of February? Certainly not. The faults of Napoleon are confined to want of respect, which he ought not to have shown, but which the equivocal conduct of Prussia excused, if it did not justify.

In reality, Prussia felt humbled by the part which she had acted, alarmed at the lonely situation in which she would find herself if England and Russia should reconcile themselves with France, confusedly troubled about the treatment which she should then be liable to experience from Napoleon, without having a person to complain to; and in this state she was ready to take the falsest, the most improbable rumours for real. In all that was passing in Berlin, one thing only was true and honourable, that was German patriotism, humiliated by the successes of France, bursting out on the first pretext, founded or not. But this sentiment burst forth unseasonably. In 1805, when Napoleon left Boulogne, Prussia ought either to have declared herself loudly for France, stating her motives for acting thus, and pledging Prussian honour in this sense, or declared herself against France from that time, and struggle against her, while Austria and Russia were in arms. Now she was rushing into ruin by a way that was not even honourable.

The despatches of M. de Lucchesini had been intercepted by Napoleon's police, and he was acquainted with their contents. Incensed at them, he had immediately ordered a letter to be written to M. de Laforest, to apprise him of the sending of these despatches, to charge him to contradict all the allegations of the Prussian minister, and to require his recall. Unfortunately it was too late, for already the impulsion given to the public opinion in Prussia was not to be controlled. M. d'Haugwitz, moreover, embarrassed by the so different parts which he had been forced to act for a year past, had no longer the courage of good resolutions. He durst neither see the minister of France, nor declare to the fools whose folly he had flattered, that he should leave them once more to join the wise, who were then extremely rare in Berlin.

M. de Laforest found him reserved and shunning explanations. However, after several attempts, he obtained an interview, and asked how he could be deficient to such a degree of his usual presence of mind; how he could believe the lying tales invented by Hesse, the giddy expressions picked up by M. de Lucchesini; why he had not waited or sought for more accurate information before he took such serious resolutions as were publicly announced. M. d'Haugwitz, distressed in proportion as the light, obscured for a moment in his mind, began to shine forth again, appeared grieved at the conduct which he had pursued, acknowledged candidly the impetuosity of the current which had carried away the king, the court, and himself; and lastly, declared that unless they received assistance, they should run perhaps to perish upon the rock of war; that nothing was yet lost if Napoleon would take any step whatever that would be a satisfaction for the pride of the multitude, for the prudence of the cabinet a reason to take courage; that the removal of the French army, accumulated for some time on the roads leading to Prussia, would fulfil this twofold object; that the armaments might then be countermanded, the government alleging as a reason for having armed the assemblage of French troops, and as a reason for disarming their retirement beyond the Rhine. M. d'Haugwitz added that, to facilitate the explanations, M. de Lucchesini should be recalled, and a discreet and safe man, M. de Knobelsdorf, sent to Paris.

Napoleon could have consented to the proposed step without compromising his glory, for he had never thought of invading Prussia. He had merely taken some precautions on the refusal to ratify the treaty of Schönbrunn. But since then he had thought only of Austria and the mouths of the Cattaro; he thought only of obtaining restitution of them by some threat, and since the treaty signed with M. d'Oubril, he was even strongly disposed to bring his troops back to France. He had given orders for a vast camp at Meudon, with the intention of assembling the grand army there, and holding magnificent fêtes in September. The order for this purpose was already despatched. But a serious and unforeseen event intervened to render this conduct difficult on his part. Contrary to his expectation, the Emperor Alexander had refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed by M. d'Oubril. He had adopted this resolution at the urgent representations of England, which had laid stress on her fidelity, referred to her recent refusal to treat without Russia, and desired in return for this fidelity that he should reject a treaty too hastily concluded, and on evidently disadvantageous conditions. The Emperor Alexander, though greatly dreading the consequences of war with

Napoleon, dreaded them rather less on seeing England more backward than he had imagined to throw herself into the arms of France. It would even appear that something had already transpired respecting the agitations of the court of Prussia, and the possibility of drawing that court into a war. Lastly, the recently acquired knowledge of the dissolution of the Germanic empire, adding to the jealousies of Russia as to those of all the powers, and producing an expectation of redoubled hatred against Napoleon, Alexander had decided not to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty. He replied, however, that he was ready to resume the negotiations, but in concert with England, that he even charged the latter with his powers for treating, on condition that not only Sicily should be left to the royal family of Naples, but the whole of Dalmatia, and that the Balearic Islands should be given to the King of Piedmont.

The courier who brought this communication arrived at Paris on the 3rd of September, at the very moment when the armaments of Prussia were engaging the attention of all Europe, and when Napoleon was desired to extricate M. d'Haugwitz and King Frederick William from embarrassment, by ordering the French troops to fall back. Napoleon, in his turn, conceived a most profound mistrust, and imagined that he was betrayed. The recollection of the conduct of Austria in the preceding year, the recollection of her armaments, so frequently and so obstinately denied, even when her troops were marching, this recollection recurring to his mind, persuaded him that the same would be the case this time, that the sudden armaments of Prussia were but a perfidy, and that he was in danger of being surprised in September 1806, as he had well-nigh been in September 1805. He was, therefore, not at all disposed to withdraw his troops from Franconia, a very important military position, as we shall soon see, for a war against Prussia. Another circumstance led him to believe in a coalition. Mr. Fox, after an illness of two months, was just dead. Thus, in the same year, the fatigues of long power had killed Mr. Pitt, and the first trials of a power which had become new to him had hastened the end of Mr. Fox. Mr. Fox carried with him the peace of the world, and the possibility of a fertile alliance between France and England. If England had sustained a great loss in Mr. Pitt, Europe and humanity suffered an immense loss in Mr. Fox. He being dead, the war party was about to triumph over the peace party in the bosom of the British cabinet.

That cabinet, however, durst not make any considerable change in the conditions of peace previously sent to Paris. Lord Yarmouth had relinquished the negotiation in disgust. Lord Lauderdale was left alone. He received orders from

London to present the demands of Russia, consisting in the claim of Sicily and Dalmatia for the court of Naples, and the Balearic Islands for the King of Piedmont. Lord Lauderdale in presenting these new conditions acted in the name of both courts, and as having the powers of both. Thus by waiting for the effect of the ratifications of St. Petersburg, Napoleon had missed the decisive occasion for having peace. The greatest minds are liable to these mistakes in the field of politics as in the field of war.

Napoleon felt on this account a sort of irritation, which induced him still more to suppose the existence of a European conspiracy. He was, therefore, much more inclined to appeal to arms than to give way. He received about this time M. de Knobelsdorf, who had come in the utmost haste to supply the place of M. de Lucchesini. He gave him personally an obliging reception, affirmed positively that he had no design against Prussia, that he could not comprehend what she wanted of him, for he wanted nothing of her but the execution of treaties; that he had no thoughts of taking anything from her, and that all that had been published on this subject was false; and he alluded in these words to the reports of M. de Lucchesini, who had on the same day delivered his letters of recall. Then with a candour worthy of his greatness, he added, that in the false rumours which were circulated, one thing was true, namely, what was said about Hanover; that, in fact, he had heard England on that subject; that, seeing the peace of the world involved in that question, he had purposed to address himself to Prussia, to explain his situation in its naked truth, to give her the choice of a general peace purchased by the restitution of Hanover, on condition of a compensation, or the continuance of the war against England, but war to the last extremity, and after an explanation, indeed, of the degree of energy which King Frederick William intended to exert in it. He affirmed, moreover, that, at any rate, he should not have taken any resolution without opening his mind frankly and completely to Prussia.

An explanation so candid ought to have banished all doubts. But Prussia wanted more; she wanted an act of deference, which should save her pride. Napoleon might, perhaps, have complied if he had not been at this moment full of mistrust, and if he had not believed that there was a new coalition, which had as yet no existence, though it was not long before it did exist. But in that excitement of mind which events occasion, we cannot always judge correctly what is passing among our adversaries. In consequence, he ordered M. de Laforest to conduct himself with reserve, to tell M. d'Haugwitz that Prussia should have no other explanations than what he had given to Messieurs de Knobelsdorf and de Lucchesini; that as for the

demand relative to the armies, he replied by a demand exactly similar, and that if Prussia countermanded her armaments, he would engage to give immediate orders to his troops to repass the Rhine. He enjoined M. de Laforest to be silent afterwards, and to watch events. "In such a situation," he wrote, "one ought not to believe protestations, how sincere soever they may appear. We have been deceived too often. We must have facts; let Prussia disarm, and the French shall repass the Rhine, not before."

M. de Laforest punctually obeyed the injunctions of his sovereign, had no difficulty to convince M. d'Haugwitz, who was previously convinced, but overruled by events; and then he was silent. It was not enough for the Prussian cabinet to be enlightened respecting the intentions of Napoleon; it wanted a palpable explanation to give to the public opinion, and for itself also facts, but clear and positive facts, such as the retirement of the French. Even then the excited imaginations would scarcely have been pacified even by a soothing act. Prussian pride claimed a satisfaction. One has as much, even more need of satisfaction, when one is in the wrong, than when one is in the right.

The king and M. d'Haugwitz suffered a few more days to elapse, to see if Napoleon would communicate anything more explicit, more satisfactory. This silence ruins everything, said M. d'Haugwitz to M. de Laforest. But the die was cast: Prussia, by tergiversations, which had alienated from her the confidence of Napoleon, France by too slighting conduct, were both to be led into a destructive war, the more to be regretted as, in the state of the world, they were the only two powers whose interests were reconcilable. The silence enjoined by M. de Laforest was invariably maintained by him; but the grief in his countenance, an expressive grief, and sufficiently significant if the court of Prussia had chosen to comprehend it, and to guide itself by what it had comprehended. But such was no longer the case, either with King Frederick William or with his ministers. Regiments passed every day through Berlin singing patriotic songs, which were repeated by the crowds collected in the streets. People were everywhere inquiring when the king would set out for the army, and if it was true that he would remain at Potsdam with the intention of changing his first determination. So great became the outcry that it was necessary to satisfy the public opinion. The unfortunate Frederick William set out on the 21st of September for Magdeburg. This was the signal for war, which was expected in Germany, and which Napoleon was waiting for in Paris. We shall see in the next book the terrible vicissitudes, the disastrous consequences for Prussia and the glorious results for Napoleon, results which would excite unmixed satisfaction if policy had harmonised with victory.

BOOK XXV.

JENA.

IT was the height of imprudence on the part of Prussia to enter into a contest with Napoleon at a moment when the French army, returning from Austerlitz, was still in the heart of Germany, and more capable of acting than any army ever was. It was above all an extreme inconsistency in her to rush into a war single-handed, after she had not dared venture upon it in the preceding year, when she would have had Austria, Russia, England, Sweden, and Naples for allies. Now, on the contrary, Austria, exhausted by her late efforts, irritated by the indifference manifested towards her, was resolved to remain in her turn a quiet spectator of the disasters of another. Russia was again placed at her natural distance by the retreat of her troops upon the Vistula. England, exasperated at the occupation of Hanover, had declared war against Prussia. Sweden had followed her example. Naples no longer existed. It is true that every friend of France, on becoming her enemy, might reckon with certainty on a speedy reconciliation with England, and with the auxiliaries whom she had in her pay. But it would have been necessary to enter into explanations with the British cabinet, and to set out with the immediate restitution of Hanover, which would never have taken place, at least without compensation, from the very worst terms on which Prussia could be with France. Russia, though awakened from her first dreams of glory, was nevertheless disposed to try once more the fortune of arms in company with the Prussian troops, the only troops in Europe in which she had any confidence. But several months must elapse before her armies could get into line, and, besides, she had no inclination whatever to push them on so far as in 1805. Prussia, therefore, was liable to find herself for some time opposed unaided to Napoleon. She went to meet him in October 1806 in the heart of Saxony, as Austria had met him in 1805 in the heart of Bavaria, but with this most disadvantageous difference for her, that he had not now to overcome the obstacle of distance, for instead of being encamped on the shores of the ocean, he was in the very centre of Germany, within two or three marches only of the Prussian frontier.

Nothing short of the most fatal infatuation could account for the conduct of Prussia; but such is party-spirit, such are its incurable illusions, that in all quarters this war was considered as likely to offer unforeseen chances, and to open new prospects to vanquished Europe. Napoleon, it was alleged, had triumphed over the weakness of the Austrians and the ignorance of the Russians, but this time he would have to encounter disciples of the great Frederick, the sole heirs of genuine military traditions, and perhaps instead of Austerlitz he might find a Rosbach. By dint of repeating such language, people had well-nigh convinced themselves that it would be verified; and the Prussians, who ought to have trembled at the idea of a rencounter with the French, had conceived the most extravagant confidence in their own strength. Discreet minds, nevertheless, knew what was to be thought of these silly hopes; and a mixture of surprise and satisfaction was felt at Vienna on seeing those vaunted Prussians put to the test in their turn, and opposed to that captain, who owed his glory, so it was asserted, solely to the degeneracy of the Austrian army. A momentary joy, therefore, pervaded the enemies of France, who believed that the term of her greatness had arrived. Unfortunately that term was destined to arrive, but not so soon, not till after faults, none of which had then been committed.

Napoleon, on his part, felt not the least concern about the approaching war. He was unacquainted with the Prussians, for he had never yet met them on the field of battle. But he said to himself that those Prussians to whom all sorts of merit were attributed since they had become his adversaries, had gained fewer advantages over the raw French troops of 1792 than the Austrians; and that if they could not beat volunteers raised in haste, still less would they beat an accomplished army, of which he was the general. Accordingly, he wrote to his brothers at Naples and in Holland, assuring them that they need not give themselves any uneasiness, that the present struggle would be terminated more speedily than the preceding; that Prussia and her allies, be they who they might, would be crushed, but that this time he would settle finally with Europe, and *put it out of the power of his enemies to stir for ten years.* Such are the very expressions which he used in his letters to the Kings of Holland and Naples.

A leader not less prudent than bold. he took as great pains to succeed as if he had been about to fight soldiers and generals equal or superior to his own. Though he could not give the Prussians credit for all that rumour affected to publish concerning them, still he followed that wise precept of prudence which enjoins us to estimate at his full value the enemy whom we know, and the enemy whom we do not know still more

highly than he deserves. With this consideration was coupled another for stimulating his active forecast: he was resolved to push to extremity the conflict with the continent, and despairing of his maritime means, he determined to conquer England in her allies, by following them up till he had forced them to drop their arms. Without being decided respecting the extent and the duration of this new war, he presumed that he should have to advance very far northward, and perhaps be obliged to seek Russia in her own territory. Astonished at the last proceedings of Prussia, unable to guess, at the distance of Paris from Berlin, the various and complicated causes which induced her to act, he imagined that, in September 1806 as in September 1805, a great coalition, secretly formed, was about to burst forth; that the unaccustomed boldness of King Frederick William was but the first symptom of it; and he expected to see all Europe rush upon him, Austria included, notwithstanding the pacific protestations of this latter. The very natural mistrust excited in him by the aggression of the preceding year was nevertheless unfounded. A new coalition was certainly destined to result from the resolution just taken by Prussia, but it would be the effect instead of being the cause of it. For the rest, everybody in Europe was as much surprised as Napoleon at what was passing in Berlin, for in cabinets people are determined to see calculations only, never passions. They are not free from them, however, and those sudden irritations which in private life sometimes seize two men and put weapons into their hands, are quite as often, more often than a maturely weighed interest, the cause that urges two nations to attack each other. The moral soreness of Prussia arose from her faults, and the treatment which those faults had drawn upon her on the part of Napoleon was, far more than any meditated treachery, the real cause of her sudden, unintelligible exasperation, which nobody knew how to account for.

Impressed, therefore, with the idea of a new coalition, and determined this time to pursue it into the recesses of the frozen regions of the north, Napoleon proportioned his preparations to the circumstances which he foresaw. He provided not only for the means of attack upon his adversaries—means which were to be found ready prepared in the great army collected in the heart of Germany—but also for the means of defence for the vast countries which he would have to leave behind him while he was proceeding to the Elbe, the Oder, perhaps to the Vistula and the Niemen. As his dominion increased, he was obliged to proportion his solicitude to the growing extent of his empire. He had to attend to Italy, from the Strait of Messina to the Izonzo, and even beyond it, since Dalmatia belonged to him. He had to attend to Holland, turned from an

allied State into a family kingdom. He was obliged to provide for the guard of these numerous countries, and for their government to boot, since his brothers were seated upon their thrones.

It is not to be denied that by placing the crown of the two Sicilies in his family, Napoleon had added as much to his difficulties as to his power. On closely considering the anxieties and the expenses in men and money which his brother Joseph's new establishment at Naples cost him, one is led to believe that, instead of driving the Bourbons from the south of Italy, he had better have left them there submissive, trembling, punished for their last treachery by heavy war contributions, by reductions of territory, and by the hard obligation to exclude the English from the ports of Calabria and Sicily. It is true that he would not then have completed the regeneration of Italy; he would not have entirely wrested that noble and beautiful country from the barbarous system under which it lived oppressed; he would not have wholly associated it with the social and political system of France: it is true that he would still have had in the courts of Naples and Rome two secret enemies, ready to call in the English and the Russians. But these reasons, which were certainly powerful, and which justified Napoleon for having undertaken the conquest of the Italian peninsula from the Izonzo to Taranto, then became decisive reasons not for limiting his enterprises in the south of Europe, but for limiting them in the north; for Dalmatia required 20,000 men, Lombardy 50,000, Naples 50,000, that is to say, 120,000 for Italy alone; and if there should be still wanted two or three hundred thousand more from the Danube to the Elbe, it was to be feared that such charges could not long continue to be defrayed, and that he would fail in the north because he had extended himself too far in the south, or in the south by attempting too much in the north. We will repeat on this occasion what we have said elsewhere, that if he limited himself in any quarter, it was better to limit himself in the north, for the Bonaparte family, striving to extend itself in Italy or in Spain, as the ancient house of Bourbon had done, was acting in the genuine spirit of French policy much more than in labouring to create for itself establishments in Germany.

Joseph, favourably received by the enlightened and wealthy population which Queen Caroline had ill-treated, applauded even for a moment by the people as a novelty, especially in the Calabrias, through which he had made a progress—Joseph was nevertheless soon aware of the immense difficulty of his task. Having neither stores in the magazines and the arsenals, nor funds in the public coffers, for the late government had not left a ducat, obliged to create all that was wanting, and fearful of loading with imposts a people whose attachment he coveted,

Joseph was involved in cruel embarrassments. To ask a country for its money when he had also to solicit its love was perhaps the way to cause both to be refused. It was necessary, however, to provide for the wants of the French army, which Napoleon was not accustomed to pay when it was employed out of France, and Joseph drew bills upon the imperial treasury, which he besought his brother to honour. He was incessantly soliciting subsidies and troops, and Napoleon replied that he had all Europe, secretly or publicly leagued, upon his hands; that he could not pay the army of the allied kingdoms besides the army of the empire; that it was quite enough to lend soldiers to his brothers, and that he could not lend them his finances too. However, the events which took place in the kingdom of Naples had obliged Napoleon to supply him with all that he solicited.

Gaëta, the fortress of the Neapolitan continent, was the only town in the kingdom that had not surrendered to the French army. That fortress, erected at the extremity of a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, connected on the fourth only with the land, and commanding on that side the neighbouring district, defended, moreover, by regular works, with three tier of cannon, was very difficult to besiege. It kept before its walls one part of the French army at work upon ways (*cheminements*) which they were frequently obliged to cut in the rock; while another portion of that army guarded Naples, and the rest, dispersed in the Calabrias, to prevent revolt ready to break out, consisted entirely of scattered forces. The end of the summer, so fatal in Italy to foreigners, had decimated the French troops, so that 6000 men could not have been collected at any one point.

Napoleon, whose correspondence with his brothers who had become kings would deserve to be studied as a series of profound lessons in the art of reigning, sometimes scolded Joseph with a severity springing from his reason, not at all from his heart. He reproached him with being weak, inactive, addicted to all the illusions of a good-natured and vain disposition. Joseph durst not levy imposts, and yet he was desirous to raise a Neapolitan army; he pretended to form a bodyguard; he kept about him for his personal safety a great part of the troops placed at his disposal; he misconducted the siege of Gaëta; and lastly, he made no preparations for the expedition to Sicily.

What you owe to your people, wrote Napoleon to him, is order in the finances, but you cannot spare them the charges of the war, for there must be taxes in order to pay the public force. Naples ought to furnish a hundred millions like the viceroyalty of Italy, and thirty of these hundred millions are sufficient to pay 40,000 men. (Letter of the 6th of March 1806.) Hope not to render yourself beloved through weakness, especially by Neapolitans. They tell you that Queen Caroline is odious, and

that your good-nature is already making you popular—a chimera of your flatterers! If I were to lose a battle to-morrow on the Izonzo, you would soon learn what was to be thought of your popularity, and of the pretended unpopularity of Queen Caroline. Those men are mean, cringing, submissive to force alone. Suppose a reverse (which is always liable to befall me), and you would see that people rise all together and shout, "Death to the French! death to Joseph! Caroline for ever!" You would come to my camp. (Letter of the 9th of August 1806.) *An exiled and vagabond king is a silly personage.* You must govern with justice and severity, suppress the abuses of the old system, establish order everywhere, prevent the dilapidations of Frenchmen as well as of Neapolitans, create finances, and pay my army, by which you exist. (Letter of the 22nd of April 1806.) As for a royal guard, it is a luxury worthy at most of the vast empire which I govern, and which would appear too expensive even to me if it were not my duty to make sacrifices to the majesty of that empire, and to the interests of my old soldiers, who find a means of comfortable subsistence in the institution of a body of élite. As for raising a Neapolitan army, don't think of it. It would desert you at the first danger, and betray you for another master. Form, if you will, three or four regiments, and send them to me. I will enable them to acquire what is to be acquired only in war, discipline, bravery, the sentiment of honour, fidelity, and I will send them back to you worthy to form the nucleus of the Neapolitan army. Meanwhile take Swiss, for I could not long leave you fifty thousand French, even if you were able to pay them. The Swiss are the only foreign soldiers who are brave and faithful. (Letter of the 9th of August.) Have in the Calabrias some movable columns composed of Corsicans. They are excellent for that kind of warfare, and will carry it on with zeal for our family. (Letter of 22nd of April 1806.) Do not disperse your forces. You have fifty thousand men—a great many more than are needed, if you knew how to make use of them. With twenty-five thousand only, I would guard every part of your kingdom, and on the day of battle be stronger than the enemy in the field. The first care of a general ought to be so to distribute his forces as to be ready everywhere. But, added Napoleon, therein lies the real secret of the art which nobody possesses—nobody—not even Massena, great as he nevertheless is in dangers.

Napoleon would have had the guard of Naples confined to two regiments of cavalry and a few batteries of light artillery; he would then have had the rest of the army posted *en échelons* from Naples to the extremity of the Calabrias, with a strong detachment placed facing Sicily, from which side an English army was liable to come, so that it might at any time be pos-

sible to collect in three marches a considerable body of troops either at Naples or in the Calabrias, or at the presumed point of landing. He wished, above all, that haste should be made to reduce Gaëta, the siege of which absorbed part of the disposable forces; that on terminating this siege attention should be paid to the creation of a large fortress, which might serve for a support to the new royalty, which should be situated in the very heart of the kingdom, into which a king of Naples might throw himself with his treasure, his archives, the Neapolitans who adhered to his cause, and the wrecks of his armies, and where he might for six months resist a besieging force of sixty thousand Anglo-Russians. (Letter of 2nd September 1806.) Napoleon was of opinion that the position of Naples was not adapted to such a destination; besides, according to him, a foreigner king could not, without some danger, place himself amidst a numerous and necessarily inimical population. He desired that this fortress should have action upon the capital, upon the sea, and upon the interior of the kingdom. On due examination, after discussing various points, particularly Naples and Capua, he had preferred Castellamare, on account of its proximity to Naples, its maritime site, and its central position. Having made this choice upon the map, he had given directions for surveys of the ground, in order to decide upon the nature of the works. Five or six millions a year ought to be devoted for ten years to this great creation, in such a manner that, with each expenditure of six millions, a degree of strength should be gained; and that so early as the second or third year, you might be able to shut yourself up in this vast fortress; for neither you nor I know what is to befall us in two, three, or four years. *Centuries are not for us.* And if you are energetic, you may hold out in such an asylum long enough to defy the rigours of Fortune, and to await the return of her favour.

Lastly, Napoleon was desirous that means should gradually be prepared for crossing the Strait of Messina with 10,000 men, a force sufficient, in his opinion, to conquer Sicily, and moreover easily transportable in the feluccas with which the sea of Italy abounds. In consequence, he had recommended defensive works to be commenced immediately either at Scylla or at Messina, in order to collect there in safety the little naval force which would be needed. But above all he urged the siege of Gaëta, the reduction of which would render half the army disposable; he besought his brother to make a different distribution of his forces, for, he incessantly repeated to him, you will have before long a landing and an insurrection; and you will no more be able to repel the one than to suppress the other.

Joseph comprehended these wise counsels, complained sometimes of the language in which they were conveyed, and fol-

lowed them according to the measure of his talents. Surrounded by some Frenchmen, his personal friends, by M. Rœderer, who was actively engaged in administrative and financial reforms, by General Mathieu Dumas, who applied himself with intelligence to the organisation of the public force, he did his best to create a government and to regenerate the fine country committed to his care. Salicetti, the Corsican, a man of ability and courage, directed his police with the vigour which circumstances commanded. But while Joseph was striving to perform his royal task, the English, verifying the anticipations of Napoleon, took advantage of the length of the siege of Gaëta, which divided the army, and of the fever which decimated it, to land in the Gulf of St. Euphemia, and appeared there to the number of 8000 men, under General Stuart. General Reynier, posted at Cosenza, could scarcely collect 4000 French, and boldly proceeded to the point of disembarkation. That officer, skilful and brave, but unlucky, whom Napoleon had consented to employ in Naples notwithstanding the remembrance of the faults committed in Egypt, was not more favoured by Fortune on this occasion than he had been formerly in the plains of Alexandria. Attacking General Stuart amidst a marshy ground, where it was impossible for him to make his 4000 men act with a unity which might have compensated for their numerical inferiority, he was repulsed and forced to retire into the interior of the Calabrias. This miscarriage, though it ought not to be considered as a lost battle, was nevertheless attended with the consequences of one, and excited a rising of the Calabrese in the rear of the French. General Reynier had to fight obstinate battles in order to reunite his scattered detachments; he beheld his sick and his wounded basely murdered, without being able to afford them assistance; and he was obliged to cut his way through the insurgents, to burn villages, and to put the inhabitants to the sword. For the rest, he conducted himself with energy and promptness, and contrived to maintain himself amidst a frightful conflagration. General Stuart's conduct on this occasion deserves to be recorded with honour. The massacre of the French was so general and so horrible, that he was revolted at it. Striving to make the love of money supply the place of humanity in those ferocious mountaineers, he promised ten ducats for each soldier, and fifteen for each officer, brought to him alive, and those whom he succeeded in saving he treated with the attentions due from one civilised nation to another when they are doomed to make war.

These events, which proved so strongly the wisdom of Napoleon's advice, became an active stimulant to the new Neapolitan government. Joseph accelerated the siege of Gaëta, in order

that he might be able to carry back the entire army to the Calabrias. He had with him Massena, whose mere name made the Neapolitan populace tremble. He had committed to him the task of taking Gaëta, but having delayed sending him till the day on which the works of approach were finished, it was necessary to exert great vigour. Generals Campredon and Vallongue, of the engineers, were charged with the direction of the operations of the siege. They followed the prescriptions of Napoleon, who desired that the action of the heavy artillery should be reserved till the besiegers should have approached quite close to the body of the place. Obliged to open the trenches in ground where stone was frequently met with, they proceeded slowly, and endured the fire of an enormous quantity of cannon and mortars without returning it. The besiegers received 120,000 balls and 21,000 bombs before they once replied to this mass of projectiles. Having at length approached within a proper distance for establishing breaching batteries, they commenced a destructive fire. The solid walls of Gaëta, founded on the rock, after having at first resisted, at length fell all at once, and presented two wide and practicable breaches. The soldiers earnestly called for the assault as the reward of their long exertions, and Massena, having formed two columns of attack, was about to grant it to them when the besieged offered to capitulate. The place was delivered up on the 18th of July, with all the matériel that it contained. The garrison embarked for Sicily, after engaging not to serve any more against King Joseph. This siege had cost the besiegers 1000 men, and the besieged as many. General Vallongue, of the engineers, one of the most distinguished officers of his arm, lost his life there; and the Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, governor of the place, was severely wounded.

Massena set out immediately with the troops which the reduction of Gaëta rendered disposable, passed through Naples on the 1st of August, and hastened to the assistance of General Reynier, who maintained his ground at Cosenza, amidst the insurgent Calabrese. The reinforcement brought by Massena increased our principal corps to 13,000 or 14,000 men. It was more than were required, without reckoning the presence of Massena, to throw the English into the sea. Of this they were so well aware that, on the mere news of the approach of the illustrious marshal, they embarked on the 5th of September. Massena had then none but the insurgents to fight. He found them more numerous, more implacable, than he had at first expected. He was reduced to the necessity of burning several villages and putting to the sword the troops of banditti which slaughtered the French. He displayed on this occasion his accustomed vigour, and succeeded in a few weeks in reducing

very considerably the flames of insurrection. At the moment when the great events which we are about to relate commenced in Prussia, tranquillity began to be restored in the south of Italy, and King Joseph might consider himself established, for some time at least, in his new kingdom.

At the same period, important events were passing in Dalmatia, the Russians still retained the mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon, taking pattern from their conduct on this point, and in particular from the manner in which they had occupied Corfu, and usurped the sovereignty of it, had resolved to seize the little republic of Ragusa, which separated Cattaro from the rest of Dalmatia. He had sent thither his aide-de-camp, Lauriston, with a brigade of infantry, for the purpose of establishing himself there. Lauriston was presently surrounded by the insurgent Montenegrins and by a Russian corps of some thousand men. Blockaded by the English on the sea side, besieged by ferocious mountaineers and a regular Russian force on the land side, he found himself in real danger, which, however, he faced with courage. Fortunately General Molitor, an equally faithful companion-in-arms, and firm and skilful officer in presence of the enemy, flew to his relief. That general, not following the example too frequent in the army of the Rhine, of leaving in the lurch a neighbour whom one dislikes, proceeded spontaneously by forced marches to Ragusa, with a corps of 4000 men, resolutely attacked the camp of the Russians and the Montenegrins, carried it though strongly entrenched, and thus extricated the French who were in the place. He put to the sword a great number of Montenegrins, and deterred them for a long time from their incursions into Dalmatia.

It was not without difficulty, as we see, that the French sway was established over these distant countries. It had required great battles to obtain them from Europe; it required daily fights to gain them from the inhabitants. At the other extremity of the empire, the foundation of a second family kingdom, that of Holland, was attended with difficulties of a different kind, but quite as serious. The grave and peaceful Hollanders were not people to raise an insurrection like the mountaineers of the Calabrias and of Illyria; but they opposed their inertness to King Louis, and gave him not less embarrassment than did the Calabrese to Joseph. The government of the stadtholder had left Holland many debts. The governments which had since followed had, in turn, contracted others to a very considerable amount to defray the expenses of the war, so that King Louis, on his arrival in Holland, had found a budget composed of an expenditure of 78 million florins and a revenue of 35. In this expenditure of 78 millions, the charge for the interest of the debt amounted alone to 35 millions of florins. The surplus was

allotted to the service of the army, the navy, and the dikes. Notwithstanding this situation, the Dutch would not hear either of new taxes or of any reduction whatever of the interest of the debt; for these lenders by profession, accustomed to lend their capitals to all governments, national and foreign, considered the debt as the most sacred of properties. The idea of a contribution on the rentes, to which the government had been led, because the rentes in Holland were the most widely diffused and important of assets, and consequently formed the largest basis for impost — this idea shocked them. It was found necessary to give it up. Here, then, the new government was threatened not with an insurrection as in Naples, but with an interruption of all the services. For the rest, the Dutch were not inimical to the new royalty, from hatred to monarchy, or in consequence of their attachment to the house of Orange; but they ardently longed for a maritime peace, and regretted that peace, the source of all their wealth, much more than the republic or the stadtholdership. Linked to the English by strong bonds of interest, and not less strong conformities of manners, they would have been attracted towards England had she not notoriously coveted their colonies. To no purpose they were told that, but for the difficulty arising from these colonies, peace would be easier by half; that their participation in the expenses of the war was the just price of the efforts made by France in all the negotiations to recover their maritime possessions; and that one would be justified in abandoning them if they would not contribute to keep up the contest—to no purpose was all this said to them; they replied that they were ready to renounce their colonies in order to obtain peace. They spoke thus, though ready to raise just clamours if France had treated on such a basis. From the riches of Java at this day, one may judge whether it was an inconsiderable interest that France defended in defending their colonies. King Louis decided to pursue the course that seemed to him to be the easiest, that is, to fall in with the views of the Dutch, and to attach them to him by acceding to their desires. Most assuredly, when a person accepts the government of a country, he ought to espouse its interests; but a distinction must be made between its permanent and its temporary interests; he must serve the one, place himself above the other; and if he has become king of a foreign nation, through the army of his country, he must renounce a part which would oblige him to betray the one or the other. King Louis was not reduced to this hard necessity, for the true policy of the Dutch ought to have consisted in uniting themselves firmly with France, in order to combat the maritime supremacy of England. On the triumph of that supremacy, they could not fail to lose the freedom of the seas

on which their lives were passed, and their colonies, without which they could not subsist. Striving rather to please than to serve them, King Louis accepted a system of finance conformable to their views at the moment. To the revenue of 35 millions of florins were added new contributions of about 15 millions, which made the total amount of the revenue 50 millions of florins; and to reduce the expenditure of 78 millions to 50, a proportionable reduction was made in the army and navy. The King of Holland wrote to Paris that he would abdicate royalty if these reductions were not agreed to. Napoleon thus had to encounter in his own brothers the spirit of resistance of the allied nations, which he had expected to attach more closely to himself by the institution of family royalties. He was deeply hurt at it, for under this spirit of resistance lurked great ingratitude, both on the part of the nations which France had emancipated, and of the kings whom she had crowned. Repressing his sentiments, however, he replied that he assented to the proposed reductions, but that Holland ought not to be astonished if, in present or future negotiations, she were left to her own means. Holland, he said, had certainly a right to refuse her resources, but France had also a right to refuse her support.

The closest secrets are soon penetrated by the malice of enemies. From a certain attitude of King Louis, his resistance to Napoleon was inferred, and he became extremely popular for it. That monarch, moreover, affected a severity of manners, which coincided with the tastes of an economical and discreet country, and he became on that account still more agreeable to the Dutch people. This same king, while making a show of simplicity, resolved nevertheless to go to the expense of a coronation and of a royal guard, hoping by these double means to secure the more firmly to himself the possession of the throne of Holland, of which he was more tenacious than he chose to acknowledge. Napoleon censured the institution of a royal guard, for the reasons already given to Joseph, and peremptorily opposed the ceremony of a coronation at a moment when Europe was about to be involved in the flames of a general war. Thus from the very first days the difficulties inherent in these family royalties, which Napoleon had resolved to found out of affection or from system, began to make their appearance. Independent allies, treated according to the services which he might have received from them, would certainly have proved much better for his power and for his heart.

Such was the general state of things in the vast extent of the French empire at the very moment of the rupture with Prussia. Exclusively of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine and of the kingdom of Italy, Napoleon had about 500,000 men. among whom must be comprehended the Swiss serving in virtue

of capitulations, besides some Valaisans, Poles, and Germans, who had entered into the service of France. After the usual deduction of the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, there remained active troops amounting to 450,000 men. Of this number 130,000 were beyond the Alps, including depôts, 170,000 in the grand army, cantoned in the Upper Palatinate and Franconia, 5000 left in Holland, 5000 placed in garrison on board the ships, and lastly, 140,000 dispersed in the interior. These last comprehended the imperial guard, the regiments not employed abroad, and the depôts. Excepting some regiments of infantry consisting of four battalions, all the others had three, two of which were war battalions destined to take the field, and one a depôt battalion, placed in general on the frontier. The depôt battalions of the grand army were ranged along the Rhine, from Huningen to Wesel; some were at the camp of Boulogne. Those of the army of Italy were in Piedmont and Lombardy. Napoleon paid extreme attention to the organisation of the depôts. He resolved to make the conscripts repair thither a year beforehand, that, during this year, instructed, trained, inured to fatigue, they might be rendered capable of replacing the old soldiers carried off by time or war. The entire conscription of 1805, called out at the end of 1805, and half of that of 1806, called out at the commencement of 1806, had filled up the skeletons with men fit for service, and a good number of whom, already trained, had been sent to Germany and Italy. Napoleon, moreover, caused the second half of the class of 1806, designated by the name of reserve in the laws of that period, to be called out. The annual contingent then furnished 60,000 men, actually fit to be embodied; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark that the government still refrained from enforcing the conscription law in the seven or eight departments of Bretagne and La Vendée. Thirty thousand more men would thus be poured into the skeletons. But the departure of the men already trained would produce a sufficient vacancy in them to make room for the newcomers. Napoleon, besides, designed to send a great part of these latter towards Italy. In regard to the conscripts destined to pass the Alps, he took particular precautions. Even before their incorporation, he despatched them in large detachments, under the conduct of officers, and clothed in military uniform, that they might not appear out of the empire like stragglers travelling in the attire of peasants.

Having provided for the increase of the army, Napoleon distributed the whole of his resources with consummate skill.

Austria protested her pacific intentions. Napoleon replied by similar protestations: he nevertheless resolved to take his measures as if, profiting by his absence, she should think of falling upon Italy. General Marmont occupied Dalmatia with

20,000 men. Napoleon directed him, after placing some detachments *en échelon* from the centre of the province to Ragusa, to keep the bulk of his forces in Zara itself, a fortified town, and the capital of the country; to collect there stores of provisions, arms, ammunition, in short, to make it the pivot of all his operations, defensive or offensive.

If he should be attacked, Zara was to serve him for a point d'appui, and to enable him to make a long resistance. If, on the contrary, he should be obliged to withdraw from it for the purpose of concurring in the operations of the army of Italy, he had in that fortress a safe place for depositing his matériel, his wounded, his sick, whatever was unfit for active war, and everything that he could not take along with him.

Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, who was in the secret of Napoleon's intentions, had orders to leave in Dalmatia nothing more, either in matériel or men, than was absolutely indispensable there, and to collect all the rest in the fortresses of Italy. Since the conquest of the Venetian States, these places had been subjected to a new ably calculated classification, and they were covered with labourers, engaged in constructing works proposed by General Chasseloup, and ordered by Napoleon. The principal of them, and the nearest to Austria, was Palma-Nova. Next to the famous citadel of Alessandria, it was the works of this place that Napoleon pushed forward with most activity, because it commanded the plain of the Friuli. Next came, a little to the left, closing the gorges of the Julian Alps, Osopo, then Legnago, on the Adige, Mantua, on the Mincio, lastly, on the Tanaro, Alessandria, the essential base of the French power in Italy. Orders had been given to shut up in these fortresses the artillery, amounting to more than 800 pieces, and not to leave outside them any article whatever, cannon, musket, projectile, likely to be carried off in case of surprise from the enemy. Venice, whose defences were not yet completed, but which had its lagoons in its favour, was added to this classification. Napoleon had selected General Miollis, an officer of extraordinary energy, to command it. He had enjoined him to execute in haste the works necessary for turning to account the advantages of the situation, till the regular works, which were to render the places impregnable, could be constructed. It was among these retreats of Osopo, Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, Alessandria, that Napoleon had distributed the depôts. Such as belonged to the armies in Dalmatia and Lombardy were divided among the fortresses from Palma-Nova to Alessandria in order to keep garrison in them and to be trained. Those which belonged to the army of Naples had been assembled in the Legations. To these depôts the fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts destined for Italy were to direct their course.

Napoleon, incessantly repeating that on the attention paid to the depôt battalions depended the quality and the duration of an army, had prescribed the measures necessary in order that the health and training of the men might be alike attended to, and that these battalions might at all times be able to furnish, not only the regular recruits for the war battalions and the garrisons of the fortresses, but likewise one or two divisions of reinforcements ready to be despatched to the points where an unforeseen want might happen to be felt. The defence of the fortresses being thus ensured, the whole of the active army became disposable. It consisted for Lombardy of 15,000 men, scattered in the Friule, and of 24,000 *en échelons* from Milan to Turin, both ready for marching. There remained the army of Naples, about 50,000 strong, a great part of which was fit for acting immediately. Massena was on the spot: if war broke out with Austria, he had instructions to fall back upon Upper Italy with 30,000 men, and to unite them with the 40,000 who occupied Piedmont and Lombardy. There was no Austrian army capable of forcing the obstinate Massena, having 70,000 French at his disposal, having, moreover, such appuis as Palma-Nova, Osopo, Venice, Mantua, and Alessandria. Lastly, in this case, General Marmont himself was to play a useful part; for if he was blockaded in Dalmatia, he was sure to keep before him 30,000 Austrians at least, and if he was not, he could fall upon the flank or the rear of the enemy.

Such were the instructions addressed to Prince Eugène for the defence of Italy. They concluded with the following recommendation:—"Read all these instructions, and at night call yourself to account for what you have done in the day towards their execution, but without noise, without effervescence of head, and without exciting alarm in any quarter." (St. Cloud, 18th of September 1806.)

Napoleon, always thinking of what Austria might attempt while he was in Prussia, ordered similar precautions in regard to Bavaria. He had enjoined Marshal Soult to leave a strong garrison at Braunau, a fortress of some importance, on account of its situation upon the Inn. He had recommended that the most urgent works should be constructed, and the timber floated down from the Alps by the Inn collected there, saying that with arms and wood one might create a fortress where nothing whatever existed. He had placed the 3rd of the line, a fine regiment of four battalions, three of them war battalions, in garrison there, besides 500 artillery, 500 cavalry, a Bavarian detachment, numerous engineer officers, the whole forming a force of about 5000 men. He had amassed there provisions for eight months, a great quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money; to these precautions he had added the

appointment of an energetic commandant, to whom he gave instructions worthy to serve for a lesson to all the governors of besieged towns. These instructions contained an order to defend himself to the last extremity, not to surrender unless in case of absolute necessity, and after withstanding three repeated assaults on the body of the place.

Napoleon had, moreover, decided that a part of the Bavarian army, which was at his disposal in virtue of the treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine, should be assembled on the banks of the Inn. He had ordered a division of 15,000 men of all arms to be formed and placed under the guns of Braunau. Such forces, if they could not keep the field, were, nevertheless, a first obstacle opposed to an enemy debouching unawares, and a ready prepared point d'appui for the army coming to the assistance of Bavaria. Napoleon, in fact, how advanced soever he might be in Germany, would always have it in his power, after beating off the Prussians and the Russians by gaining a battle, to face about, fall by Silesia or by Saxony upon Bohemia, and severely punish Austria if she durst attempt a fresh aggression. After guarding against Austria, he thought of those parts of the empire which the English threatened with a landing.

He directed his brother Louis to form a camp at Utrecht, composed of twelve or fifteen thousand Dutch, and of the 5000 French left in Holland. He assembled around the fortress of Wesel, recently annexed to France since the assignment of the duchy of Berg to Murat, a French division of ten or twelve thousand men. King Louis was to proceed to Wesel to assume the command of this division, and joining it with the troops in the camp of Utrecht, feign, with 30,000 men, an attack on Westphalia. It was even recommended to him to spread a report of an assemblage of 80,000 men, and to make some preparations in matériel calculated to accredit that rumour. For reasons which the reader will presently appreciate, Napoleon certainly did wish to draw the attention of the Prussians to that quarter, but in reality he desired that King Louis, without removing too far from Holland, should be constantly ready, either to defend his kingdom against the English, or to connect his movements with those of the French corps placed on the Rhine or at Boulogne. Besides the seven corps of the grand army destined to distant warfare, Napoleon had resolved to form an eighth under Marshal Mortier, who should be charged to turn as upon a pivot round Mayence, to watch Hesse, to encourage by his presence the German Confederates, and lastly, to give a hand to King Louis about Wesel. This corps, taken from the troops in the interior, was to be 20,000 strong. It required all Napoleon's ingenuity to raise it to that number; for out of the 140,000 men stationed in the interior, on deducting the

depôts and the imperial guard, very few disposable troops were left. Besides this eighth corps, Marshal Brune was directed this year, as the last, to guard the Boulogne flotilla, by employing in this duty the seamen and some depôt battalions, amounting to about 18,000 men. It was only with extreme circumspection that Napoleon purposed to make use of the national guards, because he was fearful of agitating the country, and particularly of extending the burdens of the war to too large a proportion of the population. Reckoning, nevertheless, on the warlike spirit of certain frontier provinces, he had no scruple to raise in Lorraine, in Alsace, and in Flanders, a few, not numerous, select detachments, composed of companies of élite, that is, of grenadiers and voltigeurs, and paid at the moment of their removal. He had fixed their number at 6000 for the north, and 6000 for the east. The 6000 national guards of the north assembled under General Rampon, established at St. Omer, organised with care at but little distance from their homes, furnished a useful reserve, always ready to hasten to Marshal Brune, and to afford him the aid of its patriotism. The 6000 national guards of the east were to assemble at Mayence, to form the garrison of that place, and thus to render Marshal Mortier's troops more disposable.

Marshal Kellermann, one of the veterans whom Napoleon was accustomed to put at the head of the reserves, commanded the depôts stationed along the Rhine; and while attending to their instruction he could, by making use of soldiers already trained, form a corps of some value, and if danger threatened the Upper Rhine, proceed rapidly to that quarter.

Thanks to this combination of means, there was wherewithal to provide against all contingencies. Suppose that Hesse, for example, instigated by the Prussians, excited uneasiness, Marshal Mortier, starting from Mayence, was ready to proceed thither with the eighth corps. King Louis, placed *en échelon*, was to bring to him part of the camp of Utrecht and of Wesel. If danger threatened Holland, King Louis and Marshal Mortier had orders to unite their forces. Marshal Brune also was to proceed to that quarter. If, on the contrary, Boulogne was in peril, Marshal Brune was to receive succour from King Louis, who was directed by his instructions to hasten, in case of need, towards that part of the frontiers of the empire. By this system of échelons, calculated with strict precision, all the points exposed to any accident whatever, from the Upper Rhine to Holland, from Holland to Boulogne, could be assisted in useful time, and as promptly as the march of the most expeditious enemy would require.

The French coast from Normandy to Bretagne yet remained to be guarded. Napoleon had left several regiments in these provinces, and according to his custom, he had assembled the

companies of élite in a flying camp at Pontivy, to the number of 2100 grenadiers and voltigeurs. General Boyer was appointed to command them. He had at his disposal secret funds, spies, and detachments of gendarmes. He was to keep patroles in suspicious places, and if a landing threatened Cherbourg or Brest, to hasten thither with the 2400 men under his command. Napoleon kept in Paris only a corps of 8000 men, composed of three regiments of infantry and some squadrons of cavalry. These regiments had received their contingent of conscripts. Junot, governor of Paris, had special orders to attend incessantly to their training, and to consider that as the first of his duties. These 8000 men were a last reserve, ready to proceed whithersoever their presence might be needed. Napoleon had recently conceived the idea of making the troops travel post, and he had employed this method for the imperial guard, which was conveyed in six days from Paris to the Rhine. The troops destined to travel in that way made, on the day of their departure, a forced march on foot; they were then put into carts, each carrying ten men, and which were drawn up *en échelon* at ten leagues' distance, so as to travel twenty leagues per day. The carts were paid for at the rate of five francs per horse, and the farmers required for this service were far from complaining. Napoleon had had a carriage made for the roads of Picardy, Normandy, and Bretagne, for the purpose of conveying in four, five, or six days, to Boulogne, Cherbourg, or Brest, the 8000 men left in Paris. "We must," said Napoleon to Prince Cambacérès, who was expressing his uneasiness on this subject—"we must accustom Paris not to see so many sentinels at every corner of a street." There was to be left in Paris nothing but the municipal guard, then amounting to 3000 men. The name of Napoleon, the tranquillity of the time, rendered it needless to devote a greater force to the guard of the capital.

As for the ports of Toulon and Genoa, Napoleon had left sufficient garrisons there. But well he knew that the English were not so silly as to hazard any attempt upon places of such strength. It was concerning Boulogne alone that he had any serious apprehensions.

Thus, in the vast circle of his foresight, he had parried all possible dangers. If Austria, extending to Prussia a succour which she had not received from her, took part in the war, the army of Italy, concentrated under Massena, and appuyed upon fortresses of the first order, Palma-Nova, Mantua, Venice, Alessandria, would be able to oppose 70,000 men to the Austrians, while General Marmont, with twelve or fifteen thousand, would throw himself into their flank by the Dalmatia road. The Inn, Braunau, and the Bavarians would suffice in the first moment for the defence of Bavaria. Marshal Kellermann had the depôts

for covering the Upper Rhine. Marshal Mortier, King Louis, Marshal Brune, by a movement towards each other, would be enabled to assemble 50,000 men on any point that might be threatened, from Mayence to the Helder, from the Helder to Boulogne. Lastly, Paris might, in urgent danger, confine itself to its police troops, and despatch a corps of reserve to the coasts of Normandy or Bretagne.

These various combinations, described with striking perspicuity, with the most minute attention to details, had been communicated to Prince Eugène, to King Joseph, to King Louis, to Marshals Kellermann, Mortier, and Brune, to all those, in short, who were to concur in their execution. Each of them knew all that was necessary for the due performance of his task. The whole had been communicated to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès alone, who, placed at the centre, was charged to give orders in the name of the emperor.

Twenty-four or forty-eight hours were sufficient for Napoleon to form his plans and to arrange the details when he had once resolved to act. He then dictated for one or two days, almost without intermission, so many as one hundred or two hundred letters, all of which have been preserved, all of which will remain everlasting models of the art of administering armies and empires. Prince Berthier, the usual interpreter of his commands, having had to stay at Munich on business of the Confederation of the Rhine, he sent for General Clarke, and passed the 18th and 19th of September in dictating his orders to him. Napoleon foresaw that twenty days might yet pass in vain explanations with Prussia, after which war would inevitably commence, for explanations would thenceforth be powerless for terminating such a quarrel. He resolved, therefore, to employ those twenty days in completing the grand army, and in providing it with everything that might yet be necessary for it.

It is not in twenty days that it is possible to place a numerous army on the war footing, were even the regiments destined to compose it completely organised each for itself. To collect it on the principal point of assembly, to distribute it into brigades and divisions, to form a staff, to procure for it parks, equipages, matériel of all sorts, would still require a series of long and complicated operations. But Napoleon, surprised in the preceding year by Austria at the moment of passing over to England, and this year by Prussia, on his return from Austerlitz, had his army quite ready, and this time even transported to the theatre of war, since it was in the Upper Palatinate and Franconia. It left nothing to be desired in any respect. Discipline, training, habit of war recently renewed in an astounding campaign, strength recruited by a rest of several months, perfect health, ardour for fighting, love of glory, unbounded devotedness to its

leader—nothing was wanting. If it had lost somewhat of that regularity of manœuvres which distinguished it when leaving Boulogne, it had gained, in place of that more showy than solid quality, an assurance and freedom of movements which are not to be acquired but in fields of battle. The uniforms, worn, but neat, added to its martial air. As we have said elsewhere, it had refrained from taking either its new clothes or its pay from the depôts, reserving the enjoyment of all this for the fêtes which Napoleon was preparing for it in September—superb, but chimerical fêtes, alas! like the thousand millions formerly promised by the Convention. That heroic army, thenceforth doomed to an everlasting war, was no longer to know any other fêtes than battles, entries of conquered capitals, the admiration of the vanquished. How few of the brave men who composed it were destined to behold their homes again and to die in the quiet of peace! And even those, as they grew old, were doomed to see their country invaded, dismembered, stripped of that greatness which she owed to the effusion of their generous blood!

Still, how well prepared soever an army may be, it never can be prepared to such a degree as not to feel any want. With his profound experience of the organisation of the troops, Napoleon united a personal knowledge of his army that was truly extraordinary. He knew the residence, the state, the strength of all his regiments. He knew what each of them was deficient in men or in matériel; and if they had left anywhere a detachment which weakened them, he knew where to find it. His first care was always for the foot-clothing of the soldier, and to secure him from cold. He ordered shoes and greatcoats to be immediately despatched. He required that each man should have a pair of shoes on his feet and two pair in his knapsack. One of these two pair was given as a gratuity to all the corps, and the soldier's fortune is so slender that even this small donation had its value. He ordered all the saddle and draught horses that could be procured to be bought up in France and abroad. The army was not in actual need of them, but, in his solicitude for the depôts, he desired that there should not be a deficiency of horses any more than of men. He then ordered three or four hundred men per regiment to be despatched from the depôts, which were about to be replenished with conscripts, in order to increase the war battalions to an effective of eight or nine hundred men each, well knowing that in two months' campaign they would presently be reduced to that of six or seven hundred. The force of the grand army would thus be increased by 20,000 fighting men, and it would then be possible to discharge without weakening it too much the soldiers worn out with fatigue; for, with this army of the Revolution, there

had hitherto been no other term to its devotedness to the service than wounds or death. There were to be seen in the ranks old soldiers attached to their regiment as to a family, exempted from all duty, but ever ready in any danger to display their ancient valour, and taking advantage of their leisure to relate to their young successors the marvels in which they had borne a part. In the rank of captain in particular there were many officers who were incapacitated for service. Napoleon ordered all the young men whose age rendered them fit for war to be removed from the military schools and trained for officers. He highly appreciated the materials furnished by those schools; he found their pupils not only well-informed but brave, for education elevates the heart as much as the mind.

After taking the means of infusing new vigour into the army, he turned his attention to the organisation of its equipages. He wished that it should gain in celerity, and not be too much encumbered with baggage. His experience did not incline him to dispense with magazines, as it has sometimes been asserted, for he disdained no kind of providence, and he no more neglected the laying up of stores than the fortresses. But offensive war, which he preferred to any other, scarcely admitted of the creation of magazines, since they must have been formed in the enemy's territory, which it was his custom to overrun at the very commencement of the operations. His system of alimentation consisted in living every night upon the country occupied, in spreading himself sufficiently to find subsistence, but not so much as to be dispersed, and in taking along with him in caissons bread for several days. This kind of supply managed with care, and renewed whenever the army halted, served for cases of extraordinary concentrations, which preceded and followed battles. For its conveyance Napoleon had calculated that two caissons per battalion were required, and one caisson per squadron. Adding to these the vehicles necessary for the sick and wounded, four or five hundred caissons would be sufficient for all the wants of the army. He expressly forbade any officer, any general, to appropriate to his use the carriages destined for the troops. The transport was at that time executed by a company, which let to the State its caissons ready horsed. Having discovered that one of the marshals, favoured by this company, had several caissons at his disposal, Napoleon repressed this infraction of the rules with the utmost severity, and made Prince Berthier responsible for the fulfilment of his orders. The army was then free from the abuses which time and the increasing wealth of its chiefs soon afterwards introduced.

Napoleon then ordered large purchases of corn to be made all along the Rhine, and an immense quantity of biscuit to be made. These provisions were to be collected at Mayence, and

from Mayence sent by the navigation of the Mayn to Wurzburg. Situated in Upper Franconia, quite close to the defiles that lead into Saxony, and commanded by an excellent citadel, Wurzburg was to be our base of operation. Napoleon wished to ascertain whether there were not other fortified posts in the environs. The officers secretly sent to reconnoitre having pointed out Forchheim and Kronach, he ordered them to be armed, and the provisions, ammunition, and tools, collected by his direction, to be deposited there in safety.

Wurzburg had belonged for some months to the Archduke Ferdinand, the same who had been successively Grand Duke of Tuscany, Elector of Salzburg, and finally, since the last peace with Austria, Duke of Wurzburg. This prince solicited his admission into the Confederation of the Rhine, by the States of which his new dominions were enclosed. He was mild, discreet, and as well disposed towards France as an Austrian prince could be; and the emperor was sure of obtaining from him all the facilities desirable for the preparations that he purposed to make. Wurzburg thus became the centre of the assemblages of men and matériel ordered by Napoleon.

There had been no want of money since the financial crisis of the preceding winter. In the treasure of the army Napoleon had, moreover, a precious resource. Without expending this treasure, exclusively devoted to the endowments (dotations) of his soldiers, he made loans with it, which the State was afterwards to reimburse by paying the interest and the principal of the sums borrowed. Napoleon had sent a great quantity of specie to Strasburg, and consigned funds to Prince Berthier, in order to conquer by the power of ready money the obstacles which might oppose the execution of his designs.

The imperial guard had travelled post, as we have seen, thanks to the relays of carts prepared upon the road. In this manner 3000 grenadiers and dismounted chasseurs had been despatched. As this mode of conveyance could not be employed for the cavalry and the artillery, the mounted grenadiers and chasseurs, forming nearly 3000 horse, as well as the park of artillery of the guard, amounting to 40 pieces, were forwarded by the usual way. This was a reserve of 7000 men, fit for warding off all unforeseen accidents. Napoleon, as prudent in the execution as he was bold in the conception of his plans, set a high value upon reserves, and it was chiefly for the purpose of creating one that he had instituted the imperial guard. But, quick in discovering the inconveniences attached to the most excellent things, he found the keeping up of this guard too expensive, and he was fearful that the recruiting of it would drain the army of choice men. The velites, a sort of enlisted volunteers, the creation of which he had devised for the pur-

pose of augmenting the guard without drafting from the army, had appeared too costly also, and not numerous enough. He therefore ordered the formation of a new regiment of infantry, under the title of fusiliers of the guard, all the soldiers of which should be selected from the annual contingent, and the officers and subalterns taken out of the guard, which should wear the uniform of the latter, which should serve with it, only be treated as young troops, that is to say, less spared under fire, have a slight increase of pay, and soon acquire all the qualities of the guard itself, without costing as much, and without depriving the army of its best soldiers. While awaiting the result of this ingenious combination, Napoleon had recourse to an expedient, already practised, of separating the companies of the grenadiers and those of the voltigeurs from the corps, and to collect them into battalions. In this manner there had been formed in 1804 the grenadiers of Arras, afterwards called Oudinot's grenadiers. At that time there had been taken the grenadier companies of all the regiments which were not destined to form part of the Boulogne expedition. After Austerlitz, several of these companies had been sent back to their corps. With those which had continued together, Napoleon gave orders for joining the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the depôts and regiments stationed in the 25th and 26th military divisions (the country comprised between the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Sambre), for organising them in battalions of six companies each, and for despatching them to Mayence. This was a new corps of 7000 men, which, united with the imperial guard, would make the reserve of the army amount to 14,000 men. He added to it 2400 dragoons of élite, formed into battalions of four companies or squadrons, and destined to serve, either on foot or mounted, always by the side of the guard. These dragoons, drawn from Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Alsace, might be transported in twenty days to the Mayn.

The reserves, whose composition we have just described, added to the conscripts taken from the depôts, would form a considerable accession to the forces ready to march for Prussia. The grand army was composed of seven corps, six only of which were in Germany, the second, under General Marmont, having gone to Dalmatia. These corps continued to be commanded by the same officers. Marshal Bernadotte commanded the first corps, 20,000 strong; Marshal Davout, the third, 27,000 strong; Marshal Soult was at the head of the fourth, the force of which amounted to 32,000 men. Marshal Lannes, always devoted, but always sensitive and irritable, had for a moment quitted the fifth corps, in consequence of a transient discontent. On the first rumour of war, he came to resume the command of it. This corps amounted to 22,000 men, even after Oudinot's grenadiers

ceased to form part of it. Marshal Ney had remained at the head of the sixth, which continued at an effective of 20,000 men present under colours. The seventh, under Marshal Augereau, numbered 17,000. The cavalry reserve, scattered through districts abounding in forage, could assemble 28,000 horse. Murat, still continued in the command of it, had received orders to quit the duchy of Berg: he hastened, overjoyed, to recommence a species of war in which he so eminently distinguished himself, and to gain a glimpse not of a duchy but of a kingdom as the prize of his exploits.

These six corps, with the reserve of cavalry, comprehended no fewer than 170,000 fighting men. If we add the guard, the troops of élite, the staffs, the park of reserve, we may say that the grand army amounted to about 190,000 men. It was to be presumed that in the first days it would not be completely assembled, for, out of the guard and the companies of élite, the foot guard only would have arrived. But 170,000 men were sufficient, and more than sufficient, for the commencement of that war. The corps were composed of the same divisions, the same brigades, the same regiments as in the last campaign—a very wise arrangement, for officers and soldiers had learned to know and to have confidence in each other. As for the general organisation, it continued to be the same. It was that which Napoleon had substituted for the organisation of the army of the Rhine, and the excellence of which he had proved in the Austrian campaign, the very first in which 200,000 men had been seen marching under a single commander. The army was still divided into corps which were complete in infantry and artillery, but which, as to cavalry, had only a few chasseurs and hussars to guard it. The bulk of the cavalry was still concentrated under Murat, and placed directly under the hand of Napoleon, from motives which we have assigned elsewhere. The guard and the companies of élite formed a general reserve of all arms, never quitting Napoleon, and marching close to him, not to ensure the safety of his person, but to execute his commands the more expeditiously.

Orders for moving were given so as to be executed in the first days of October. Napoleon enjoined Marshals Ney and Soult to unite in the country of Baruth, in order to form the right of the army; Marshals Davout and Bernadotte to join about Bamberg, to form its centre; Marshals Lannes and Augereau to form a junction in the environs of Coburg, to compose its left. He thus concentrated his forces on the frontiers of Saxony, in military views, the extent and profundity of which the reader will soon appreciate. Murat had orders to assemble the cavalry at Wurzburg. The foot guard, conveyed in six days to the Rhine, marched towards the same point. These different corps were to

reach their posts by the 3rd or 4th of October. It was expressly recommended to them not to pass the frontiers of Saxony.

Everything being prepared, both for the safety of the empire and for the active war in which Napoleon was about to engage, he left Paris. Nothing new had taken place in the relations with Prussia. Laforest, the minister, had kept the silence enjoined by Napoleon, but he wrote that the king, swayed by the passions of the court and of the young aristocracy, having set out for his army, no hope was left of preventing war, unless the two monarchs, present in their headquarters, should exchange some direct explanations, which should put an end to a deplorable misunderstanding, and suffice to satisfy the pride of the two governments. Unfortunately such explanations were not to be expected. M. de Knobelsdorf, who continued in Paris, protested the pacific intentions of his cabinet. But little initiated into the secret of affairs, neither sharing nor comprehending the passions which ran away with his court, he performed at that of Napoleon the part of a respected but useless personage. The news from the north represented Russia as anxious to comply with the wishes of Prussia, and engaged in preparing her armies. The intelligence from Austria described her as exhausted, full of rancour against Prussia, and not to be feared by France unless in case of a great reverse. As for England, when once Mr. Fox was dead, the war party, thenceforth triumphant, had resumed its pretensions in inadmissible propositions, such as the cession of the Balearic Islands, Sicily, and Dalmatia to the Bourbons of Naples, that is to say, to the English themselves—propositions which Lord Lauderdale, a sincere friend of peace, supported methodically, and with a simple ignorance of the real intentions of his cabinet. Napoleon did not choose to dismiss him abruptly, but he directed an answer equivalent to the sending of his passports to be addressed to him. He then prescribed a communication to the Senate detailing the long negotiations of France with Prussia, and the melancholy conclusion which had terminated them. This communication, however, he ordered to be deferred till war was irrevocably declared between the two courts. Nevertheless, as it was necessary to assign a motive for his departure from Paris, he caused it to be intimated that, at a moment when the powers of the north were assuming a threatening attitude, he deemed it expedient to put himself at the head of his army, to be ready for whatever might happen. He held a last council, to explain to the dignitaries of the empire their duty and the part they had to act in the various cases that might occur. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, a man for whom he reserved all his confidence, even when he left his two brothers, Louis and Joseph, in Paris, must of course have possessed it in a still greater degree when he left not one of the princes of his family

in the capital. Napoleon conferred on him the most extensive powers under the different titles of president of the Senate, president of the Council of State, and president of the Council of the Empire. Junot, one of the men most attached to the emperor, had the command of the troops cantoned in the capital. None of the imperial family but the females were left in Paris. Again Josephine, terrified to see Napoleon exposed to new dangers, had solicited and obtained permission to accompany him to the banks of the Rhine. She hoped by establishing herself at Mayence to be more speedily and more frequently informed of what was passing. Besides the government of the empire, the arch-chancellor was to have that of the imperial family. He was charged to advise and to restrain the individuals of that family who should in any way offend against the laws of decorum or against the rules prescribed by the emperor himself.

Napoleon set out in the night between the 24th and the 25th of September, accompanied by the empress and M. de Talleyrand, stopped a few hours at Metz to see the place, and then directed his course towards Mayence, where he arrived on the 28th. In that city he learned that a courier from Berlin, with the final explanations of the court of Prussia, had crossed him in his course, and continued his journey to Paris. It was not, therefore, till he advanced further into Germany that he was able to obtain the definitive explanations which he expected. At Mayence he saw Marshal Kellermann, who superintended the organisation of the depôts, and Marshal Mortier, appointed to the command of the eighth corps, and again explained to them how they were to conduct themselves according to circumstances. He directed the provisioning of Mayence to be completed; he made some alterations in the arming of the place; he hastened the departure of the young soldiers taken from the depôts, the transport of the provisions and ammunition destined to pass out of the Rhine into the Mayn, and then to ascend the Mayn to Wurzburg. A troop of orderly officers, running in all directions, came every moment to report upon the missions which they had fulfilled; and accustomed not to affirm any more than they had seen with their own eyes, they went and came incessantly, to acquaint him with the real state of things, and what progress had been made in the execution of his orders. At Mayence, Napoleon sent back his civil establishment, retaining about him his military household alone. He could not for a moment control his emotion on seeing the tears shed by the empress. Though full of confidence, he at length gave way himself to the general uneasiness excited around him by the prospect of a long war in the north, in distant regions, against new nations. He parted, therefore, with some pain from Josephine and M. de Talley-

rand, and advanced beyond the Rhine: absorbed by his vast thoughts, by the spectacle of immense preparations, he was soon diverted from a species of emotion, which he was glad to banish from his heart, and still more so from his calm and imperious countenance.

A great concourse of German generals and princes were waiting at Wurzburg to pay their respects to him. The new Duke of Wurzburg, proprietor and sovereign of the place, had preceded all the others. This prince, whom he had known in Italy, reminded Napoleon of the first days of his glory, as well as of the most friendly relations; for he was the only one of the Italian sovereigns whom he had not found intent on injuring the French army. Hence it was not without pain that he had found himself obliged to make him bear his part in the general vicissitudes. Napoleon was received in the palace of the former bishops of Wurzburg, a magnificent palace, little inferior to that of Versailles, a pompous monument of the wealth of the Germanic Church, formerly so powerful and so largely endowed, now so poor and so decayed. He had a long conversation with the Archduke Ferdinand on the general state of things, and particularly on the dispositions of the court of Austria, to which this prince was most nearly allied, for he was the brother of the Emperor Francis, and with which he was perfectly acquainted. The Duke of Wurzburg, a friend of peace, possessing the intelligence of the German princes, educated in Tuscany, was solicitous, for the sake of his own quiet, for a good understanding between Austria and France. He took occasion from the late events to speak to Napoleon on the grave question of alliances, to decry that of Prussia, and to extol that of Austria. He strove to insinuate some ideas which had prevailed in the last century, when the two cabinets of Versailles and Vienna, united against that of Berlin, were connected at once by a common war and by marriages. He reminded him that this alliance had been the brilliant period of the French navy, and took pains to demonstrate to him that France, more powerful on the continent than she had need to be, was at present destitute of the maritime force necessary for re-establishing and protecting her commerce, destroyed for the last fifteen years. This language had nothing new for Napoleon, for M. de Talleyrand daily dinned his ears with it. The Duke of Wurzburg appeared to believe that the court of Vienna would gladly seize this occasion of courting the friendship of France, and of creating in her a support instead of an incessantly threatening enemy. Napoleon, disposed by the circumstances of the moment to entertain such ideas, was so touched by them that he wrote himself to his ambassador, M. de la Rochefoucauld, and ordered him to make amicable overtures at Vienna—overtures reserved enough not to compromise his dignity, significant

enough for Austria to know that it depended upon herself to form a close connection with France.*

Powerful and confident as he was, Napoleon began to believe that without a great continental alliance he should always be liable to fresh coalitions, diverted from his contest with England, and obliged to expend upon land resources which he ought to expend exclusively upon sea. The alliance of Prussia, which he had cultivated, unfortunately, with too little care, having slipped through his hands, he was naturally led to the idea of an alliance with Austria. But this idea, very recent with him, was the illusion of a moment, unworthy of the firm perspicacity of his mind. No doubt had he been willing to pay with a sacrifice for this new alliance, and to restore to Austria some of the spoils

* We quote the following letter written to M. de la Rochefoucauld by Napoleon, as a proof of the dispositions which we attribute to him at this moment. The violent expressions which he uses in speaking of Prussia must be ascribed solely to the irritation excited by the unexpected conduct of that court towards him. It was not in these terms that he usually expressed himself, especially in regard to the King of Prussia, for whom he had never ceased to feel and to profess a real esteem.

"To M. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, my ambassador to his majesty the Emperor of Austria.

"WURZBURG, *the 6th of October* 1806.

"I have been since yesterday at Wurzburg, which has given me occasion to converse for a long time with H.R.H. I have acquainted him with my firm resolution to break all the ties of alliance which bind me to Prussia, be the result of the present affairs what it may. According to my last accounts from Berlin, it is possible that war may not take place, but I am resolved not to be the ally of a power so versatile and so despicable. I shall be at peace with her, no doubt, because I have no right to spill the blood of my people under vain pretexts. Still, the necessity for directing my efforts towards my navy renders an alliance upon the continent indispensable for me. Circumstances had led me to an alliance with Prussia, but that power is at this day what it was in 1740, and what it has been at all times, without consistency and without honour. I have esteemed the Emperor of Austria, even amidst his reverses and the events which have divided us; I believe him to be constant and faithful to his word. You must explain yourself in this spirit, without, however, employing a too misplaced urgency. My position and my forces are such that I need not fear anybody; but all these efforts press at last upon my people. Of the three powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, I must have one for my ally. In no case can Prussia be trusted; Russia and Austria alone are left me. The navy flourished formerly in France through the benefit which we derived from the alliance of Austria. That power, besides, feels a necessity for remaining quiet—a sentiment in which I also heartily join. An alliance founded on the independence of the Ottoman empire, on the guarantee of our dominions, and on amicable arrangements which would consolidate the peace of Europe and would enable me to throw my efforts upon my navy, would suit me. The house of Austria having frequently made insinuations to me, the present moment, if it knows how to profit by it, is the most favourable of all. I shall say no more to you. I have explained my sentiments more at length to the Prince of Benevento, who will not fail to inform you of them. For the rest, your mission will be fulfilled whenever you signify in the slightest possible manner that I am not averse from adhering to a system, which should knit more firmly my ties with Austria. Fail not to keep an eye on Moldavia and Wallachia, and to inform me of the movements of the Russians against the Ottoman empire. Whereupon, &c. &c., NAPOLEON."

which he had wrested from her, the agreement might have been possible and sincere—but God knows! But how propose to Austria, stripped in ten years of the Netherlands, of Lombardy, of the duchies of Modena and Tuscany, of Suabia, of the Tyrol, of the Germanic crown—how propose to her to ally herself to the conqueror, who had wrested from her such territories and such power! One might, indeed, hope for her neutrality after the word given at the bivouac of Urschitz, and under the influence of the remembrance of Rivoli, of Marengo, of Austerlitz; but to induce her to an alliance was a chimera of M. de Talleyrand's and of the Duke of Wurzburg's, the one giving way to his personal predilections, the other swayed by the interests of his new position. This tendency to seek an impossible alliance clearly proves what a fault had been committed in treating lightly the alliance of Prussia, which was at once possible, easy, founded on great common interests. For the rest, this accommodation with Austria was an experiment which Napoleon hazarded *en passant*, in order not to neglect a useful idea, but the success of which he did not consider as indispensable in the high degree of power to which he had attained. He hoped, in fact, notwithstanding all that was said of the Prussians, to beat them so completely and so quickly, that he should soon have all Europe at his feet, and for ally the exhaustion of his enemies, in default of their good-will.

An important member of the Confederation of the Rhine arrived also at Wurzburg: this was the King of Wurtemberg, formerly a mere elector, now a king of Napoleon's creation, a prince known for the warmth of his temper and the penetration of his mind. Napoleon had to settle with him the details of a marriage already agreed upon between Prince Jerome Bonaparte and the Princess Catherine of Wurtemberg. After attending to this family business, Napoleon arranged with the King of Wurtemberg concerning the meeting of the Confederates of the Rhine, who among them were to furnish about 40,000 men, independently of the 15,000 Bavarians concentrated around Braunau. The Germans had found themselves harshly used when serving under Marshal Bernadotte in the Austrian campaign. The Bavarians, in particular, had solicited as a special favour that they might not be again placed under that marshal. It was decided that all the German auxiliaries should be collected into a single corps, and that they should be placed in the rear of the grand army, under the command of Prince Jerome, who had quitted the naval service for the land service. This prince being destined to marry a German princess, and probably to receive her dowry in Germany, it was wise to familiarise him with the Germans, and to familiarise the Germans with him.

The conversation of the Emperor of the French and the

German monarch then turned upon the court of Prussia. The King of Wurtemberg had it in his power to give Napoleon useful information, for he had handfuls of letters from Berlin, which gave a lively account of the vertigo which had seized all heads, and even those which were to be supposed the soundest. The Duke of Brunswick, whose age and whose enlightened reason ought to have preserved him from the general infatuation, had himself given way to it, and he had written to the King of Wurtemberg, threatening that he would soon plant the Prussian eagles in Stuttgart if that prince did not abandon the Confederation of the Rhine. The King of Wurtemberg, unintimidated by such threats, showed all these letters to Napoleon, who turned them to account, and felt redoubled irritation against the court of Prussia. Napoleon made much inquiry concerning the Prussian army and its real merit. The King of Wurtemberg extolled the Prussian cavalry beyond measure, and represented it as so formidable that Napoleon, struck with what he was told, spoke upon the subject himself to all his officers, took care to prepare them for this rencounter, reminded them of the manner of manœuvring in Egypt, and said to them with that vivacity of expression which was peculiar to him, that they must march to Berlin *in a square of two hundred thousand men.*

Though Napoleon received no definitive declaration from the court of Prussia, he decided, upon the mere fact of the invasion of Saxony by a Prussian army, to consider war as declared. In the preceding year he had designated as hostility the invasion of Bavaria by Austria; this year, in like manner, he designated as hostility the invasion of Saxony by Prussia. This was a skilful way of stating the question, for he appeared to interfere in Germany solely for the purpose of protecting the second-rate German princes against those of the first order. On these conditions, for the rest, war was completely declared at the moment, for the Prussians had crossed the Elbe by the bridge of Dresden, and they already lined the extreme frontier of Saxony, as the French lined it by occupying the Franconian territory.

The reader would not comprehend Napoleon's plan of campaign against Prussia, one of the finest and grandest that was ever conceived and executed, without casting a look at the general configuration of Germany.

Austria and Prussia divide the soil of Germany, as they divide its wealth, its dominion, and its politics, leaving between them a certain number of petty States, whose geographical situation, the laws of the empire, and French influence have hitherto maintained in their dependence. Austria is in the east of Germany, Prussia in the north. Austria occupies and fills almost entirely that beautiful valley of the Danube, long,

winding, at first contracted by the Alps and the mountains of Bohemia, then opening below Vienna, and becoming a hundred leagues wide between the Carpathians and the mountains of Illyria, embracing in these vast slopes the superb kingdom of Hungary. It is to the extremity of this valley that you must go to look for Austria, crossing the Upper Rhine between Strasburg and Basle, then traversing the defiles of Suabia, and descending by a perilous progress the course of the Danube, to the basin amidst which rises Vienna, and which it overlooks. Prussia, on the contrary, has established herself in the vast plains of the north, the entrance of which she occupies—hence her old appellation of the March or Mark of Brandenburg. To reach her you must not ascend the Upper Rhine to Basle, but pass it at about the middle of its course, at Mayence, or descend to Wesel, and thus cross or turn the mountainous centre of Germany. No sooner are you beyond the moderately elevated mountains of Franconia, Thuringia, and Hesse, than you enter an immense plain, traversed successively by the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Niemen, terminating to the north at the North Sea, and to the east at the foot of the Uralian mountains. This plain is called Westphalia, Hanover, Prussia along the North Sea, Poland in the interior of the continent, Russia as far as the Ural. On the slope of the mountains of Germany, by which you arrive at it, that is to say, in Saxony, in Thuringia, in Hesse, it is covered with a solid, vegetable mould, and on the banks of the rivers with a rich alluvial soil. But in the intervals which separate these rivers, and especially along the sea, it is invariably sandy; the waters, having no drain, there form innumerable lakes and marshes. The only feature that varies the surface is sandhills, the only vegetation the fir, the birch, and a few oaks. It is grave and gloomy like the sea, of the aspect of which it frequently reminds you, like the slender and dark vegetation with which it is covered, like the sky of the north. It is extremely fertile on the banks of the rivers, but in the interior scanty crops are raised here and there amidst the clearings of the pine forests; and if at times it exhibits the spectacle of abundance, it is where numerous cattle have enriched the soil. But such is the power of economy, of courage, of perseverance, that among these sands has been formed a State of the first order, if not wealthy, at least in easy circumstances, Prussia, the bold and patient work of a great man, Frederick II., and of a succession of princes, who, before or after him, though not possessing his genius, were animated by the same spirit. And such, too, is the power of civilisation, that from amidst these marshes, surrounded by sandhills, the great Frederick caused the royal mansion of Potsdam to spring forth, that Versailles of the north, where the

genius of the arts has had the skill to impress the sadness of these cold and dreary regions with grace and elegance.

The Elbe, the first great river which you meet with in this plain when you descend from the mountains of Central Germany, is the principal seat of the power of Prussia, the bulwark which covers her, the vehicle which conveys her productions. In its upper course it waters the plains of Saxony, runs through Dresden, and washes the foot of the formerly Saxon fortress of Torgau. It then proceeds into the heart of Prussia, runs round Magdeburg, her principal fortress, protects Berlin, her capital, situated beyond it, at an equal distance from the Elbe and the Oder, among lakes, sandhills, and canals. Lastly, before it falls into the North Sea it forms the port of the wealthy city of Hamburg, which introduces into Germany, by the waters of this river, the productions of the whole world. From this brief sketch of the Elbe one may easily comprehend the ambition of Prussia to possess its entire course, and to absorb Saxony on the one side, the Hanseatic towns and Hanover on the other—an ambition which slumbers at the present moment; for all the European ambitions, glutted at the expense of France in 1815, appear to be asleep for a time. But at the period to which this history relates the convulsion of States had inflamed and made manifest all desires. Prussia had demanded of us the Hanseatic towns; as for Saxony, she had never ventured to claim more than its dependence under the title of Confederation of the North; and it is natural that Napoleon should have felt all that jealousy which he felt on account of Bavaria, when he committed the fault of being jealous of Prussia.

The Elbe, then, is the river which you must reach and cross when you would make war upon Prussia, as the Danube is that the course of which you must descend when you want to make war upon Austria. As soon as you have succeeded in forcing the Elbe, the defences of Prussia fall, for you take Saxony from her, you annul Magdeburg, and Berlin is left unprotected. The channels of commerce themselves are occupied by the assailant, and this becomes a serious matter if the war is prolonged. Thus while you are obliged in the case of the Danube, after reaching its sources, to descend its course to Vienna, in the case of the Elbe, in order to attain your principal object, it is sufficient to have crossed it; and if you have a conception of the vast designs of Napoleon, it then becomes necessary to push on to the Oder, in order to interpose between Prussia and Russia, to intercept succours from one to the other. You must even advance to the Vistula, beat Russia in Poland, where so many resentments are brooding against her, and follow the example of Hannibal, who carried the war into the heart of the Italian provinces, trembling under the insecurely riveted yoke of ancient Rome. Such are

the steps of that immense march to the north, which has hitherto been attempted by one man only, by Napoleon. Will it ever be attempted again? That the world knows not. If such be the will of Providence, may it be at last a serious attempt, conducive to the freedom and the independence of the west!

But to reach that northern plain, at the entrance of which Prussia is situated, you must traverse the mountainous country which forms the centre of Germany, or turn it by proceeding to that level beach which, under the name of Westphalia, extends from the mountains to the North Sea.

This country, which closes the entrance to Prussia, is composed of a long and broad group of wooded heights, connecting on the one side with Bohemia, extending northward to the plains of Westphalia, amidst which it terminates, after rising for a moment to form the summits of the Harz, so rich in metals. This mountainous group, which separates the waters of the Rhine from those of the Elbe, covered in its upper part with forests, throws into the Rhine, the Mayn, the Lahn, the Sieg, the Ruhr, the Lippe, into the Elbe, the Elster, the Saale, the Unstrut, and lastly, directly into the North Sea, the Ems and the Weser.

Various routes for traversing this tract present themselves. In the first place, setting out from Mayence, you can proceed to the right, and ascend the winding valley of the Mayn to above Wurzburg, and even to its sources. There, in the environs of Coburg, you meet with wood-covered heights, which under the name of the forest of Thuringia separate Franconia from Saxony, and from which flow the Mayn on the one side, the Saale on the other. They are traversed by three defiles, those from Baruth to Hof, from Kronach to Schleiz, from Coburg to Saalfeld; then you descend into Saxony through the valley of the Saale. Such is the first route. The second is to the left of those wooded heights which form the forest of Thuringia. If you take this, you ascend the Mayn from Mayence to Hanau; there you leave it, throw yourself into the valley of the Werra, or country of Fulda, leave the forest of Thuringia to the right, descend by Eisenach, Gotha, Weimar, into the plain of Thuringia and Saxony, and arrive on the banks of the Elbe. The latter has always been the main road of Germany, that from Frankfort to Leipsic.

The third and last route consists in turning the mountainous centre of Germany, and proceeding northward till you have reached the plain of Westphalia, which you do by following the course of the Rhine to Wesel, crossing at Wesel, then traversing Westphalia and Hanover, having the mountains on the right, the sea on the left. You meet by the way with the Ems, the Weser, and lastly, the Elbe, become, at this extremity of its course, one of the most considerable rivers in Europe.

Of these various ways of penetrating into the plain of the north,

Napoleon had chosen the first, that leading from the sources of the Mayn to the sources of the Saale, by traversing the defiles of Franconia.

The motives for his choice were profound. In the first place, he had his troops in Upper Franconia, and if he had marched them northward to reach Westphalia, he would have exposed himself to the inconvenience of travelling double or treble the distance, and to the risk of unmasking his movements by the mere length of the journey. Independently of the length and meaning of this journey, he would have met with the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and been obliged to cross those rivers in the lower part of their courses, when they have become formidable obstacles. These reasons left a choice between two courses only; either to take the great central road of Germany, which runs through Frankfort, Hanau, Fulda, Gotha, Weimar, to Leipsic, and passes to the left of the forest of Thuringia; or to ascend the Mayn to its source, and to throw himself out of the valley of the Mayn into the valley of the Saale, which consisted in passing to the right of the forest of Thuringia. Of these two routes, however, the second was far preferable, for a reason pertaining to the general plan of Napoleon and to his system of warfare. The farther he passed to the right, the more chance he had of turning the Prussians by their left, to reach the Elbe before them, to cut them off from Saxony, to deprive them of its resources and its soldiers, to cross the Elbe in the part of its course where it is easiest to cross, to make himself master of Berlin, and lastly, after outstripping the Prussians at the Elbe, to get before them to the Oder, on which side the Russians might be coming to their assistance. If Napoleon attained this object he would do something like what he had accomplished in the preceding year, by turning the Austrian general, Mack, by separating him from the Russian succours, and by cutting in two the forces of the coalition, and beating one portion after the other. To be first at the Elbe and the Oder was therefore the grand problem to be resolved in this war. With this object the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, and passing through the forest of Thuringia, were the route that Napoleon must prefer, without taking into account that his troops were all brought thither, and that they had only to set out from the point where they were to get into action.

But a point in which it behoved him to take especial pains to succeed, was to leave the Prussians in doubt respecting his real design, to persuade them that he should take the road through Fulda, Eisenach, and Weimar, that is to say, the central road of Germany, that which runs to the left of the forest of Thuringia. To this end he had placed part of his left wing, composed of the fifth and seventh corps, commanded by Marshals Lannes and Augereau, about Königshofen and Hildburghausen, on the

Werra, to induce a belief that he was going into Upper Hesse. And in fact there was enough in this to mislead them. Napoleon had not confined himself to this demonstration; with a view to increase their uncertainty, he had ordered other demonstrations towards Westphalia. The march of the King of Holland, preceded by false reports, had had that object. Nevertheless it could not deceive the Prussians so much as to persuade them that Napoleon would attack by Westphalia. Besides the presence of the French army in Franconia, an accessory circumstance had been sufficient to enlighten them. Dupont's division, always employed separately since the battles of Haslach and Albeck, had been sent to the Lower Rhine to occupy the grand duchy of Berg. On the approach of war it had been brought back by the way of Mayence and Frankfort. This movement from left to right contradicted the probability of any offensive operation in the quarter of Westphalia, and led to a belief that the attack would take place either from the country of Fulda or from Franconia, either to the left or to the right of the forest of Thuringia. But which of these two passages would be preferred by Napoleon; there lay the doubt, which that profound calculator took infinite pains to keep up in the minds of the Prussian generals.

Nothing can give an idea of the agitation which prevailed among those unfortunate generals. They were all assembled at Erfurt, at the back of the forest of Thuringia, with the ministers, the king, the queen, and the court, deliberating in a sort of confusion difficult to describe. The Prussian forces, first assembled in each military district, had been afterwards concentrated in two masses, one in the environs of Magdeburg, under the Duke of Brunswick, the other in the environs of Dresden, under the Prince of Hohenlohe. The principal army, moved from Magdeburg to Naumburg on the Saale, then to Weimar and Erfurt, was at this moment around the latter town, ranged behind the forest of Thuringia, its front covered by the length of the forest, and its left by the steep banks of the Saale. The Duke of Weimar, with a strong detachment of light troops, occupied the interior of the forest, and pushed reconnaissances beyond it. General Ruchel formed the right of this army, with the troops of Westphalia.

This principal army might be computed at 93,000 men, including the corps of General Ruchel. The second army, organised in Silesia, had been marched to Saxony for the purpose of gaining over the unfortunate elector, who had neither interest in the war nor liking for it, partly by persuasion, partly by fear. Yielding at length after much hesitation, he had just promised 20,000 Saxons, very good troops, and to deliver the bridge of Dresden to the Prussians, on condition that they should cover Saxony by placing one of the two acting armies there. The

20,000 Saxons were not ready, and detained the Prince of Hohenlohe, who was slowly ascending the Saale to take a position opposite to the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, facing the assemblage of the French troops. The Prussian contingent of the country of Baruth, under the command of General Tauenzien, had fallen back upon Schleiz on our approach, and thus formed the advanced guard of Prince Hohenlohe. The latter, with the 20,000 Saxons, whom he was waiting for, and the thirty and odd thousand Prussians from Silesia, would have under him a corps of more than 50,000 men.

Such were the two Prussian armies. For the whole reserve there was at Magdeburg a corps of about 15,000 men, placed under the command of the Prince of Wurtemberg, who had quarrelled with his family. To this enumeration must be added the garrisons of the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula, amounting to about 25,000 men. Thus the Prussians had not more than 180,000 or 185,000 soldiers, including the Saxons, at their disposal, and numbered of their own not more than 160,000 or 165,000.*

Thus 180,000 Germans were about to be opposed to 190,000 French, who were soon to be followed by 100,000 more, and who were so inured to war that they might be pitted in the proportion of one to two, sometimes even of one to three, against the best troops in Europe. We say nothing of the weight thrown into the scale by the genius and the presence of Napoleon. The folly of such a contest on the part of the Prussians was consequently very great, without reckoning the political fault of a war between Prussia and France, a fault, it is true, equal on both sides. For the rest, the Prussians were brave, as the Germans always have been; but since the Seven Years' War, that is to say, ever since 1763, they had not been engaged in any serious war; for their intervention in 1792, in the first struggle of Europe against the French Revolution, had not been either very long or very energetic. Hence they had taken no

* The following is, we believe, a most accurate statement of the Prussian forces:—

Advanced guard under the Duke of Weimar	10,000	men.
Principal corps under the Duke of Brunswick	66,000	,,
Troops of Westphalia under General Ruchel, forming the right of the Duke of Brunswick	17,000	,,
Total of the principal army	93,000	,,
Corps of the Prince of Hohenlohe, including Saxons	50,000	,,
Reserve under the Prince of Wurtemberg	15,000	,,
Garrisons of the Oder and Vistula	25,000	,,
Total of the Prussian forces	183,000	,,

They may, however, be set down at 185,000, for the corps of the Prince of Hohenlohe was in general computed at more than 50,000 men.

share in the changes introduced during the last fifteen years into the organisation of the European troops; they deemed the art of war to consist in a regularity of movements, which is much more serviceable at a review than in a field of battle; they were followed by a quantity of baggage, sufficient of itself to undo an army by the obstacles which it throws in the way of its march. For the rest, pride, which is a great moral force, was extreme in the Prussians, especially among the officers; and in them it was accompanied by a still nobler sentiment, an inconsiderate but ardent patriotism.

Their army was not less to be found fault with for the confusion of its counsels than for the quality of the troops. The king had committed the direction of this war to the Duke of Brunswick, out of deference to the old renown of this nephew, this disciple, of the great Frederick. There are established reputations, which are sometimes destined to ruin empires; the command, in fact, cannot be refused them; and when it has been conferred, the public, which perceives the insufficiency under the glory, censures the choice which it has imposed, and renders it still more mischievous by weakening with its animadversions the moral authority of command, without which material authority is nothing. Such was the case with the Duke of Brunswick. This choice was generally deplored among the Prussians, and they expressed themselves on the subject with a boldness, of which it would be impossible to find an example elsewhere, for it seemed that in this nation freedom of mind and language was to spring from the bosom of the army. The Duke of Brunswick, endowed with an enlightened understanding (an advantage not always possessed by men whose merit Fame has exaggerated), deemed himself unfit for the so active and so terrible wars of the time. He had accepted the command out of an old man's weakness, that he might not have the mortification of leaving it to rivals, and he felt overwhelmed by this burden. Judging of others as justly as of himself, he appreciated as it deserved the folly of the court and that of the young military nobility, and he was not less alarmed at it than at his own insufficiency. Beside the Duke of Brunswick was another relic of the reign of the great Frederick—old Marshal Mollendorf; he, too, bowed by years, but modest, devoted, exercising no authority, and called solely to give his opinion; for the king, uncertain in everything, not daring to assume the command, and unable to resolve to commit it entirely to another, wished to consult upon every resolution of his staff, and to judge of every order, before he permitted its execution. To the weakness of the old men were added the pretensions of the young, convinced that to them alone belonged the talent and the right to command armies. The principal of them was the Prince of Hohenlohe, commander of

the second army, and one of the German sovereigns stripped of their dominions by the new Confederation of the Rhine. Full of passions and pride, he owed to a few daring acts in the war of 1792 the reputation of an able and enterprising general. That reputation, not very justly deserved, was sufficient to excite in him an ambition to be independent of the generalissimo, and to act according to his personal notions. He had addressed an application to the king, who, not daring either to accede to his wishes or to refuse them, had suffered a secondary command, ill defined, tending to separation and insubordination, to spring up beside the command-in-chief. Desirous to draw the war to himself, the Prince of Hohenlohe strove to establish the theatre of the principal operations on the Upper Saale, where he was, while the Duke of Brunswick endeavoured to fix it at the back of the forest of Thuringia, where he had placed himself. From this deplorable squabble the most mischievous consequences could not fail very soon to arise. Then came the declaimers, General Ruchel, who had not scrupled to insult M. d'Haugwitz; Prince Louis, who had so mainly contributed to infatuate the court, alike decided to favour no plan but what tended to an immediate offensive, out of fear of a return to pacific ideas and of an accommodation between Frederick William and Napoleon. Among these generals, and forming a contrast to them, Marshal Kalkreuth was conspicuous. Not so aged as the one, not so young as the others, superior to all by his talents, still adequate to fatigue, though he had borne a glorious part in the campaigns of the great Frederick, enjoying and deserving the confidence of the army, he considered the present war as extravagant, the commander appointed to direct it incapable; declaring his opinion, moreover, with a boldness which contributed to shake profoundly the authority of the generalissimo. It was by him that the army would have wished to be commanded; though, in presence of French soldiers and Napoleon, he might have done no better than the Duke of Brunswick himself. To these military personages were added several civil personages—M. d'Haugwitz, first minister, M. Lombard, the king's secretary, M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia at Paris, besides a great number of German princes, among the rest, the Elector of Hesse, whom vain efforts were made to drag into the war; and lastly, completing this medley, the queen, with some of her ladies, riding on horseback, and showing herself to the troops, who greeted her with their acclamations. When sensible people inquired what that august personage did there, she, who by her position and rank seemed so out of place in headquarters? the reply was, that her energy was useful—that she alone kept the king steady—prevented his swerving; and thus there was alleged, in excuse for her presence, a reason not less indecorous than her presence itself.

M. d'Haugwitz, M. Lombard, and all the old partisans of French alliance strove to obtain their pardon by not the most honourable disavowal of their anterior conduct. Messrs. d'Haugwitz and Lombard, who had sufficient intelligence to judge of what was passing before their faces, and who ought to have retired when peace politics had become impossible, and have left to M. de Hardenberg the consequences of war politics, affected, on the contrary, the greatest warmth of sentiments, in order to gain credit for the sincerity of their change. They carried their weakness to such a length as to calumniate themselves, by insinuating that their attachment to French alliance had been but a feint on their part to deceive Napoleon, and to defer a rupture, which they foresaw, but which the king, always a friend to peace, had imperatively commanded them to postpone. To give themselves the character of knaves in times past in order to pass for honest men at the present moment was neither very clever nor very honourable. All that M. d'Haugwitz gained by this sort of conduct was to lose in a day the merit of a wise policy which belonged to him, to assume the responsibility of a disastrous policy with which he had nothing to do.

There was at that time in Germany an able and eloquent pamphleteer, a bitter enemy to France, and whose patriotic passions, though genuine, were not disinterested, for he was paid for his attacks by the courts of Vienna and London: this pamphleteer was M. de Gentz. It was he who for several years wrote the manifestoes of the coalition, and filled the journals of Europe with virulent declamations against France. MM. d'Haugwitz and Lombard had invited him to the Prussian headquarters, to beg him to draw up the Prussian manifesto; and there were they, before this scribbler of libels, imploring, coaxing, wheedling, loading him with attentions and marks of distinction, even presenting him to the queen herself, and procuring him interviews with that princess. After they had frequently denounced him to France as a firebrand sold to England, they besought him at this moment to inflame all German hearts against that same France. They had requested him, moreover, to be surety to Austria for their sincerity, excusing themselves for being so late to fight the common enemy by the assurance that they had always detested him.

It was amidst this strange medley of military officers, princes, ministers, men, women, all obtruding their opinion, advice, approbation, or censure, that politics and war were discussed. M. d'Haugwitz, who sought to prolong his illusions as he had sought to prolong his power, strove to persuade everybody that all was going on well—very well, better than could have been hoped for. He boasted of having found very amicable dispositions in Austria, and even talked of secret communications, which

encouraged an expectation of the speedy concurrence of that power. He extolled the generosity of the Emperor Alexander, and published as authentic news the immediate arrival of the Russian troops on the Elbe. He represented the adhesion of the Elector of Hesse as secured, and the junction of 30,000 Hessians, the best soldiers of the Confederation, to the Prussian army. Lastly, he announced the sudden reconciliation of Prussia with England, and the departure of a British plenipotentiary for the Prussian headquarters. M. d'Haugwitz, however, could not believe such news to be true; for he knew that Austria, well remembering the conduct held towards her, would not join Prussia till the day when Napoleon should be vanquished, that is to say, when there would be no further need of her assistance; that the Russian troops would not reach the Elbe for three or four months, that is to say, not till the question would be decided; that the Elector of Hesse, always crafty, awaited the issue of the first battle to declare himself; that lastly, England, whose reconciliation with Prussia was in fact certain, could furnish nothing but money, whereas Prussia wanted soldiers to oppose to the terrible soldiers of Napoleon. He knew that the question still consisted in conquering with the Prussian army, limited to its own force, enervated by a long peace, commanded by an old man, the French army, constantly victorious for fifteen years past, and commanded by Napoleon. But striving to deceive himself for a day, for an hour longer, he circulated reports which he disbelieved, and endeavoured to throw some shade over the precipice towards which all were rushing.

No better disposition of mind was manifested in discussing the plans of campaign. All the conclusion drawn from the grand lessons in the military art given by Napoleon to Europe was, that it was necessary to take the offensive immediately, to beat the French with their own weapons, that is, with daring and celerity, and as Prussia was not capable of supporting for any long time the expense of so great an armament, to lose no time in settling the business by fighting a decisive battle with the whole collected force of the monarchy. The Prussians seriously persuaded themselves, even after Austerlitz, even after Hohenlinden and a hundred other pitched battles, that the French, brisk and adroit, were chiefly fit for a war of posts, but that in a general action, in which large masses are engaged, the solid and scientific tactics of the Prussian army would get the better of their inconsistent agility. What was requisite above all to please these agitated people, to be favourably listened to by them, was to talk of offensive war. Whoever had brought a plan of defensive war, let the grounds on which that plan was founded be ever so sound; whoever, appealing to the everlasting rules of prudence, had dared to say that, to an enemy pro-

foundly experienced, singularly impetuous, till then invincible, it was necessary to oppose time, space, natural obstacles, judiciously chosen, and to wait for suitable occasions, that Fortune yields neither to the rash who outrun her, nor to the timid who flee from her, but to the skilful who grasp her when she presents herself; whoever had dared to give such advice, would have been regarded as a coward or a traitor, sold to Napoleon. Still, as the Prussian army could not then make head against the French army, the plainest common sense suggested that other obstacles than the bosoms of soldiers ought to be opposed to Napoleon. These obstacles, such as one already had a glimpse of them, and such as experience soon revealed them, were the distance, the climate, the junction of the German and Russian forces in the frost-bound recesses of the north. There was no need then, by moving forward, to spare Napoleon half the distance, to transfer the war to a temperate climate, and to afford him the advantage of fighting the Prussians before the arrival of the Russians. There was no need, especially in presence of an enemy so prompt, so adroit, so skilful in profiting by a false movement, for the former, by taking a too advanced position, to run the risk of being cut off from their line of operation, separated from the Elbe or the Oder, enveloped, annihilated at the very outset of the war. The Austrians, whom they had so severely censured in the preceding year, ought to have served for a lesson, and to have prevented them by the remembrance of their disasters from exhibiting a second time the spectacle of Germans, surprised, beaten, disarmed, before the arrival of their auxiliaries from the north.

Thus prudence taught that instead of advancing to the woody mountains which separate the valley of the Elbe from that of the Rhine, they ought merely to keep en masse behind the Elbe (the only obstacle capable of stopping the French), to dispute the passage of it to the best of their power; then when they had crossed the Elbe, to fall back to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, till they had joined the Russians, avoiding any but partial actions, which without compromising anything would have renewed in the Prussians the long-lost habit of war. When 150,000 Prussians should be joined by 150,000 Russians, in the alternately muddy or frozen plains of Poland, then serious difficulties would commence for Napoleon.

It required no genius, we repeat it, but only plain common sense, to conceive such a plan. Besides, a Frenchman, a great general, Dumouriez, who had formerly saved France against that same Duke of Brunswick, and who, corrupted since by exile, was taking pains to advise our enemies, but without being listened to by them—Dumouriez sent memorials upon memorials to the European cabinets, urging that to fall back, and to

oppose to Napoleon distances, climate, hunger, rains, were the safe means of fighting him. Napoleon himself was so convinced of this, that when he was informed that the Prussians were advancing beyond the Elbe, he refused at first to believe it.*

It is true that by the adoption of such a plan they would lose the concurrence of Hesse and Saxony, the finest provinces of the monarchy, abandoned without fighting to the enemy, the resources in which those provinces abounded, the capital, and lastly, the honour of their arms, compromised by so rapid a retreat. But these objections, serious, it is true, were more specious than solid. Hesse, in fact, would not give herself up to men who already had the stamp of defeat on their brow. Twenty thousand Saxons were not worth the sacrifice of a good system of war. The provinces which they scrupled to abandon were liable to be lost, either willingly or by force, by an offensive movement of Napoleon's; and after he had been seen traversing Austria with giant strides, without being stopped by mountains or rivers, it was puerile to compute space with him. Those lines of the forest of Thuringia, of the Elbe, of the Oder, which they were afraid to give up to him, they were certain to see wrested from them by a single manœuvre of Napoleon's, without their being able to take the successive steps of a well-calculated retreat, and losing at the same time not only the provinces contained between those lines, but the army itself, that is to say, the monarchy. Lastly, as for the honour of the arms, little account must be taken of appearances: a retreat which can be imputed to calculation has never compromised the reputation of an army.

For the rest, none of these ideas had been discussed in the tumultuous council, where king, princes, ministers, generals, deliberated upon the operations of the impending war. Such was the ardour prevailing in it, that no discussion of any but offensive

* Here is a fragment of a letter which reveals Napoleon's way of thinking on this point:—

"To M. the Marshal Prince of Neufchatel.

"ST. CLOUD, *24th September* 1806.

"My Cousin, I send the copy of the orders of movement of the army, which I addressed to you on the morning of the 20th instant, and which I am sorry not to have sent you twelve hours after the departure of my courier of the 20th of September, because he was liable to be intercepted. However, I have no reason to apprehend it. You must have received by noon on the 24th the first courier of the 20th. When this reaches you, which will no doubt be on the 27th, orders will have been given to Marshal Soult, who will have set out on the 26th; and as it will take him three or four days' march to get to Amberg, he would be able to get there by the 30th, though he has orders not to do so till the 3rd. You will receive the present courier on the 27th, in order that you may accelerate the movement of Marshal Soult. It is of importance that he should speedily reach Amberg, because the enemy is at Hof, an extravagance of which I did not believe him to be capable, conceiving that he would remain on the defensive along the Elbe.

"NAPOLEON."

plans was allowed; and all these plans tended to transfer the Prussian army to Franconia, amidst the cantonments of the French army, for the purpose of surprising the latter, and driving it to the Rhine, before it had time to concentrate itself.

The plan which would have agreed best with the prudence of the Duke of Brunswick would have been to continue to lie close at the back of the forest of Thuringia, and to wait in this position for Napoleon to debouch by one side of that forest or the other, by the defiles of Franconia in Saxony, or by the central route of Germany, which goes from Frankfort to Weimar. In the first case, the Prussians, with their right at that forest of Thuringia, their front covered by the Saale, had only to allow Napoleon to advance. If he purposed to attack them before he went further, they would oppose to him the banks of the Saale, which it was almost impossible to cross before an army of 140,000 men. If he were to hasten to the Elbe, they would follow him, still covered by those same banks of the Saale. If, on the contrary, what was less probable, considering the place chosen for the assembling of his troops, Napoleon, traversing all Franconia, should gain the central route of Germany, the way was so long, that they would have time to collect en masse, and choose a suitable spot for giving him battle at the moment when he should debouch from the mountains. Certainly if the line of the Elbe were not adopted from the outset as the first theatre of defensive war, the next best thing to be done was to place themselves behind the forest of Thuringia, as the Duke of Brunswick was disposed to do.

But though this was his opinion, he durst not propose it. Giving way to the general impulsion, he devised one plan of offensive warfare. The Prince of Hohenlohe, usually in contradiction to him, devised another. To take the position which they occupied, the Duke of Brunswick had set out from Magdeburg, the Prince of Hohenlohe from Dresden—the first ascending the left bank, the second ascending the right bank of the Saale. In the system of offensive warfare the Prussians might pass, as we have observed, on either side of the forest of Thuringia, or ascend the Upper Saale, and traverse the defiles that place Saxony in communication with Franconia, before which the French were then assembling; or, taking the opposite side, traverse Upper Hesse, and march from Eisenach upon Fulda, Schweinfurt, and Wurzburg. The Prince of Hohenlohe, desiring to play the principal part, proposed to leave the Duke of Brunswick where he was, to ascend the Upper Saale, to pass through the defiles of Franconia, to throw himself upon the Upper Mayn, to surprise the French before they were quite assembled, and to make them fall back upon the Upper Mayn, upon Wurzburg, Frankfort, and Mayence. As soon as the

retreat commenced, the Duke of Brunswick was to join him, no matter by what road, to complete the rout of the French, with the whole mass of the Prussian forces.

The Duke of Brunswick's plan for acting on the opposite side was to advance by Eisenach, Fulda, Schweinfurt, Wurzburg, that is to say, by the central route of Germany, to fall upon Wurzburg itself, and thus to cut off from Mayence all the French who were in Franconia. This plan was assuredly the better of the two; for while the Prince of Hohenlohe, proposing to debouch upon the Upper Mayn, would have flung the French back upon the Upper Mayn, from Coburg upon Wurzburg, and would have tended to rally them as they fell back, the Duke of Brunswick, on the contrary, directing his course upon Wurzburg itself, would have cut off the French who were on the Upper Mayn from those who were on the Lower Mayn, and placed himself between Wurzburg, which was the centre of their assemblages, and Mayence, which was their base of operation. Besides, he would have acted with a united force of 140,000 men, and have entered upon the offensive with the mass of troops that ought to be devoted to the purpose when one does venture to take it. But whichever plan were adopted, that there might be some chance of succeeding, it would have been requisite, in the first place, that the Prussian army should be, if not equal in quality to the French army, at least capable of withstanding its shock; in the second place, that it should anticipate Napoleon, and surprise him before he had concentrated all his forces upon Wurzburg. Now the Duke of Brunswick had given orders for moving on the 10th of October, and Napoleon was at Wurzburg on the 3rd, at the head of his assembled forces, and ready to meet all events.

While the Prussians were thus disputing about these offensive plans, all founded on the ridiculous datum of surprising the French on the 10th of October, when Napoleon was so early as on the 3rd in the midst of his assembled troops, they received intelligence of his arrival at Wurzburg, and began to get a glimpse of his dispositions. They were then aware that they had miscalculated, in measuring his activity by that which they had themselves; and the Duke of Brunswick, who, without possessing the rapid comprehension, the resolution, the activity of a great general, was nevertheless endowed with a practised judgment, was more keenly sensible of the danger of confronting the French army, already formed, and having Napoleon at its head. From that moment he renounced all the plans of offensive operations adopted out of condescension, and confined himself more and more to the defensive position taken at the back of the forest of Thuringia. He strove to demonstrate to all around him the advantages of this position; for he incessantly repeated to them that if Napoleon should direct his course by Königshofen,

Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt, which would bring him into Germany by the great central road, they might take him in flank at the moment when he was debouching from the mountains; if, on the contrary, passing through the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, he appeared upon the Upper Saale, they would occupy the course of that river, and await him without stirring, behind its steep banks. Other reasons, not avowed by the Duke of Brunswick, inspired him with a decided preference for this position. At bottom he disapproved the war, and he had just discovered with joy a chance of preventing it. According to the reports of the spies, Napoleon was having great defensive works executed towards Schweinfurt, on the very road from Wurzburg to Königshofen and Eisenach. It was true that Napoleon had ordered works in different directions, especially in the direction of Schweinfurt, Königshofen, Hildburghausen, and Eisenach. The Duke of Brunswick thence concluded not that Napoleon purposed to advance by the great central road from Frankfort to Weimar, but that he meant to establish himself about Wurzburg, and there take a defensive position. His conversations with M. de Lucchesini contributed equally to produce this persuasion. That ambassador, who had unfortunately irritated his cabinet two months before by exaggerated reports, now mixing a little truth with much that was false, affirmed that, at bottom, Napoleon was not desirous of war; that he had, no doubt, treated Prussia slightingly, but that he had never harboured any design of aggression against her; and that it was very possible that he had come to post himself at Wurzburg, in order to await there, behind good entrenchments, the final decision of King Frederick William.

It was very late to dare to bring forward this truth, and it was choosing a moment to bring it forward when it had ceased to be accurate. If, in fact, Napoleon, before he left Paris, had been disposed to settle matters with Prussia by means of amicable explanations, now that he was at the head of his army and his sword half unsheathed he was ready to draw it completely, and to act with the promptness which was natural to him. Nothing was less in unison with his character than the plan of establishing himself in a defensive position before Wurzburg. But from this plan, falsely attributed to Napoleon, and the reports of M. de Lucchesini, the Duke of Brunswick concluded with secret joy that it would be possible to avoid war, especially if the precaution were taken to remain at the back of the forest of Thuringia, and to leave between the two armies that obstacle to their collision.

The king, without avowing it, was of the same opinion. A last council was therefore held at Erfurt on the 5th of October, at which the Duke of Brunswick, the Prince of Hohenlohe, Marshal

Mollendorf, several officers of the staff, the commanders of corps, the king himself and his ministers, were present. This council lasted for two whole days. The duke proposed the following question: "Was it prudent to go and seek Napoleon in an unassailable position, when they no longer entertained, as according to the first offensive plan, any hope of surprising him?" Long and violent discussions ensued on this point. The Prince of Hohenlohe again put forward, through the medium of the chief of his staff, the idea of operating by the Upper Saale, and of passing through the defiles at the outlets of which Napoleon had assembled his troops. This idea was combated on the part of the Duke of Brunswick, and the advantages of the position taken behind the forest of Thuringia were again expatiated upon. Thus the two generals-in-chief kept up an obstinate contest by means of their staff officers. For the rest, there was no harmony anywhere. While the Duke of Brunswick was engaged in warm contention with the Prince of Hohenlohe, M. d'Haugwitz was disputing with M. de Lucchesini, and maintaining, in regard to the pacific dispositions attributed to Napoleon, that they were no longer to be reckoned upon. To the clash of ideas was added the clash of passions, and General Ruchel ventured to offer a new affront to M. d'Haugwitz. From this debate each carried away only a greater confusion of mind and a deeper bitterness of heart. The king in particular, who earnestly sought to enlighten himself, not daring to trust to his own judgment, and who was sensible of the imminence of the danger—the king was grieved to the very heart. As it was impossible to come to any decision, the council, feeling the necessity for learning more precisely the real resolutions of Napoleon, adopted the plan of a general reconnaissance, to be executed simultaneously by the three principal corps of the Prince of Hohenlohe, the Duke of Brunswick, and General Ruchel. The king caused a modification of this singular resolution by reducing the three reconnaissances to one only, directed by Colonel de Muffling, an officer of the Duke of Brunswick's staff, on that same road from Eisenach to Schweinfurt, towards which Napoleon seemed to be making some preparations of defence. Orders were given to the Prince of Hohenlohe to continue the concentration of the army of Silesia on the Upper Saale, leaving General Tauenzien, with the detachment of Baruth, in observation towards the defiles of Franconia. To this military measure was added a political measure, namely, to send a definitive note to Napoleon, signifying the irrevocable resolutions of the court of Prussia. This note was to set forth the relations which had existed between the two courts, the harsh usage with which France had repaid the friendly conduct of Prussia, the obligation imposed upon the cabinet of Berlin to demand an explanation bearing upon all the points at issue, and which ought

to be preceded by a step for the satisfaction of Germany, namely, the immediate retreat of the French troops to the other side of the Rhine. This retreat was required to be effected by a specified day, and to commence on the 8th of October.

Assuredly if Prussia was still desirous of peace, the projected note was a very ill-contrived expedient for maintaining it; for it was mistaking the character of Napoleon most egregiously to send him a summons to retire by a certain day. But while the Duke of Brunswick and the king were striving to save for themselves a last chance of peace, by continuing at the back of the forest of Thuringia, they were forced, in order to satisfy the furious partisans of war, to make some apparent demonstrations of haughtiness, thus submitting to the caprices of an army, which had transformed itself into a popular multitude, and which shouted, dictated, ordered, like the mob, when the reins are resigned to it.

Such was the way in which the Prussians spent the time that Napoleon, on his part, was devoting to preparations so active and so ably conceived. Without tarrying at Wurzburg, he had proceeded to Bamberg, where he deferred his entry into Saxony for the final explanations of Prussia, with whom, and not with him, lay the wrong of the aggression. His right, composed of the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney, was in advance of Baruth, ready to debouch by the road from Baruth to Hof upon the Upper Saale. His centre, formed by the corps of Marshals Bernadotte and Davout, preceded by the reserve of cavalry, and followed by the foot-guard, was at Kronach, waiting only for orders to advance by Lobenstein upon Saalburg and Schleiz. His left, consisting of the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, making deceitful demonstrations towards Hildburghausen, was at the first signal to move from left to right, from Coburg towards Neustadt, in order to debouch by Grafenthal upon Saalfeld. These three columns had to traverse the narrow defiles, bordered with woods and rocks, which place Franconia in communication with Saxony, and run to the Upper Saale. The frontier of Saxony, however, was not yet passed, and they continued on the Franconian territory, with one foot raised for marching. The imperial guard was not, it is true, completely assembled: the cavalry and artillery of that guard were still wanting, because they could not travel post, like the infantry; the companies of élite and the great park also were still deficient. But Napoleon had at hand about 170,000 men, and those were more than he needed to crush the Prussian army.

When he received, on the 7th, the note of Prussia, he was extremely exasperated. Major-General Berthier was with him. "Prince," said he, "we will be punctual to the appointment; and on the 8th, instead of being in France, we shall be in

Saxony." He immediately addressed to his army the following proclamation :—

"SOLDIERS,—The order for your return to France was issued; you had already made several marches; triumphal festivities awaited you! But while we were indulging in this too confident security, fresh plots were hatching under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war were raised in Berlin. The same spirit of infatuation which, by favour of our intestine dissensions, led the Prussians, fourteen years ago, into the plains of Champagne, still pervades their counsels. If it is not Paris that they would fain raze to its foundations, it is now their flags that they would boast of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is our laurels that they would snatch from our brows! They insist that we should evacuate Germany at sight of their army. . . . Soldiers, there is not one of you who would wish to return to France by any other way than that of honour. It behoves us not to enter it again but under arches of triumph. Should we then have defied seasons, seas, deserts, conquered Europe, several times leagued against us, carried our glory from east to west, to return this day to our country as fugitives, after deserting our allies, and to hear it said that the French eagle had fled, affrighted at sight of the Prussian eagles? Woe, then, be to those who provoke us! Let the Prussians meet with the same fate which they experienced fourteen years ago! Let them learn that it is easy to acquire an increase of territory and of power with the friendship of the great nation: its enmity is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."

On the following day, the 8th of October, Napoleon gave orders for the whole army to cross the frontier of Saxony. The three columns of which it was composed broke up simultaneously. Murat, who preceded the centre, entered first, at the head of the light cavalry and of the 27th light, and pushed his squadrons by the central defile, that of Kronach, to Lobenstein. No sooner was he past the woody heights which separate Franconia from Saxony than he despatched several detachments—upon the right towards Hof, upon the left towards Saalfeld—to clear the outlet of the débouches, by which the other columns of the army would have to penetrate. He then marched direct from Lobenstein for Saalburg. There he found posted upon the Saale a body of infantry and cavalry belonging to the corps of General Tauenzien. The enemy at first seemed disposed to defend the Saale, which is a feeble obstacle in this part of its course, and sent several rounds of cannon-shot at our horse. He was answered by several pieces of light artillery, usually attached to the reserve of the cavalry; he was then shown some companies of infantry of the 27th light. He defended neither the passage of the Saale nor Saalburg, and retreated towards Schleiz, at

some distance from the place of this first rencounter. Towards Hof, on our right, the cavalry discovered nothing that could impede the march of Marshals Soult and Ney, who, however, were sufficiently strong to clear a way for themselves. On the left, on the contrary, towards Saalfeld, it perceived at a distance a considerable body, commanded by Prince Louis. These two corps of General Tauenzien and Prince Louis formed part of the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, who in spite of the formal order which he had received to cross to the left bank of the Saale, and to support himself upon the Duke of Brunswick, delayed obeying, and remained dispersed in the hilly country which the Saale traverses at its source.

The three columns of the French army kept advancing simultaneously by the defiles already specified, that of the left, however, being a little behind, because it had to go back from Coburg towards Grafenthal, which obliged it to travel twelve leagues upon roads scarcely passable for artillery. For the rest, no serious obstacle checked the march of our troops. The spirit of the army was excellent; the soldier displayed the greatest cheerfulness, and seemed to make light of some hardships, inevitable in a poor and difficult country. Victory, of which he had no doubt, was for him a compensation for all sufferings.

On the next day, the 9th of October, the centre left Saalburg and advanced upon Schleiz, after crossing the Saale. Murat, with two regiments of light cavalry, and Bernadotte, with Drouet's division, marched at the head. They arrived before Schleiz about noon. Schleiz is a small town situated on a stream, which is called the Wiesenthal, and which discharges itself into the Saale. At the foot of a height beyond Schleiz and the Wiesenthal was perceived General Tauenzien's corps, drawn up in order of battle. It was backed upon the height, its infantry deployed, its cavalry disposed on the wings, the artillery on its front. It appeared to consist of about 8000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. Napoleon, who had slept in the environs of Saalburg, hastened to the spot in the morning, and at sight of the enemy gave orders for the attack. Marshal Bernadotte directed some companies of the 27th light, commanded by General Maison, upon Schleiz. General Tauenzien, apprised that the bulk of the French army was following this advanced guard, had no idea of defending the ground which he occupied. He contented himself with reinforcing the detachment which guarded Schleiz, in order to gain time by a petty action for the rearguard to retire. General Maison entered Schleiz with the 27th light, and drove out the Prussians. At that moment the 94th and 95th regiments of the line, of Drouet's division, were crossing the Wiesenthal, the one below Schleiz, the other at Schleiz itself, and contributed to hasten the retreat

of the enemy, who proceeded towards the heights in rear of Schleiz. He was briskly pursued upon these heights, and on reaching their summit followed down the back of them. Murat, accompanied by the 4th hussars and the 5th chasseurs (the latter being a little behind) closely pressed the enemy's infantry, which was escorted by 2000 horse. Perceiving the small number of the force at the disposal of Murat, some Prussian squadrons rushed towards it. Murat got the start of them, charged them, sword in hand, at the head of the 4th hussars, and repulsed them. But being soon driven back by a more numerous cavalry, he sent in all haste for the 5th chasseurs, as well as General Maison's light infantry, which had not yet been able to join him. He had meanwhile several charges to sustain, and he met them with his accustomed valour. Luckily the 5th chasseurs came up at a gallop, rallied the 4th hussars, and made a vigorous charge in its turn. But General Tauenzien, wishing to rid himself of those two regiments of light cavalry, sent the Saxon red dragoons and the Prussian hussars against them. At this moment five companies of the 27th light, headed by General Maison, came up. Not having time to form them in square, he halted them on the spot in such a manner as to cover the flank of our cavalry, and then caused a volley to be discharged within point blank range with such precision as to extend two hundred of the red dragoons upon the pavement. The whole of the Prussian cavalry then betook itself to flight. Murat, with the 4th hussars and the 5th chasseurs, dashed after it, and drove General Tauenzien's cavalry and infantry pell-mell into the woods. The enemy retreated in the utmost haste, throwing away upon the roads a great number of muskets and hats, and leaving in our hands about 400 prisoners, besides 300 killed or wounded. But the moral effect of the action was greater than the material effect, and the Prussians could then see what sort of soldiers they had to deal with. If Murat, as Napoleon remarked to him, had had at hand a few more cavalry, he would not have been obliged to expose himself so much, and the results would have been more considerable.*

* "To the Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves at Schleiz.

"IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HEADQUARTERS,
October 10, 1806, 5 A.M.

"General Rapp has acquainted me with the successful result of yesterday. It appears to me that you had not a sufficient collected force of cavalry at hand. If you scatter it all, you will have none left. You have six regiments; I have recommended to you to have at least four at hand. I do not see that you had yesterday more than two. Reconnaissances on the right are now becoming much less important: on the arrival of Marshal Soult at Plauen, it is upon Possneck and Saalfeld that strong reconnaissances must be directed, to learn what is passing there. Marshal Lannes arrived on the evening of the 9th at Grafenthal. He will attack Saalfeld to-morrow. You know how important it is to me to be informed during the day of the movement upon Saalfeld, that, if the enemy had assembled there more than 25,000 men, I might be able to march reinforcements thither by Possheim, and take them

Napoleon was extremely pleased with this first action, which proved how little the Prussian cavalry, though excellently mounted, and very skilful in the management of its horses, was to be feared for the sake of his solid infantry and his bold horse-soldiers. He established his headquarters at Schleiz, in order to wait there for the rest of the column of the centre, in order more especially to give his right, headed by Marshals Ney and Soult, his left, led by Marshals Lannes and Augereau, time to clear the defiles, and to come and take a position of battle upon its wings. From what he saw, and from what was reported to him by his spies, who had found the country covered by detached columns, he judged that he had surprised the enemy in a movement of concentration, and that he was likely to give him a great deal of trouble. The reports from the right wing, sent by Marshals Soult and Ney, stated that they had nothing before them, and that they perceived only occasional detachments of cavalry, retiring on their approach. The tidings from the left, on the contrary, made mention of a corps at Saalfeld, before which Marshal Lannes would arrive on the following day, the 10th.

Napoleon thence concluded that the enemy was then retiring towards the Saale, and leaving the highroad to Dresden open. He was resolved not to venture upon it till he had beaten the Prussians, and to beat them without delay, whether they came to meet him with the intention of barring his way, or he was obliged to seek them behind the steep banks of the Saale.*

in rear. I have ordered Dupont's and Beaumont's divisions to proceed to Schleiz. We must, at all events, find a good position in advance of Schleiz suitable for a field of battle for more than 80,000 men. This need not prevent you from taking advantage of daybreak to push strong reconnaissances upon Auma and Possneck, and to let them even be supported by Drouet's division. Marshal Davout's first division will be at Saalburg, the two other divisions will be in advance, near Obersdorf, and his light cavalry beyond. I am giving orders to Marshal Ney to march to Tanna. Your chief business to-day ought to be, in the first place, to profit by yesterday's advantage to pick up as many prisoners as possible, and to get from them all the information you can; in the second place, to reconnoitre Auma and Saalfeld, in order to ascertain positively what are the movements of the enemy. Whereupon, &c.,

"NAPOLEON."

* We quote the following letter illustrative of Napoleon's ideas at this moment:—

"To Marshal SOULT, at Plauen.

"OBERSDORF, *the 10th October*, 1806, 8 A.M.

"We yesterday thrashed the 8000 men who had retired from Hof to Schleiz, where they expected reinforcements in the night. Their cavalry has been cut in pieces, and a colonel taken. More than 2000 muskets and caps were found on the field of battle. The Prussian infantry did not stand its ground. We have picked up but two or three hundred prisoners, because it was dark, and they dispersed in the woods. I reckon upon a good number this morning.

"What seems to me perfectly clear is this: it appears that the Prussians designed to attack; that their left will debouch to-morrow by Jena, Saalfeld, and Coburg; that the Prince of Hohenlohe had his headquarters at Jena, and Prince Louis at Saalfeld. The other column debouches by Meiningen

The Prince of Hohenlohe, persuaded that he alone had penetrated the plans of Napoleon, that he alone had devised the true means of thwarting them, by proposing to get to the defiles of Franconia before him, fluctuated amidst a thousand different ideas. Sometimes he inclined to execute the orders of the Duke of Brunswick and to recross the Saale; at others he formed the silly resolution of proceeding to Mittel-Pöllnitz and giving battle there, and thus issued orders and counter-orders which harassed his troops, not in the best condition for marching, laden with baggage, and ill provisioned. Meanwhile Prince Louis, impatient to meet the French, and insisting, at any rate, on forming the advanced guard of the Prussian army, had on his solicitation been left at Saalfeld, where he still was on the morning of the 10th of October.

It was towards this point that the French left column was to

upon Fulda. So that I am inclined to think that you have nobody before you, perhaps not a thousand men as far as Dresden. If you can crush a corps of theirs, do so. Such are my plans for to-day. I cannot march; I have too many things in arrear. I shall push my advanced guard to Auma. I have discovered a good field of battle for 80,000 or 100,000 men in advance of Schleiz. I am making Marshal Ney march to Tanna: there he will be two leagues from Schleiz. At Plauen you will yourself not be so far off as not to be able to come thither in twenty-four hours.

"On the 5th the Prussian army again made a movement upon Thuringia, so that I believe it to be a great number of days behindhand. My junction with my left is not yet made, unless it be by posts of cavalry, which signify nothing.

"Marshal Lannes is not to arrive till to-day at Saalfeld, unless the enemy is there in considerable force.

"Thus the 10th and 11th will be lost for marching forward. If my junction is made, I shall push on to Neustadt and Triplitz. After that, whatever the enemy may do, I shall be delighted: if he suffers himself to be attacked, I will not fail to be at him. If he files off by Magdeburg, you will be at Dresden before him. I long for a battle. If the enemy has been desirous to attack me, it is because he has great confidence in his strength. In this case, it is not impossible that he may attack. He could do nothing that would please me better. After that battle, I shall be at Dresden and at Berlin before him.

"I am waiting impatiently for my horse-guards; 40 pieces of artillery and 3000 horse, such as they, are not to be disdained. You now see my plans for to-day and to-morrow. You are at liberty to act as you judge best, but procure bread for yourself, that, if you come and join me, you may have sufficient for some days.

"If you find something to do against the enemy at the distance of one march from you, you may do it boldly. Establish little posts of cavalry to communicate rapidly between Schleiz and Plauen. Up to this hour, it seems to me that the campaign commences under the happiest auspices.

"I imagine that you are at Plauen. It is highly expedient that you should get possession of it.

"Let me know what you believe you have before you. None of the troops that were at Hof have retired upon Dresden.

"*P.S.*—I receive this moment your despatch of the 9th at 6 P.M. I approve the dispositions which you have made. The intelligence that the thousand horse who were at Plauen have retired to Gera leaves me in no doubt that Gera will be the point of concentration of the enemy's army. However, in the course of the day I shall receive further information, I shall have more precise ideas. You, being at Plauen, will be furnished with them by letters intercepted at the post."

march, as soon as it should have debouched from Grafenthal. Having reached Grafenthal on the 9th, Lannes, who formed the head of that column, marched for Saalfeld on the morning of the 10th. He had set out at a very early hour. The wooded heights, which generally skirt the Saale, receding at this point from its bed, leave a marshy plain, amidst which rises the little town of Saalfeld, surrounded by walls, and seated on the very margin of the river. On reaching the circumference of these heights, which overlook Saalfeld, Lannes perceived in advance of the town the corps of Prince Louis, consisting of about 7000 foot and 2000 horse. The prince had taken a rather unmilitary position. His left, composed of infantry, was appuyed upon the town and the river; his right, composed of cavalry, extended into the plain. Commanded in front by the circle of the heights, whence the French artillery could pour its fire upon him, he had in his rear a little marshy stream, the Schwartza, which falls into the Saale below Saalfeld, and which is rather difficult to cross. His retreat was consequently very ill secured. Had he been capable of any prudence, and less obliged by his preceding bravadoes to appear rash, he should have retired as speedily as possible, and descended the Saale to Rudolstadt or Jena. Unfortunately it was not consistent either with his character or his part to recoil from the first meeting with the French. Lannes had not at hand either Augereau's corps, forming with him the left column, or even his own entire corps. He was reduced to the mere division of Suchet and two regiments of light cavalry, the 9th and 10th hussars. He nevertheless commenced the attack immediately. In the first place, he ranged his artillery upon the heights, which commanded the line of battle of Prince Louis, and opened a brisk cannonade upon it. He then threw part of Suchet's division upon his left, with orders to file along the woods which crowned the heights, and to turn the right of Prince Louis, by descending to the banks of the Schwartza. In a few moments this movement was executed. While the artillery, placed in battery on the front of the Prussians, occupied them by sweeping off their men, our tirailleurs, slipping through the woods, commenced an unexpected and destructively well-aimed fire upon their rear. Lannes then made his infantry descend en masse into the plain to overturn the enemy's infantry. In this position there was no judicious course for Prince Louis to adopt, had he even had that experience in war of which he was not possessed. He began by moving towards his infantry, in order to meet the shock of Suchet's division. But after efforts of bravery, worthy of being better employed, he saw his battalions broken and driven back in confusion upon the walls of Saalfeld. Not knowing what to do, he hastened to his cavalry, with the intention of charging the two regiments of hussars which had followed the movements

of our tirailleurs. He charged them with impetuosity, and at first repulsed them. But those two regiments, having rallied, dashed vigorously forward, broke his numerous cavalry, and pursued it with such ardour that, finding it impossible to form again, it threw itself in disorder into the marshes of the Schwartza. The prince, in a brilliant uniform, adorned with all his decorations, behaved during the action with the valour befitting his birth and character. Two of his aides-de-camp were killed by his side. Being soon surrounded, he tried to escape, but his horse having entangled himself in a hedge, he was forced to stop. A quartermaster of the 10th hussars, taking him for an officer of high rank, but by no means for a prince of the blood-royal, ran up to him, crying, "General, surrender!" To this summons the prince replied by a lunge with his sword. The quartermaster then gave him a thrust in the middle of the chest, and he dropped dead at the foot of his horse. A concourse collected round the body of the prince, which was recognised, and deposited, with all the honours due to his rank and his misfortune, in the town of Saalfeld. The Prussian and Saxon troops, for there were both at this point, deprived of their commander, and enclosed in a spot having no outlet, escaped as they best could, leaving behind 20 pieces of cannon, 400 killed or wounded, and about a thousand prisoners.

Such was the opening of the campaign. The first blow of the war, as Napoleon observed next day in the bulletin of the action, had killed one of its authors. So near were the two armies to each other, that Napoleon at Schleiz heard the cannon of Saalfeld, that the Prince of Hohenlohe heard them on his side upon the heights of Mittel-Pöllnitz, and that towards Jena, on the line occupied by the Prussian main army, their distant rolling was distinctly perceptible. All sensible men in the Prussian army shuddered at it as a signal which announced tragic events. Napoleon, detecting the point whence these reports proceeded, sent off a reinforcement to Lannes, and a great number of officers in quest of news. The Prince of Hohenlohe, on his part, roamed about on horseback, without giving any orders, and questioning goers and comers concerning what was passing. It was a lamentable sight to see such incapacity and imprudence battling with such vigilance and genius.

A few hours afterwards the fugitives informed both armies of the result of the first encounter and the tragic end of Prince Louis, an end well worthy of his life, on the double score of imprudence and courage. The Prussians were enabled to judge what was to be expected from their scientific tactics, opposed to the simple, practical, and rapid mode of acting pursued by the French generals.

The consternation spread from Saalfeld to Jena and Weimar.

The Prince of Hohenlohe, already informed by his own eyes of the discouragement which had seized General Tauenzien's troops, his mind impressed with the rash adventure of Saalfeld, repaired in person to Jena, and despatched orders in all directions to fall back upon the Saale, in order to cover himself with that river, if, however, after so many contradictory movements, the Prussians could flatter themselves with the hope of reaching it in time. It was the third counter-order given to those unfortunate men, who knew not what was wanted of them, and who were not habituated, like the French, to make several marches in a day, and to live upon what they procured for themselves on march. Some fugitives of the corps beaten at Saalfeld, hurrying towards Jena, and firing without motive, like soldiers going upon the stroll, were mistaken for French tirailleurs. At sight of them an inexpressible terror pervaded the troops marching towards Jena and the numerous drivers of the baggage train. They fled in disorder, rushing towards the bridges over the Saale, and from those bridges into the streets of Jena. In a few moments all was frightful confusion—a luckless omen of the events that were about to follow.

Napoleon, apprised of the action at Saalfeld, and anxious to bring his wings again nearer to the centre, in proportion as it issued from the defiles by which it had entered Saxony, directed Lannes not to ascend the Saale, which would have removed him too far from himself and brought him too near to the enemy, but to make a movement to the right, and to proceed by Possneck and Neustadt to Auma, where the headquarters were fixed. Augereau was to fill the vacancy left between the Saale and the corps of Lannes. Ordering a like movement of concentration on his right, Napoleon had despatched Marshal Soult upon Weida and Gera, along the Elster, and sent word for Marshal Ney to occupy Auma, when the headquarters should have left. He would thus have 170,000 men at hand, within the distance of seven or eight leagues, with the faculty of collecting 100,000 of them in a few hours; and while concentrating himself he kept advancing, ready to cross the Saale if it were necessary to force the enemy's position there, or to push on to the Elbe if he wanted to get thither before him. For the rest, he had not marched more than four or five leagues a day, in order to give his corps time to rejoin; for his reserves were still behindhand, especially the artillery and the cavalry of the guard, as well as the battalions of élite. Though he knew from the two actions of the preceding days what he ought to think of the Prussian troops, he marched with the prudence of great captains in presence of an army which could have opposed to him from 130,000 to 140,000 men collected into a single mass. In the evening of the 12th he left Auma for Gera.

The cavalry, moving about in all directions among the baggage columns of the unfortunate Saxons, made rich and numerous prizes. Five hundred carriages were taken at one blow. The cavalry, as Napoleon wrote, was "seamed with gold" (*cousue d'or*). At length intercepted letters and the reports of spies began to agree, and to represent the Prussian grand army as changing position, and advancing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to approach the banks of the Saale. It might be coming thither with one of the two following intentions: either to occupy the bridge over the Saale at Naumburg, over which passes the great central road of Germany, in order to retire upon the Elbe, while covering Leipsic and Dresden; or to approach the course of the Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks against the French. To meet this double contingency Napoleon took a first precaution, which was to despatch Marshal Davout immediately to Naumburg, with orders to bar the passage of the bridge there with the 26,000 men of the third corps. He sent Murat, with the cavalry, along the banks of the Saale, to watch its course, and to push reconnaissances as far as Leipsic. He directed Marshal Bernadotte upon Naumburg, with instructions to support Marshal Davout in case of need. He sent Marshals Lannes and Augereau to Jena itself. His object was to make himself master immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale, those at Naumburg and Jena, either to stop the Prussian army there if it should design to cross and to retire to the Elbe, or to go and seek it on the heights bordering that river if it purposed to remain there on the defensive. As for himself, he continued with Marshals Ney and Soult within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march for either point according to circumstances.

On the morning of the 13th he learned by more circumstantial accounts that the enemy was definitively approaching the Saale, with the yet uncertain resolution of fighting a defensive battle on its banks, or of crossing and pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direction from Weimar to Jena that the largest assemblage appeared. Without losing a moment, Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. He gave himself his instructions to Marshals Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena in the evening, or at latest in the night. He directed Murat to bring his cavalry towards Jena, and Marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornburg an intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately, sending officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, and to make them turn back for Jena.

In the evening of the preceding day Marshal Davout had entered Naumburg, occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte had joined him. Murat had sent his light cavalry as

far as Leipsic, and surprised the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had proceeded towards Jena, a small university town seated on the very banks of the Saale, and had driven back pell-mell the enemy's troops left beyond the river, as well as the baggage which encumbered the road. He had taken possession of Jena, and immediately pushed his advanced posts upon the heights which command it. From these heights he had perceived the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, which after recrossing the Saale encamped between Jena and Weimar, and he had reason to suspect that a great assemblage was collecting in that place.

The Prussian army was, in fact, concentrated here, and ready to take its final determinations. The Prince of Hohenlohe had decided to obey the orders of the Duke of Brunswick, and to re-cross the Saale, for the purpose of rejoining the Prussian grand army. He would have reached that position in better order, and without losing his baggage, had he obeyed sooner. His troops were assembled there confusedly, and without provisions, not knowing where to procure any, applying for them in vain to the principal army, which possessed only just enough for itself. The Saxons, whose conduct had been honourable, but whom the chance of events had put forward conspicuously in the first two encounters, and who saw their country delivered over without defence to the French, complained bitterly of being ill-treated, ill-fed, and dragged into a war which set out with the most sinister prospects. Great pains were taken to pacify them; and this time they were placed in second line behind the Prussians. However, in spite of this deplorable commencement, the Prussians were assembled along the forest of Thuringia, in advance of the Saale, to stop the French if they attempted to cross it, or to descend in safety to the Elbe if they were in haste to reach that river. This was the case, since they had attached such value to this position as to persevere in the idea that had been formed of it, and to avail themselves of the advantages which it offered. The Saale, in fact, though fordable, runs in a bed which forms a sort of continuous gorge. The left bank, on which the Prussians were encamped, is covered by abrupt heights, the foot of which is washed by the river, and the summit clothed with a series of woods. Beyond are undulated plateaux, well adapted to receive an army. In descending from Jena to Naumburg, the difficulties become greater than anywhere else. Besides Jena and Naumburg there were but three avenues by which access could be gained, those of Löbstedt, Dornburg, and Camburg, about two leagues distant from each other, and very easy to defend. Since, instead of establishing themselves behind the Elbe, the Prussians had determined to go and meet the French, and fight them en masse, there was not a more advantageous site than the left bank of the Saale for a general action. They had deprived them-

selves, it is true, of 10,000 men, composing the advanced guard of the Duke of Weimar, and sent to reconnoitre beyond the forest of Thuringia; they had lost five or six thousand in killed, prisoners, and fugitives in the actions of Schleiz and Saalfeld; but the Prince of Hohenlohe had still 50,000 men left, the Duke of Brunswick 66,000, General Ruchel 17,000 or 18,000, that is to say, 134,000 men—a very formidable army behind such a position as that of the Saale from Jena to Naumburg. By placing strong detachments before the principal passages, and the mass a little in rear, in a central position, so as to be able to hasten in force to the point attacked, they would be capable of fighting a dangerous battle for the French army, and if not to wrest victory from it, to dispute it with such effect as to render retreat easy and the issue of the war uncertain.

But the perturbation of mind continued only to increase in the Prussian staff. The Duke of Brunswick, who had hitherto displayed sound reasoning powers, and who had appeared to appreciate the position occupied in the different possible cases—the Duke of Brunswick, now that one of those cases, and the most foreseen, was realised, seemed suddenly to have lost his senses, and was for decamping with the utmost expedition. The movement of Marshal Davout upon Naumburg had been a flash of light for him. He had concluded from the appearance of that marshal on the way to Naumburg that it was Napoleon's intention not to give battle, but to hasten his march to the Elbe, to cut off the Prussians from Saxony, and even from Prussia, as he had cut off General Mack from Bavaria and Austria. The fear of being surrounded, as General Mack had been, and forced, like him, to lay down his arms, disturbed the generally just judgment of this unfortunate old man. He resolved, therefore, to set off instantly for the Elbe. In Prussia the unfortunate Mack had been jeered so mercilessly and with so little justice, that people lost their reason at the bare idea of finding themselves in the same situation, and that, in order to avoid it, they ran the risk of falling into other positions which were not better. The present situation was, nevertheless, far from resembling that of the Austrian general. The Duke of Brunswick might, it is true, be turned, separated from Saxony by a rapid movement of Napoleon's towards the Elbe; perhaps the French might reach Berlin before him, but it was impossible that he could be enveloped and obliged to capitulate. Whether he lost a battle on the Saale, whether Napoleon got the start of him on the Elbe, he had a sure retreat to Magdeburg and the Lower Elbe, and though he was liable to arrive there in bad plight, he could not be taken in the vast plains of the north, like the Austrians in that close gorge of the valley of the Danube. Besides, while General Mack's army numbered at most 70,000 men, that of the Duke of Brunswick

would amount to 144,000, if the Duke of Weimar were called in; and such an army is not easily surrounded so completely as to be obliged to lay down its arms. But since the Prussians had been so intent on fighting, had so earnestly desired to meet the French, even thought of crossing the mountains in order to go and seek them in Franconia, when they at length fell in with them on a ground excellent for themselves, very difficult for the enemy, wherefore not establish themselves upon it en masse, and fling them into the deep and rocky bed of the Saale the moment they should attempt to ascend its heights? But they had lost all presence of mind since the enemy, whom they defied at a distance, was so close to them, since it had been shown at Schleiz and Saalfeld that the quality of the Prussian army was so little superior to that of the Austrian and Russian armies.

The Duke of Brunswick, impatient to secure himself from the so-dreaded fate of General Mack, determined to decamp immediately, and to push on by forced marches for the Elbe, covering himself with the Saale, which course would entail the relinquishment of Leipsic, of Dresden, and of all Saxony to the French. The Prince of Hohenlohe, having tardily decided on recrossing the Saale, encamped upon the heights of Jena. The Duke of Brunswick enjoined him to remain there, to close that débouche, while the principal army, filing behind the army of Silesia, should join the Saale at Naumburg, and descend it to the Elbe.

He ordered General Ruchel to stay at Weimar for the time required to rally the advanced guard, engaged in a useless reconnaissance beyond the forest of Thuringia; and as for himself, taking with him the five divisions of the principal army, he resolved to decamp on the 13th, to follow the highroad from Weimar to Leipsic as far as the bridge of Naumburg, to leave three divisions at that bridge to guard it, while he should go with the two others to secure the passage of the Unstrut, one of the tributaries of the Saale; then, that obstacle overcome, to fall back upon the three divisions posted at Naumburg, to draw to him the Prince of Hohenlohe and General Ruchel, left in rear, and to march along the banks of the Saale to the junction of that river with the Elbe in the environs of Magdeburg.

Such was the plan of retreat adopted by the Duke of Brunswick. It was not worth while to quit the defensive line of the Elbe, which ought never to have been left, for the purpose of regaining it so soon and with such great dangers.

In consequence, the principal army received orders to break up on the same day, the 13th of October. The Prince of Hohenlohe was directed to occupy the heights of Jena, and to close that passage, while the five divisions of the Duke of Brunswick,

leaving Weimar, were to go and pass the night at Naumburg. These five divisions were to follow one another at the distance of a league, and to march six leagues that day. It is not thus that the French march when they have an important end to attain. Weimar being evacuated, General Ruchel was to proceed thither immediately. All these dispositions being settled and communicated to those who were appointed to execute them, the army of the Duke of Brunswick commenced its march, having at its head the king, the princes, the queen herself, and followed by such a mass of baggage as to render any manœuvre impossible. The cannon were heard so near that the queen could not be allowed to continue at the headquarters. Her presence, after being indecorous, became perilous for herself and a subject of uneasiness for the king. It required a formal injunction from the latter to decide her to leave. At length she departed, her eyes full of tears, no longer doubting, since the actions of Schleiz and Saalfeld, the fatal consequences of a policy of which she was the hapless instigator.

While the Duke of Brunswick was thus marching towards Naumburg, the Prince of Hohenlohe, left upon the heights of Jena with 50,000 men, and having as rearguard General Ruchel with 18,000, endeavoured to restore a little order among his troops, sent out waggons to scour the country in quest of provisions, and in particular to procure some relief for the Saxons, whose discontent was extreme. Coinciding in opinion with the Duke of Brunswick that the French were hastening to Leipsic and Dresden in order to get first to the Elbe, he gave himself little concern about the town of Jena, and paid little attention to the heights situated behind it.

During this same afternoon of the 13th of October, Napoleon, as we have seen, had moved rapidly from Gera towards Jena, followed by all his forces. He arrived there himself about noon: Marshal Lannes, who had outstripped him, was waiting for him with impatience. Without losing a moment, both mounted their horses to reconnoitre the localities. At Jena itself the valley of the Saale begins to widen. The right bank, on which we were marching, is low, damp, and covered with meadows. The left bank, on the contrary, that which the Prussians occupied, presents steep heights, whose peaked tops overlook the town of Jena, and which are ascended by narrow winding ravines, overhung with wood. On the left of Jena, a gorge more open, less abrupt, called the Mühlthal, has become the passage through which the highroad from Jena to Weimar has been carried. This road first keeps along the bottom of the Mühlthal, then rises in form of a spiral staircase, and opens upon the plateaux in rear. It would have required a fierce assault to force this pass; more open, it is true, but guarded by a great portion of

the Prussian army. Of course, to climb the plateaux at this point, in order to give battle there to the Prussians, was wholly out of the question.

But another resource presented itself. The bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines which are met with on going out of Jena, had succeeded in ascending the principal height, and all at once perceived the Prussian army encamped on the plateaux of the left bank. Followed presently by some detachments of Suchet's division, they had made room for themselves by driving in General Tauenzien's advanced posts. Thus, thanks to the boldness of our soldiers, the heights which command the left bank of the Saale were conquered, but by a route which, unfortunately, was scarcely accessible to artillery. Thither Lannes conducted Napoleon amidst an incessant fire of tirailleurs, which rendered reconnaissances extremely dangerous.

The principal of the heights that overlook the town of Jena is called Landgrafenberg, and since the memorable events of which it has been the theatre, it has received from the inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg. It is the highest in these parts. Napoleon and Lannes, surveying from that height the surrounding country, with their backs turned to Jena, beheld on their right the Saale running in a deep, winding, wooded gorge to Naumburg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. Before them they saw undulated plateaux, extending to a distance, and subsiding by a gentle slope to the little valley of the Ilm, at the extremity of which is situated the town of Weimar. They perceived on their left the highroad from Jena to Weimar, rising by a series of slopes from the gorge of the Mühlthal to these plateaux, and running in a straight line to Weimar. These slopes, somewhat resembling a sort of snail's shell, have thence received in German the appellation of the Schnecke (snail). On this same road from Jena to Weimar was posted *en échelons* the Prussian army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, but it was not possible to judge precisely of its number. As for the corps of General Ruchel posted at Weimar, the distance did not permit that to be discerned. In the same predicament was the grand army of the Duke of Brunswick, which, marching from Weimar to Naumburg, was hidden in the bottoms of the valley of the Ilm.

Napoleon, having before him a mass of troops the force of which could scarcely be estimated, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen this ground for a field of battle, and immediately made his dispositions so as to debouch with his army on the Landgrafenberg before the enemy should hasten up, en masse, to hurl him into the precipices of the Saale. He was obliged to make the best use of his time, and to take advantage of the space gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself on the height. He had, it is true, no more of it than the summit, for only a few

paces off there was the corps of General Tauenzien, separated from our troops only by a slight ridge of ground. This corps was appuyed on two villages, one on our right, that of Closewitz, surrounded by a small wood, the other on our left, that of Cospoda, likewise surrounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon purposed to leave the Prussians quiet in this position till the next day, and meanwhile to lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. The space which it occupied was capable of containing the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered them to be led up immediately through the steep ravines which serve to ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On the left he placed Gazan's division, on the right Suchet's division, in the centre, and a little in rear, the foot-guard. He made the latter encamp in a square of four thousand men, and in the centre of this square he established his own bivouac. Ever since that time the people of the country have called that height the Napoleonsberg, marking by a heap of rough stones the spot where this personage, popular everywhere, even in places where he has only shown himself terrible, passed that memorable night.

But it was not enough to bring infantry upon the Landgrafenberg—it was necessary to mount artillery too upon it. Napoleon, riding about in all directions, discovered a passage less steep than the others, and by which the artillery might be dragged up with great exertion. Unluckily the way was too narrow. Napoleon sent forthwith for a detachment of the engineers, and had it widened by cutting the rock; he himself, in his impatience, directed the works, torch in hand. He did not retire till the night was far advanced, when he had seen the first pieces of cannon rolled up. It required twelve horses to draw each gun-carriage to the top of the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon proposed to attack General Tauenzien at daybreak, and by pushing him briskly to conquer the space necessary for deploying his army. Fearful, however, of debouching by a single outlet, wishing also to divide the attention of the enemy, he directed Augereau towards the left, to enter the gorge of the Mühlthal, to march one of his two divisions upon the Weimar road, and to gain with the other the back of the Landgrafenberg, in order to fall upon the rear of General Tauenzien. On the right he ordered Marshal Soult, whose corps, breaking up from Gera, was to arrive in the night, to ascend the other ravines, which, running from Löbstedt and Dornburg, debouch upon Closewitz, likewise for the purpose of falling upon the rear of General Tauenzien. With this double diversion on the right and on the left Napoleon had no doubt of forcing the Prussians in their position, and gaining for himself the space needed by his army for deploying. Marshals Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route which Lannes and the guard had followed.

The day of the 13th had closed; profound darkness enveloped the field of battle. Napoleon had placed his tent in the centre of the square formed by his guard, and had suffered only a few fires to be lighted; but all those of the Prussian army were kindled. The fires of the Prince of Hohenlohe were to be seen over the whole extent of the plateaux, and at the horizon on the right, topped by the old castle of Eckartsberg, those of the army of the Duke of Brunswick, which had all at once become visible for Napoleon. He conceived that so far from retiring, the whole of the Prussian forces had come to take part in the battle. He sent immediately fresh orders to Marshals Davout and Bernadotte. He enjoined Marshal Davout to guard strictly the bridge of Naumburg, even to cross it if possible, and to fall upon the rear of the Prussians while they were engaged in front. He ordered Marshal Bernadotte, placed intermediately, to concur in the projected movement, either by joining Marshal Davout if he was near the latter, or by throwing himself directly on the flank of the Prussians if he had already taken at Dornburg a position nearer to Jena. Lastly, he desired Murat to arrive as speedily as possible with his cavalry.

While Napoleon was making these dispositions, the Prince of Hohenlohe was in complete ignorance of the lot which awaited him. Still persuaded that the bulk of the French army, instead of halting before Jena, was hurrying to Leipsic and Dresden, he supposed that he should at most have to deal with the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, which, having passed the Saale after the action at Saalfeld, would, he imagined, make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, as if they had descended from the heights of the forest of Thuringia. Under this idea, not thinking of making front towards Jena, he had on that side opposed only the corps of General Tauenzien, and ranged his army along the road from Jena to Weimar. His left, composed of Saxons, guarded the summit of the Schnecke; his right extended to Weimar, and connected itself with General Ruchel's corps. However, a fire of tirailleurs, which was heard on the Landgrafenberg, having excited a sort of alarm, and General Tauenzien applying for succour, the Prince of Hohenlohe ordered the Saxon brigade of Cerrini, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, and several squadrons of cavalry to get under arms, and despatched these forces to the Landgrafenberg, to dislodge from it the French, whom he conceived to be scarcely established on that point. At the moment when he was about to execute this resolution, Colonel de Massenbach brought him from the Duke of Brunswick a reiterated order not to involve himself in any serious action, to guard well the passages of the Saale, and particularly that of Dornburg, which excited uneasiness because some light troops had been perceived there. The Prince of Hohenlohe,

who had become one of the most obedient of lieutenants when he ought not to have been so, desisted at once, in compliance with these injunctions from the headquarters. It was singular, nevertheless, that in obeying the order not to fight he should abandon the débouche by which, on the morrow, a disastrous battle was to be forced upon him. Be this as it may, relinquishing the idea of retaking the Landgrafenberg, he contented himself with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerrini to General Tauenzien, and with placing at Nerkwitz, facing Dornburg, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, the Pelet fusiliers, a battalion of Schemmelpfennig, lastly, several detachments of cavalry and artillery, under the command of General Holzendorf. He sent some light horse to Dornburg itself, to learn what was passing there. The Prince of Hohenlohe confined himself to these dispositions: he returned to his headquarters at Capellendorf, near Weimar, saying that, with 50,000 men, and even 70,000, including Ruchel's corps, kept towards Dornburg by General Holzendorf, towards Jena by General Tauenzien, fronting to the road from Jena to Weimar, he would punish the two marshals Lannes and Augereau for their audacity, if they dared to attack him with the 30,000 or 40,000 French at their disposal, and retrieve the honour of the Prussian arms, seriously compromised at Schleiz and Saalfeld.

Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his last instructions to his lieutenants, and orders for his soldiers to get under arms. The night was cold, the country covered to a distance with a thick fog, like that which for some hours enveloped the field of Austerlitz. Escorted by men carrying torches, Napoleon went along the front of the troops, talking to the officers and soldiers. He explained the position of the two armies, demonstrated to them that the Prussians were as deeply compromised as the Austrians in the preceding year; that if vanquished in that engagement, they would be cut off from the Elbe and the Oder, separated from the Russians, and forced to abandon to the French the whole Prussian monarchy; that in such a situation the French corps which should suffer itself to be beaten would frustrate the grandest designs and disgrace itself for ever. He exhorted them to keep on their guard against the Prussian cavalry, and to receive it in square with their usual firmness. His words everywhere drew forth shouts of "Forward! *Vive l'Empereur!*" Though the fog was thick, yet through its veil the enemy's advanced posts perceived the glare of the torches, heard the acclamations of our soldiers, and went to give the alarm to General Tauenzien. At that moment the corps of Lannes set itself in motion on a signal from Napoleon. Suchet's division, formed into three brigades, advanced first. Claparède's brigade, composed of the 17th light and a battalion of élite, marched at the

head, deployed in a single line. On the wings of this line, and to preserve it from attacks of cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming the second brigade, were disposed in close column. Vedel's brigade deployed, closed this sort of square. On the left of Suchet's division, but a little in rear, came Gazan's division, ranged in two lines, and preceded by its artillery. Thus they advanced, groping their way through the fog. Suchet's division directed its course towards the village of Closewitz, which was on the right, Gazan's division towards the village of Cospoda, which was on the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick Augustus and Rechten, and the Prussian battalion of Zweifel, perceiving through the fog a mass in motion, fired all together. The 17th light sustained that fire, and immediately returned it. This fire of musketry was kept up for a few minutes, the parties seeing the flash and hearing the report, but not discerning one another. The French, on approaching, at length discovered the little wood which surrounded the village of Closewitz. General Claparède briskly threw himself into it, and after a fight hand to hand had soon carried it, as well as the village of Closewitz itself. Having deprived General Tauenzien's line of this appui, the French continued their march amidst the balls that issued from that thick fog. Gazan's division, on its part, took the village of Cospoda, and established itself there. Between these two villages, but a little further off, was a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, occupied by Erichsen's fusiliers. Gazan's division carried that also, and was then able to deploy more at its ease. At this moment the two divisions of Lannes were assailed by fresh discharges of artillery and musketry. These were from the Saxon grenadiers of the Cerrini brigade, who, after taking up the advanced posts of General Tauenzien, continued to move forward, firing battalion volleys with as much precision as if they had been at a review. The 17th light, which formed the head of Suchet's division, having exhausted its cartridges, was sent to the rear. The 34th took its place, kept up the fire for some time, then encountered the Saxon grenadiers with the bayonet, and broke them. The rout having soon extended to the whole corps of General Tauenzien, Gazan's and Suchet's divisions picked up about twenty pieces of cannon and many fugitives. From the Landgrafenberg, the undulated plateaux, on which the French had just deployed, gradually subsided, as we have said, to the little valley of the Ilm. Hence they marched rapidly upon sloping ground, at the heels of a fleeing enemy. In this quick movement they encountered two battalions of Cerrini, and also Pelet's fusiliers, which had been left in the environs of Closewitz. These troops were flung back for the rest of the day towards General Holzendorf, commissioned on the preceding day to guard the débouche of Dornburg.

This action had not lasted two hours. It was nine o'clock, and Napoleon had thus early realised the first part of his plan, which consisted in gaining the space necessary for deploying his army. At the same moment his instructions were executing at all points with remarkable punctuality. Towards the left, Marshal Augereau, having sent off Heudelet's division and likewise his artillery and cavalry to the extremity of the Mühlthal, on the highroad from Weimar, was climbing with Desjardins' division the back of the Landgrafenberg, and coming to form on the plateaux the left of Gazan's division. Marshal Soult, only one of whose divisions, that of General St. Hilaire, had arrived, was ascending from Löbstedt, in the rear of Closewitz, facing the positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Krone, occupied by the relics of Tauenzien's corps and by the detachment of General Holzendorf's. Marshal Ney, impatient to share in the battle, had detached from his corps a battalion of voltigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th light, two regiments of cavalry, and had gone on before with this body of élite. He entered Jena at the very hour when the first act of the engagement was over. Lastly, Murat, returning at a gallop with the dragoons and cuirassiers from reconnaissances executed on the Lower Saale, was mounting in breathless haste towards Jena. Napoleon resolved, therefore, to halt for a few moments on the conquered ground, to afford his troops time to get into line.

Meanwhile the fugitives belonging to General Tauenzien's force had given the alarm to the whole camp of the Prussians. At the sound of the cannon the Prince of Hohenlohe had hastened to the Weimar road, where the Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet believing the action to be general, and complaining that the troops were harassed by being obliged needlessly to get under arms. Being soon undeceived, he took his measures for giving battle. Knowing that the French had passed the Saale at Saalfeld, he had expected to see them make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, and drawn up his army along the road running from one to the other of these towns. As this conjecture was not realised, he was obliged to change his dispositions, and he did it with promptness and resolution. He sent the bulk of the Prussian infantry, under the command of General Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned by General Tauenzien. Towards the Schnecke, which was to form his right, he left the Niesemeuschel division, composed of the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prussian Boguslawski battalion, and of a numerous artillery, with orders to defend to the last extremity the winding slopes by which the Weimar road rises to the plateaux. To aid them he gave them the Cerrini brigade, rallied and reinforced by four Saxon battalions. In rear of his centre he

placed a reserve of five battalions, under General Dyherrn, to support General Grawert. He had the wrecks of Tauenzien's corps rallied at some distance from the field of battle, and supplied with ammunition. As for his left, he directed General Holzendorf to push forward, if he could, and to fall upon the right of the French, while he would himself endeavour to stop them in front. He sent General Ruchel information of what was passing, and begged him to hasten his march. Lastly, he hurried off himself with the Prussian cavalry and the artillery horsed to meet the French, for the purpose of keeping them in check and covering the formation of General Grawert's infantry.

It was about ten o'clock, and the action of the morning, interrupted for an hour, was about to begin again with greater violence. While, on the right, Marshal Soult, debouching from Löbstedt, was climbing the heights with St. Hilaire's division; while, in the centre, Marshal Lannes, with Suchet's and Gazan's divisions, was deploying on the plateaux won in the morning; and while, on the left, Marshal Augereau, ascending from the bottom of the Mühlthal, had reached the village of Iserstedt, Marshal Ney, in his ardour for fighting, had advanced with his 3000 men of the élite, concealed by the fog, and had placed himself between Lannes and Augereau, facing the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which occupied the centre of the field of battle. He arrived at the very moment when the Prince of Hohenlohe was hastening up at the head of the Prussian cavalry. Finding himself all at once facing the enemy, he engaged before the emperor had given orders for renewing the action. The horse-artillery of the Prince of Hohenlohe, having already placed itself in battery, Ney pushed the 10th chasseurs upon this artillery. This regiment, taking advantage of a clump of trees to form, dashed forward on the gallop, ascended by its right upon the flank of the Prussian artillery, cut down the gunners, and took seven pieces of cannon, under the fire of the whole line of the enemy. But a mass of Prussian cuirassiers rushed upon it, and it was obliged to retire with precipitation. Ney then despatched the 3rd hussars. This regiment, manœuvring as the 10th chasseurs had done, took advantage of the clump of trees to form, ascended upon the flank of the cuirassiers, then fell upon them suddenly, threw them into disorder, and forced them to retire. Two regiments of light cavalry, however, were not enough to make head against thirty squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers. Our chasseurs and our hussars were soon obliged to seek shelter behind our infantry. Marshal Ney then sent forward the battalion of grenadiers and the battalion of voltigeurs which he had brought, formed two squares, then placing himself in one of them, opposed the charges of the Prussian cavalry. He allowed the enemy's

cuirassiers to approach within twenty paces of his bayonets, and terrified them by the aspect of a motionless infantry which had reserved its fire. At his signal a discharge within point-blank range strewed the ground with dead and wounded. Though several times assailed, these two squares remained unbroken.

Napoleon, on the top of the Landgrafenberg, had been highly astonished to hear the firing recommence without his order. He learned with still more astonishment that Marshal Ney, whom he had supposed to be in rear, was engaged with the Prussians. He hastened up, greatly displeased, and on approaching Vierzehn-Heiligen, perceived from the height Marshal Ney defending himself in the middle of two weak squares against the whole of the Prussian cavalry. This heroic countenance was enough to dispel all displeasure. Napoleon sent General Bertrand with two regiments of light cavalry, all that he had at hand in the absence of Murat, to assist in extricating Ney, and ordered Lannes to advance with his infantry. During the time that elapsed before relief arrived, the intrepid Ney was not disconcerted. While, with four regiments of horse, he renewed his charges of cavalry, he moved the 25th infantry to his left, in order to appuy himself on the wood of Iserstedt, which Augereau, on his part, was striving to reach; he made the battalion of grenadiers advance as far as the little wood which had protected his chasseurs, and despatched the battalion of voltigeurs to gain possession of the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen. But at the same instant Lannes, coming to his assistance, threw the 21st regiment of light infantry into the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, and putting himself at the head of the 100th, 103rd, 34th, 64th, and 88th of the line, debouched in the face of the Prussian infantry of General Grawert. The latter deployed before the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen with a regularity of movement due to long exercises. It drew up in order of battle, and opened a regular and terrible fire of small arms. Ney's three little detachments suffered severely; but Lannes, ascending on the right of General Grawert's infantry, endeavoured to turn it in spite of repeated charges of the Prince of Hohenlohe's cavalry, which came to attack him in his march.

The Prince of Hohenlohe bravely supported his troops amidst the danger. The regiment of Sanitz was completely broken; he formed it anew under the fire. He then purposed that the Zastrow regiment should retake the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen at the point of the bayonet, hoping thereby to decide the victory. Meanwhile he was informed that more hostile columns began to appear; that General Holzendorf, engaged with superior forces, was incapable of seconding him; that General Ruchel, however, was on the point of joining him with his corps. He then judged it expedient to wait for this powerful succour, and poured a

shower of shells into the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, resolved to try the effect of flames before he attacked it with his bayonets. He sent at the same time officers after officers to General Ruchel to urge him to hasten up, and to promise him the victory if he arrived in time; for according to him the French were on the point of giving way. Vain illusion of an impetuous but blind courage! At that very hour Fortune was deciding otherwise. Augereau debouching at last from the wood of Iserstedt with Desjardins' division, disengaged Ney's left, and began to exchange a fire of musketry with the Saxons who were defending the Schnecke, while General Heudelet attacked them in column on the highroad from Jena to Weimar. On the other side of the field of battle the corps of Marshal Soult, after driving the remains of the Cerrini brigade, as well as the Pelet fusiliers, out of the wood of Closewitz, and flinging back Holzendorf's detachment to a distance, opened its guns on the flank of the Prussians. Napoleon, seeing the progress of his two wings, and learning the arrival of the troops which had been left in rear, was no longer afraid to bring into action all the forces present on the ground, the guard included, and gave orders for advancing. An irresistible impulsion was communicated to the whole line. The Prussians were driven back, broken, and hurled down the sloping ground which descends from Landgrafenberg to the valley of the Ilm. The regiments of Hohenlohe and the Hahn grenadiers of Grawert's division were almost entirely destroyed by the fire or by the bayonet. General Grawert himself was severely wounded while directing his infantry. No corps manifested greater firmness. The Cerrini brigade, assailed with grape, fell back upon the Dyherrn reserve, which in vain opposed its five battalions to the movement of the French. That reserve, being soon left uncovered, found itself attacked, surrounded on all sides, and forced to disperse. Tauenzien's corps, rallied for a moment and brought back into the fire by the Prince of Hohenlohe, was hurried away, like the others, in the general rout. The Prussian cavalry, taking advantage of the absence of the heavy French cavalry, made charges to cover its broken infantry; but our chasseurs and hussars kept it in check; and though driven back several times, returned incessantly to the charge, upheld, intoxicated by victory. A terrible carnage followed this disorderly retreat. At every step prisoners were made; artillery was taken by whole batteries.

In this great danger, General Ruchel at length made his appearance, but too late. He marched in two lines of infantry, having on the left the cavalry belonging to his corps, and on the right the Saxon cavalry, commanded by the brave General Zeschwitz, who had come of his own accord and taken that position. He ascended at a foot pace those plateaux sloping

from the Landgrafenberg to the Ilm. While mounting, Prussians and French poured down around him like a torrent, the one pursued by the other. He was thus met by a sort of tempest at the moment of his appearance on the field of battle. While he was advancing, his heart rent with grief at the sight of this disaster, the French rushed upon him with the impetuosity of victory. The cavalry which covered his left flank was first dispersed. That unfortunate general, an unwise but ardent friend of his country, was the first to oppose the shock in person. A ball entered his chest, and he was borne off dying in the arms of his soldiers. His infantry, deprived of the cavalry which covered it, found itself attacked in flank by the troops of Marshal Soult, and threatened in front by those of Marshals Lannes and Ney. The battalions placed at the left extremity of the line, seized with terror, dispersed and hurried along the rest of the corps in their flight. To aggravate the disaster, the French dragoons and cuirassiers came up at a gallop, under the conduct of Murat, impatient to take a share in the battle. They surrounded those hapless dispersed battalions, cut in pieces all who attempted to resist, and pursued the others to the banks of the Ilm, where they made a great number of prisoners.

On the field of battle were left only the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, which, after honourably defending the Schnecke against Heudelet's and Desjardins' divisions of Augereau's corps, had been forced in their position by the address of the French tirailleurs, and effected their retreat formed into two squares. These squares presented three sides of infantry and one of artillery, the latter being the rear side. The two Saxon brigades retired, halting alternately, firing their guns, and then resuming their march. Augereau's artillery followed, sending balls after them: a swarm of French tirailleurs ran after them, harassing them with their small arms. Murat, who had just overthrown the relics of Ruchel's corps, fell upon the two Saxon brigades, and ordered them to be charged to the utmost extremity by his dragoons and cuirassiers. The dragoons attacked first without forcing an entrance; but they returned to the charge, penetrated, and broke the square. General d'Hautpoul, with the cuirassiers, attacked the second, broke it, and made that havoc which a victorious cavalry inflicts on a broken infantry. Those unfortunate men had no other resource but to surrender. The Prussian battalion of Boguslawski was forced in its turn, and treated like the others. The brave General Zeschwitz, who had hastened with the Saxon cavalry to the assistance of its infantry, made vain efforts to support it, and was driven back, and forced to give way to the general rout.

Murat rallied his squadrons, and hastened to Weimar to collect fresh trophies. At some distance from that town were

crowded together, pell-mell, detachments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, at the top of a long and steep slope, formed by the highroad leading down to the bottom of the valley of the Ilm. These troops, confusedly huddled together, were supported upon a small wood, called the wood of Webicht. All at once the bright helmets of the French cavalry made their appearance. A few musket-shots were instinctively fired by this affrighted crowd. At this signal the mass, seized with terror, rushed down the hill, at the foot of which Weimar is situated: foot, horse, artillerymen, all tumbled one over another into this gulf —a new disaster, and well worthy of pity. Murat sent after them a part of his dragoons, who goaded on this mob with the points of their swords, and pursued it into the streets of Weimar. With the others he made a circuit to the other side of Weimar, and cut off the retreat of the fugitives, who surrendered by thousands.

Out of the 70,000 Prussians who had appeared on the field of battle, not a single corps remained entire, not one retreated in order. Out of the 100,000 French, composed of the corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, Murat, and the guard, not more than 50,000 had fought, and they had been sufficient to overthrow the Prussian army. The greater part of that army, seized with a sort of vertigo, throwing away its arms, ceasing to know either its colours or its officers, covered all the roads of Thuringia. About 12,000 Prussians and Saxons killed and wounded, about 4000 French killed and wounded also, strewed the ground from Jena to Weimar. On that ground were seen stretched a great number—a greater number, indeed, than usual—of Prussian officers, who had nobly paid for their silly passions with their lives. Fifteen thousand prisoners, 200 pieces of cannon, were in the hands of our soldiers, intoxicated with joy. The shells of the Prussians had set fire to the town of Jena, and from the plateaux where the battle was fought columns of flame were seen bursting from the dark bosom of night. French shells ploughed up the city of Weimar, and threatened it with a similar fate. The shrieks of fugitives while running through the streets, the tramp of Murat's cavalry dashing through them at a gallop, slaughtering without mercy all who were not quick enough in flinging down their arms, had filled with horror that charming city—the noble asylum of letters, the peaceful theatre of the most exquisite intercourse of mind that was then to be found in the world. At Weimar, as at Jena, part of the inhabitants had fled. The conquerors, disposing like masters of these almost deserted towns, established their magazines and their hospitals in the churches and public buildings. Napoleon, on returning from Jena, directed his attention, according to his custom, to the collecting of the

wounded, and heard shouts of *Vive l'Empereur !* mingled with the moans of the dying. Terrible scenes, the sight of which would be intolerable, did not the genius and heroism displayed redeem their horror, and did not glory, that light which embellishes everything, throw over them its dazzling rays!

But great as were the results already obtained, Napoleon knew not yet the full extent of his victory, nor the Prussians the full extent of their disaster. While the cannon were heard rolling at Jena, they were also heard in the distance, on the right towards Naumburg. Napoleon had often looked that way, saying that Marshals Davout and Bernadotte, who had around them 50,000 men, had not much to fear from the remnant of the Prussian army, the greater part of which he had had, as he conceived, upon his hands. He had several times repeated the order to hold out to the last man rather than abandon the bridge of Naumburg.

The Prince of Hohenlohe, who retired with a spirit racked by grief, had also heard the cannon towards Naumburg, and was inclined to proceed thither, alternately attracted and repelled by news brought from Auerstädt, the place where the army of the Duke of Brunswick was encamped. Scouts declared that this army had gained a complete victory; others said, on the contrary, that it had sustained a more signal disaster than the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe. The prince soon learned the truth. Here follows what passed on that same memorable day, marked by two sanguinary battles, fought at the distance of four leagues from one another.

The royal army had marched on the preceding day in five divisions on the highroad from Weimar to Naumburg. Crossing those plateaux, undulated like the waves of the sea, which form the surface of Thuringia, and terminate in abrupt hills towards the banks of the Saale, it had halted at Auerstädt, a little in advance of the defile of Kösen, a well-known military position. It had marched five or six leagues, and this was considered much for troops not accustomed to the fatigues of war. It had therefore bivouacked in the evening of the 13th of October in front and rear of the village of Auerstädt, and fared very ill, from not knowing how to subsist without magazines. Like the Prince of Hohenlohe, the Duke of Brunswick appeared to pay little attention to the outlets by which it was possible for the French to come upon him. Beyond Auerstädt, and before you reach the bridge of Naumburg, over the Saale, you come to a sort of basin of considerable magnitude, intersected by a rivulet, which after a few windings runs to join the Ilm and the Saale. This basin, the two sides of which incline towards each other, seems to be a field of battle ready formed to receive two armies, opposing nothing to their meeting but the slender obstacle of

a brook easy to cross. The road from Weimar to Naumburg runs all through it, at first descending towards the stream, crossing it by a bridge, then ascending on the opposite side, passing through a village called Hassenhausen, and which is the only point d'appui that there is on this clear spot. Beyond Hassenhausen, the road, having reached the outer margin of the basin in question, stops all at once, and descends by rapid windings to the banks of the Saale. Here is what is called the defile of Kösen. Below there is a bridge which has been named the bridge of Kösen or of Naumburg.

As it was known that the French were on the other side of the Saale, at Naumburg, it was natural to take a position with at least one division on the top of the winding descent of Kösen, not for the purpose of clearing the pass, which there was merely an idea of masking, but to bar the access against the French, while the other divisions should prosecute their movement of retreat, covered by the Saale.

Not an individual of the Prussian staff thought of this. They contented themselves with sending a few cavalry patroles to reconnoitre, and these retired after exchanging pistol-shots with the advanced posts of Marshal Davout. From these patroles it was learned that the French had not established themselves at the defile of Kösen, and it was concluded that all was safe. On the following day, three divisions were to pass through the basin that we have just described, to occupy the winding slopes which lead down to the banks of the Saale, and the two other divisions under Marshal Kalkreuth, marching after the first three, had orders to possess themselves of the bridge of Freyburg over the Unstrut, in order to secure to the army the passage of that tributary of the Saale.

In war it is in vain to think of many things if one does not think of all: the forgotten point is precisely the one by which the enemy surprises you. It was as gross a fault at this moment to neglect the defile of Kösen as to relinquish the Landgrafenberg to Napoleon.

Marshal Davout, whom Napoleon had placed at Naumburg, united with the soundest sense extraordinary firmness and inflexible severity. He was stimulated to vigilance as much by love of duty as by the feeling of a natural infirmity—very weak sight. Thus this illustrious warrior was indebted to a physical defect for a moral quality. Being scarcely able to discern objects, he took the pains to observe them very closely: when he had seen them himself, he made others look at them: he incessantly overwhelmed all about him with questions, and neither took any rest himself, nor allowed them any, till he thought himself sufficiently informed; never being content to live in that uncertainty in which so many generals go to sleep, and risk their

own glory and the lives of their soldiers. In the evening he had gone himself to ascertain what was passing in the defile of Kösen. Some prisoners, taken in a skirmish, had informed him that the Prussian grand army was approaching, headed by the king, the princes, and the Duke of Brunswick. He had immediately despatched a battalion to the bridge of Kösen, and enjoined these troops to be stirring by midnight, for the purpose of occupying the heights commanding the Saale before the enemy.

Marshal Bernadotte was at the moment at Naumburg, with orders to go to any point where he conceived that he should be most useful, and especially to second Marshal Davout if he had need of him. Marshal Davout proceeded to Naumburg, communicated to Marshal Bernadotte what he had just learned, proposed to him that they should give battle together, offered even to put himself under his command; for 46,000 men, which they had between them, were not too many to cope with the 80,000 that rumour assigned to the Prussian army. Marshal Davout urged this proposal for the sake of the most important considerations. Had Marshal Lannes or any other been in the place of Marshal Bernadotte, so much time would not have been lost in useless explanations. The generous Lannes would on the appearance of the enemy have embraced even a hated rival, and have fought with the utmost devotedness. But Marshal Bernadotte, interpreting the emperor's orders in the falsest manner, absolutely persisted in leaving Naumburg and proceeding to Dornburg, where the enemy was not stated to be.* Whence could so strange a resolution proceed? It proceeded from that detestable sentiment which often causes the blood of men, the welfare of the State, to be sacrificed to envy, to hatred, to revenge. Marshal Bernadotte felt a deep aversion, conceived on the most frivolous motives, for Marshal Davout. The latter

* We quote a letter from the emperor to the Prince of Ponte Corvo, written after the battle of Auerstädt, which confirms all our assertions. It manifests a dissatisfaction which Napoleon felt still more strongly than he expressed.

"To the Prince of Ponte Corvo.

"WITTENBERG, *23rd October* 1806.

"I have received your letter. I am not in the habit of recriminating upon the past, since it is without remedy. Your *corps d'armée* was not on the field of battle, and that might have been extremely disastrous for me. Still, agreeably to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal débouches of the Saale, on the same day that Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kala, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In default of having executed these dispositions, I had let you know in the night, that, if you were still at Naumburg, you were to march towards Marshal Davout for the purpose of supporting him. When this order arrived you were at Naumburg; and yet you preferred making a false march and returning to Dornburg, and in consequence you were not at the battle, and Marshal Davout had principally to bear the brunt of the enemy's efforts. All this is certainly very unfortunate, &c. NAPOLEON."

was left with three divisions of infantry and three regiments of light cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte took with him a division of dragoons, which had been detached from the cavalry reserve to second the first and the third corps, and which he had no right to dispose of exclusively.

Marshal Davout, however, was under no hesitation concerning the resolution which he had to take. He determined to bar the enemy's way, and to perish with the last men of his corps rather than leave open a road which Napoleon made it such an important point to close. In the night between the 13th and 14th he was on march for the bridge of Kösen, with the three divisions of Gudin, Friant, and Morand, forming 26,000 men present under arms, the greater part infantry, luckily the best in the army, for the discipline was of iron under that inflexible marshal. With these 26,000 men he expected to have to fight 70,000 according to some, 80,000 according to others, in reality 66,000. As for the soldiers, they were not accustomed to count their enemies, how numerous soever they might be. Under all circumstances, they held themselves bound and certain to conquer.

The marshal having his troops under arms long before it was light, crossed the bridge of Kösen, which he had occupied the preceding evening, ascended with Friant's division the winding slopes of Kösen, and debouched about six in the morning on the heights forming one side of the basin of Hassenhausen. In a few moments the Prussians appeared on the opposite side, so that the armies might have perceived each other at the two extremities of this kind of amphitheatre, if the fog which at that hour enveloped the field of battle of Jena had not covered that of Auerstädt also. The Prussian division of Schmettau marched at the head, preceded by an advanced guard of 600 horse, under the command of General Blucher. A little in rear came the king, with the Duke of Brunswick and Marshal Mollendorf. General Blucher had descended to the muddy stream which runs through the basin, crossed the little bridge, and was ascending the highroad at a foot pace, when he met a French detachment of cavalry commanded by Colonel Bourke and Captain Hulot. Pistol-shots were exchanged amidst the fog, and on our side some prisoners were taken from the Prussians. The French detachment, after this bold reconnaissance, executed in a dense fog, went and placed itself under the protection of the 25th of the line, headed by Marshal Davout. The marshal ordered some pieces of artillery to be placed on the road itself, and fired with grape at General Blucher's 600 horse, who were soon thrown into great disorder. A horsed battery, which followed this detachment of cavalry, was taken by two companies of the 25th, and conveyed to Hassenhausen. This first encounter revealed the extremely critical nature of the situation. We should have a great battle to fight.

At any rate, the fog must retard the engagement, for neither party could attempt any serious movement in presence of an enemy who might be said to be invisible. Marshal Davout, coming from Naumburg to cut off the retreat of the Prussians, turned his back on the Elbe and on Germany. He had the Saale on his left, wooded heights on his right; the Prussians coming from Weimar had the contrary position. Marshal Davout, thanks to the delay caused by the fog, had time to post in a suitable manner Gudin's division, the first that arrived, and composed of the 25th, 85th, 12th, and 21st of the line, and six squadrons of chasseurs. He placed the 85th in the village of Hassenhausen, and as on the right of Hassenhausen (the right of the French) there was a small wood of willows, he dispersed in this wood a great number of tirailleurs, who opened a destructive fire upon the Prussian line, which began to be discernible. The three other regiments were posted on the right of the village, two of them deployed, and ranged in such a manner as to present a double line, the third in column, ready to form into square on the flank of the division. The ground on the left of Hassenhausen was reserved for the troops of General Morand. As for those of General Friant, their position would be determined by the circumstances of the battle.

The King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Marshal Mollendorf, who had crossed the rivulet with Schmettau's division, deliberated, at sight of the dispositions which they perceived in front of Hassenhausen, whether they should attack immediately. The Duke of Brunswick advised waiting for Wartensleben's division, that they might act with greater unity; but the king and Marshal Mollendorf were of opinion that the combat should not be deferred. Besides, the fire of musketry became so brisk that it was necessary to reply to it and to engage immediately. They deployed therefore with Schmettau's division, facing the ground occupied by the French, having before them Hassenhausen, which, situated amidst this open ground, was soon to become the pivot of the battle. They tried to repulse the French tirailleurs in ambush behind the willows, but with no effect, and then they moved a little to the right of Hassenhausen (right for the French, left for the Prussians) to secure themselves from a downward and destructive fire. Schmettau's division approached the lines of our infantry to fire at it, and the fog beginning to clear off, it discovered the infantry of Gudin's division drawn up to the right of Hassenhausen. At this sight General Blucher collected his numerous cavalry, and making a circuit, advanced to charge Gudin's division in flank. The latter, however, did not allow him time to do so. The 25th, which was in first line, immediately formed its right battalion into square; the 21st, which was in second

line, followed that example; lastly, the 12th regiment, which was in rearguard, formed a single square of its two battalions, and these three masses, bristling with bayonets, waited with calm assurance for General Blucher's squadrons. Generals Petit, Gudin, Gauthier, had each placed themselves in a square. The marshal went from one to another. General Blucher, who was distinguished for impetuous courage, made a first charge, which he took care to direct in person. But his squadrons failed to reach our bayonets, a shower of balls stopping them short, and obliging them to turn about precipitately. General Blucher had his horse killed; he took that of a trumpeter, made three more attempts to charge, but always unsuccessfully, and was soon himself borne away in the rout of his cavalry. Our squadrons of chasseurs, carefully kept in reserve under the protection of a small wood, dashed away in pursuit of that fugitive cavalry, and obliged it to scamper off still more speedily by killing several men.

Thus far the third corps maintained its ground without any wavering. Friant's division, which had behaved so well at Austerlitz, appeared at this moment on the field of battle. Marshal Davout, perceiving that the enemy's efforts were directed upon the right of Hassenhausen, sent Friant's division to that point, and concentrated Gudin's division around Hassenhausen, which according to all appearance was about to be violently attacked. He sent orders at the same time to General Morand to hasten his coming, and to place himself on the left of the village.

On the side of the Prussians, the second division, that of Wartensleben, arrived quite out of breath, delayed as it had been by an encumbrance of the baggage, which had taken place on its rear. Orange's division also arrived breathless, having been long detained by the same cause. From a deficiency of the habit of war, the movements of that army were slow, unconnected, awkward.

The moment had arrived when the combat began to be furious. Wartensleben's division moved to the left of Hassenhausen, while Schmettau's division, led with vigour by the Prussian officers, advanced in front of Hassenhausen itself, then drew back its two wings above that village, in order to surround it. Fortunately three of General Gudin's regiments had thrown themselves into it. The 85th, which occupied the front of it, behaved in this engagement with heroic valour. Driven back into the interior of the village, it barred the passage into it with invincible firmness, replying by a continued and well-directed fire to the tremendous mass of the Prussian fire. That regiment had lost more than half of its effective; still it stood firm and unshaken. Meanwhile, Wartensleben's division, taking advantage of the circumstance that Morand's division had not yet occupied the left of Hassenhausen, threatened to turn the

village, having an immense cavalry to precede it. At this sight General Gudin had deployed the fourth of his regiments, the 12th, to the left of Hassenhausen, to prevent his being turned. It was evident to all eyes that, on this open ground, the village of Hassenhausen being the only appui of the one, the only obstacle to the other, the possession of it must be obstinately disputed. The brave General Schmettau, at the head of his infantry, received a shot which obliged him to retire. The Duke of Brunswick, witnessing the determined resistance of the French, felt a secret despair, and believed that the catastrophe, a presentiment of which had for a month past oppressed his dejected spirit, was near at hand. This aged warrior, hesitating in council, never under fire, resolved to put himself at the head of the Prussian grenadiers, and to lead them to the assault of Hassenhausen, along a ridge of ground running by the side of the road, and by which the village might be more surely reached. While encouraging and showing them the way, a rifle ball struck him in the face and gave him a mortal wound. He was borne away with a handkerchief over his face, that the army might not recognise the illustrious sufferer. On the news of this event a noble rage seized the Prussian staff. The worthy Mollendorf determined not to survive that day; he advanced, and was in his turn mortally wounded. The king and the princes exposed themselves to danger like the lowest of the soldiers. The king had a horse killed, but would not move out of the fire. At length the division of Orange arrived. It was parted into two brigades; one went to support Wartensleben's division on the left of Hassenhausen (left of the French), to try to reduce that position by turning it; the other to occupy the space left vacant by Schmettau's division, and to throw itself upon Hassenhausen. This second brigade was especially destined to curb Friant's division, which began to gain ground on the flank of the Prussian army.

Marshal Davout, ever present in the greatest danger, pushed to the right Friant's division, which was exchanging a brisk fire of musketry with the brigade of the Orange division opposed to it. At the centre, at Hassenhausen itself, he cheered all hearts by announcing the arrival of Morand. At length Morand appeared on the left, and he hastened thither to range that division, not the bravest of the three, for all were equally brave, but the most numerous. The intrepid Morand brought five regiments, the 13th light, and the 61st, 51st, 30th, and 17th of the line. These five regiments furnished nine battalions, the 10th having been left to guard the bridge of Kösen. They came to occupy the level ground which is on the left of Hassenhausen. The Prussians had planted upon this ground a numerous artillery, ready to play upon any troops that might

appear. Each of the nine battalions, after ascending the winding slopes of Kösen, would have to debouch upon the plateau, amidst the grapeshot of the enemy. They deployed, however, one after another, forming at the very moment when they got into line, in spite of the repeated discharges of the Prussian artillery. The 13th light appeared first, formed, and moved rapidly forward; but having advanced too far, it was obliged to fall back upon the other regiments. The 61st, which came next, received in the same manner as the 31st, was not staggered by it. A soldier, whom his comrades had nicknamed the Emperor, on account of a certain resemblance to Napoleon, perceiving some wavering in his company, ran forward, drew himself up erect, and cried, "My lads, follow your Emperor!" All followed him, keeping close to each other, amidst that shower of grapeshot. The nine battalions finished deploying, and marched in columns, with their artillery in the interval between one battalion and the next. Marshal Davout, while conducting his battalions, was struck on the head by a rifle ball, which pierced his hat at the height of the cockade, and carried away some hair, without touching the skull. The nine battalions placed themselves facing the enemy's line, and obliged Wartensleben's division to fall back, as well as the brigade of Orange, which came to its support. By gaining ground they disengaged the flank of Hassenhausen, and obliged Schmettau's division to draw back its wings, which it had extended around the village. After a long firing of musketry, Morand's division perceived a fresh storm gathering over its head: an enormous mass of cavalry was seen collecting behind the ranks of Wartensleben's division. The royal army had with it the better and more numerous portion of the Prussian cavalry. It could produce 14,000 or 15,000 horse, excellently mounted, and trained to manœuvres by long exercises. With this mass of cavalry the Prussians intended to make a desperate effort against Morand's division. They flattered themselves that, on the level ground between Hassenhausen and the Saale, they should trample it under their horses' feet, or hurl it from top to bottom of the spiral slopes of Kösen. If they succeeded, the left of the French army being overthrown, Hassenhausen surrounded, Gudin taken in the village, Friant's division could do no other than beat a running retreat. But General Morand, on perceiving this assemblage, disposed seven of his battalions in squares, and left two deployed, to connect him with Hassenhausen. He placed himself in one of these squares, Marshal Davout placed himself in another, and they prepared to receive with firmness the mass of enemies ready to rush upon them. All at once the ranks of Wartensleben's infantry opened, and vomited forth torrents of Prussian cavalry, which at this point numbered not fewer than 10,000

horse, led by Prince William. It attempted a series of charges, which were several times renewed. Every time our intrepid foot-soldiers, coolly awaiting the order of their officers, allowed the enemy's squadrons to come within thirty or forty paces of their lines, and then poured upon them volleys so well aimed and so destructive as to strike down hundreds of men and horses, and thus to form for themselves a rampart of carcases. In the interval between these charges, General Morand and Marshal Davout passed from one square to another, to give to each of them the encouragement of their presence. The Prussian horse repeated these fierce assaults, but never advanced even so far as our bayonets. At length, after a frequent repetition of this tumultuous scene, the disheartened Prussian cavalry retired behind its infantry. Then General Morand, breaking his squares, deployed his battalions, formed them into columns of attack, and pushed them upon Wartensleben's division. The Prussian infantry, assailed with vigour, gave way before our soldiers, and descended, while falling back, to the bank of the rivulet. At the same time, General Friant, on the right, forced the first brigade of the division of Orange to retire; and in consequence of this double movement, Schmettau's division, left exposed on both its wings, horribly decimated, was compelled to give way, and to move off from that village of Hassenhausen, so violently contested with Gudin's division.

The three Prussian divisions were thus driven beyond the marshy brook which runs through the field of battle. There the French army halted for a moment to take breath, for that unequal combat had lasted for six hours, and our soldiers were fatigued to death. Gudin's division, charged to defend Hassenhausen, had sustained prodigious loss; but Friant's division had suffered moderately; Morand's division, not much hurt by the cavalry, like all infantry that has not been broken, but worse treated by the artillery, was nevertheless in fighting condition, and all three were ready to begin again if necessary, in order to make head against the two Prussian divisions of reserve, which had remained spectators of the engagement on the opposite side of the basin where the battle took place. These two divisions of reserve, Kühnheim's and Arnim's, under Marshal Kalkreuth, awaited the signal for entering into line in their turn, and renewing the conflict.

Meanwhile those around the King of Prussia were engaged in deliberation. General Blucher was for uniting the entire mass of cavalry with the two divisions of reserve, and dashing with fury upon the enemy. The king had at first been of the same opinion, but it was represented to him that if they waited but for a single day they should be joined by Prince Hohenlohe's and General Ruchel's corps, and that they should crush the

French by means of this union of forces. The supposition was not well founded; for if they were authorised to reckon upon the junction of the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the French whom they had before them were likely to be joined also by the grand army. No chance, therefore, could be better than that which might be found in a last effort, made immediately, and with the determination to conquer or die, though that chance was not great, considering the state of Friant's and Morand's divisions. Orders, however, were given for retreat. The king had shown remarkable bravery, but bravery is not firmness. Besides, the minds of those about him were overwhelmed with despondency.

The movement of retreat was commenced in the afternoon. Marshal Kalkreuth went forward to cover it with his two fresh divisions. General Morand had taken advantage of an elevation, called the Sonnenberg, to place batteries, which poured a most incommodious fire upon the right of the Prussians. Marshal Davout set in motion his three divisions, and carried them briskly beyond the brook. They marched in spite of the fire of the divisions of reserve, came up within musket-shot of them, and forced them to retreat, without disorder, it is true, but precipitately. If Marshal Davout had had the regiment of dragoons carried away with him by Marshal Bernadotte on the preceding day, he might have taken thousands of prisoners. He did nevertheless take 3000, besides 115 pieces of cannon—an enormous capture for a corps which had itself only 44. On reaching the other side of the basin where the battle had been fought he halted his infantry, and perceiving the troops of Marshal Bernadotte in the environs of Apolda, he requested him to fall upon the enemy, and to pick up the vanquished whom his corps, exhausted with fatigue, could not pursue much longer. The soldiers of Marshal Bernadotte were indignant, and asked one another what could be thought of their courage at such a moment.

The Prussian army had lost 3000 prisoners, 9000 or 10,000 men killed and wounded, besides the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mollendorf, and General Schmettau, mortally, and a prodigious number of other officers, who had bravely done their duty. The corps of Marshal Davout had sustained a heavy loss. Out of 26,000 men there were 7000 hors de combat. Generals Morand and Gudin were wounded; General de Billy was killed; half the generals of brigade and colonels were dead or severely wounded. Never since Marengo had there been so bloody a day for the arms of France, and never had a grander example of heroic firmness been given by a general and his soldiers.

The royal army retired under the protection of the two divisions of reserve, commanded by Marshal Kalkreuth. The rendezvous appointed for all the corps disorganised by the battle was Weimar, behind Prince Hohenlohe, who was supposed to be

still safe and sound. The king marched thither, deeply grieved, no doubt, but yet calculating, if not on a turn of fortune, at least on a retreat in good order, thanks to the 70,000 men under the Prince of Hohenlohe and General Ruchel. He was proceeding, accompanied by a strong detachment of cavalry, when the troops of Marshal Bernadotte were descried on the rear of the field of battle of Jena. At sight of them no doubt was entertained that some accident had befallen the army of Prince Hohenlohe. Precipitately leaving the Weimar road, the Prussians turned off to the right into that of Sommerda. But the whole truth was soon known, for the army of Prince Hohenlohe sought at that moment from the king's army that support which the king's army was seeking from it. They met in a thousand detached parties, running in all directions, and each learned that the other had been beaten. At this intelligence, the disorder, not so great at first in the king's army, because it was not pursued, rose to the highest pitch. A sudden panic seized the minds of all: they set off running confusedly along the highroads and the by-roads, seeing the enemy everywhere, and taking affrighted fugitives themselves for the victorious French. To aggravate the disaster, they found upon the roads that enormous mass of baggage which the Prussian army, softened by a long peace, carried with it, and among the rest a quantity of royal baggage, not in accordance with the personal simplicity of King Frederick William, but which the presence of the court had rendered necessary. Impatient to withdraw from the danger, the two Prussian armies regarded these obstacles to the rapidity of their flight as a calamity. The cavalry turned off, crossing the country, and escaping in detached squadrons. The infantry broke their ranks, ransacking and overturning this incommodious baggage, and leaving to the conqueror the trouble of pillaging it, because they were anxious above all things to get away. The two divisions of Marshal Kalkreuth, which alone had hitherto continued in good order, were soon infected with the general despair; and in spite of the energy of their commander, they began to disband themselves. The ranks thinned from hour to hour, and the soldiers, who had not shared the passions of their officers, thought that the simplest way to escape the consequences of the defeat was to fling away their arms and hide themselves in the woods. The roads were strewed with knapsacks, muskets, cannon. Thus it was that the Prussian army retired across the plains of Thuringia, and towards the mountains of the Harz, presenting a very different spectacle from that which it had a few days before exhibited, when it promised to behave before the French far otherwise than the Austrians and the Russians had done.*

* We merely repeat here the statements made by Prussian officers themselves in the various narratives which they have published.

The army of Hohenlohe fled partly to the right towards Sommerda, partly to the left towards Erfurt, beyond Weimar. Half of the royal army, that which had first quitted the field of battle with orders to proceed to Weimar, finding that town in the hands of the enemy, went to Erfurt, carrying its mortally wounded chiefs, the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mollendorf, and General Schmettau, along with it. The rest of the royal army marched towards Sommerda, not that this was ordered, but because Sommerda and Erfurt were towns situated on the rear of the country in which they had fought. Since that delirium of terror which had seized all heads, no person was capable of giving an order. The king, surrounded by some cavalry, marched towards Sommerda. The Prince of Hohenlohe, who had retired with 1200 or 1500 horse, had not 200 when he arrived next morning, the 15th, at Tennstädt. He made inquiries about the king, who, on his part, inquired about him. No chief knew where the others were.

During that terrible night the victors suffered not less than the vanquished. They lay upon the ground, bivouacking in an intensely cold night, having scarcely anything to eat after a day of battle naturally unproductive of provisions. Many of them, wounded more or less severely, were stretched on the bare earth beside wounded enemies, mingling their groans; for it is not in so short a time that the best organised medical establishment could have picked up 12,000 or 15,000 wounded. Napoleon, from feeling as much as from calculation, had for several hours personally superintended their removal; and he had then returned to Jena, where he, too, had found an accession of news, namely, the account of a second victory still more glorious than that which had been gained before his own eyes. He refused at first to believe all that was told him, because a letter from Marshal Bernadotte, in order to excuse by a lie his unpardonable conduct, asserted that Marshal Davout had not more than 9000 or 10,000 men before him. Captain Trobriant, an officer of Marshal Davout's, having come to apprise him that he had 70,000 men to fight, he could not believe this statement, and replied, "Your marshal must see double." But when he was made acquainted with all the details his joy was extreme, and he lavished praises and soon afterwards recompenses upon the admirable conduct of the third corps. He was indignant with Marshal Bernadotte, but not much surprised. In the first moment he intended to use the utmost rigour, and even thought of ordering a trial before a council of war. But relationship, and a sort of weakness which would not allow him to vent spleen otherwise than in vehement words, softened down his resolution of severity into a dissatisfaction, which, for the rest, he took no pains to conceal. Marshal Bernadotte got off with letters from

Prince Berthier and Napoleon himself—letters which must have made him profoundly wretched if he had possessed the heart of a citizen and a soldier.

Next morning Marshal Duroc was sent to Naumburg. He was the bearer of a letter from the emperor to Marshal Davout, and signal testimonies of satisfaction for the whole *corps d'armée.* "Your soldiers and yourself, monsieur le maréchal," said Napoleon, "have gained an everlasting right to my esteem and gratitude." Duroc was to go to the hospitals, to visit the wounded, to convey to them the promise of magnificent rewards, and to distribute money among all those who were in need of it. The emperor's letter was read in the chambers where the wounded were crowded together, and these unfortunate men, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* amidst their sufferings, expressed a desire for the recovery of their health, that they might again devote their lives to him.

On the very next day, the 15th of October, Napoleon took measures for following up the victory with that activity which no captain, ancient or modern, has ever equalled. In the first place he enjoined Marshals Davout, Lannes, and Augereau, whose corps had suffered much on the 14th, to rest for two or three days at Naumburg, Jena, and Weimar. But Marshal Bernadotte, whose soldiers had not fired a shot, Marshals Soult and Ney, part only of whose troops had been engaged, Murat, whose cavalry had suffered nothing but fatigue, were ordered forward to harass the Prussian army, to pick up its wrecks, easy to capture in the state of disorganisation into which it had fallen. Murat, who had slept at Weimar, had orders to hasten with his dragoons to Erfurt on the morning of the 15th, and Ney to follow him immediately. Marshal Soult was to march by Sommerda, Greussen, Sondershausen, Nordhausen, after the enemy's army, to pursue it through Thuringia towards the mountains of the Harz, where it seemed in its disorder to purpose seeking refuge. Marshal Bernadotte was enjoined to direct his course that very day towards the Elbe, by proceeding towards the right of the army through Halle and Dessau. It will be remarked that Napoleon, careful to concentrate himself on the eve of a great battle, next day, when he had struck the enemy, spread his corps, like a vast net, to catch all that fled, skilful in thus modifying the application of the principles of war according to circumstances, and always with that accuracy and fitness which ensures success.

Having given these orders, Napoleon bestowed some attention on politics. The direction which the Prussians were following in their retreat removed them to a distance from Saxony. Napoleon held, moreover, in his power a considerable number of Saxon troops, who had fought honourably, though far from pleased either at the war into which their country had been

dragged, or with the ill-usage of which they conceived that they had reason to complain on the part of the Prussians. Napoleon assembled the officers of the Saxon troops at Jena in one of the halls of the University. Making use of an employé of the foreign affairs, called to be about him, he addressed them in words which were immediately translated. He said that he knew not why he was at war with their sovereign, a wise, pacific prince, and deserving of respect; that he had even drawn the sword to rescue their country from the humiliating dependence in which it was held by Prussia, and that he could not see why the Saxons and the French, with so few motives for hating each other, should persist in fighting together; that he was ready, for his part, to give a first pledge of his amicable dispositions by setting them at liberty, and by sparing Saxony, provided that they would promise on their part never more to bear arms against France; and that the principal of them should go to Dresden to propose peace and to induce its acceptance. The Saxon officers, seized with admiration on beholding the extraordinary personage who was speaking to them, touched by the generosity of his proposals, replied by a unanimous oath not to serve, either themselves or their soldiers, during that war. Some of them offered to set out immediately for Dresden, declaring that before the end of three days they would be back, bringing the consent of their sovereign.

By this politic act Napoleon purposed to disarm German patriotism, so strongly excited through the efforts of Prussia, and by treating a prince justly respected with this kindness, to acquire a right to treat with severity a prince whom nobody esteemed. This latter was the Elector of Hesse, who had contributed by his falsehoods to provoke the war, and who since the war sought to traffic with his adhesion, resolved to give himself up to that power of the two which victory should favour. He was a secret enemy, devoted to the English, with whom he had deposited his wealth. Napoleon, on advancing into Prussia, did not care to leave such an enemy on his rear. The principles of war commanded him to be got rid of, and those of an upright policy did not defend him, for this prince had been a faithless neighbour both to Prussia and France. Immediately, before he proceeded further, Napoleon ordered the eighth corps to leave Mayence and to march to Cassel, though that corps could not yet number more than 10,000 or 12,000 men. He directed his brother Louis to march by Westphalia for Hesse, and to join Marshal Mortier with 12,000 or 15,000 men, in order to concur in the execution of the decrees of victory. However, deeming it inexpedient to charge one of his brothers with so rigorous a commission, he advised King Louis to send his troops to Marshal Mortier, and to relinquish to the

latter the execution of the task of dispossessing the house of Hesse, with the obedience and the probity that distinguished him. Marshal Mortier was to declare that the Elector of Hesse had ceased to reign (a form already adopted in regard to the house of Naples), to take possession of his dominions in the name of France, and to disband his army, giving to such of the Hessian soldiers as chose to continue to serve the offer of going to Italy. They were mostly robust men, well-disciplined, accustomed to bear arms out of their own country in behalf of those who paid them, especially in behalf of the English, who employed them in India with great advantage. The Hessian army was composed of 32,000 of all arms. It was an important point not to leave behind one this formidable force, especially when expecting to proceed so far northward as Napoleon intended to do.

With these different orders Napoleon sent tidings of his brilliant successes, tidings which could not fail to dispel the hopes of his enemies and the fears of his friends, and to increase in his soldiers left in the interior a zeal to join the grand army. According to custom he added a multitude of instructions for the calling out of the conscripts, for the organisation of the depôts, for the departure of the detachments destined to recruit incomplete regiments, and for the regulation of the civil affairs, which during his reign never suffered from the preoccupations of war.

From Jena Napoleon proceeded to Weimar. He found there the whole court of the grand duke, including the grand duchess, sister of the Emperor Alexander. The grand duke alone was absent, having the command of a Prussian division. This polished and learned court had made Weimar the Athens of modern Germany, and under its protection Goethe, Schiller, Wieland, lived honoured, rich, and happy. The grand duchess, who was accused of having contributed to the war, went to meet Napoleon, and agitated at the tumult which prevailed around her, she said, on approaching him, "Sire, I recommend my subjects to you." "You see, madam, what war is," replied Napoleon coldly. For the rest, he confined himself to this vengeance, and treated this inimical but lettered court as Alexander would have treated a city of Greece, showed himself full of courtesy towards the grand duchess, expressed to her no displeasure at the conduct of her husband, caused the town of Weimar to be respected, and ordered due attention to be paid to the wounded generals of whom it was full. From Weimar he bore to the right, directing his course to Naumburg, to congratulate in person the corps of Marshal Davout, while his lieutenants were pursuing the Prussian army to the last extremity.

In this interval the indefatigable Murat had galloped with his squadrons to Erfurt, and invested the place, which, though of but moderate strength, was surrounded with very good walls

and provided with a considerable matériel. It was crowded with wounded and fugitives. Thither had been conveyed Marshal Mollendorf, to whom Napoleon had ordered the utmost attention to be paid. Murat summoned Erfurt, and employed Marshal Ney's infantry to enforce the summons. Among the Prussian fugitives there was not one capable of making head against the French, and of replying by any energetic resistance to the impetuosity of their pursuit. Besides, 14,000 or 15,000 fugitives, 6000 of whom were wounded, most of them dying, were anything but elements of defence. The place capitulated in the evening of the 15th. Here were picked up, exclusive of the 6000 wounded Prussians, 9000 prisoners and an immense booty. Murat and Ney left the town immediately, to pursue the main body of the Prussian army.

Murat had sent Klein's dragoons to Weissensee, to intercept the corps that were fleeing separately. That town was between Sommerda, where the King of Prussia had passed the first night, and Sondershausen, where he was to pass the second. General Klein reached it before the Prussians. General Blucher, on arriving with his cavalry, was quite astonished to find Murat's dragoons already in his way. Having desired to parley, he entered into a sort of negotiation with General Klein, founded on a letter alleged to have been written by Napoleon to the King of Prussia, a letter containing, it was said, offers of peace: he affirmed upon his word that an armistice had just been signed. General Klein believed General Blucher, and opposed no obstacle to his retreat. This stratagem saved the relics of the Prussian army. General Blucher and Marshal Kalkreuth were thus enabled to repair to Greussen. But Marshal Soult was following these corps upon the same road. Next morning, the 16th, he overtook at Greussen the rearguard of Marshal Kalkreuth, who, wishing to gain time, had recourse in his turn to the fable of an armistice. Marshal Soult was not to be duped: he declared that he disbelieved the existence of an armistice; and after passing a few moments in parley, in order to allow his infantry time to rejoin, he attacked Greussen, carried it by main force, and picked up many more prisoners, horses, and cannon.

On the following day, the 17th, pursued and pursuers continued their course for Sondershausen and Nordhausen, the one abandoning to the other baggage, cannon, entire battalions. More than 200 pieces of artillery had already been picked up on all the roads, and several thousand prisoners.

The King of Prussia, on arriving at Nordhausen, found the Prince of Hohenlohe there. Still believing in the talents of that general, who had been beaten like the Duke of Brunswick, but who had in the eyes of the army the merit of having censured the plan of the generalissimo, he conferred upon him the command-

in-chief. At the same time he left the command of the two divisions of the reserve to old Kalkreuth, who had also the merit of having found great fault with all that had been done. This was the only measure taken by the king after that great disaster. Dejected, reserved, showing a stern countenance to those senseless persons who had been partisans of war, but sparing them reproaches, which they might have returned, for if they had been silly, he had been weak, he proceeded towards Berlin, at a moment when his presence with the army was most needed to restore the temper of downcast, divided, sour minds, to mould all those wrecks into a corps which should retard the passage of the Elbe, cover Berlin for some time, and on retiring to the Oder bring to the Russians a contingent of a certain value. This departure was a serious fault, and unworthy of the personal courage shown by Frederick William during the battle. That monarch added but one act to the nomination of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and that was to write to Napoleon, to express his regret at being at war with France, and to propose to open a negotiation immediately.

The king, having left the headquarters without giving any military instructions to his generals, these acted without the slightest concert. The Prince of Hohenlohe collected the wrecks of the two armies, excepting the reserve committed to Marshal Kalkreuth, and formed it into three detachments, two of troops retaining some organisation, the third containing the mass of the runaways. He directed them all by a movement to the right towards the Elbe, making them march by three different lines of route, but all running in the same direction, from Nordhausen to Magdeburg. There would have been little advantage in throwing himself into the Harz, for besides the deficiency of resources in the way of provisions, that mountainous chain was neither sufficiently distant, nor had it depth enough to serve for an asylum to the fugitive army. It would have been pursued thither by the French, who are very alert in mountains, and perhaps, on crossing the chain, it would have found them beyond it, barring the way to the Elbe. It was, therefore, a judicious determination to turn off to the right, with a view to proceed directly to the Elbe and Magdeburg. It dragged along with it, nevertheless, a train of heavy artillery, which greatly retarded its march. The idea was conceived of consigning it to the care of General Blucher, who, turning the mountains of the Harz on the opposite side by Osterode, Seesen, and Brunswick, was likely to descend into the plains of Hanover without being followed by the French; for it was to be presumed that these would throw themselves en masse into the track of the Prussian main army, and not run after a detachment along the difficult roads of Hesse. In consequence, General Blucher, with two battalions and a

considerable corps of cavalry, undertook to escort the great park. The Duke of Weimar, who had plunged with the advanced guard into the forest of Thuringia, soon left it on hearing of the two lost battles. Keeping along the foot of the mountains, he skirted at as great a distance as possible the two armies, French and Prussian. He received timely information of the movement which General Blucher was to execute, and resolved to join him by way of Osterode and Seesen. Marshal Kalkreuth, after halting a few hours at Nordhausen to cover the retreat, proceeded directly for the Elbe, below Magdeburg, choosing to march alone, dissatisfied at having passed under the command of two successive generals whom he held in little estimation, while he conceived, and not without reason, that he had himself deserved the chief command.

Marshals Ney, Soult, and Murat started in pursuit of the main Prussian army, making forced marches to overtake it, and taking prisoners and matériel at every step. But the route from Nordhausen to Magdeburg was not long enough to allow them time to get up with the Prussians. They attained, however, the principal object, by leaving them not a day's rest, and thus depriving them of all means of reorganising themselves, and still forming a force of some consistency upon the Elbe.

Meanwhile Marshal Bernadotte had marched for Halle, intending to pass the Saale there, and to reach the Elbe towards Barby or Dessau. Halle is on the Lower Saale, below the point where that river receives the Elster, and above the point where it falls into the Elbe. The Duke of Brunswick, on his departure from Weimar, for the purpose of retiring to the Elbe under cover of the Saale, had ordered Prince Eugène of Wurtemberg to proceed to Halle to meet the Prussian main army. That prince had come thither with a corps of about 17,000 or 18,000 men, forming the last resource of the monarchy. He had established himself there, as in a good post for collecting the beaten army. But having taken the Magdeburg road, it never came near him, and instead of it a detachment of French troops made its appearance on the morning of the 17th of October. It was Dupont's division, which for the moment accompanied Marshal Bernadotte's corps. No sooner was General Dupont in sight of Halle than, having orders to attack, he hastened to reconnoitre himself the position of the enemy. Before the city of Halle the Saale divides into several branches. It is passed by a bridge of great length, which at the same time crosses overflowed meadows and several arms of the river. This bridge was provided with artillery, and in advance of it there was a body of infantry. On the islands which separate the river into several branches had been formed batteries, enfilading the road by which the French were approaching. At the extremity of the bridge stands the city, the gates of which were barricaded. Lastly, beyond it,

upon the heights which command the course of the Saale, was perceived the corps of the Prince of Wurtemberg, drawn up in order of battle. Thus the French would have to cross the bridge, to force the gates of Halle, to penetrate into the city, to pass through it, and to take the heights in the rear. These were a series of difficulties almost insurmountable. At this sight General Dupont, who had commanded in the brilliant actions of Haslach and Dirnstein, instantly formed his resolution. He determined to dislodge the troops posted at the avenues to the bridge, then to carry the bridge, the town, and the heights. He went back, withdrew his division out of the hands of Marshal Bernadotte, who had most unseasonably scattered it,* and disposed it in the following manner. He placed the 9th light in column upon the road, on the right the 32nd (which had made itself so famous in Italy, and was still commanded by Colonel Darricau), and then the 9th in rear to support the whole movement. This done, he gave the signal, and heading the troops in person, he advanced with them at a run upon the post of infantry placed at the head of the bridge. They had to sustain tremendous discharges of musketry and grape, but darted to the bridge with the rapidity of lightning, drove back upon it the troops which guarded it, and pursued them in spite of the fire poured from all sides, and striking French and Prussians. After a conflict of a few minutes the former forced their way to the further end of the bridge, and entered the city pell-mell with the fugitives. There a vehement fire of musketry took place in the streets with the Prussians; however, they were soon expelled from the town and the gates closed upon them.

General Dupont had sustained some loss, but he had taken almost all the troops that defended the bridge, and likewise their numerous artillery. Still, the operation was not finished. The corps of the Prince of Wurtemberg was posted on the other side of the town upon the heights in rear. It was necessary for General Dupont to dislodge him from them if he would remain master of Halle and of the bridge over the Saale. Having left his troops time to recover breath, he ordered the city gates to be thrown open, and directed his division towards the foot of the heights. The three French regiments, now numbering not more than 5000 combatants, were received with the fire of 12,000 men well posted. They advanced, nevertheless, in several columns, with the vigour of troops not accustomed to shrink from any obstacle. At the same time General Dupont sent one of his battalions upon the flank of the position, turned

* We here repeat an assertion contained in the Memoirs of General Dupont. We can affirm that in those Memoirs, still in manuscript, and very interesting, General Dupont is no detractor of Marshal Bernadotte's. He treats him like a friend, as well as all those who triumphed in 1815, when France was overcome.

it, and perceiving the effect produced by this manœuvre, pushed forward his columns of attack. His three regiments dashed on in spite of the enemy's fire, scaled the heights, and reaching the summit, dislodged the Prussians. A new action ensued with the whole corps of the Prince of Wurtemberg on the ground situated beyond. But Drouet's division arrived at the moment, and its presence, extinguishing all the enemy's hopes, put an end to his efforts.

This brilliant action cost the French about 600 killed and wounded, and the Prussians about 1000. Four thousand more were made prisoners. The Duke of Wurtemberg retired in disorder towards the Elbe by Dessau and Wittenberg, destroying all the bridges without loss of time. One of his regiments, that of Trescow, which was coming from Magdeburg along the left bank of the Saale to join him, was surprised, and almost the whole of it taken. Thus the reserve even of the Prussians was in flight, and as disorganised as the rest of their army.

Napoleon having come to Naumburg to see the field of battle of Auerstädt, and to compliment the corps of Marshal Davout on its brilliant conduct, had stopped there a very short time and proceeded to Merseburg. On his way was the spot where the battle of Rosbach was fought. Perfectly versed in military history, he was accurately acquainted with the minutest details of that celebrated action, and he sent General Savary to seek the monument which had been erected in memory of the battle. General Savary discovered it in a stubble field. It was a small column, only a few feet high. The inscriptions were effaced. Troops belonging to Lannes' corps, passing the spot, carried it away and put the pieces into a caisson, which was sent off to France.

Napoleon then proceeded to Halle. He could not help admiring the exploit of Dupont's division. Upon the ground lay the dead of that division, whom there had not been time to bury, dressed in the uniform of the 32nd regiment. "What!" exclaimed Napoleon, "the 32nd again! So many of it were killed in Italy, that I thought there could be none left." He was lavish of his praises upon the troops of General Dupont.

The movements of the enemy's army began to become clear. Napoleon directed the pursuit conformably to his general plan, which consisted in turning the Prussians, getting before them to the Elbe and the Oder, and passing that river by means of a bridge of boats near Barby, not far from the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe. He enjoined Marshals Lannes and Augereau, who had had two or three days for recruiting themselves, to cross the Saale by the bridge of Halle, and the Elbe by the bridge of Dessau, replacing the latter if it were destroyed. He had already directed Marshal Davout to leave all his wounded

at Naumburg, to proceed with his corps to Leipsic, and from Leipsic to Wittenberg, to make himself master of the passage of the Elbe at this latter point. If he could gain timely possession of the course of the Elbe from Wittenberg to Barby, he had the greatest chance of arriving first at Berlin and upon the Oder.

On his way, although Leipsic belonged to the Elector of Saxony, Napoleon prescribed to Marshal Davout a rigorous measure against the merchants of that city, who were the principal traders in English commodities in Germany. Napoleon, to revenge himself on the commerce of Great Britain for the war which she made upon France, strove to intimidate the commercial cities of the north, such as Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Leipsic, Dantzig, which strove to open the continent to the English while he was striving to close it against them. He required, therefore, every merchant to declare what English goods he possessed, adding, that if the declarations appeared false, their accuracy would be tested by ocular inspection, and false allegations punished with heavy penalties. All the goods declared were to be confiscated for the benefit of the French army.

Meanwhile our troops continued their march towards the Elbe. Marshal Bernadotte passed that river at Barby, but less promptly than he had orders to do. Napoleon, who had restrained himself after the affair of Auerstädt, gave vent this time to his displeasure, and made Prince Berthier address a letter to Marshal Bernadotte, in which, in reference to his tardy passage of the Elbe, he was bitterly reminded of his precipitate departure from Naumburg on the day of the two battles of Jena and Auerstädt.* However, as it is the case when we follow

* We quote this letter, which is at the Depôt de la Guerre :—

"Marshal BERTHIER to Marshal BERNADOTTE.

"HALLE, 21*st October* 1806.

"The emperor, monsieur le maréchal, desires me to inform you that he is highly displeased because you have not executed the order which you received to proceed yesterday to Calbe, for the purpose of throwing a bridge over the mouth of the Saale at Barby. Yet you must be aware that all the emperor's dispositions were combined.

"His majesty, who is extremely angry that you have not executed his orders, reminds you, in reference to this subject, that you were not at the battle of Jena; that this might have been sufficient to endanger the safety of the army, and to thwart the grand combinations of his majesty; and that it rendered that battle doubtful and very sanguinary, when otherwise it would have been much less so. Deeply mortified as the emperor was, he refrained from speaking to you on the subject, because he was fearful lest, in calling to mind your former services, he should hurt your feelings, and because the consideration which he has for you induced him to be silent; but, on this occasion, when you have not gone to Calbe, and when you have not tried to pass the Elbe, either at Barby or at the mouth of the Saale, the emperor is determined to speak his mind, because he is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed to mere etiquettes of command.

"The emperor, monsieur le maréchal, directs me also to speak to you

the rules of cold justice less than the impulses of the heart, Napoleon, too indulgent the first time, was almost too rigorous the second, because the tardiness of Marshal Bernadotte in passing the Elbe was the fault of the elements much more than his. Lannes threw himself upon Dessau, and thence upon the bridge over the Elbe, which the Prussians had half destroyed. He lost no time in repairing it. Marshal Davout, on reaching Wittenberg, found the Prussians there also employed in destroying the bridge over the Elbe, and ready to blow up a powder magazine not far from the town. The inhabitants, who were Saxons, and who already knew that Napoleon wished to spare Saxony the consequences of the war, hastened to save the bridge of Wittenberg themselves, to remove the matches, and to assist the French to prevent an explosion. It was on the 20th of October that Marshals Davout, Lannes, and Bernadotte crossed the Elbe, six days after the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. As we see, there had not been an hour lost. Two great battles and a very smart action at Halle had taken up only the time spent in fighting, and the march of our columns had not been suspended for a moment. The Prussians themselves, though their flight was rapid, did not reach the Elbe till the 20th of October, and they passed it at Magdeburg, on the same day that Marshals Lannes and Davout passed it at Dessau and Wittenberg. But they arrived there in a state of increasing disorganisation, incapable of defending the lower course of the river, and not even having any hope of reaching the Oder before the French—a condition upon which their safety depended.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his impatience to get to Berlin in order to direct his troops to the Oder, stopped a day at Wittenberg to take there marching precautions which he was careful to multiply in proportion as he carried the war to greater distances. We have already seen him, when penetrating into Austria, securing points of support at Augsburg, at Braunau, at Lintz. In the expedition of far greater length which he was now undertaking, he purposed to create upon his route places of safety for his sick or fatigued men, for the recruits sent from France, for the stores of ammunition and provisions that he intended to collect. Erfurt being taken, he had changed his line of stations, and instead of making it pass through Franconia, the province through which he had entered Prussia, he had given it again its

about a matter of less consequence, namely, that in spite of the order which you received yesterday, you have not yet sent hither three companies to escort your prisoners. There remain in Halle 3500 without any escort. The emperor, monsieur le maréchal, orders you to send immediately a staff officer at the head of three complete companies, forming 300 men, to take all the prisoners that are at Halle and to conduct them to Erfurt. There are no troops left here but the imperial guard, and the emperor does not choose that it should escort the prisoners taken by your corps. It is nine o'clock, and there are no signs of the three companies for which I applied to you yesterday.

natural direction, and made it pass along the ordinary and central highroad of Germany, by Mayence, Frankfort, Eisenach, Erfurt, Weimar, Naumburg, Halle, and Wittenberg. Erfurt was provided with very good defences, and stored with a considerable matériel. Napoleon made it the first station on the military road which he was resolved to mark out across Germany. Wittenberg possessed ancient half-destroyed fortifications. On this account, but chiefly for the sake of the bridge existing there over the Elbe, Napoleon ordered this place to be put into condition, as far as that could be done in the space of two or three weeks. He put into the hands of General Chasseloup a large sum of money, for the purpose of employing six or seven thousand native labourers, and in default of regular works, for constructing field-works of great solidity. He ordered the old scarps to be bared at the foot, those which wanted height to be raised, and where time would not permit the employment of masonry, he directed wood, which was very abundant in the neighbouring forests, to be substituted for stone. Immense palisades were set up, a Roman camp was in some sort constructed, such as the ancient conquerors of the world constructed against Gaul and Germany. In the same town of Wittenberg, Napoleon had ovens built, corn collected, biscuit made. He determined also that the great park of artillery should be collected in this place, and that workshops for repairs should be established there. He took possession of the public edifices and places, to turn them into hospitals capable of containing the sick and wounded of a numerous army. Lastly, on the suddenly raised ramparts of this vast depôt he ordered more than a hundred pieces of heavy artillery, collected in his victorious march, to be placed in battery. He had appointed General Clarke governor of Erfurt; he nominated General Lemarrois, one of his aides-de-camp, governor of Wittenberg. The wounded, separated into two classes, *great* and *little* wounded, that is to say, such as would be able to return to the ranks in a few days, and those whose recovery would require a long time, were divided between Wittenberg and Erfurt. The little wounded remained at Wittenberg, so that they could rejoin their corps immediately; the others were sent to Erfurt. Each regiment, besides the principal depôt which it had in France, had also a field depôt at Wittenberg. In the latter could be left men who were fatigued or slightly indisposed, that by means of the attentions of a few days they might be enabled to march afresh, without encumbering the roads, without exhibiting there the spectacle of a tail of an army, sick, impotent, increasing in length in proportion to the rapidity of the movements and the duration of the war. The detachments of conscripts, when leaving France in bodies, had orders to halt at Erfurt and Wittenberg to be

there reviewed, provided with what they needed, augmented by convalescents, and directed to their regiments. Lastly, to the same depôts, but especially to that of Wittenberg, Napoleon ordered the immense quantity of fine horses picked up in all parts of Germany to be sent. He directed all the regiments of cavalry to pass through them in their turn, in order to be remounted. The same order was given to dragoons coming from France on foot. There they would find horses, which they could not procure in France. Thus Napoleon concentrated at these points, in a well-defended asylum, all the resources of the conquered country, which he had the art to take from the enemy and to apply to his own use. Victorious, and marching forward, he had in them relays abundantly furnished with everything, provisions, ammunition, matériel, and situated on the route of the corps coming to reinforce the army. If obliged to retire, they would be supports and means of refitting placed on the lines of retreat.

After inspecting and ordering everything himself, Napoleon left Wittenberg, and took the road for Berlin. Fate decreed that in the space of a year he should visit Berlin and Vienna as conqueror. The King of Prussia, who had written to solicit peace, sent to him M. de Lucchesini to negotiate an armistice. Napoleon would not see M. de Lucchesini, and charged Marshal Duroc to deliver to the minister of King Frederick William the answer commanded by circumstances. It would, in fact, have been giving the Russians time to succour the Prussians to grant an armistice. This military reason admitted of no reply; unless the formal powers of Russia and Prussia were produced for treating immediately for peace on the conditions which Napoleon had a right to impose after the late victories.

He despatched orders, therefore, to all his corps to march to Berlin. Marshal Davout was to start from Wittenberg, taking the direct route from Wittenberg to Berlin, that of Jüterbock; Lannes and Augereau were to follow that from Treuenbrietzen to Potsdam. Napoleon, with the guard, horse and foot, now united and reinforced by seven thousand grenadiers and voltigeurs, marched between these two columns. He purposed that, in recompense for the victory of Auerstädt, Marshal Davout should be the first to enter Berlin and receive the keys of the capital from the hands of the magistrates. As for himself, before he went to Berlin, he intended to stay awhile at Potsdam, in the retreat of the great Frederick. Marshals Soult and Ney had orders to invest Magdeburg, Murat to remain in ambush for a few days about that great fortress, to intercept the bands of fugitives crowding thither. "It is a trap," wrote Napoleon to him, "in which, with your cavalry, you will catch all the detached parties that are seeking a safe place for crossing the

Elbe." Murat was afterwards to join the grand army at Berlin, and thence post off to the Oder.

Having waited to allow his *corps d'armée* to get the start of him a little, Napoleon set out on the 24th of October, and passed through Kropstadt on his way to Potsdam. Performing the journey on horseback, he was caught in a violent storm, though the weather had continued very fine ever since the opening of the campaign. It was not his custom to stop for such a reason. However, he was offered shelter in a house situated amid woods, and belonging to an officer of the hunting establishment of the court of Saxony. He accepted the offer. Some females, who seemed from their language and dress to be of elevated rank, received, around a great fire, this group of French officers, whom from fear as much as out of politeness they treated with much civility. They seemed not to be aware who was the principal of these officers, around whom the others respectfully ranged themselves, when one of them, still young, seized with a strong emotion, exclaimed, "That is the emperor!" "How came you to know me?" asked Napoleon drily. "Sire," she answered, "I was with your majesty in Egypt." "And what were you doing in Egypt?" "I was the wife of an officer, who has since died in your service. I have solicited a pension for myself and my son, but I was a foreigner, and could not obtain it; and I am come to live with the mistress of this house, who has kindly received me, and entrusted me with the education of her children." The countenance of Napoleon, who was displeased at being recognised, stern at first, all at once assumed a soft expression. "Madam," said he, "you shall have a pension; and as for your son, I charge myself with his education."

The same evening he took care to affix his signature to both these resolutions, and said smiling, "I never yet met with an adventure in a forest in consequence of a storm; here is one, however, and a most agreeable one."

He arrived in the evening of the 25th of October at Potsdam. He immediately went to visit the retreat of the great captain, the great king, who called himself "The Philosopher of Sans-Souci," and with some reason, who seemed to wield sword and sceptre with a jeering indifference, as if in mockery of all the courts of Europe, one might venture to add, of his own people, if he had not taken so much pains to govern them well. Napoleon went through the great and little palace of Potsdam, desired to be shown Frederick's works, crowded with Voltaire's notes, sought to discover in his library on what books he was accustomed to feast his great mind, and then went to the church of Potsdam, to inspect the modest tomb where rests the founder of Prussia. At Potsdam were kept the sword of Frederick, his belt, his order of the Black Eagle. Napoleon seized them, exclaiming, "What

a capital present for the Invalides, especially for those who have formed part of the army of Hanover! They will be delighted, no doubt, when they see in our possession the sword of him who beat them at Rosbach." Napoleon, in seizing these precious relics with so much respect, most assuredly offered no affront either to Frederick or the Prussian nation. But how extraordinary, how worthy of meditation, is that mysterious concatenation which binds, blends, separates, or brings together the things of this world! Frederick and Napoleon met here in a very strange manner. That philosopher king, who unknown to himself had been from his elevated throne one of the promoters of the French Revolution, now lying in his coffin, received a visit from the general of that Revolution, become emperor and conqueror of Berlin and Potsdam! The victor at Rosbach received a visit from the victor at Jena! What a sight! Unfortunately these reverses of fortune were not the last.

While the headquarters were at Potsdam, Marshal Davout entered Berlin with his corps on the 25th of October. King Frederick William, when he withdrew, had left Berlin to the government of the citizens, under the presidency of a considerable personage, the Prince de Hatzfeld. The representatives of the civic body offered to Marshal Davout the keys of the capital, which he gave back to them, saying that they belonged to one greater than he—to Napoleon. He left a single regiment in the city to do the police duty jointly with the city militia. He then went and established himself at Friedrichsfeld, a league distant, with his right to the Spree and his left to the woods. By order of Napoleon he encamped militarily, with the artillery pointed, and part of the soldiers on duty as sentinels at the camp, while the others went alternately to visit the capital conquered through their exploits. He ordered hovels to be made with straw and fir, that the troops might be sheltered from the inclemency of the season. It was not necessary to recommend discipline to Marshal Davout; there was no need to watch him, unless to render him less severe. Marshal Davout promised to respect persons and property, as civilised conquerors ought to do, on condition that they would obtain from the inhabitants complete submission and provisions during the short time that the army had to spend within their walls, which for such a city as Berlin could not constitute a very heavy burden.

The day after the entry of the French into Berlin the shops were open. The inhabitants were walking peaceably in the wide streets of that capital, and even in greater numbers than usual. They seemed to be at once mortified and curious, natural impressions among a people patriotic but passionate, enlightened, struck with all that is great, eager to know the most renowned generals and soldiers then in the world. They disapproved,

moreover, of their government having undertaken a senseless war; and that disapprobation could not but diminish the hatred which they bore to the provoked conquerors. Marshal Lannes was sent to Potsdam and Spandau; Marshal Augereau passed through Berlin at the heels of Marshal Davout; and Napoleon, having stayed the 25th and 26th at Potsdam, and the 27th at Charlottenburg, fixed on the 28th for his entry into Berlin.

It was the first time that he had ever made a triumphant entry, like Alexander or Cæsar, into a conquered capital. He had not entered Vienna in that manner: indeed he had scarcely visited the Austrian capital at all, living constantly at Schönbrunn, out of the sight of its inhabitants. But on this day, whether from pride at having demolished an army reputed to be invincible, or from a desire to awe Europe by a striking spectacle, or perhaps from the intoxication of victory mounting higher than usual into his head, he chose the morning of the 28th for his triumphant entry into Berlin.

The whole population of the city was abroad to witness this grand scene. Napoleon entered, surrounded by his guard, and followed by the fine cuirassiers of Generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty. The imperial guard, in rich uniform, was on this day more imposing than ever. In front the grenadiers and dismounted chasseurs, in rear the horse grenadiers and chasseurs, in the middle Marshals Berthier, Duroc, Davout, Augereau, and in the centre of this group, left by himself out of respect, Napoleon, in the simple dress which he wore in the Tuileries and in fields of battle. Napoleon, the object of all eyes in that immense concourse, silent, impressed at once with sorrow and admiration. Such was the spectacle exhibited in that long and spacious street of Berlin leading from the gate of Charlottenburg to the palace of the kings of Prussia. The populace were in the streets, the wealthy citizens at the windows. As for the nobility, it had fled full of fear and with confusion. The wives of the Prussian burghers seemed to devour the spectacle that was before their eyes: some shed tears, but none uttered either cries of hatred or cries of flattery for the conqueror. Happy Prussia, not to be divided and to keep up her dignity in her disaster! The entry of the enemy was not with her the ruin of one party, the triumph of another; and she had not in her bosom an unworthy faction, feeling an odious joy, applauding the presence of foreign soldiers. We French, more unfortunate in our reverses, have witnessed that execrable joy, for we have seen everything in this century, the extremes of victory and defeat, of greatness and abasement, of the purest devotedness and the blackest treachery!

Napoleon received the keys of Berlin from the magistrates, then proceeded to the palace, where he gave audience to all the

public authorities, used mild, cheering language, promised order on the part of the soldiers, on condition of order on the part of the inhabitants, showed no severity in his expressions but towards the German aristocracy, which was, he said, the sole author of all the calamities of Germany, which had dared to provoke him to the fight, and which he would chastise by obliging it to beg its bread in England. He established himself in the king's palace, received the foreign ministers representing friendly courts, and summoned M. de Talleyrand to Berlin.

His bulletins, narratives of all that the army accomplished daily, often, too, violent answers to his enemies, series of political reflections, lessons to kings and nations, were rapidly dictated by him, and usually revised by M. de Talleyrand before they were published. He there recorded each of the progresses which he made in the enemy's country; he even related what he heard concerning the political causes of the war. In those which he published in Prussia, he affected to lavish homage to the memory of the great Frederick, tokens of esteem on his unfortunate successor, taking good care indeed that some pity for his weakness should peep through, and the most virulent sarcasms on queens who meddle in affairs of State, who expose their husbands and their country to frightful disasters; treatment most ungenerous towards the Queen of Prussia, who was sufficiently racked by the sense of her faults and her misfortunes to be spared the addition of outrage to adversity. These bulletins, which betrayed with too little reserve the licentiousness of the victorious soldier, exposed Napoleon to more than one censure amidst the shouts of admiration which his triumphs drew from his enemies themselves.

In his irritation against the Prussian party which promoted the war, he received sternly the envoys of the Duke of Brunswick, who had been mortally wounded at the battle of Auerstädt, and who, before he expired, recommended his family and his subjects to the conqueror. "What would he who sent you have to say," replied Napoleon—"what would he have to say if I were to inflict on the city of Brunswick that subversion with which, fifteen years ago, he threatened the capital of the great nation which I command? The Duke of Brunswick had disavowed the insensate manifesto of 1792; one would have thought that with age reason had begun to get the better of the passions, and yet he has again lent the authority of his name to the follies of hot-headed youth, which have brought ruin upon Prussia. To him it belonged to put women, courtiers, young officers into their proper places, and to make all feel the authority of his age, of his understanding, and of his position. But he had not the force to do so, and the Prussian monarchy is demolished and the States of Brunswick are in my power. Tell the Duke of Brunswick that I shall show him that consideration which is due to

an unfortunate general, justly celebrated, struck by that fate which may reach us all, but that I cannot recognise a sovereign prince in a general of the Prussian army."

These words, published through the usual channel of the bulletins, intimated that Napoleon would not treat the sovereignty of the Duke of Brunswick any better than that of the Elector of Hesse. If, however, he showed asperity to some, he showed himself kind and generous to others, taking care to vary his treatment according to the known participation of each in the war. His expressions in regard to old Marshal Mollendorf were perfectly decorous. There was in Berlin Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great Frederick and father of Prince Louis, as well as the princess his wife. There were also the widow of Prince Henry and two sisters of the king's, one lying-in, the other ill. Napoleon went to visit all these members of the royal family with all the signs of profound respect, and touched them by testimonies coming from so high a personage, for there was not then a sovereign whose attentions had so great a value as his. In the situation to which he had attained, he knew how to calculate his slightest tokens of kindness or severity. Exercising at this moment the right belonging to all generals in time of war, that of intercepting correspondence to discover the movements of the enemy, he seized a letter from the Prince de Hatzfeld, in which he appeared to inform Prince Hohenlohe of the position of the French army around Berlin. The Prince de Hatzfeld, as head of the municipal government established in Berlin, had promised upon oath not to attempt anything against the French army, and to attend solely to the quiet, safety, and welfare of the capital. It was an engagement of loyalty towards the conqueror, who suffered an authority which he could have abolished to subsist for the benefit of the conquered country. The fault, however, was very excusable, since it proceeded from the most honourable of sentiments, patriotism. Napoleon, who was apprehensive that other burgomasters would imitate this example, and that, in this case, all his movements would be revealed from hour to hour to the enemy—Napoleon resolved to intimidate the Prussian authorities by an act of signal severity, and was not sorry that this act of severity should fall upon one of the principal members of the nobility, accused of having been a warm partisan of war, but accused falsely, for the Prince de Hatzfeld was of the number of the Prussian nobles who had moderation because they had understanding. Napoleon sent for Prince Berthier, and ordered Marshal Davout, on whose severity he could reckon, to form a military commission, which should apply to the conduct of the Prince de Hatzfeld the laws of war against espionage. Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution adopted by Napoleon, endeavoured in vain

to dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulaincourt, Savary, not presuming to hazard remonstrances which seemed misplaced from any other lips than those of the major-general, were alarmed. Not knowing to what means to resort, they hid the prince in the very palace, upon pretext of having him arrested, and then informed the Princess de Hatzfeld, an interesting person, and who was then pregnant, of the danger which threatened her husband. She hastened to the palace. It was high time; for the commission, having assembled, was applying for the evidence. Napoleon, returning from a ride in Berlin, had just alighted from his horse, the guard beating the march; and as he crossed the threshold of the palace, the Princess de Hatzfeld, conducted by Duroc, appeared all in tears before him. Thus taken by surprise, he could not refuse to receive her: he granted her an audience in his cabinet. She was seized with terror. Napoleon, touched by her distress, desired her to approach, and handed her the intercepted letter to read. "Well, madam," said he, "do you recognise the handwriting of your husband?" The princess, trembling, knew not what to reply. Presently, however, taking care to cheer her, Napoleon added, "Throw that paper into the fire, and the military commission will have no evidence to convict upon."

This act of clemency, which Napoleon could not refuse after he had seen the Princess de Hatzfeld, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice for him, because it was part of his design to intimidate the German nobility, particularly the magistrates of the towns, who revealed to the enemy the secrets of his operations. He learned subsequently to know the Prince de Hatzfeld, appreciated his character and his understanding, and was glad that he had not given him up to military justice. Happy the governments that have discreet friends, who contrive to delay their severities! It is not necessary that this delay should be long, before they have ceased to purpose acts upon which, at first, they were most resolutely bent.

Napoleon in this interval had incessantly directed the movements of his lieutenants against the wrecks of the Prussian army. Placed at Berlin with his principal forces, he cut off the Prussians from the direct route from the Elbe to the Oder, and left them no roads for reaching the latter river but such as were long, almost impassable, and easy to intercept. Berlin, in fact, is situated between the Elbe and the Oder, at an equal distance from the two rivers. The plains of sand which we have already described, as they approach the Baltic towards Mecklenburg, rise into sandhills, and present a series of lakes of all dimensions, parallel to the sea. These lakes, being prevented by the chain of sandhills from discharging themselves directly into the sea, find a channel towards the interior of the country in an

inconsiderable and rather sluggish stream, the Havel, which runs towards Berlin, where it falls in with the Spree, coming from an opposite direction, that is to say, from Lusatia, a province which separates Saxony from Silesia. The Havel and Spree, united near Berlin, expand about Spandau and Potsdam, and there form new lakes, which the hand of the great Frederick took pains to embellish, and turning to the left proceed to the Elbe. They thus describe a transverse line, which on one side unites Berlin to the Elbe, and continued by the Finow Canal on the other, joins that capital to the Oder. It was through this tract, intersected by natural or artificial streams, covered with lakes, forests, and sand, that the vagrant relics of the Prussian army had to take their flight.

Napoleon, established since the 25th of October at Potsdam and Berlin, had it in his power to anticipate them in all directions. He kept Lannes' corps at Spandau, the corps of Augereau and Davout in Berlin itself, lastly, Bernadotte's corps beyond Berlin —all of them ready to march on the first indication they should have of the direction taken by the enemy. Napoleon had spread the cavalry around Berlin and Potsdam, and upon the banks of the Havel and the Elbe, to pick up intelligence.

Spandau had already surrendered. That fortress, situated very near Berlin, amidst the waters of the Spree and the Havel, strong by its situation and its works, was capable of making a long resistance. But such had been the presumption and the carelessness of the Prussian government, that it had not even armed the place, though the magazines which it contained were provided with a considerable matériel. On the 25th, the day of Marshal Davout's entry into Berlin, Lannes had appeared under the walls of Spandau, and threatened the governor with the severest treatment if he refused to surrender. The guns were not upon the walls; the garrison, participating in the terror which had seized all hearts, desired to capitulate. The governor was an old soldier, whom age had bereft of all energy. Lannes saw him, frightened him by the account of the disasters of the Prussian army, and wrung from him a capitulation, by virtue of which the place was immediately delivered up to the French, and the garrison declared prisoners of war. It would require at once the improvidence of the government, which had neglected to arm the fortress, and the demoralisation which everywhere prevailed, to account for so strange a capitulation.

The emperor hastened in person to Spandau, and resolved to make it his third depôt in Germany. This new refuge offered the more advantages, inasmuch as it was situated within three or four leagues of Berlin, surrounded by water, perfectly fortified, and contained an immense quantity of corn. Napoleon ordered it to be armed forthwith, ovens built there, ammunition amassed,

hospitals organised—in short, the same establishments created as at Wittenberg and Erfurt. He sent thither immediately all the artillery, muskets, and munitions of war taken at Berlin. In that capital had been found 300 pieces of cannon, 100,000 muskets, and a great quantity of powder and projectiles. This vast matériel, added to considerable stores of grain, was a sort of guarantee against any attempt of the people of Berlin, now very quiet and docile, but whose submission any reverse which we might sustain would be liable to change into revolt.

While the emperor was occupied with these provident measures, the uninterrupted expeditions of the light cavalry had revealed the march of the Prussian army. The eleven days which had elapsed since the battle of Jena, those eleven days employed by the French in gaining the Elbe, in crossing it, in occupying Berlin, had been employed by the Prussians also in gaining the Elbe, in there collecting their scattered wrecks, in then proceeding towards Mecklenburg, in order to reach the line of the Oder by means of a circuit to the north. This movement towards Mecklenburg being unmasked, Napoleon despatched Murat, by way of Oranienburg and Zehdenick, to follow the banks of the Havel and the Finow Canal. It was along these military lines, and protected by them, that the Prince of Hohenlohe would march. Napoleon ordered them to proceed along these lines in such a manner as to keep constantly between the enemy and the Oder, and then, when they had turned the Prussians, to endeavour to envelop them, and take them to the last man. Marshal Lannes had set out with Murat, and with the recommendation to march as rapidly as the cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte had orders to follow Lannes. Marshal Davout, after the three or four days' rest which he needed, was to proceed to Frankfort on the Oder; Marshal Augereau and the guard were to remain at Berlin. Marshals Ney and Soult had been sent, as we have said, to invest Magdeburg.

The unfortunate Prince of Hohenlohe had actually taken the resolution that was attributed to him. Pursued most perseveringly by the French, he had arrived at Magdeburg, hoping to find there rest, provisions, matériel, and above all, the time necessary for the reorganisation of his army. Vain hope! The want of precautions against a retreat so easy to be foreseen prevailed everywhere. At Magdeburg there were no supplies but what were indispensable for the garrison. The old governor, M. de Kleist, having provided for the first wants of the fugitives, and given them a small quantity of bread, refused to feed them any longer, fearful of diminishing his own resources if he should be besieged. The interior of Magdeburg was so encumbered with baggage that the army could not be lodged there: the cavalry was established, as a matter of necessity, on the glacis; the in-

fantry in the covered ways. Very soon the Prussian troops, continually harassed by the French cavalry, which came and carried off whole detachments under the cannon of the place, were obliged to pass to the other side of the Elbe. At length M. de Kleist, terrified at the disorder prevailing within and without Magdeburg, earnestly requested the Prince of Hohenlohe to continue his retreat towards the Oder, and to leave him the liberty which he so much needed to put himself into a state of defence. The Prince of Hohenlohe had, therefore, but two days to reorganise an army composed of nothing but wrecks, and in which several battalions had to be united in order to form one. Moreover, Marshal Kalkreuth having been sent for by the king, who was in East Prussia, the Prince of Hohenlohe was ordered to pick up the two divisions of reserve, and obliged to go to the Lower Elbe, far below Magdeburg, to join them.

Amidst these embarrassments, the Prince of Hohenlohe commenced his march in three columns. On his right, General Schimmelpfennig, with a detachment of cavalry and infantry, was to cover the army towards Potsdam, Spandau, and Berlin, to keep at first along the Havel, then when he had ascended high enough to turn Berlin, to proceed along the Finow Canal, and thus flank the retreat as far as Prenzlau and Stettin, for owing to the position of the French it was only towards the mouth of the Oder that the Prussians could reach that river. The bulk of the infantry, marching at the centre, at an equal distance from the corps of Schimmelpfennig and the Elbe, was to proceed through Genthin, Rathenau, Gransee, and Prenzlau. The cavalry, which was already on the banks of the Elbe, where it profited by the abundance of forage, was to follow the banks of that river by Jerichow and Havelberg, then leave them to proceed northward, and passing through Wittstock, Mirow, Strelitz, Prenzlau, arrive at the common point, Stettin.

The corps of the Duke of Weimar and the grand park, under the conduct of General Blucher, had fortunately turned the Harz by Hesse and Hanover, without being annoyed by the French, who were hastening to reach the Elbe. The Duke of Weimar, by means of a very clever manœuvre, had continued to deceive Marshal Soult. Feigning at first to attack the line of investment around Magdeburg, and then slipping off all at once, he had suddenly crossed the Elbe at Tangermunde, and thus gained the right bank. He had with him 12,000 or 14,000 men. General Blucher had passed the river below. The Prince of Hohenlohe assigned to the Duke of Weimar the concerted rendezvous of Stettin, which he was to reach by crossing Mecklenburg, and gave General Blucher the command of the troops beaten before Halle, troops which had passed out of the hands of the Duke of Wurtemberg into those of General Natzmer.

General Blucher was directed to form with these troops the rearguard of the Prussian army.

If these forces had contrived to escape the French and to reach Stettin, they might, after being reorganised and joined by the contingent of East Prussia, have composed behind the Oder an army of some value, and lent a useful hand to the Russians. The Prince of Hohenlohe had kept together 25,000 men at least. Natzmer's corps, with the other wrecks of General Blucher's, numbered 9000 or 10,000. The troops of the Duke of Weimar amounted to 13,000 or 14,000. There was consequently a total force of about 50,000 men, which, joined to about 20,000 left in East Prussia, could still have presented 70,000 fighting men, and, combined with the Russians, have played an important part. There were left 22,000 men to defend Magdeburg. The Saxons, hastening to avail themselves of the clemency of Napoleon towards them, had returned to their homes.

The Prince of Hohenlohe had to effect his retreat through a poor country, difficult to traverse, and amidst numerous squadrons of French cavalry. The latter, which was at first cautious in presence of the Prussian cavalry, the excellence of which was highly extolled to it, now intoxicated with its successes, had become so daring, that mere chasseurs were no longer afraid to encounter cuirassiers.

The prince set out then on the 22nd of October by the roads specified, Schimmelpfennig's corps of flankers proceeding for Plauen, the infantry for Genthin, the cavalry for Jerichow. They marched slowly, on account of the sands, the exhausted state of men and horses, and their being unused to fatigue. Seven or eight leagues a day were as much as these troops could perform, while the French infantry, in case of need, would clear fifteen. Moreover, a very great indiscipline had crept into the corps. Disaster, which sours men's minds, had diminished the respect due to officers. The cavalry, in particular, marched in a confused manner, without obeying any orders. The Prince of Hohenlohe was obliged to halt the army, and to address it in very sharp terms to bring it back to a sense of its duty. He even caused a horse-soldier, who had wounded an officer, to be shot. For the rest, it must be confessed that such is the usual effect of great reverses, and sometimes, too, of great successes, for victory has its disorder as well as defeat. The French, eager after booty, ran, like the Prussians, in all directions, without heeding the commands of their officers; and Marshal Ney wrote to the emperor that, unless he were authorised to make some examples, the lives of the officers would be no longer safe. Singular consequences of the dissolution of States! The precipitate movements caused by this dissolution disorganise the conquered and the conqueror.

We had arrived at the perfection of the highest department of war, and were already approaching the limit where it becomes an immense confusion.

On the 23rd the Prussians were, the infantry at Rathenau, the cavalry at Havelberg. But the pains which they took to break down the bridges impeded the march of the corps on the right, that of Schimmelpfennig, and they were obliged to approach the Elbe by a wheel to the left, in order to avoid the numerous streams which are met with between the Havel and the Elbe. They turned off as far as Rhinow. On the 24th they were, the cavalry at Kiritz, the infantry at Neustadt, the corps of Schimmelpfennig at Fehrbellin. Natzmer's corps, transferred here to General Blucher, took near Rhinow the place of the principal corps, the rearguard of which it formed.

Having reached this point, the Prince of Hohenlohe had to deliberate on the further course to be pursued. They had ascended to the north far beyond Berlin, Spandau, and Potsdam. At every step the army became more and more disorganised. The colonel of the staff, de Massenbach, advised that the troops should be allowed a day of rest, in order to reorganise them, and to be at least in a condition for fighting if they should chance to meet with the French. The Prince of Hohenlohe replied very justly, that neither one, two, nor even three days would be sufficient to reorganise the army, and it might give the French time to cut it off from Stettin and the Oder. As usual, a middle course was adopted; a common rendezvous was fixed at Gransee, where a general review was to be held, and addresses delivered to the troops to recall them to their duty. They then continued their march without stopping. The rendezvous at Gransee was fixed for the 26th.

But the French being already apprised, Murat's cavalry hurried to Fehrbellin on the one side, to Zehdenick on the other. Lannes having entered Spandau on the 25th, marched in the evening of the 26th with his infantry to support Murat. Marshal Soult was pursuing the Duke of Weimar, while Marshal Ney invested Magdeburg. Thus three French *corps d'armée*, besides Murat's cavalry, with the exception, it is true, of the cuirassiers, kept in Berlin, were at this moment pursuing the Prussians. On the 26th the infantry of the Prince of Hohenlohe was at Gransee, at the appointed rendezvous, listening to his exhortations, imbibing hopes of being soon at Stettin, and resting behind the Oder. But at that moment Murat's dragoons surprised Schimmelpfennig's corps at Zehdenick, overturned his cavalry, killed 300, and took seven or eight hundred horse, and obliged the infantry of that corps of flankers to disperse in the woods.

This intelligence, brought by peasants and fugitives to Gransee, induced the Prince of Hohenlohe to decamp immediately, and

to turn off once more to the left towards Fürstenberg instead of marching to Templin, which was the direct route for Stettin. He was thus in hopes of rallying his cavalry to him, and of getting at the same time further from the French. But while he was making this circuit, Murat proceeded by the shortest road to Templin, and Lannes, halting neither day nor night, kept constantly in sight of Murat's squadrons. The Prince of Hohenlohe slept at Fürstenberg, and made his infantry pass the night there, while Lannes spent that same night in marching. French and Prussians continued to pursue a northward course towards Templin and Prenzlau, the common point of the Stettin road, moving at the distance of a few leagues from each other, and separated merely by a curtain of woods and lakes. They were still 12 leagues (7 German miles) from Prenzlau. On the morning of the 27th the Prince of Hohenlohe started for Boitzenburg, sending word to the cavalry to join him, and to the rearguard, commanded by General Blucher, to quicken its pace.

He marched all day, having no other refreshment for his troops than what was furnished them by the patriotism of the villagers, who placed upon the road piles of bread and cauldrons full of potatoes. Towards evening they approached Boitzenburg, and the owner of that place, M. d'Arnim, came to intimate that he had had bivouacs prepared around his mansion and abundantly provided with victuals and drink. This was welcome news to men dying from fatigue and hunger. But on approaching Boitzenburg, reports of firearms destroyed that hope of rest and food. Murat's light horse, having already reached Boitzenburg, were regaling on the provisions destined for the Prussians. Too few, however, to make head against the latter, they left Boitzenburg. The unfortunate soldiers of Prince Hohenlohe devoured what was left, but the presence of French horse warned them that they had no time to lose. They started again that same night, making another circuit to the left to avoid the French and to reach Prenzlau before them. They marched the whole night, flattering themselves that they should outstrip them. At daybreak they began to discern Prenzlau; but on the right, across the woods and lakes which lined the route, they had caught a glimpse of horsemen riding at a rapid rate. The fog prevented them from distinguishing the colour of their uniform. Were they French? were they Prussians? Such were the questions which they asked each other. Some imagined that they perceived the white plume of a Prussian regiment; others, on the contrary, fancied that they could distinguish the helmet of Murat's dragoons. At length, amidst these conjectures of fear and hope, they arrived in sight of Prenzlau, the French, as they were assured, not having yet been seen. They pushed on into a suburb, a quarter of a league

in length. Half of the Prussian army had already entered, when all at once the cry, To arms! was raised. The French dragoons, coming up at the moment when part of the Prussian army was in Prenzlau, attacked the tail of it, drove it into the town itself, charged it in all directions, and then dashed into the streets. The Pritwitz dragoons, pushed by the French dragoons, fell back upon the Prussian infantry and overturned it. Horrible was the fray that followed, terror aggravating the tumult and the danger. The Prussian army, cut in several pieces, fled beyond Prenzlau, and took position as well as it could on the Stettin road. It was soon surrounded, and Murat sent to summon the Prince of Hohenlohe to surrender. He conceived that Murat had brought nothing but cavalry with him. But the infantry of Lannes, which after leaving Spandau had marched day and night, halting only to eat, arrived at the same moment. The colonel of the staff, de Massenbach, affirmed that he had seen it. There was no chance of escaping. Murat desired to speak with the Prince of Hohenlohe. The soldier who had become prince, and continued as generous as he was intrepid, consoled the Prussian general, promised him an honourable capitulation, the most honourable that he could grant within the limit prescribed by the instructions of Napoleon. Murat required that all the soldiers should be prisoners, but consented that the officers should remain free and be allowed to carry away whatever they possessed, on condition, however, of not serving again during the war. He consented also that the soldiers should be exempted from the humiliating formality of laying down their arms when filing before the French. This was a difference which, under their misfortune, would distinguish them from the troops of the Austrian Mack. The Prince of Hohenlohe, seeing that he could not obtain better terms, feeling even that Murat could not grant more, returned to his officers, made them form a circle around him, and, his eyes filled with tears, explained to them the state of things. He was one of those who had declaimed most vehemently against every kind of capitulation. But he was aware that there was no other resource, not even that of an honourable combat, for the ammunition was exhausted, and the spirits of the troops had arrived at the lowest degree of dejection. As no officer proposed an expedient, the circle separated, uttering maledictions, and breaking their arms.

The capitulation was, therefore, signed by the prince, and in the course of the same day, the 28th of October, a year after the catastrophe of General Mack, 14,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry surrendered themselves prisoners of war. The conquerors were intoxicated with joy, and what joy was ever better founded! Such boldness in manœuvring, such patience in enduring privations, equal at least to those which the conquered had endured,

such ardour in making still more rapid marches than theirs, well deserved such a prize. Disorders unfortunately were committed at Prenzlau, caused by the eagerness of the soldiers to secure the booty, which they considered as the legitimate fruit of victory. But the French officers displayed the greatest firmness in protecting the Prussian officers. German writers themselves have done them this justice. In 1815, the departments of the north of France had not the same justice to render to the Prussians.

But the French had more trophies to collect. A number of Prussian squadrons and battalions, which had not entered Prenzlau, had marched further north towards Passewalck. General Milhaud's light cavalry overtook them. Six regiments of cavalry, several battalions of infantry, a park of horse-artillery, laid down their arms. Lasalle, with the hussars and chasseurs, hastened to Stettin, followed by the infantry of Lannes. Wonderful to relate, an officer of light cavalry dared to summon Stettin, a fortress having a numerous garrison and an immense artillery. General Lasalle had an interview with the governor, and expatiated with such conviction on the complete annihilation of the Prussian army, that the governor surrendered the place with all that it contained and a garrison of 6000 men prisoners of war. Lannes entered the place on the following day. Nothing assuredly could better serve to convey an idea of the demoralisation of the Prussians, and of the terror excited by the French, than a fact so strange and so new in the annals of war.

All now left to be taken of the Prussian army were General Blucher and the Duke of Weimar, with about 20,000 men. When this last remnant should be taken, one might say that 160,000 men had been destroyed or made prisoners in a fortnight, without one of them having recrossed the Oder. General Blucher and the corps of the Duke of Weimar had Marshals Soult and Bernadotte in pursuit of them. They would soon be overtaken by Murat himself, and would find themselves cut off from the Oder, since Lannes occupied Stettin. They had, therefore, very little chance of escaping.

Napoleon on receiving these tidings was extremely delighted. "Since your chasseurs," he wrote to Murat, "take fortresses, I may disband my corps of engineers, and melt down my heavy artillery." In the bulletin he made mention of the cavalry only, and omitted the infantry of Lannes, which had nevertheless contributed to the capitulation of Prenzlau as much as the cavalry itself. This omission was owing to the circumstance that Murat, in haste to report the exploits of his cavalry, had not thought of noticing the corps of Lannes. When that marshal received the bulletin, he durst not read it to his soldiers for fear of mortifying them. "My attachment to your person," he wrote to Napoleon, "will always set me above every kind of injustice, but what am

I to say to those brave soldiers who march day and night, without rest, without food? What reward can they hope for, unless to have their deeds proclaimed by the hundred voices of Fame, which you alone have at your disposal?" That admirable emulation, that ardent jealousy of glory, which, however, manifested themselves here in a noble pensiveness alone, was not one of the least remarkable signs of that heroic enthusiasm which then warmed all minds.

Napoleon, singularly kind to Lannes, replied: "*Are you and your soldiers children?* Can you suppose me to be unacquainted with all that you have done to second the cavalry? There is glory for all. Another time it will be your turn to fill with your name the bulletins of the grand army."

Lannes, transported, assembled his infantry in one of the public places of Stettin, and ordered Napoleon's letter to be read in the ranks. Overjoyed as himself, his soldiers greeted that letter with repeated shouts of *Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!*" (Long live the Emperor of the West!) This singular appellation, which corresponded so perfectly with the secret ambition of Napoleon, proceeded therefore from the enthusiasm of the army, and it proved that in the estimation of all he already filled the West with his power and his glory.

Lannes, in the effusion not of his flattery but of his joy, for, pleased himself, he wished his master to be pleased too—Lannes wrote, "Sire, your soldiers shout '*Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!*" are we henceforward to address our letters to you by that title?"*

Napoleon made no reply, and that title which gushed, as it

* We quote some of the letters of Marshal Lannes, which show the spirit of the French troops at this period, and may serve to impart their true character to those prodigious events.

"Marshal LANNES to his majesty the Emperor.

"SIRE,—I have received the letter which your majesty has done me the honour to write me: it is impossible for me to express the pleasure that it has given me. There is nothing in the world that I desire so much as to be sure that your majesty knows that I do all that lies in my power for your glory.

"I have communicated to my *corps d'armée* what your majesty has been pleased to say to me for it. It would be impossible to describe to your majesty the gratification which it afforded them. A single word from you is sufficient to make the soldiers happy.

"Three hussars, having lost their way towards Gartz, found themselves in the midst of an enemy's squadron. They ran up to it, levelling their pieces, saying that it was surrounded by a regiment, and must dismount immediately. The commander of this squadron ordered it to dismount, and it surrendered its arms to those three hussars, who brought the men thither prisoners of war.

"I should be glad to learn your majesty's intentions, that I may know whether I ought to have sent Suchet's division to Stargard, and the cavalry on further. By these means we should have spared the provisions of the fortress of Stettin, which, however, I have not yet touched. The soldiers are cantoned in the environs, and live with the inhabitants.

"I have been over the fortress with General Chasseloup: he thinks it bad; and my opinion is, that a great deal of money must be spent to put it into a tate of defence. We have been to Damm: it is a superb natural position;

were, from the enthusiasm of the soldiers was not assumed. As Napoleon conceived, it was only deferred. Of all the grandeurs that he ever dreamt of, this is the only one that was not realised even for a moment. If, however, he had not the title, he had the vast dominion of the Emperor of the West. But human pride is as fond of the title of power as of power itself.

The Prince of Hohenlohe being taken, there was nothing left to take but General Blucher, with the rearguard and the corps of the Duke of Weimar. The latter had come under the command of General de Vinning, since the Duke of Weimar, accept-

you cannot get to it but by a causeway of a league and a half, on which there are at least forty bridges. I think that, if your majesty purposes to advance further, you will render that position impregnable.

"I have just been assured that the king has shown great displeasure with those gentlemen about him who advised him to the war; that he was never seen in such a passion; that he told them that they were scoundrels, that they had made him lose his crown, that he had no hope left but to go and see the great Napoleon, and that he reckoned upon his generosity. I am, with the most profound respect, &c., LANNES."

"PASSEWALCK, *November* 1, 1806.

"SIRE,—I had the honour to announce yesterday to your majesty 30 pieces of cannon, 60 caissons, as many carts laden with ammunition, drawn by eight or ten horses each vehicle, and 1500 light artillerymen. Indeed, sire, I never saw finer men. It is a superb park; I shall send it off this morning for Spandau. Almost all the men are mounted, and march in the greatest order. Your majesty could, if you pleased, have them taken to Italy. I am certain that if a few officers who could speak German were to be placed with them, these men would serve most cheerfully. I wish your majesty were to see this convoy; that would decide you to send them to the kingdom of Italy.

"The Grand Duke of Berg writes to me that he calculates upon coming up with the enemy, that is, the grand corps of the Duke of Weimar and Blucher, with the Prince of Ponte Corvo, in the course of to-morrow. He has already taken some prisoners from the tail of the column. In consequence of this information, I am recalling all the light cavalry, which I had sent off for Boitzenburg, and am going to assemble my whole *corps d'armée* at Stettin.

"There have been found in this place more than 200 pieces of cannon on their carriages, and many spare ones, an infinite quantity of powder, ammunition, and magazines.

"I shall throw all my light cavalry upon the right bank of the Oder. I shall have all the corn and flour I can collected to increase our stores; I shall have ovens built, and as much biscuit made as possible.

"The garrison of Stettin amounted to 6000 men; a regiment of Gazan's division shall escort it to Spandau. That general has but one regiment left. Suchet's division also has furnished a great number of men for the escort of troops, so that my *corps d'armée* is reduced very low.

"If Stettin affords sufficient means for clothing the soldiers, I shall do it, for they are quite naked. An inventory of what there is in the place is preparing. I shall have the honour to send it to your majesty.

"Meanwhile I request your imperial majesty to let me know your intentions as speedily as possible. My headquarters will be to-night at Stettin.

"Yesterday I had your majesty's proclamation read at the head of the troops. The concluding words deeply touched the hearts of the soldiers. They all set up shouts of *Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!* It is impossible for me to tell your majesty how much you are beloved by these brave fellows, and, in truth, never was lover so fond of his mistress as they are of your person. I beg your majesty to let me know if you will be pleased to have my despatches addressed in future to the Emperor of the West, and I make this inquiry in the name of my *corps d'armée*. I am, with the most profound, &c., LANNES."

ing the treatment granted by Napoleon to the whole house of Saxony, had left the army. There were still 22,000 men to take prisoners, after which there would not exist a single detachment of Prussian troops from the Rhine to the Oder. Napoleon ordered them to be pursued without intermission, that they might be picked up to the last man.

Lannes established himself at Stettin, with the intention of occupying that important place, and affording his infantry a rest which it greatly needed. Murat and Marshals Bernadotte and Soult were sufficient to complete the destruction of 22,000 Prussians, worn out with fatigue. It was enough to march in order to take them, unless, indeed, they had the luck to reach the sea, and to find sufficient shipping to carry them to East Prussia. Murat, therefore, directed his course in great haste along the coast, to prevent their approach to it. He pushed as far as Stralsund, while Marshal Bernadotte, setting out from the environs of Berlin, and Marshal Soult from the banks of the Elbe, proceeded northward, to drive the enemy into the net of the French cavalry.

General Blucher had assumed the command of the two Prussian corps at Waren, near the lake of Muritz. To retreat to East Prussia across the Oder was impossible, since that river was guarded in every part of its course by the French army. The access to the coast and to Stralsund was already intercepted by Murat's horse. There was no other resource but to turn about and go back to the Elbe. General Blucher formed this design, hoping to throw himself into Magdeburg, to increase the force there to such a degree as to convert the garrison into a real *corps d'armée*, and supported by that great fortress to make a brilliant resistance. He directed his course, therefore, towards the Elbe, with a view to attempt to pass it in the environs of Lauenburg.

His illusions were of short duration. Patroles of the enemy informed him that he was surrounded on all sides; that on his right Murat was already advancing along the coast, that on his left Marshals Bernadotte and Soult barred the approach to Magdeburg. Not knowing what plan to pursue, he marched for some days straight forward towards the Lower Elbe, as a French corps returning to France, through Mecklenburg and Hanover, might have done. His ranks grew thinner every moment, because his soldiers fled into the woods, or chose rather to surrender than longer to endure hardships which had become intolerable. He also lost a considerable number in rearguard actions, which, owing to the difficult nature of the country, did not always turn out complete defeats, but which invariably ended with the relinquishment of the disputed ground, and in the sacrifice of many men taken or hors de combat.

In this manner he marched from the 30th of October to the 5th of November. Not knowing which way to direct his course,

he conceived a violent act, which, however, necessity might justify. In his road lay the city of Lübeck, one of the last free cities preserved by the Germanic constitution. Neutral by right, it ought to have been safe from all hostility. General Blucher resolved to throw himself into it by main force, to possess himself of the great resources which it contained in provisions as well as money, and if he could not defend himself there, to seize all the merchant vessels he should find in its waters, to embark his troops, and to transport them to East Prussia.

In consequence, on the 6th of November, he entered Lübeck by force, in spite of the protest of the magistrates. The ramparts of the city, imprudently converted into a public promenade, had lost their principal strength. Besides, the city was so unprovided with garrison that General Blucher had no difficulty to penetrate into it. He quartered his soldiers upon the inhabitants, from whom they took whatever they wanted, and besides, required a large contribution from the magistrates. Lübeck, as everybody knows, is situated on the frontier of Denmark. A corps of Danish troops guarded that frontier. General Blucher signified to the Danish general that, if he suffered it to be violated by the French, he would violate it in his turn and take refuge in Holstein. The Danish general having declared that he would perish with the whole of his corps rather than suffer any violation of territory, General Blucher shut himself up in Lübeck, confident that he should not be turned by the French if the neutrality of Denmark were respected. But while he conceived that he should enjoy some safety in Lübeck, protected by the remains of the fortification, and find compensation in the abundance of a great commercial city for the privations of an arduous retreat, the French made their appearance. The neutrality of Lübeck had ceased to exist for them, and they had a right to pursue the Prussians thither. Arriving on the 7th, they attacked on the same day the works which covered the gates called the Burg-Thor and the Mühlen-Thor. The corps of Marshal Bernadotte carried the one, that of Marshal Soult the other, by escalading, under a fire of grape, and with unparalleled hardihood, works which, though weakened, still presented obstacles difficult to overcome. An obstinate conflict ensued in the street. The unfortunate inhabitants of Lübeck beheld their opulent city converted into a scene of carnage. The Prussians, cut in pieces or surrounded, were obliged to flee, leaving more than a thousand dead on the spot, about 6000 prisoners, and all their artillery. General Blucher, sallying from Lübeck, took a position between the half inundated territory in the environs of Lübeck and the Danish frontier. There he halted, having neither provisions nor ammunition left. This time he was compelled to surrender, and, after so severely censuring Mack a year and the Prince of Hohenlohe a week before,

to follow their example. He wished to add a few words to the capitulation. Murat allowed him out of respect for his misfortune. The words added were that he surrendered for want of ammunition. This capitulation gave the French 14,000 prisoners, who, with those already taken in Lübeck, formed a total of 20,000.

From this day there was not a single Prussian corps between the Rhine and the Oder; the 70,000 men who had endeavoured to gain the Oder were dispersed, killed, or prisoners.

While these events were occurring in Mecklenburg, the important fortress of Cüstrin, on the Oder, submitted to a few companies of infantry, commanded by General Petit. Four thousand prisoners, considerable magazines, the second position of the Lower Oder, were the prize of this new capitulation. Thus the French occupied on the Oder the fortresses of Stettin and Cüstrin. Marshal Lannes was established at Stettin, Marshal Davout at Cüstrin.

On the Elbe there was still left the great fortress of Magdeburg, which contained a garrison of 22,000 men and a vast matériel. Marshal Ney had undertaken the investment of it. Having procured a few mortars for want of siege artillery, he several times threatened the place with a bombardment—a threat which he took good care not to put in execution. Two or three bombs thrown into the air frightened the population, who surrounded the governor's residence, begging with loud cries that they might not be exposed to useless ravages, since the Prussian monarchy was now too much reduced to be capable of defending itself. So complete was the demoralisation among the Prussian generals that these reasons were held to be good, and that, the day after the capitulation of Lübeck, General Kleist surrendered Magdeburg, with 22,000 prisoners.

Thus since the opening of the campaign the Prussians had done four times, at Erfurt, at Prenzlau, at Lübeck, and at Magdeburg, what they had so grievously reproached the Austrians with having done once at Ulm. This remark is not designed to wound their feelings under a misfortune which has since been so fully repaired, but to prove that it had been better a year before to respect the misfortune of another, and not to declare the Austrians such cowards from the paltry motive of making the French appear less brave and less clever.

Of the 160,000 men who had composed the active army of the Prussians, there was not then a fraction left. Setting aside the exaggerations which in the surprise of such successes were circulated in Europe, it is certain that about 25,000 men had been killed or wounded, and 100,000 made prisoners. Of the 35,000 others, not one had recrossed the Oder. Those who were Saxons had returned to Saxony. Those who were Prussians had flung away their arms and fled across the country. One might say, with perfect truth, that there was no longer a Prussian

army. Napoleon was absolute master of the monarchy of the great Frederick, with the exception of a few places in Silesia, incapable of resistance, and East Prussia, protected by the distance and by the vicinity of Russia. Napoleon had carried off all the matériel of Prussia in cannon, muskets, warlike stores; he had acquired provisions to subsist his army during a campaign, 20,000 horses to remount his cavalry, and colours sufficient to cover the edifices of his capital. All this had been accomplished in a month, for Napoleon had entered on the 8th of October, and received the capitulation of Magdeburg, which was the last, on the 8th of November. And it is this rapid annihilation of the Prussian power that renders the campaign, the history of which we have been relating, so marvellous. That 160,000 French, who had arrived at military perfection by fifteen years of war, should have vanquished 160,000 Prussians, enervated by a long peace, is no great miracle. But it is an astonishing event this oblique march of the French army, combined in such a manner that the Prussian army, constantly turned during a retreat of two hundred leagues, from Hof to Stettin, should not reach the Oder till the very day that this river was occupied, that it should be destroyed or taken to the last man, and that in a month the sovereign of a great monarchy, the second in succession from the great Frederick, should find himself without soldiers and without dominions! It is, we say, an astonishing event when we consider that this was not the case of Macedonians beating cowardly and ignorant Persians, but a European army beating a European army, both intelligent and brave.

As for the Prussians, if you must know the secret of that unparalleled rout, after which fortresses surrendered at the summons of a few hussars, or of a few companies of light infantry, you will find it in the demoralisation which usually follows overweening presumption. After having denied, not the victories of the French—they were undeniable—but their military superiority, the Prussians were so struck with it in the first encounter, that they considered resistance as no longer possible, flung away their arms, and fled. They were laid prostrate, and Europe with them. She trembled all over after Jena, much more than Austerlitz; for, after Austerlitz, a confidence in the Prussian army was retained, at least by the enemies of France. After Jena, the entire continent seemed to belong to the French army. The soldiers of the great Frederick had been the last resource of envy: those soldiers vanquished, but one other resource was left to Envy, the only one, alas! that never fails her—to predict the faults of a genius thenceforth irresistible; to pretend that no human reason could bear up under such successes: and it is unfortunately true that Genius, after tormenting Envy by its successes, takes upon itself to console her by its faults.

BOOK XXVI.

EYLAU.

NAPOLEON had in a month overturned the Prussian monarchy, destroyed its armies, conquered the greater part of its territory. Frederick William had nothing left but a province and 25,000 men. It is true that the Russians, who had taken refuge at Königsberg, hastened, at the earnest solicitation of the court of Berlin, as fast as the distance, the season, and the unskilfulness of a semi-barbarous administration permitted them. But the Russians had been seen at Austerlitz, and notwithstanding their bravery, it could not be expected of them that they should change the fortune of the war. The cabinets and the aristocracies of Europe were overwhelmed with consternation. The conquered people, divided between patriotism and admiration, could not help recognising in Napoleon the child of the French Revolution, the propagator of its ideas, the glorious applier of the most popular of them all—equality. They beheld a striking example of this equality in our generals, who were no longer designated by their names, so well known, of Berthier, Murat, Bernadotte, but by the titles of Prince of Neufchatel, Grand Duke of Berg. Prince of Ponte Corvo! Striving to account for the unequal triumphs which we had gained over the Prussian army, they attributed them not only to our courage, to our experience in war, but to the principles on which the new French society rested. They accounted for the incredible ardour of our soldiers by the extraordinary ambition which the government had contrived to excite in them, by throwing open to them that immense career, upon which a man might enter a peasant, like the Sforzas, and leave it marshal, prince, king, emperor. It is true that the last prize was the only one of its kind in the urn of Fortune; but if there was only one emperor who had earned that distinction by a prodigious genius, how many dukes and princes were there whose superiority to their comrades was not of a nature to make any person despair!

The intercepted letters of the Prussian officers were full of strange reflections on this subject. One of them, writing to his family, said, "If nothing more was necessary than to use our strength against the French, we should very soon be conquerors.

They are short, puny; one of our Germans would beat four of them. But in the fire they become supernatural beings. They are hurried away by an inexpressible ardour, not a trace of which is to be discovered in our soldiers. . . . What would you do with peasants, led into fire by nobles, whose dangers they share, without ever sharing their passions and their rewards!" *

Thus there was mingled in the mouths of the vanquished, with the glorification of our bravery, the glorification of the principles of our Revolution. The King of Prussia, in fact, when a fugitive on the confines of his kingdom, was preparing an ordinance for introducing equality into the ranks of his army, and for effacing in it all the distinctions of class and birth. Singular example of the propagation of the liberal ideas carried to the extremity of Europe by a conqueror, who is frequently represented as a giant who would fain have stifled those ideas! He had quashed some of them, it is true, but the most social of them travelled with him as far as his glory. Always inclined to give to things the brilliancy of his imagination, Napoleon, who had projected on the morrow of Austerlitz the column in the Place Vendôme, the triumphal arch of l'Etoile, the grand Rue Imperiale, decreed in the heart of conquered Prussia the erection of a monument, which is since become one of the grandest in the capital, the Temple of La Madeleine.

On the spot now occupied by the church of that name, which forms with the Place de la Concorde so magnificent a whole, was to have stood the new Exchange. Napoleon thought the site too fine for the temple of wealth to be erected upon it, and he resolved to raise there the temple of glory. He decided that some other quarter should be sought out for the new Exchange, and that on one of the four points seen from the middle of the Place de la Concorde should be erected a monument consecrated to the glory of our arms. He intended the front of this edifice to bear the inscription—L'EMPEREUR NAPOLEON AUX SOLDATS DE LA GRANDE ARMÉE—(The Emperor Napoleon to the Soldiers of the Grand Army). On marble tablets were to be inscribed the names of all the officers and soldiers who had been present at the great events of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena; and on tablets of gold the names of those who had fallen in those battles. Immense basso-relievos were to represent the superior officers and the generals grouped beside each other. Statues were granted to the marshals who had commanded corps of the army. The colours taken from the enemy were to be suspended from the roof of the building. Lastly, Napoleon decided that every year a festival of antique character, like the edifice itself, should

* In this passage we adhere faithfully to the sense of a great quantity of letters, the originals of which are preserved among the innumerable papers of Napoleon's in the Louvre.

be held on the 2nd of December, in honour of the martial virtues. He gave orders for a competition, reserving to himself the right to choose from among the plans presented that which should seem to him the most suitable; but he determined beforehand the style of architecture which he intended to give to the new fabric. He wanted, he said, a temple of Grecian or Roman form. We have churches, he wrote to the minister of the interior, but we have not a temple, like the Parthenon, for instance: Paris must have one of that kind. France was then fond of the arts of Greece, as formerly she was fond of the arts of the middle ages; and an imitation of the Parthenon was an absolutely new present to offer to the capital. At the present day this Grecian temple, turned into a Christian church (which cannot be a subject for regret), contrasts with its new destination, and with the arts of the present period. Thus our tastes, our passions, our ideas are as transient as the caprices of that Fortune which has devoted this edifice to purposes so different from those to which it was originally destined. At any rate, it fills majestically the spot which was at first assigned to it, and the people have not forgotten that this temple was to have been the temple of glory.*

* We quote some letters of Napoleon's on this subject, which seem to us worthy of being introduced.

"To the Minister of the Interior.

"POSEN, *6th December* 1806.

"Literature has need of encouragement: you are its minister. Propose to me some means for giving a shock to all the different branches of the belles-lettres, which have in all times shed a lustre on the nation.

"You will have received the decree which I have issued respecting the building of La Madeleine, and that which repeals the establishment of the Exchange on that spot. It is, however, necessary to have an Exchange in Paris. My intention is to have an Exchange built corresponding with the grandeur of the capital and the quantity of business which is some day to be transacted there. It must be spacious, in order to have walks round it. I should like a detached site.

"In assigning a fund of three millions for the erection of the edifice of La Madeleine, I destined that sum for the building only, not for the ornaments, upon which, in time, I purpose to expend a much larger sum. I desire that the surrounding timber yards be previously purchased, in order to form a large circular place, in the centre of which the structure shall stand, and around which I will have houses built on a uniform plan.

"It would not be unsuitable to call the Bridge of the Military School the *Bridge of Jena*. Propose to me a decree for giving the names of the generals and colonels who were killed in that battle to the different new streets.

"Whereupon, &c., NAPOLEON."

"To the Minister of the Interior.

"FINKENSTEIN, 30*th May* 1807.

"After having examined attentively the different plans for a monument dedicated to the grand army, I have not been for a moment doubtful. That of M. Vignon is the only one which fulfils my intentions. It is a temple that I asked for, and not a church. What could one do in the style of churches that would be fit to compete with St. Geneviève or Notre Dame, and above all with St. Peter's at Rome? M. Vignon's plan unites, with many other

The flatterers of the time, acquainted with the weaknesses of Napoleon, and even exaggerating them to themselves in their meanness, proposed to him to change the revolutionary name of Place de la Concorde into another name more monarchical, taken from the imperial monarchy. He replied to M. de Champagny in this very short letter:—"The Place de la Concorde must keep the name it has. CONCORD—'tis that which renders France invincible." (January 1807.) But a magnificent stone bridge, recently decreed, and erected opposite to the Military School, had not yet received a name. Napoleon ordered it to be called by the glorious name of Jena, which that bridge has

advantages, that of harmonising much better with the palace of the Legislative Body, and of not crushing the Tuileries.

"I will not have anything of wood. The spectators must be placed, as I have said, upon seats of marble, forming the amphitheatres destined for the public. Nothing in this temple must be movable and changing; everything, on the contrary, must be fixed in its place. If it were possible to place at the entrance of the temple the Nile and the Tiber, which have been brought from Rome, that would produce a very good effect. M. Vignon must endeavour to introduce them into his definitive plan, as well as equestrian statues to be placed outside, since they would really be out of place in the interior. It is necessary also to fix the situations where the armour of Francis I., taken at Vienna, and the great quadriga of Berlin, are to be placed.

"No timber must be used in the construction of this temple. . . . Granite and iron—such must be the materials of this monument. It may be objected that the present columns are not of granite; but that objection would not be good, since, in time, those columns might be renewed without injuring the monument. However, if it should be proved that the use of granite would occasion too great an expense and too long delay, it must be given up; for the principal condition of the project is that it be executed in three or four years, and at furthest five years. This monument is connected in some measure with politics; of course it is one of those which ought to be speedily finished. It would, nevertheless, not be amiss to seek after granite for other structures which I shall order, and which from their nature may allow thirty, forty, or fifty years to be given to their completion.

"I presuppose that all the sculptures in the interior shall be of marble, and that no sculptures fit for the drawing-rooms and dining-rooms of the wives of Paris bankers shall be proposed to me: whatever is not of long duration ought not to be employed in this edifice. I repeat that there must be no sort of furniture, not even curtains.

"As for the plan which has obtained the prize, it has not come up to my views; it was the first that I threw aside. It is true that I made it a fundamental point to retain that portion of the building of La Madeleine which is still standing; but that expression is an ellipsis. It meant that as much as possible of that building should be preserved; otherwise there would have been no need of programme, and nothing more to do than to follow the original plan. My intention was not to have a church, but a temple, and I desired neither that all should be demolished, nor that all should be retained. If these two propositions were incompatible, namely, that of having a temple and that of retaining the present buildings of La Madeleine, it was plain that the definition of a temple ought to have been adhered to; by temple, I meant such a monument as existed at Athens, but exists not in Paris. There are plenty of churches in Paris; there are churches in all the villages. I should most assuredly not have taken it amiss if the architects had pointed out that there was a contradiction between the idea of having a temple and the intention of retaining buildings erected for a church. The first was the principal idea, the second was an accessory idea. M. Vignon has therefore divined what I wanted. NAPOLEON."

retained, and which at a later period would have become fatal to it if an honourable act of Louis XVIII. had not saved it in 1814 from the brutal rage of the Prussians.

These projects for monuments of art, formed in the midst of conquered capitals, were only accessory ideas to those vast ideas which occupied his mind. The glorious event of Austerlitz had already impressed him with the highest notion of his strength, and applied new stimulants to his gigantic ambition. That of Jena raised his confidence and his desires to the highest pitch. After that so complete and so speedy destruction of the military power in highest repute in Europe, there was nothing but what he deemed possible, nothing but what he desired. His enemies, to depreciate his anterior triumphs, having incessantly repeated that the Prussian army was the only one to be made any account of, the only one that it was difficult to conquer, he had taken them at the word, and having conquered, more than conquered, annihilated it, in a month, he perceived thenceforward no bound to his power, and admitted of no limitation to his will. Europe appeared to him a field without owner, in which he could build up whatever he pleased, whatever he considered as great, wise, useful, and brilliant. Where, then, was he to discern a symptom of resistance? Austria, disarmed by a single manœuvre, that of Ulm, was trembling, exhausted, incapable of resuming arms. The Russians, though deemed brave, had been driven with the bayonet at their loins from Munich to Olmütz, and if they had made a stand at Hollabrünn, at Austerlitz, it was to sustain overwhelming defeats. Lastly, the Prussian monarchy had just been destroyed in thirty days. What obstacle, we repeat it, could he discover to his projects? The wrecks of the Russian armies, united in the north to 25,000 Prussians, afforded no prospect of a danger that he needed to be alarmed at. Hence he wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, "All here is *child's play*, to which an end must be put; and this time I will take such a course with my enemies as to settle them all." He decided therefore to push the war till he had wrung peace from all the powers, and such a peace as should be equally brilliant and durable. Not indeed that it would be difficult to wring it from the courts of the continent, but from England, which, protected by the ocean, was the only country that had escaped the yoke with which Europe saw herself threatened. Napoleon had already said that he would gain the dominion of the sea by means of the land; and that if the English were determined to close the ocean against him, he would close the continent against them. Having reached the Elbe and the Oder, he confirmed himself in this idea more than ever; he systematised it in his head, and he wrote to his brother Louis in Holland, *I am going to reconquer the colonies*

by means of the land. In the fermentation of mind produced in him by the extraordinary success of the war with Prussia, he conceived the most gigantic ideas that he ever brought forth in his life. In the first place, he resolved to keep in deposit all that he had conquered, and all that he should yet conquer, till England had restored to France, to Holland, to Spain, the colonies which she had taken from them. The continental powers being in reality but subsidised auxiliaries of England, he determined to hold them all responsible for the British policy, and to lay down as the essential principle of negotiation, but he would not restore to one of them anything that he had taken till England should give up the whole or part of her maritime conquests. Two Prussian negotiators, M. de Lucchesini and M. de Zastrow, were at Charlottenburg, soliciting an armistice and peace. He replied to them through Duroc, who had continued the friend of the court of Berlin, that as for peace, it was not to be thought of till England was brought into more moderate views; and that Prussia and Germany should remain in his hands in pledge for what England had taken from the maritime powers; but that as for an armistice, he was ready to grant one on condition of the immediate delivery to him of the line on which he intended to winter, and which he meant to make the starting post of his future operations—the line of the Vistula. In consequence, he required all the fortresses in Silesia, such as Breslau, Glogau, Schweidnitz, Glatz, and all those on the Vistula, such as Dantzig, Graudenz, Thorn, Warsaw, to be delivered up to him immediately; for, if they were not given up, he said, he should go and reduce them in a few days.

With this intention to CONQUER THE SEA BY THE LAND, by depriving Great Britain of all her allies, and closing all the ports of the continent against her, the first thing to be done was to interdict to her without delay access to the vast coasts occupied by the French armies. Napoleon had already himself, or by means of Prussia, closed the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe. This was a natural and legitimate exercise of the right of conquest, for conquest confers all the rights of the sovereign, and especially the right of closing the ports or intercepting the roads of the conquered country, without such rigour being held to be a violation of the right of nations towards any person whatever. But to forbid the entry of the Ems, the Elbe, and the Weser was a measure very inadequate for attaining the end proposed to himself by Napoleon; for in spite of the strictest watch on the coasts, English goods were introduced by smuggling not only into Hanover but into Holland, the government of which was under our direct influence, and in Belgium, which had become a French province.

Besides, when the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe were closed, these goods entered by the Oder, by the Vistula, and descended again from north to south. They grew dear, it is true, but the English, necessitated to dispose of them, sold them at a price which compensated the expenses of smuggling and freight. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to more rigorous measures against English merchandise, and Napoleon was not the man to suffer himself to be deterred from them.

England herself had just authorised all sorts of excesses against her commerce by taking an extraordinary measure, and one of the most outrageous that can be imagined, against the most generally admitted right of nations, and which is called a paper blockade. As we have already explained several times, it is a principle with most of the maritime nations that every neutral, that is to say, every flag not a party in a war between two powers, has a right to sail from the ports of one to the ports of the other, to carry any merchandise whatever, even that of the enemy, excepting contraband of war, which consists in arms, munitions of war, and provisions cured for the use of the armies. This liberty ceases only in the case of a seaport blockaded by a naval force, so that the blockade be efficacious. In this case the blockade being notified, the faculty of entering the blockaded place is suspended for neutrals. But if in the restrictions imposed upon the freedom of navigation we do not stop at this certain limit of the presence of an effective force, there is no reason why we should not lay an interdict upon whole tracts of coast upon pretext of blockade. England had already sought to overstep the limits of the real blockade by alleging that, with a few sail, insufficient in number to close the approaches to a seaport, she had a right to declare the blockade. But at last she had admitted the necessity of a force of some sort against the blockaded port. Now she did not stop at this limit already so vague, and at the time of her momentary rupture with Prussia, occasioned by the occupation of Hanover, she had ventured to forbid all commerce to neutrals on the coasts of France and Germany, from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe. This was the abuse of strength carried to the utmost excess, and thenceforward a mere British decree was sufficient to lay under interdict all the parts of the globe which England was pleased to deprive of commerce.

This incredible violation of the right of nations furnished Napoleon with a just pretext for authorising the most rigorous measures in regard to English commerce. He devised a formidable decree, which, however excessive it might appear, was but a just reprisal of the violences of England, and which had, moreover, the advantage of completely answering the views which he had recently conceived. This decree, dated Berlin, the 21st of

November, applicable not only to France, but to the countries occupied by her armies or in alliance with her, that is to say, to France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and all Germany, declared the British Islands in a *state of blockade.* The consequences of the state of blockade were the following:—

All commerce with England was absolutely prohibited;

All goods, the produce of English manufactures, or of English colonies, were to be confiscated not only on the coast but in the interior, in the houses of the merchants by whom they should be harboured;

All letters coming from or going to England, addressed to an Englishman, or written in English, were to be stopped at the post-offices and destroyed;

Every Englishman whatsoever, seized in France or in the countries under subjection to her arms, was to be declared a prisoner of war;

Every vessel having only touched at the English colonies or at any of the ports of the three kingdoms was forbidden to enter French ports or ports under subjection to France; and in case of a false declaration being made on this subject, she became a lawful prize;

Half of the produce of the confiscation was destined to indemnify French and allied merchants who had suffered by the spoliations of England;

Lastly, the English who fell into our power were to serve for the exchange of the French or their allies who were taken prisoners.

Such were these measures, assuredly inexcusable if England had not taken pains to justify them beforehand by her own excesses. Napoleon was fully sensible of their severity; but in order to induce England to relinquish her tyranny at sea, he had recourse to a like tyranny upon land. He wished most especially to intimidate the agents of the English commerce, and principally the merchants of the Hanseatic towns, who, laughing at the orders issued respecting the Elbe and the Weser, distributed the prohibited goods throughout all parts of the continent. The threat of confiscation, a threat soon followed up, would make them tremble, and if not close the outlets opened clandestinely to British commerce, at least render them very narrow.

Napoleon, saying to himself that all the commercial nations were interested in the resistance which he was opposing to the unjust pretensions of England, concluded that they would submit to the inconveniences of a struggle which had become necessary; he thought that, these inconveniences falling particularly upon the speculators of Hamburg, Bremen, Leipsic, Amsterdam, and on smugglers by profession, it was not worth while to limit his means of reprisal, out of regard for such interests.

The effect of this decree on the opinion of Europe was immense. Some regarded it as a revolting excess of despotism, others as a stroke of profound policy, all as an extraordinary act, proportioned to the conflict of giants maintained by England and France against each other, the one daring to seize the dominion of the sea, hitherto the common route of nations, and to interdict all commerce to her enemies, the other aiming at the entire occupation of the continent by force of arms, to reply to the closing of the sea by the closing of the land. Unheard-of spectacle, without example in the past and probably in the future, exhibited at this moment by the unchained passions of the two greatest nations of the earth!

No sooner was this decree conceived and drawn up by Napoleon himself, and by him alone, without the participation of M. de Talleyrand—no sooner was this decree signed, than it was sent by extraordinary couriers to the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy, with orders to some, summonses to others, to put it into immediate execution. Marshal Mortier, who had already taken possession of Hesse, was directed to proceed with the utmost expedition to the Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, and to make himself master not only of those towns, but of the ports of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania, as far as the mouths of the Oder. He was enjoined to occupy the rich warehouses of the Hanseatic towns, to seize the merchandise of English origin there, to arrest the English merchants, and to do all this with punctuality, exactness, and probity. It was because Napoleon expected a more rigorous and at the same time honest execution from Marshal Mortier than from any other that he had given him such a commission. He ordered him to take with him into Germany a certain number of seamen, drafted from the Boulogne flotilla, to make them cruise in vessels at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, to arm all the passes with cannon, and to sink every suspicious ship that should attempt to force the blockade.

Such was the *continental blockade* by which Napoleon replied to the *blockade upon paper* devised by England.

But to subject the continent to his policy, it was requisite that Napoleon should push the war further than he had done. Austria was six months before in his mighty hands, and might be so again whenever he pleased. Prussia was there at that moment. But Russia, always repulsed when she appeared in the regions of the west, nevertheless escaped his blows by retiring beyond the Vistula and the Niemen. She was the only ally that England had left, and he must beat her as completely as he had beaten Austria and Prussia, to realise in its full extent the policy of CONQUERING THE SEA BY THE LAND. Napoleon was therefore resolved to proceed northward, and to hasten to meet

the Russians in the plains of Poland, where the people were ready to rise at his appearance. Never had warrior setting out from the Rhine reached the Vistula, much less the Niemen. But he who had carried the tricoloured flag to float on the banks of the Adige, the Nile, the Jordan, the Po, the Danube, and the Elbe, could and must perform this daring march! At any rate, his presence in the regions of the north would instantly raise an immense European question, that of the re-establishment of Poland. The Poles had always said, France is our friend, but she is at a great distance. When France approached Poland so near as the Oder, must not the idea of a great reparation become with one the subject of well-founded hope, with the other the subject of a matured project? Those unfortunate Poles, so unsteady in their conduct, so serious in their sentiments, uttered shouts of enthusiasm on hearing of our victories, and a crowd of emissaries, hastening to Berlin, besought Napoleon to proceed to the Vistula, promising him their property, their arms, their lives to assist him in reconstituting Poland. This scheme, so seductive, so generous, so politic if it had been more practicable, was one of those enterprises with which the smitten imagination could not fail to be captivated at that moment, and one of those imposing spectacles which it befitted his greatness to give to the world. In penetrating into the heart of Poland, he was adding, it is true, to the difficulties of the present war the most important of all difficulties—that of distance and of climate; but he was depriving Prussia and Russia of the resources of the Polish provinces, considerable resources in men and alimentary substances; he was sapping the foundation of Russian power; he was striving to render Europe the most signal service that had ever been done for it; he was adding fresh pledges to those which he had already in his hands, and which were to serve him to obtain from England maritime restitutions by means of continental restitutions. The vast countries situated upon the route from the Rhine to the Vistula, causes of weakness for an ordinary general, would be converted under the greatest of captains into abundant sources of things necessary for war; he should draw from them, thanks to a skilful administration, provisions, ammunition, arms, horses, money. As for the climate, so formidable in these countries in November and December, he took it into account, no doubt; but he was resolved in this campaign to halt at the Vistula. If it were given up to him by the proposed armistice, he purposed to establish himself there; if, on the contrary, it were disputed, he would conquer it in a few marches, make the troops encamp there till the winter was over, feed them there upon the corn of Poland, warm them with the wood of its forests, recruit them with fresh soldiers brought from the Rhine, and next spring start from the

Vistula to penetrate much farther north than any man had yet dared to do.

Excited by success, impelled by his genius and his good fortune to a greatness of ideas to which no head of empire or army had yet attained, he hesitated not a moment what course to pursue, and made dispositions for advancing into Poland. When passing the Rhine, he had certainly embraced in his designs the idea of a daring march to the north, but vaguely. It was in Berlin, and after the rapid and signal successes obtained over Prussia, that he formed the serious plan of its execution.

Still, in addition to the perils inherent in the enterprise itself, there was a particular danger which Napoleon did not disguise from himself; that is, the impression which might be produced upon Austria, which, though conquered, and conquered even to exhaustion, might nevertheless be tempted to seize the opportunity to fall upon our rear.

The present conduct of that court was of such a nature as to excite more than one fear. To the offers of alliance, which Napoleon had directed to be made in consequence of his conversations with the Duke of Wurzburg, she had replied by affected demonstrations of good-will, feigning not to understand our ambassador; and when he had explained himself in a clearer manner, alleging that too close a connection with France would draw upon her a rupture with Russia and Prussia, and that, so soon after a long struggle thrice renewed in the last fifteen years, she was no longer capable of waging war either for or against any power.

To these evasive words she had recently added the most significant acts. She had assembled in Bohemia 60,000 men, who, placed at first along Bavaria and Saxony, were at this moment marching towards Galicia, following, in some measure, behind their own frontiers the movement of the belligerent armies. Independently of these 60,000 men, she had despatched fresh troops towards Poland, and she was exerting herself with extreme activity to form magazines in Bohemia and Galicia. When questioned concerning her armaments, she assigned commonplace reasons, grounded on her personal safety, saying that, exposed on all sides to the contact of hostile armies which were warring with each other, she must not allow any of them to violate her territory, and that the measures which she was called to account for were but measures of pure precaution.

Napoleon was not to be duped by language so insincere. The need of an alliance, since he had lost that of Prussia, had for a moment directed his mind towards the court of Vienna; but it was now easy to perceive that the power from which we had wrested, in fifteen years, the Netherlands, Suabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, Tuscany, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and lastly,

the Germanic crown, could never be any other than an irreconcilable enemy, dissembling out of policy her deep resentment, but ready to let it burst forth on the first occasion. He clearly perceived that the fears of Austria were feigned, for none of the belligerent parties had an interest in provoking her by a violation of territory; and he knew that, if she armed, it could only be with the perfidious intention of falling upon the rear of the French army. Attaching no more importance than was necessary to the word of a man and a sovereign, by which Francis II. had engaged not to make war again upon France, he thought, nevertheless, that the recollection of that word solemnly given must embarrass that prince; that he would need a very specious pretext for breaking it; and he had formed two maturely weighed resolutions: the first, not to afford Austria any pretext for interfering in the present war; and the second, to take such precautions as if she were certain to interfere, and to take them in an ostensible manner. His language was conformable to these resolutions. He first complained with the utmost frankness of the armaments going forward in Bohemia and Galicia, and in such a way as to prove that he comprehended their object. Then with the same frankness he intimated the precautions which he thought himself obliged to take, and which were likely to deter the cabinet of Vienna. He affirmed anew that he would not give any provocation to war, but it should be prompt and terrible if Austria had the imprudence to recommence it. He declared that, determined not to afford any pretext for a rupture, he would not countenance a rising in the provinces of Poland belonging to Austria; that the rising in Prussian and Russian Poland was imputable exclusively to those who had been bent on war; that he did not disguise from himself the difficulty of repressing the Poles dependent on Austria, when the Poles dependent on Russia and Prussia were stirring; but that if people at Vienna thought on that point as he did, and if, like him, they were convinced of the enormous fault committed in the last century in destroying a monarchy which was the bulwark of the west, he suggested a very simple expedient for repairing that loss in reconstituting Poland, and offering to the house of Austria an ample indemnification for the provinces to the sacrifice of which she would have to submit. This indemnification was the restitution of Silesia, wrested from Maria Theresa by Frederick the Great. Silesia was certainly as valuable as the Galicias, and this would be a signal reparation of the disasters, the outrages, which the founder of the Prussian monarchy had inflicted on the house of Austria.

Assuredly, in the situation in which Napoleon was placed, nothing was better calculated than such a proposal. Led, in fact, by the course of events to destroy the work of the great Frederick by humbling Prussia, he could not do better than to destroy that

work completely by restoring to Austria what Frederick had taken away, and by taking from her what Frederick had given her. For the rest, he offered this exchange, without pretending to impose it upon her. If such a proposal, which formerly would have filled Austria with joy, should awaken her old sentiments in regard to Silesia, he was quite ready, he said, to carry it into effect; if not, it must be considered as not having been made; and he reserved himself to act in Prussian and Russian Poland as events should suggest to him, engaging only not to undertake anything injurious to the rights of Austria. While taking care to furnish no pretext for complaint to the court of Vienna, Napoleon nevertheless repeated that he was quite prepared, and that if she was bent on war, she would not take him at unawares. Though satisfied with the services of his ambassador, M. de la Rochefoucauld, he appointed in his stead General Andreossy, who, as a military man, and perfectly acquainted with Austria, was capable of observing with a more correct eye the nature and extent of the preparations of that power.

Napoleon, at this extraordinary moment of his reign, conceived the idea of making the east subservient to his projects in the west. Turkey was in a state of crisis, by which he hoped to benefit. That unfortunate empire, threatened ever since the reign of Catherine even by its friends, who, seeing its provinces on the point of being rent from it, hastened to prevent their rivals from seizing them—witness the conduct of France in Egypt—that unfortunate empire had sometimes been attracted towards Napoleon by the instinct of a common interest, sometimes drawn away from him by the intrigues of England and Russia, working up the Divan by the recollection of the Pyramids and Aboukir. Having made peace at the time of the consulate, relapsed into coldness at the time of the creation of the empire, which he had refused to recognise, Sultan Selim had been definitively brought by the battle of Austerlitz to a reconciliation, which had soon become intimacy. He had not only conceded to Napoleon the title of Padishah, at first denied, but had sent to Paris an ambassador extraordinary, to carry him congratulations and presents along with the act of recognition. Sultan Selim, in acting thus, had indulged the real inclination of his heart, which drew him towards France in spite of the intrigues with which he was beset, and the redoubling of which attested the deplorable decline of the empire. This prince, mild, discreet, enlightened as a European, fond of the civilisation of the west, not from the whim of a despot, but from a strong sense of the superiority of that civilisation to the civilisation of the east, had from his youth, when he was buried in the voluptuous obscurity of the seraglio, kept up, through M. Ruffin, personal and secret correspondence with Louis XVI. Having since ascended the throne, he had retained a marked

preference for France, and he was glad to find in her victories a decisive reason for giving himself up to her. The Russians and English would fain have combated this inclination even by force of arms. An opportunity offered for trying their influence at Constantinople; this was the choice to be made of the two hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. The hospodars Ipsilanti and Maruzzi, devoted to England, to Russia, to whomsoever desired the ruin of the Turkish empire, for they were the real precursors of the Greek insurrection, showed themselves in their administration the declared accomplices of the enemies of the Porte. Things had arrived at such a point that the latter was compelled to recall unfaithful and dangerous agents. Russia had immediately ordered General Michelson to march for the Dniester with an army of 60,000 men, and England had sent a fleet to the Dardanelles, to effect by this junction of forces the reinstatement of the deposed hospodars. The young Emperor Alexander, who had appeared upon the stage of the world only to sustain the memorable defeat of Austerlitz, said to himself that, amidst this sanguinary fray of all the European nations, it behoved him to take advantage of circumstances, and to advance towards Turkey, that whatever might be the chances of fortune between the Rhine and the Niemen, what he should take in the east would perhaps be left him to compensate what others should take in the west.

This calculation was plausible enough; but having Napoleon on his hands, he acted with little prudence in depriving himself of 60,000 men, and sending them upon the Pruth. The proof of this fault is manifested in the joy which Napoleon felt when informed that a rupture was likely to take place between Russia and the Porte. It was in this anticipation that he had attached such importance to the occupation of Dalmatia, which permitted him to keep an army on the frontier of Bosnia, and afforded him facility to succour or to annoy the Porte, according to the circumstances of his policy. On perceiving the approach of that crisis, which he desired the more ardently the more serious the aspect of events became, he had chosen for his ambassador at Constantinople a soldier, a native of Corsica like himself, who united remarkable political sagacity to military experience: this was General Sebastiani, who had already been employed on a mission in Turkey, of which he had most satisfactorily acquitted himself. Napoleon had given him express instructions to excite the Turks against the Russians, and to exert all his efforts to provoke a war in the east. He had authorised him to draw from Dalmatia officers of artillery and engineers, ammunition, and even General Marmont's 25,000 men, if the Porte, driven to extremities, should desire the presence of a French army. The battle of Austerlitz having reconciled Sultan Selim with Napoleon, the battle of Jena was, in fact, likely

enough to embolden him to go to war. Napoleon wrote to that prince, offering him an alliance defensive and offensive, to induce him to seize this opportunity of raising the Crescent again, and informing him that he was about to render the Turks the greatest service that it was possible to do them, to repair the greatest disaster which they had ever sustained, by endeavouring to re-establish Poland. Orders were given to General Marmont to hold in readiness all the succours that should be applied for by the Porte, and to General Sebastiani to neglect nothing to kindle a conflagration which should extend from the Dardanelles to the mouths of the Danube. In thus setting the Russians and Turks together by the ears, Napoleon proposed to himself a twofold object, that of dividing the Russian forces, and that of throwing Austria into cruel perplexities. Austria, no doubt, hated France, but when she should see the Russians overrunning the shores of the Black Sea, she would necessarily feel apprehensions that would be a very powerful diversion to her hatred.

That immense quarrel, kept up for the last fifteen years between Europe and the French Revolution, was thus about to spread from the Rhine to the Vistula, from Berlin to Constantinople. Involved in a war of extermination, Napoleon had recourse to means proportioned to the magnitude of his designs. His first care was to levy a new conscription. At the end of 1805 he had called out the first half of the conscription of 1806, and had just called out the second half at the moment of his entry into Prussia. He resolved to act in the same manner in regard to the conscription of 1807, and in calling it out immediately, though it was not yet the end of 1806, to spare the young men of that class for training, for gaining their full strength, for breaking themselves to the fatigues of war. With the spirit that pervaded the skeletons, this was more than was needed to form excellent soldiers. This new levy of men would, moreover, make a considerable addition to the general effective of the army. That effective, which in 1805, at the time of leaving Boulogne, amounted to 450,000, which was raised by the conscription of 1806 to 503,000, would be further augmented by the conscription of 1807 to 580,000. Annual liberations being forbidden during the war, the army was thus augmented by every conscription; for battle and disease did not diminish the effective by a number of men equal to that called out. The campaign of Austria had not cost more than 20,000 men; that of Prussia had not yet cost any. It is true that, the war being carried every day to a greater distance and under severer climates, the quality of the troops being lowered in proportion as young recruits stepped into the place of the veteran soldiers of the Revolution, the losses would soon be more sensibly felt. But they were as yet of little importance, and the army,

composed of tried soldiers, made young rather than weakened by the addition of a certain number of conscripts to the war battalions, had attained its state of perfection.

Napoleon wrote, therefore, to M. de Lacuée, ordering him to call out the class of 1807. M. de Lacuée was the person in the ministry of war officially charged with these calls. He was an able functionary, devoted to the emperor, and determined to overcome the difficulties of a very ungrateful task, under a government under which there was so great a consumption of men. Though he was not minister of war, Napoleon corresponded immediately with him, feeling it necessary to guide, to support, to excite him by direct communications. "You will see," he wrote to him, "by a message addressed to the Senate, that I am calling out the conscription of 1807, and that I will not lay down arms till I have peace with England and Russia. I see by the statements that the whole of the conscription of 1806 will have marched. . . . You shall have no need to await my orders for the distribution among the different corps. I have not yet lost any men, but the project which I have formed is more vast than any that I ever conceived; and from this time I must find myself in a position to cope with all events." (Berlin, November 22, 1806.—Depôt of the Secretary of State's Office.)

Napoleon, following the practice which he had adopted in the preceding year, of reserving for the Senate the vote of the contingent, sent a message to that body to demand of it the conscription of 1807, and to acquaint it with the extension given to his policy since he had annihilated Prussia. In this message, in which the energy of the style equalled that of the ideas, he said that till then the monarchs of Europe had played with the generosity of France; that when one coalition was conquered, another immediately sprang up; that no sooner was that of 1805 dissolved than he had had to fight that of 1806; that it behoved France to be less generous in future; that the conquered States should be retained till the general peace on land and sea; that England, regardless of all the rights of nations, launching a commercial interdict against one quarter of the globe, must be struck with the same interdict, and it must be rendered as rigorous as the nature of things permitted; that finally, it would be better, since they were doomed to war, to plunge in wholly than to go but half-way into it; that this was the way to terminate it more completely and more solidly by a general and durable peace. His style expressed with the utmost vigour those ideas of which he was full. Pride, exasperation, confidence were alike conspicuous. He then claimed means proportioned to his ends, and these consisted, as we have just mentioned, in the conscription of 1807 levied at the end of 1806.

We have already explained the precautions taken by Napoleon

in the twofold hypothesis of a long war in the north, and of an unforeseen attack on any part whatever of his vast empire. The third battalions of the regiments of the grand army, forming depôts, were, as we have seen, ranged along the Rhine under Marshal Kellermann, or in the camp of Boulogne under Marshal Brune. These third battalions, already filled by conscripts of 1806, soon to be by those of 1807, carefully trained and equipped under Marshal Kellermann, might, if wanted, join the eighth corps, commanded by Marshal Mortier, to cover the Rhine; or those under Marshal Brune might join the King of Holland, to cover either Holland or the coast of France as far as the Seine. Such of these regiments as were neither in Germany nor Italy, assembled in the interior, at St. Lo, at Pontivy, at Napoleonville, formed into small camps, were destined to proceed to Cherbourg, Brest, La Rochelle, or Bordeaux. Detachments of national guards, not numerous but well chosen, one at St. Omer, one in the Lower Seine, a third in the environs of Bordeaux, were to concur in the defence of threatened points. Some corps concentrated in Paris were to travel thither by post.

The same system had been adopted, as we have already seen, for the army of Italy. The third battalions of the army, spread over Upper Italy, were dedicated to the instruction of the conscripts, and furnished at the same time the garrisons of the fortresses. The war battalions were with the three active armies of Naples, the Frioul, and Dalmatia.

Napoleon resolved, in the first place, to draw from the depôts the reinforcements necessary for the grand army, and to fill the vacancy which he should leave in them with the new conscription; and as that vacancy would be filled, and much more than filled, by the contingent of 1807, to avail himself of the surplus to raise the battalions to 1000 or 1200 men, and the cavalry regiments to an effective of 700 men, instead of 500. He resolved also to augment the effective of the companies of artillery, having perceived that the enemy, to compensate for the quality of his troops, was greatly increasing the number of his guns. The depôt battalions being augmented to 1000 or 1200 men, there might always be drafted from them, besides the recruiting of the active army, the best trained 300 or 400 men, to be sent to any quarter where an unforeseen want of them might arise.

Napoleon had already drawn from the depôts about 12,000 men, who had been conducted in large detachments from Alsace into Franconia, from Franconia into Saxony, to fill the vacancies produced in his ranks by the war. Seven or eight thousand had just arrived, four or five thousand were still on march. This was not a full equivalent for what he had lost, much more, however, from fatigue than by battle. Bearing in mind, above all, the

distance to which the war was about to be carried, he devised a system, profoundly conceived, for bringing the conscripts from the Rhine to the Vistula—for bringing them thither in such a manner, that they should incur no danger during the long journey, that they should not disperse upon the road, and that they should have it in their power to render services by the way upon the rear of the army. These detachments, drawn from each depôt battalion, were to form several companies, according to their number; these companies were to be then united into battalions, and these battalions into provisional regiments of twelve or fifteen hundred men. Officers, taken temporarily from the depôts, were to be given them for the route, and they were to be organised as if they were to form definitive regiments. Setting out with this organisation, and with their complete equipment, they had orders to stop at the fortresses situated on our line of operation, such as Erfurt, Halle, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Spandau, Cüstrin, Frankfort on the Oder; to rest if they had need of rest, and to keep garrison there if it were necessary for the safety of our rear; and wherever they made a halt they were to resume the military exercises, that the instruction of the men might not be neglected during a journey of several months. They would thus cover the communications of the army, and obviate the necessity of weakening it by too great a number of garrisons left in rear, and therefore in some measure augment its effective before they could actually join it.

Having arrived at the theatre of war, they were to be dissolved by the despatch of each detachment to its corps, and the officers were to return by post to their depôts to fetch other recruits.

The same organisation was adopted for the cavalry, with some particular precautions commanded by the nature of that arm.

In all the fortresses converted into grand depôts, such as Wurzburg, Erfurt, Wittenberg, Spandau, orders were given for collecting there, by means of the resources which the country afforded, clothing, shoes, arms, in abundance. The commandants of those places were enjoined to inspect every provisional regiment that passed, to supply clothing and arms for such men as were in want of them, and to detain those who had need of rest. The next corps that passed were to pick up the men left on the way by those which had preceded them, and finding as many men and horses to take as they left behind, they were always sure to arrive complete at the theatre of war. Napoleon, reading assiduously the reports of the commandants of the fortresses through which the provisional regiments passed, incessantly comparing them together, reprimanded the slightest negligence, and thus ensured punctual attention from all. It required nothing short of such combinations, supported by such vigilance, to keep entire so large an army at so vast a distance.

Napoleon not only purposed to keep up the corps at the effective which they had at the time of entering upon the campaign, he designed also to draw new corps to the grand army. He had left, as we have seen, three regiments in Paris, to form a reserve, which could be despatched to the coasts of France if they were threatened. He conceived that he could dispose of two of these regiments, the 58th of the line and the 15th light, in consequence of the considerable increase of the conscripts in the depôts. There were in Paris six third battalions belonging to regiments which had four battalions. The conscription was to raise each of them to 1000 men. Junot, governor of Paris, had orders to review them several times a week, and to make them manœuvre in his presence. It was a reserve of 6000 men, always ready to set out post for Boulogne, Cherbourg, or Brest, and which allowed the 58th of the line and the 15th light to be removed without inconvenience. These two regiments, considered as among the finest in the army, were marched off for the Elbe by Wesel and Westphalia.

It will be recollected that Napoleon had resolved to convert the velites into fusiliers of the guard. Thanks to the prompt execution of what he ordered, a regiment of two battalions, amounting to 1400 men, the soldiers of which had been carefully selected from the annual contingent, and the officers and subalterns taken from the guard, was already completely formed. Napoleon directed it to be kept for the time strictly necessary for its instruction, and then sent by post from Paris to Mayence.

The guard of the capital was then, as now, committed to a municipal force, consisting of two regiments, and called regiments of the Paris guard. Napoleon had recommended that the effective of these two regiments should be augmented as much as possible by men taken from the last conscription. Reaping the benefit of his foresight, he could, without stripping Paris too much, take from them two battalions, which would furnish a regiment of twelve or thirteen hundred men, of excellent quality and appearance. He ordered them to be sent off for the army, thinking that a body of troops which had been employed in keeping order at home ought not to be deprived of the honour of contributing abroad to the greatness of the country, to which it would return better and more respected.

The workmen at the ports were without employment and without bread, because naval operations languished amidst the immense development given to the continental war. Napoleon found useful occupation and wages for them. He composed out of them battalions of infantry, which were charged to guard the ports to which they belonged, with a promise that they should never be required to leave them. They might be relied on, for they were attached to the establishments entrusted to their

vigilance, and they partook besides of the martial spirit of the navy. Thanks to this idea, Napoleon was enabled to take from the coast service three fine regiments, the 19th, 15th, and 31st of the line, which were at Boulogne, Brest, and St. Lo. They were, like the others, increased to 2000 men for the two battalions, and sent off for the grand army.

Thus there were seven new regiments of infantry, capable of forming the nucleus of a fine *corps d'armée*, that Napoleon had the art to draw from France, without weakening the interior too much. To these regiments was to be joined the legion of the north, filled with Poles, and which was already on march for Germany.

That which seemed particularly desirable to Napoleon, and the utility of which he appreciated perhaps to exaggeration, at a moment when he was leaving the plains of Prussia and entering those of Poland, was the cavalry. He had recently drawn from Mayence and marched off on foot, partly towards Hesse, partly towards Prussia, all the trained horse-soldiers that were at the depôts. He had ordered that their horses should be left in France, and that they should be supplied from those which had been collected in Germany. Marshal Mortier, on entering the States of the Elector of Hesse, had disbanded the army of that prince. This had furnished four or five thousand excellent horses, part of which had served for mounting immediately a thousand French horse-soldiers, and the others had been sent to Potsdam. There were at Potsdam vast stables built by the great Frederick, who frequently took delight in seeing a great number of squadrons manœuvring at once in the delightful retreat where he lived as king, philosopher, and warrior. Napoleon there created, under the cannon of Spandau, an immense establishment for the accommodation of his cavalry. Here he collected all the horses taken from the enemy, besides a great quantity of others bought in the different provinces of Prussia. General Bourcier, who had quitted the active army after honourable services, was placed at the head of this depôt, with the recommendation not to leave it for a moment, to see with his own eyes that due attention was paid to the numerous horses collected there, to mount with them the cavalry regiments coming on foot from France, to stop those which passed through Prussia, to review them, to furnish them with horses in place of those that were knocked up or scarcely capable of service, to detain also such men as were sick, and to send them off with regiments coming after them. The workmen of Berlin, having nothing to do in consequence of the departure of the court and the nobility, were to be employed in this depôt, for wages, in saddlers', harness-makers', shoemakers', and wheelwrights' work.

It was to Italy that Napoleon thought to have recourse for

procuring cavalry. Nowhere was it of less use. In Naples they never had to encounter any but Calabrese mountaineers or English, landing from their ships without horse-soldiers. There were at Naples sixteen regiments of cavalry, some of them cuirassiers, and among the finest in the army. Napoleon directed ten of them to be marched towards Upper Italy, leaving only six, all of which were light cavalry, and the effective of which he was enabled to increase to a thousand men each, in consequence of the great number of the conscripts sent beyond the Alps. They would thus form a force of 6000 men, furnishing 4000 horse-soldiers, always ready to mount, and fully adequate to the service of observation, which they had to perform in the kingdom of Naples.

Neither were the intersected plains of Lombardy, in which canals, rivers, long screens of trees, render the movements of cavalry so difficult, a country where it was very necessary. Besides, ten regiments of that army, transferred from the south to the north of Italy, would allow some to be detached and sent off to the grand army. Napoleon drew from this source a division of cuirassiers, formed of four superb regiments, which afterwards distinguished themselves under the command of General d'Espagne. He drew from it light cavalry also, and gave orders for despatching successively to Germany the 19th, 24th, 15th, 3rd, and 24th regiments of chasseurs, which made, with the four of cuirassiers, nine regiments of cavalry borrowed from Italy. This was a force of 5000 horse at least, travelling partly with their horses, partly on foot, the latter being destined to be mounted in Germany.

Napoleon was occupied at the same time in placing the army of Italy on the war footing. He had taken care to send it 20,000 men of the conscription of 1806, and he had recommended to Prince Eugène to pay continual attention to their training. When ready to penetrate into the north, leaving upon his rear Austria more terrified but more hostile since Jena, he gave orders to proceed without delay to the formation of the active divisions, so that they might be fit to take the field immediately. In Frioul there were already two divisions fully organised. He ordered their artillery to be completed to twelve pieces for each division. He gave directions to form forthwith on the war footing one division at Venice, one at Brescia, a third at Alessandria, each nine or ten battalions strong, to prepare their artillery, to compose their equipages, and to appoint their staff. He followed the same course in regard to the cavalry. He directed the regiments of dragoons drawn from Naples to be raised to their complement, both of men and horses, and to be provided, moreover, with a division of light artillery. These five divisions amounted together to 45,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, making a total of 52,000

present under arms. This force, augmented in case of need by Marmont's corps and by part of the army of Naples, would be sufficient in the hands of a man like Massena to keep the Austrians in check, especially if it supported itself upon such fortresses as Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, and Alessandria. Napoleon ordered the eight depôt battalions of the army of Dalmatia to be established in Venice, the seven of the corps of the Frioul in Osopo and Palma-Nova, the fourteen of the army of Naples in Peschiera, Legnago, and Mantua. Each of these battalions contained already more than 1000 men since the contingent of 1806, and would soon have 1100 or 1200 on the arrival of the contingent of 1807. It would then become easy to extract from them the companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers, and with these to compose excellent active divisions. Such was the fruit of a vigilance that was never relaxed. Napoleon, moreover, ordered the provisioning of the fortresses to be completed without delay.

Thus wholly engrossed in developing the vast plan of precautions adopted on his departure from Paris, Napoleon screened France from all insult on the part of the English, secured Italy from all sudden hostility on the part of the Austrians, and without disorganising the means of defence of either, he drew from the first seven regiments of infantry, from the second nine regiments of cavalry, independently of the provisional regiments, which, setting out incessantly from the Rhine, would ensure the recruiting of the grand army, and the safety of his rear.

The reinforcements which, within a month, were likely to augment the grand army, may be computed at about 50,000 men. With the corps which had already joined it since its entry into Prussia, and which had raised it to about 190,000 men, with those which were preparing to join, with the German, Dutch, Italian auxiliaries, it would amount to near 300,000 men; and such is the inevitable scattering of the forces, even under the direction of the ablest general, that after deducting from these 300,000 men the wounded, the sick, who became more numerous in winter and in severe climates, the detachments on march, the corps placed in observation, you could not flatter yourself to bring more than 150,000 men into fire. So necessary is it that the resources should exceed the foreseen wants, in order that they may merely supply the real wants! And if we extend this observation to the whole of the forces of France in 1806, we shall see that, with a total army amounting for the entire empire to 580,000—to 650,000 including the auxiliaries—300,000 at most could be present on the theatre of war between the Rhine and the Vistula, 150,000 upon the Vistula itself, and perhaps 80,000 upon the fields of battle where the fate of the world was to be decided. And yet never had so

many men and horses marched, never had so many cannon rolled with that force of aggregation towards one and the same goal.

It was not enough to bring the soldiers together; financial resources were required for supplying all that they needed. Napoleon, having succeeded in raising his budget in war time to 700 millions (820 with the cost of collection), had the means of keeping an army of 450,000 men. But he would soon have 600,000 to pay. He resolved to draw from the conquered countries the resources necessary for paying his new armaments. Possessed of Hesse, Westphalia, Hanover, the Hanseatic towns, Mecklenburg, lastly, Prussia, he could, without inhumanity, lay contributions on these different countries. He had suffered the Prussian authorities to remain everywhere, and placed at their head General Clarke for the political administration of the country, M. Daru for the financial administration. The latter, able, assiduous, upright, had made himself master of all the financial affairs, and was as well acquainted with them as the best Prussian employés.

The monarchy of Frederick William, composed at this period of East Prussia, extending from Königsberg to Stettin, Polish Prussia, Silesia, Brandenburg, the provinces to the left of the Elbe, Westphalia, the enclosed districts situated in Franconia, might yield its government about 120 millions of francs, the costs of collection being paid upon the produce itself, most part of the wants of the army being supplied by local taxes, the repair of the roads ensured by certain rates imposed upon the farmers of the domains of the crown. In these 120 millions of revenue, the land-tax furnished 35 or 36 millions, the farming of the domains of the crown 18, the produce of the excise, which consisted of duties on liquors, and on the transit of merchandise, 50, the monopoly of salt 9 or 10. Various accessory imposts made up the remainder of the 120 millions. Functionaries, collected into provincial commissions, under the appellation of Chambers of Domains and War, superintended their assessment, their collection, and the farming of the domains of the crown.

Napoleon decided that this administration should be suffered to exist, even with its abuses, which M. Daru had soon discovered, and he notified to the Prussian government itself, to assist it in correcting them, that attached to each provincial administration there should be a French agent to keep an eye upon the collection of the revenues, and upon their payment into the central chest of the French army. Daru was to superintend these agents, and to centralise their operations. Thus the finances of Prussia were about to be administered on the account of Napoleon and for his profit. It was foreseen, however, that the annual produce of 120 millons would sink to 70 or 80 in consequence of existing circumstances. Napoleon, exercising

his right of conquest, was not content with the ordinary imposts, and decreed in addition a war contribution, which for all Prussia might amount to 200 millions. It was to be levied gradually, in the course of the occupation, over and above the ordinary taxes. Napoleon also levied a war contribution on Hesse, Brunswick, Hanover, and the Hanseatic towns, independently of the seizure of English merchandise.

At this rate, the army was to subsist itself, and to consume nothing without paying for it. Numerous purchases of horses, immense orders for clothing, shoes, harness, gun-carriages, given in all the towns, but more particularly in Berlin, with the view to occupy the workmen and to provide for the wants of the French army, were paid for out of the produce of the contributions, ordinary and extraordinary.

The contributions, heavy, no doubt, were still the least vexatious mode of exercising the right of war, which authorises the conqueror to live upon the conquered country; for it substituted the regular collection of the tax to the wasteful extravagance of the soldiers. For the rest, the most rigid discipline, the most complete respect for private property, excepting the ravages of the field of battle, happily confined to very few localities, compensated these inevitable hardships of the war. And assuredly, if we go back to the past, we shall find that never did armies behave with less barbarity and with so much humanity.

Napoleon, disposed by policy to spare the court of Saxony, had offered it an armistice and a peace after Jena. That court, honest and timid, had joyfully accepted such an act of clemency, and submitted to the discretion of the conqueror. Napoleon agreed to admit it into the new Confederation of the Rhine, and to change the title of elector borne by the sovereign into the title of king, on condition of a military contingent of 20,000 men, reduced for this time to 6000, in consideration of circumstances. This extension of the Confederation of the Rhine afforded great advantages, for it ensured to our armies a free passage through Germany, and the possession at all times of the line of the Elbe. To compensate the charges of military occupation, which were spared Saxony by this treaty, she agreed to pay a contribution of 25 millions, in specie or in bills of exchange at a short date.

Napoleon, therefore, could, while the war lasted, dispose of 300 millions at least. Carrying foresight to the utmost length, he did not suffer his minister of the treasury to lull himself to sleep in confidence on the resources found in Germany. The sum of 24 millions was due to the grand army for arrears of pay. Napoleon required that this sum should be deposited partly in Strasburg, partly at Paris, in metallic specie, because he would not submit to the necessity of running in a pressing

emergency after paper for the payment of which there would be a longer or shorter time to wait. Accordingly, he left the money in deposit at Paris and on the Rhine, intending to use it at a future time, and meanwhile caused the arrears to be discharged out of the revenues of the conquered country, that his soldiers might have their pay to spend while they were yet in the towns of Prussia, and be able to procure for themselves those comforts which are to be found only amidst large populations.

All these dispositions being completed, General Clarke being left in Berlin to assume the political government of Prussia, and M. Daru to administer it financially, Napoleon broke up with his columns to enter Poland.

The King of Prussia had not accepted the proposed armistice, because the terms were too rigorous, and also because he had been made to wait too long. Rejoined by Duroc at Osterode in old Prussia, he replied that, notwithstanding his most sincere desire to suspend the course of a disastrous war, he could not consent to the sacrifices required of him; that in demanding not only the part of his dominions already overrun, but also the province of Posen and the line of the Vistula, they would leave him without territory and without resources, and above all, give up Poland to inevitable insurrection; that he had therefore made up his mind to continue the war; that he acted thus from necessity, and also from fidelity to his engagements, for having called the Russians, it was impossible for him to send them back after the appeal which he had made to them, and which they had answered with the utmost cordiality.

In vain did MM. d'Haugwitz and de Lucchesini, who, after participating for a moment in the general infatuation of the Prussian nation, had been brought back to reason by calamity —in vain did they unite their efforts to induce the acceptance of the armistice, such as it was, saying that whatever was refused to Napoleon he would conquer in a fortnight; that they should let slip the opportunity for putting a stop to the war and its ravages; that if they were to treat at that moment, they should no doubt lose the provinces situated on the left of the Elbe, but that if they treated later they should lose Poland itself along with those provinces—in vain MM. d'Haugwitz and de Lucchesini gave this advice; their tardy prudence obtained no credit. The court, in going to Königsberg, had placed itself under Russian influences: adversity, which had calmed discreet minds, had, on the contrary, heightened the exaltation of those destitute of reason; and the war party, instead of imputing to itself the reverses of Prussia, imputed them to alleged treasons of the peace party. The queen, irritated by mortification, insisted more strongly than ever that the fortune of arms should be once more tried, with the remains of the Prussian

forces, with the support of the Russians, and under favour of distance, which was a great advantage to the vanquished, a great disadvantage to the victor. MM. d'Haugwitz and de Lucchesini, deprived of all authority, assailed by unjust accusations, sometimes overwhelmed with insults, solicited and obtained their dismissal. The king, more equitable than the court, granted it to them with demonstrations of infinite regard, especially for M. d'Haugwitz, having never ceased to appreciate his intelligence, to acknowledge his long services, and to lament that he had not always followed his counsels.

The Russians had actually arrived on the Niemen. A first corps of 50,000 men, commanded by General Benningsen, had passed the Niemen on the 1st of November, and was advancing towards the Vistula. A second, of the like force, headed by General Buxhövden, followed the first. A reserve was organised under General Essen. Part of General Michelson's troops were ascending the Dniester and hastening to Poland. The imperial guard, however, had not yet left Petersburg. A swarm of Cossacks, issuing from their deserts, preceded the regular troops. Such were the then disposable forces of that vast empire, which showed for the second time that its resources were not equal to its pretensions. Joined to the Prussians, and while awaiting the reserve of General Essen, the Russians could present themselves upon the Vistula to the number of 120,000 men. In this there was nothing to embarrass Napoleon, if the climate did not happen to bring a powerful auxiliary to the soldiers of the north; and by the climate we mean not merely the cold, but the soil, the difficulty of marching and subsisting in those immense plains, alternately muddy and sandy, and where woods exceed in extent the part under cultivation.

The English, it is true, promised a powerful co-operation in money, in matériel, and even in men. They announced landings on different points of the coasts of France and Germany, and particularly an expedition to Swedish Pomerania, on the rear of the French army. They had, indeed, a very convenient landing-place in the inundated fortress of Stralsund, situated upon the last tongues of the German continent. This point was guarded by the Swedes, and everything prepared to receive the English troops in an almost inviolable retreat. But it was probable that eagerness to seize the rich colonies of Holland and Spain, ill defended at this moment on account of the preoccupations of the continental war, would absorb the attention of the English forces. A last resource, more vain than that expected from the English, formed the complement of the means of the coalition—that was the supposed interference of Austria.

The Prussians and Russians flattered themselves that, if a single success crowned their efforts, Austria would declare in

their favour, and they almost included in the effective of the belligerent troops the 80,000 Austrians at that moment assembled in Bohemia and Galicia.

All this gave little uneasiness to Napoleon, who never was fuller of confidence and pride. The refusal of the armistice had neither surprised nor nettled him. "Your majesty," he wrote to the King of Prussia, "has sent me word that you have thrown yourself into the arms of Russia. . . . time will show whether you have chosen the better and more efficacious part. You have taken up the dice-box to play: the dice will decide."

The military dispositions of Napoleon for penetrating into Poland were these. He had nothing immediate to fear from the Austrians; his general preparations in France as well as in Italy, and his diplomacy in the east, having provided against all that he could have to apprehend on their part. The landings of the English and Swedes in Pomerania, tending to excite insurrection on his rear in suffering and humbled Prussia, presented a more real danger. To this danger he attached, however, but little importance, for he wrote to his brother Louis, who importuned him with his alarms, "The English have something else to do than to land in France, Holland, or Pomerania. They had rather pillage the colonies of all nations than attempt landings: the only advantage which they reap from them is to be disgracefully flung back to the sea." Napoleon believed one point at most—that relating to the Swedes, who had twelve or fifteen thousand men at Stralsund. At any rate, the eighth corps under Marshal Mortier was charged to provide against these contingencies. This corps, which had for its first mission to occupy Hesse and to reunite the grand army with the Rhine, was, now that Hesse was disarmed, to awe Prussia and to guard the coast of Germany. It was composed of four divisions: one Dutch, which had become vacant by the return of King Louis to Holland; one Italian, despatched through Hesse to Hanover; two French, which were about to be increased to the full complement with part of the regiments recently drawn from France. One portion of these troops was to besiege the Hanoverian fortress of Hameln, which remained in the hands of the Prussians, another to occupy the Hanseatic towns. The remainder, established towards Stralsund and Anklam, was destined to drive the Swedes back into Stralsund if they should sally from it, or to proceed to Berlin if a fit of despair should seize the people of that capital.

General Clarke had orders to concert with Marshal Mortier how to parry all accidents. Not a musket had been left in Berlin, and all the matériel had been removed to Spandau. Sixteen hundred citizens formed the guard of Berlin, with 800 muskets, which they passed from one to another, only 800 being on duty at once. If a movement of any importance took place, General

Clarke was to retire to Spandau, and to wait there for Marshal Mortier. The vast cavalry depôt established at Potsdam would always be capable of furnishing a thousand horses for patrole duty and for securing stragglers, who roved about the country since the dispersion of the Prussian army. To such a length had wariness been carried, as to search the woods, in order to collect the cannon which the Prussians had concealed in their flight, and to shut them up in the fortresses.

The corps of Marshal Davout, which had entered Berlin before any of the others, had had time to rest there. Napoleon marched it off the first for Cüstrin, and from Cüstrin for the capital of the grand duchy of Posen. The corps of Marshal Augereau, having reached Berlin, the second, and sufficiently rested also, was sent by Cüstrin and Landsberg, on the Netze, the road to the Vistula, with instructions to march to the left of Marshal Davout. Further to the left still, Marshal Lannes, established at Stettin ever since the capitulation of Prenzlau, having while residing there somewhat recruited his troops, reinforced by the 28th light, and supplied with greatcoats and shoes, had orders to take with him provisions for eight days, to cross the Oder, to pass through Stargard and Schneidmühl, and to join Augereau on the Netze. It is superfluous to add that before he left Stettin he was to put that fortress into a state of defence. Lastly, the indefatigable Murat, leaving his cavalry to return by short marches from Lübeck, had orders to repair himself to Berlin, to take the command of the cuirassiers there, who had been resting themselves while the dragoons were running after the Prussians, to join with the cuirassiers Beaumont's and Klein's dragoons, who had not advanced so far as the others in pursuit of the enemy, and remounted, moreover, with fresh horses in the depôt of Potsdam. With this cavalry Murat was to join Marshal Davout at Posen, to precede him to Warsaw, and to put himself at the head of all the troops sent to Poland, till Napoleon should come to command them himself. The Russians were still at a great distance from the Vistula. Napoleon afforded himself time for the despatch of his numerous affairs in Berlin, and left his brother-in-law to commence the movement upon Poland, and to sound the disposition of the Poles in regard to insurrection. No person was fitter than Murat to excite their enthusiasm, by participating in it himself.

While the French army, crossing the Oder, was about to advance to the Vistula, Prince Jerome, having under his command the Wurtembergers and the Bavarians, seconded by an able and vigorous officer, General Vandamme, was to take possession of Silesia, to besiege the fortresses in that province, to push part of his troops as far as Kalisch, and thus to cover against Austria the right of the corps that was to march upon Posen.

The troops despatched to Poland might amount to about 80,000 men—the corps of Marshal Davout consisting of 23,000, that of Marshal Augereau of 17,000, that of Marshal Lannes of 18,000, the detachment of Prince Jerome sent to Kalisch of 14,000, lastly, Murat's reserve cavalry, of 9000 or 10,000. This was more than would be required to make head against the Russian and Prussian forces which they were likely to meet with at the first moment.

Meanwhile the corps of Marshal Soult and Bernadotte were marching from Lübeck to Berlin. They were to stay some time in that capital, to recruit themselves there, and to get supplied with all that they wanted. Marshal Ney had repaired thither after the capitulation of Magdeburg, and was preparing to march for the Oder. Napoleon, with the imperial guard, with General Oudinot's division of grenadiers and voltigeurs, with the remainder of the reserve cavalry, which was resting itself at Berlin, with the three corps of Marshals Soult, Bernadotte, and Ney, would have at his disposal a second army of 80,000 men, at the head of which he was to proceed to Poland, to support the movement of the first.

Marshal Davout, the first despatched for Posen, was a firm and reflective man, of whom no imprudence was to be apprehended. He had been initiated into the real ideas of Napoleon relative to Poland. Napoleon was frankly resolved to repair the serious injury done to Europe by the abolition of that ancient kingdom; but he did not disguise from himself the immense difficulty of reconstituting a destroyed State, especially with a people whose anarchical spirit was as famous as its valour. He intended, therefore, not to involve himself in such an enterprise unless upon conditions which should render its success, if not certain, at least sufficiently probable. It was requisite, in the first place, that he should gain signal triumphs while advancing into those plains of the north, where Charles XII. had found his ruin; there was requisite, in the next place, a unanimous rising of the Poles, to concur in those triumphs, and to satisfy him respecting the solidity of the new State that was to be founded amidst three hostile powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. When I see all the Poles afoot, said he to Marshal Davout, then will I proclaim their independence, but not till then. He ordered a convoy of arms of all kinds to accompany the French troops, for the purpose of arming the insurrection in case of its becoming general, as he was assured that it would.

Marshal Davout, preceding the *corps d'armée* which were to start from the Oder, had set himself in motion in the first days of November. He marched with that order and that strict discipline which he was accustomed to maintain among his troops. He had notified to his soldiers that, in entering Poland,

they would enter a friendly country, and that it must be treated as such. As we have observed, a certain indiscipline had crept into the ranks of the light cavalry, which has a greater share in the disorders of the war, and contributes more to them. Two soldiers of that arm having committed some excesses, Marshal Davout ordered them to be shot, in presence of the third corps.

He advanced upon Posen in three divisions. The country between the Oder and the Vistula is very much like that which extends from the Elbe to the Oder. Most generally you have to traverse sandy plains, upon which wood readily thrives, especially the resinous woods, and in particular the fir; and as there is found beneath the bed of sand a marl fit for culture, sometimes drowned by the sand itself, sometimes rising to the surface: amidst the fir forests you meet with vast clearings tolerably well cultivated, and in these clearings, with a scanty, poor, but robust population, dwelling under wood and thatch. On this soil the transport of everything is a matter of unparalleled difficulty, for moving sands are succeeded by clay, in which, when it is soaked with water, you sink to a great depth, so that after a few days' rain it is converted into a vast sea of mud. Men perish in it if assistance does not come to extricate them. As for horses, cannon, baggage, they are absorbed, and not the strength of a whole army could save them Hence war is impracticable in this portion of the plain of the north, unless in summer when the ground is completely dry, or in winter when a cold of several degrees has given to it the consistence of stone. But every intermediate season is fatal to military combinations, especially to the most ingenious, which depend, as everybody knows, upon the rapidity of the movements.

These physical characters do not appear all together till you approach the Vistula, and especially further on, between the Vistula and the Niemen. They begin, indeed, to be observed after crossing the Oder. A phenomenon peculiar to these vast plains, which we have already noticed, and which occurs here, is that the sand, raised into hills along the sea, repels the waters towards the interior of the country, where they form numerous lakes, discharge themselves into petty rivers, then unite into larger, till, gradually increasing in magnitude, they become vast streams, like the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, capable of opening themselves a passage through the barrier of sand. In Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, that is to say, between the Elbe and the Oder, the country which was the theatre of the pursuit of the Prussians by our army, the reader has already had occasion to remark these peculiarities of nature. They become more striking between the Oder and the Vistula. The sands rise, retain the waters, which seek through the Netze and Warta an outlet towards the Oder. The Netze comes from the left, the Warta

from the right, for any person proceeding from Berlin to Warsaw, and after they have both circulated between the Vistula and the Oder, they unite in a single bed, and throw themselves together into the Oder near Cüstrin. The country along the sea forms what is called Prussian Pomerania. It is German by the inhabitants and by spirit. The interior, watered by the Netze and the Warta, is marshy, clayey, and Slavonian by the race of people which inhabits it. It is called Posnania, or grand duchy of Posen, the capital of which is Posen, a town of some importance, situated on the Warta itself.

This province was the one in which the Polish spirit burst forth with the greatest ardour. The Poles, who became Prussians, seemed to endure the foreign yoke more impatiently than the others. In the first place, the German and the Slavonian races meeting on this frontier of Pomerania and the duchy of Posen, had an instinctive aversion for each other, naturally stronger on the border where they adjoined. Independently of this aversion, the usual consequence of neighbourhood, the Poles did not forget that the Prussians had been, under the great Frederick, the first authors of the partition of Poland, that they have since acted with black perfidy, and completed the ruin of their country, after favouring its insurrection. Lastly, the sight of Warsaw in the hands of the Prussians rendered them the most odious of the partitioning powers. These feelings of hatred were carried to such a length that the Poles would almost have considered it as a deliverance to escape from the King of Prussia and to belong to an Emperor of Russia, who, uniting all the Polish provinces under the same sceptre, should have proclaimed himself King of Poland. There was therefore a stronger disposition to insurrection in the duchy of Posen than in any other part of Poland.

Such was, in physical and moral respects, the country through which the French were marching at this moment. Transported into a climate so different from their native climate, so different in particular from the climates of Egypt and Italy, where they had lived so long, they were, as ever, merry, confident, and found, in the very novelty of the country which they were traversing, a subject of humorous pleasantry rather than of bitter complaints. Besides, the favourable reception of the inhabitants compensated their hardships; for on the roads and in the villages the peasants ran to meet them, offering them victuals and the liquors of their country.

But it is not in the country, it is among conglomerate populations, that is to say, in the bosom of cities, that the patriotic enthusiasm of nations bursts forth with the greatest energy. At Posen the moral dispositions of the Poles manifested themselves more strongly than elsewhere. That city, which usually contained 15,000 souls, soon contained double the number, from

the affluence of the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces thronging to meet their deliverers. It was on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of November that the three divisions of Davout's corps entered Posen. They were received there with such transports of enthusiasm that the grave marshal was touched by them, and that he himself indulged the idea of the re-establishment of Poland, an idea very popular in the mass of the French army, but not at all among its chiefs. Accordingly, he wrote to the emperor letters strongly impregnated with the sentiment which had just broken forth around him.

He told the Poles that, in order to reconstitute their country, Napoleon must have the certainty of an immense effort on their part, in the first place, to assist him to gain great successes, without which he could not impose upon Europe the re-establishment of Poland, and in the next place, to inspire him with some confidence in the duration of the work which he was about to undertake—a very difficult work, since its object was to restore a State destroyed forty years ago, and which had been degenerating for more than a century. The Poles of Posen, more enthusiastic than those of Warsaw, promised, with the utmost cheerfulness, all that seemed to be desired of them. Nobles, priests, people, ardently wished to be delivered from the German yoke, antipathic to their religion, to their manners, to their race; and at this price there was nothing which they were not ready to do. Marshal Davout had as yet but 3000 muskets to give them; they distributed them among themselves immediately, begging to have thousands of them, and affirming that, whatever the number, they would find arms to carry them. The people formed battalions of infantry, the nobles and their vassals squadrons of cavalry. In all the villages situated between the Upper Warta and the Upper Oder, on the approach of the troops of Prince Jerome, the population expelled the Prussian troops, and only spared their lives because the French troops everywhere prevented violence and excesses. From Glogau to Kalisch, Prince Jerome's route, the insurrection was general.

At Posen there was established a provisional authority, with which were concerted the measures necessary for subsisting the French army on its passage. There could not be a question about imposing war contributions on Poland. It was understood that she should be held exempt from the charges laid upon conquered countries, on condition, however, that her strength should be joined to ours, and that she should give up to us some of the corn with which she was so abundantly provided. The new Polish authority concerted with Marshal Davout for the erection of ovens, the collection of corn, forage, and cattle. The zeal of the country and some funds seized in the Prussian chests were sufficient for these first preparations. Thus everything

was arranged for receiving the bulk of the French army, and particularly its commander, who was awaited with keen curiosity and ardent hopes.

Nearly about the same time Marshal Augereau had reached the boundary which separates Posnania and Pomerania, leaving the Warta on the right, and bearing to the left, along the Netze. He had passed by Landsberg, Driesen, Schneidmühl, through a dreary, poor, moderately populated country, which could not give very expressive signs of life. Marshal Augereau met with nothing that could warm and exalt his imagination; he had great difficulty to march, and would have had still greater difficulty to subsist, but for a convoy of caissons laden with the bread for his troops. In the environs of Nackel the streams cease to flow towards the Oder, and begin to run towards the Vistula. A canal joining the Netze with the Vistula commences at Nackel, and terminates at the town of Bromberg, which is the entrepôt of the commerce of the country. Augereau's corps found there some relief from its fatigues.

Marshal Lannes had advanced by Stettin, Stargard, Deutsch-Krone, Schneidmühl, Nackel, and Bromberg, flanking the march of Augereau's corps, as the latter flanked the march of Davout's corps. He, too, skirted the boundary of the German and Polish country, and traversed a tract more difficult, more dreary still than that which Marshal Augereau had passed through. He found the Germans hostile, the Poles timid, and swayed by the impressions which he received from the wild and desert country, from the information which he collected respecting the Poles, in a country which was not favourable to them, he was led to consider the re-establishment of Poland as a rash and even foolish undertaking. We have already made mention of this extraordinary man, of his qualities, of his defects; we shall have frequent occasion to mention him hereafter in the history of a period during which he was so lavish of his noble life. Lannes, impetuous in his sentiments, consequently unequal in character, inclined to ill-temper, even towards his master to whom he was attached, was one of those whom the sun, hiding or showing his face, by turns depressed and cheered. But never losing his heroic temper, he recovered in dangers that calm force of which sufferings and crosses had robbed him for a moment. We should not do justice to this superior warrior were we not to add here that in him a great fund of good sense was so joined to unevenness of temper as to influence him to censure a spirit of immoderate enterprise in Napoleon, and to draw from him sinister predictions amidst our most glorious triumphs. After the success of the war with Prussia, he was for stopping short at the Oder, and imposed not the least restraint upon himself in the expression of this opinion. On reaching

Bromberg after a toilsome march, he wrote to Napoleon that he had been traversing a sandy, barren country, without inhabitants, comparable with the exception of climate to the desert which must be traversed in going from Egypt to Syria, that the soldiers were dull, and attacked by fever, owing to the wetness of the soil and season; that the Poles were not at all disposed to rise, but trembled under the yoke of their masters; that a judgment of their dispositions must not be formed from the counterfeit enthusiasm of a few nobles attracted to Posen by a fondness for noise and novelty; that at bottom they were always fickle, divided, given up to anarchy; and that by attempting to reconstitute them into one nation, we should uselessly expend the blood of France for a work without solidity and without permanence.

Napoleon having remained in Berlin till the last days of November, received without surprise the contradictory reports of his lieutenants, and waited till the movement produced by the presence of the French should have spread to all the Polish provinces, in order to form an opinion in regard to the re-establishment of Poland, and to resolve whether to pass through that country as a field of battle, or to erect a grand political edifice upon its soil. He made Murat set out, after having again specified to him the conditions which he intended to attach to the restoration of Poland, and the instructions which he wished to be followed in marching for Warsaw.

The Russians had arrived on the Vistula, and taken possession of Warsaw. The last Prussian corps that King Frederick William had left, placed under the command of General Lestocq, an officer equally discreet and brave, was established at Thorn, having garrisons at Graudenz and Dantzig.

Napoleon desired that on approaching Warsaw the different corps of the French army should keep close to each other, in order that, with a mass of 80,000 men, a force far superior to what the Russians could bring together on one point, his lieutenants should be screened from any check. He recommended to them neither to seek nor to accept battle unless they were very superior in number to the enemy, to advance with great caution, and all of them appuying to the right, to cover themselves from the Austrian frontier. At this period, the Pilica on the left side of the Vistula, the Narew on the right side, both falling into the Vistula near Warsaw, formed the Austrian frontier. By appuying therefore to the right, on leaving Posen, they would be drawing nearer to the Pilica and Narew, they would be covered on all sides by the neutrality of Austria. If the Russians designed to take the offensive, they could not do so without passing the Vistula on our left, in the environs of Thorn, and then by dropping down on the left the French

would obtain one of these three results—they should either fling them into the Vistula, or drive them back to the sea, or thrust them upon the bayonets of the second French army marching to Posen. For the rest, it should be added that, if Napoleon, contrary to his custom, did not on this occasion oppose a single mass to the enemy, which would have cut short all difficulties, it was because he knew that the Russians were not 50,000 all together, and because the extreme fatigue of part of his troops, having run as far as Prenzlau and Lübeck, obliged him to form two armies, one composed of those who could march immediately, the other of those who had need of a few days' rest before they started again. Thus it is that circumstances occasion variations in the application of the most invariable principles. It is for the tact of the great general to modify this application safely and fitly.

Napoleon therefore enjoined Marshal Davout to bear to the right, as the route from Posen to Warsaw required, to pass through Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno, Sochaczew, and Blonie, and to send his dragoons direct to the Vistula at Kowal, to give a hand to Marshals Lannes and Augereau. Lannes, after indemnifying himself amidst the abundance of Bromberg for the privations of a long route through the sands, had taken the precedence of Augereau. He had orders to ascend the Vistula, and by his right to proceed from Bromberg to Inowraclaw, Brezesc, Kowal, filing away under the cannon of Thorn, and connecting himself with the corps of Marshal Davout, the left of which he was to form. Marshal Augereau soon followed him, and pursuing the same route, came to form the left of Lannes.

On the 16th of November and the following days, Marshal Davout, preceded by Murat, marched from Posen, where he left everything in the best order, for Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno. Lannes, after leaving Bromberg, and filing away in sight of Thorn, while covering himself with the Vistula, found that he was again surrounded by the sands, which are met with almost universally in this part of the course of the Vistula, encountered for a second time sterility, dearth, the desert, and was not on that account the more favourably disposed to the war which was about to be undertaken. He proceeded by Kowal and Kutno to appuy himself on the corps of Marshal Davout. Augereau followed at his heels, participating in his impressions, as it frequently happened, for he had more than one resemblance in character to Lannes, though far inferior in talents and energy.

Murat and Davout, not at all tempted to give battle without the emperor, having orders, moreover, to avoid it, advanced with great caution to the environs of Warsaw. On the 27th of November their light cavalry drove a detachment of the enemy's out of Blonie, and advanced to the very gates of the capital.

The Russians had been everywhere found retreating, or occupied in destroying provisions, or in removing them from the left bank to the right bank of the Vistula. In retreating they merely passed through Warsaw, which no longer seemed to them a place of safety, in proportion as the approach of the French thrilled all hearts there. They therefore recrossed the Vistula, to shut themselves up in a suburb of Praga, situated, as it is well known, on the other bank of the river. On repassing it they destroyed the bridge of Praga, and sunk or took away with them all the craft that could serve for means of crossing.

Next day Murat, at the head of a regiment of chasseurs and dragoons of Beaumont's division, entered Warsaw. After leaving Posen, the people of the small towns and in the country had shown less cordiality than the inhabitants of that city, because they were restrained by the presence of the Russians. But in a great population the expression of its sentiments is proportionate to the feeling of its strength. All the inhabitants of Warsaw had hastened beyond the walls of the city to meet the French. The Poles had, from a secret instinct, long regarded the victories of France as the victories of Poland itself. They had been thrilled by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, fought so near the frontiers of Galicia, and that of Jena, which seemed gained on the very road to Warsaw. The entry of the French into Berlin, and the appearance of Davout on the Oder, had filled them with hope. They beheld at last those French so renowned, so eagerly expected, and at their head that brilliant general of cavalry, a prince to-day, to-morrow a king, who conducted their advanced guard with equal hardihood and glory. They extolled with transport his noble look, his heroic appearance on horseback, and greeted him with a thousand times repeated shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur! vivent les Français.*" A general delirium seized all classes of the population. This time the resurrection of Poland might be considered as rather less chimerical on witnessing the appearance of the grand army, which under the great captain had vanquished all the armies of Europe. Joy, vehement, profound, without reserve, pervaded that unfortunate people, so long the victim of the ambition of the courts of the north, of the effeminacy of the courts of the south, feasting itself with the idea that the hour had at last arrived when the Emperor of the French would make amends for the weaknesses of the kings of France. The Austrians had everywhere destroyed the provisions, but the cordiality of the Poles supplied the deficiency. People quarrelled which should have French soldiers to lodge and to board.

Two days afterwards Marshal Davout's infantry, which had not been able to keep pace with the cavalry, entered Warsaw. There was the same intoxication, there were the same demonstra-

tions at sight of these veteran warriors of Auerstädt, Austerlitz, and Marengo. All looked bright at this first moment, when the prospect of difficulties was veiled, as it were, by joy and hope.

Napoleon sincerely designed, as we have already said, to restore Poland. It was, according to his ideas, one of the most useful and most approved ways of renewing that Europe, the face of which he purposed to change. When, in fact, he created new kingdoms to form supports for his young empire, nothing was more natural than to raise again the most brilliant and the most to be regretted of the destroyed kingdoms. But besides the difficulty of wringing great sacrifices of territory from Russia and Prussia, sacrifices which it was not possible to wring from them without fighting to the last extremity, there was another difficulty, that of taking the Galicias from Austria; and if those provinces were to be left out, if he were to content himself with recomposing new Poland with two-thirds of the old, he should run the very serious risk of exciting in the cabinet of Vienna a redoubled distrust, hatred, ill-will, and perhaps of bringing an Austrian army upon the rear of the French army. Napoleon therefore would not make any but conditional engagements with the Poles, and he decided not to proclaim their independence till they should have deserved it by a unanimous outburst, by a warm zeal to second him, by the energetic resolution to defend the new country which he had recovered for them. Unfortunately the high Polish nobility, not so easily wrought upon as the people, discouraged by the different insurrections which had been attempted, fearful of being deserted after they had committed themselves, hesitated to throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon, and found in their actual situation something better to do than to rise in insurrection to receive from the French an existence, independent but destitute of support, exposed to all dangers between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This high nobility, fallen, like Warsaw itself, under the yoke of Prussia, entertained for that court the same aversion which was felt by all the Poles who had become Prussians. Most of the members of the Warsaw nobility would have considered it as a happy change of fortune to become subjects of Alexander, upon condition of being remoulded into one nation, and acting under the Emperor of Russia the same part as the Hungarians act under the Emperor of Austria. To be united into one and the same nation, and transferred from a German master to a Slavonian master, seemed to them an almost desirable lot, the only one, at least, to which they ought to aspire in the present circumstances. It was, in the estimation of many of them, secretly influenced by Russian intrigue, the only reconstitution of Poland that was practicable, for Russia, they said, was near at hand, and capable of supporting her work when once undertaken, whereas the

existence which they should receive from France would be precarious, ephemeral, and vanish as soon as the French army had withdrawn. It is true that there were some reasons of prudence to be alleged in favour of that idea of a demi-reconstitution of Poland, the offspring of a demi-patriotism; but those who formed this wish forgot that, if the existence which Poland could receive from France was liable to perish when the French had recrossed the Rhine, that which the Russians should give it was exposed to another certain and speedy danger, to the danger of being absorbed in the rest of the empire, of being subjected, in short, to a complete assimilation, a result to which Russia must incessantly tend, and which she would not fail to realise on the first occasion, as events have since proved. It was therefore necessary either that the Poles should renounce their nationality, or that they should devote themselves to Napoleon, at any cost, at any risk, with all the uncertainties attached to such an enterprise, on the day that this mighty reformer of Europe should appear at Warsaw. Certain motives, less exalted, operated upon that portion of the nobility which gave a cold reception to the deliverance of Poland by the hand of the French; this was the jealousy excited by the Polish generals trained in our armies, returning with reputation, pretensions, an exaggerated sense of their own merit. These various motives, however, did not prevent the generality of the nobles from feeling a lively joy at sight of the French, but they rendered them more prudent, and induced them to make conditions with a man to whom patriotism would then have advised them not to propose any. But the masses, more unanimous, less restrained by reflection, at that moment better—for there is a moment, a single moment, when reason is of less worth than the impulsion of the passions; it is when that devotedness, even if blind, is the necessary condition of the salvation of a people—the masses, we say, insisted on throwing themselves into the arms of the French, and thrust all into them without distinction, people, nobles, and priests.

Divided between these contrary sentiments, the grandees of Warsaw thronged around Murat, and came to submit to him their wishes, not in the form of demands but of advice, and with the aim, as they said, of producing a universal rising of the Polish people. These wishes consisted in soliciting that Napoleon would immediately proclaim the independence of Poland, not confine himself to this act, but select a king from his own family, and solemnly place him on the throne of the Sobieskis. This double guarantee given them, they added, the Poles, no longer doubting the intentions of Napoleon and his firm resolution to uphold his work, would give themselves up to him, body and possessions. The king to be chosen out of the imperial family was already designated—it was that valiant general of

cavalry, so well fitted to be the king of a nation of horsemen—it was Murat himself, who actually cherished in his heart the ardent desire of a crown, and particularly of that which was offered to him at this moment, for it corresponded alike with his heroic propensities and with his frivolous and ostentatious taste. He had already accommodated his costume to this new character, and brought from Paris gorgeous habiliments calculated to give his French uniform some resemblance to the Polish uniform.

Murat, ever since his marriage to a sister of Napoleon's, was consumed by the passion for reigning. This passion, which ultimately proved fatal to his glory and his life, had been strengthened by the incitements of his wife, still more ambitious than himself, and capable, in order to accomplish her wishes, of drawing her husband into the most culpable actions. At the sight of this vacant throne of Poland, Murat could no longer curb his impatience. He had therefore no difficulty to adopt the ideas of the Polish nobility, and undertook to communicate them to Napoleon. The commission, however, was a difficult one to execute, for Napoleon, though fully sensible of the brilliant and generous qualities of his brother-in-law, had nevertheless an extreme distrust of the levity of his character, and frequently proved himself a harsh and severe master to him.

Murat guessed full well what reception Napoleon would give to ideas which ran counter to his politics, and which would, moreover, have the appearance of an interested proposal. He took good care, therefore, not to name the king fixed upon by the Poles: he went no further than to state their ideas in a general manner, and to express their desire that the independence of Poland should be immediately proclaimed and guaranteed by a French king of the Bonaparte family.

Napoleon had himself left Berlin during the march of his *corps d'armée* to Warsaw, and arrived on the 25th of November at Posen. There it was that he received Murat's letter. He needed not to be told what he wished to know. Even under the most artful dissimulation he detected the secrets of minds, and Murat's dissimulation was not of such a nature as to be very difficult to penetrate. He soon discovered the ambition which swayed that heart, at once so valiant and so weak. It excited equal dissatisfaction with him and with the Poles. He viewed the proposals made to him as calculations, reserves, conditions, a demi-enthusiasm, and those of them that related to himself as dangerous engagements without the equivalent of a powerful co-operation. By a singular concurrence of circumstances, he received on the same day despatches from Paris relative to the celebrated Kosciusko, whom he had purposed to draw from France, and to put at the head of new Poland. This Polish patriot, whom mistaken notions prevented at this period from doing useful service to his

country, lived in Paris amidst the small number of discontented men who had not yet forgiven Napoleon the 18th Brumaire, the Concordat, the re-establishment of the monarchy. A few senators, a few members of the old Tribunate, composed this honest and vain society. Kosciusko was wrong to oppose unseasonable contradictions to the only man who then had it in his power to save his country, and who seriously intended to save it. Besides the preliminary engagements proposed by the nobles of Warsaw, and impossible to be taken in the face of Austria, Kosciusko required other political conditions, absolutely puerile at a moment when the only question was about raising Poland again, before discussing what constitution should be given her. Finding himself thwarted at once by the Poles who had become ideologues in Paris, and the Poles who had become Russians in Petersburg, he conceived a distrust and coldness for the matter.

As for what related to Kosciusko, he replied to Fouché, the minister whom he had commissioned to make proposals to him: "Kosciusko *is a fool*, who has not in his own country all the importance that he fancies he has, and whom I shall well do without for re-establishing Poland, if the fortune of arms seconds me." He addressed a dry and severe letter to Murat. "Tell the Poles," he wrote, "that it is not with these calculations, with these personal precautions, that men emancipate their country which has fallen under a foreign yoke; that it is, on the contrary, by rising all at once, blindly, without reserve, and with the resolution to sacrifice fortune and life, that one may have not the certainty but the mere hope to deliver it. I am not come hither," he added, "*to beg a throne for my family, for I am not in want of thrones to give away;* I am come in behalf of the European equilibrium, to attempt the most difficult of enterprises, by which the Poles have more to gain than anybody else, since it is their national existence that is at stake, as well as the interests of Europe. If by dint of devotedness they second me so far as that I succeed, I will grant them independence. If not, I will do nothing, and I will leave them under their Prussian and Russian masters. I do not find here in Posen, in the provincial nobility, all the jealous notions of the nobility of the capital. I find in them frankness, zeal, patriotism, what is requisite, in short, for saving Poland, and what I seek in vain among the great personages of Warsaw."

Napoleon, dissatisfied, but not renouncing on that account the plan of changing the face of the north of Europe by the re-establishment of Poland, resolved not to go to Warsaw, but to remain at Posen, where he was the object of an extraordinary enthusiasm. He contented himself with sending to Warsaw M. Wibiski, a Pole, whose understanding he highly appreciated, a

gentleman more versed in the science of law and politics than in that of war, but having a thorough knowledge of his country, and animated with the sincerest patriotism. Napoleon explained to him the difficulties of his situation, in presence of the three old co-partners in the partition of Poland, two of whom were in arms against him, and the third ready to declare himself, the necessity he was under of using great delicacy, and of finding in a spontaneous and unanimous movement of the Poles at once a pretext for proclaiming their independence, and a support sufficient to uphold it. His language, perfectly sensible and sincere, persuaded M. Wibiski, who repaired to Warsaw for the purpose of endeavouring to impart his convictions to those of his countrymen most distinguished by their position and their talents.

This singular contest between the Poles, who expected Napoleon to begin with proclaiming their independence, and Napoleon insisting that they ought to set out with deserving it, should not be a motive of censure either for them or him, but a proof of the very difficulty of the enterprise. The Poles thereby acknowledged that they deemed an existence placed at so great a distance from the protector who had restored it to them extremely precarious, and required of him, for their satisfaction, not only a solemn engagement, but also the ties of blood.

Napoleon, on his part, acknowledged that, though powerful enough to pretend to change the face of Europe, bold enough to dare to carry the war to the Vistula, still he hesitated to proclaim the independence of Poland, having two of the three co-partitioners in front and the third on his rear. If, however, it is absolutely necessary to find here matter for censure against some one, it must be against the Poles, at least against those who calculated in that manner. Napoleon, in fact, owed nothing to the Poles, except on account of what they should do for Europe, whose representative he was, while they owed everything to their country, even an imprudent confidence, were that confidence to entail an aggravation of their evils. When Napoleon was prudent, he did his duty; when the Poles pretended to be so, they failed in theirs; for, in the situation in which they were, their duty was not to be prudent, but devoted, even though they perished.*

Napoleon, established at Posen, among the nobility of the

* Marshal Davout, a warm partisan of the re-establishment of Poland, wrote under date of the 4th of December: "The levies of men are very easily raised, but they are in want of persons capable of directing their organisation and training. Muskets also are wanting. The public spirit is excellent at Warsaw, but the great exert their influence to cool the ardour which is general in the middle classes. The uncertainty of the future alarms them, and they give us plainly to understand that they will not declare themselves openly till by declaring their independence we shall have entered into a tacit engagement to guarantee it.

"WARSAW, 1*st December* 1806."

grand duchy, all of whom flocked around him, employed himself in creating there one of those military establishments with which he was accustomed to mark his route, in proportion as the war was carried to a greater distance. He bought up corn, forage, in particular cloth, for there was at Posen a considerable cloth manufactory; he organised the preserving of provisions, hospitals, all that was requisite, in short, for forming a vast depôt in the heart of Poland. This place, it is true, was not fortified, like Wittenberg and Spandau; it was as open as Berlin, but it had for its defence the affection of the inhabitants, heartily devoted to the cause of the French.

Napoleon then directed the movements of the artillery, conformably to his plan of invasion. Marshal Ney had arrived at Posen. Marshals Soult and Bernadotte were proceeding thither by short marches, after taking in Berlin all the rest that their troops had need of. The guard and the grenadiers, repairing to Posen, surrounded the emperor there. Prince Jerome had sent off the Bavarians for Kalisch, and with the Wurtembergers commenced with Glogau the investment of the fortresses of Silesia.

Napoleon sent Marshal Ney from Posen to Thorn, to endeavour to gain possession of this latter place, and to secure by surprise the passage of the Vistula. He directed Marshal Lannes, who had already executed that same movement, to enter Warsaw, to take the place of Marshal Davout, as soon as the latter should have re-established the bridges of the Vistula, which connect the city of Warsaw with the suburb of Praga. In ordering Marshals Ney and Davout to cross the Vistula as soon as possible at the two points, Thorn and Warsaw, he recommended to them to secure the passage in a permanent manner by constructing strong *têtes de pont.* He deferred his ulterior movements till the moment when these two bases of operation should be solidly established; and meanwhile he occupied himself in bringing forward, without haste and without fatigue, the two corps of Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, that they might enter into line at the head of all his collected forces.

During this interval, Marshal Davout, with his *corps d'armée*, Murat with the cavalry reserve, had installed themselves in Warsaw, and were endeavouring to execute the emperor's orders there. The Russians had employed the time of their stay in that city in carrying off or destroying the provisions, in sinking all the craft, in short, in leaving no means of subsistence and no means of passage. Thanks to the zeal of the Poles, they were supplied with great part of what was wanting. Authorised by Napoleon, who never spared the money with which he was provided, bargains were made with Jew dealers, who proved themselves very expert and very clever at extracting from these extensive countries the corn in which they abounded. An

Austrian cordon stationed along Galicia prevented the exportation of alimentary commodities. But the Jews were commissioned to remove the difficulty by handsome bribes to the officers of the customs, and by means of the money that was paid them, and by means of all the salt found in the Prussian magazines that was given up to them, they were induced to promise to send down the Pilica into the Vistula, by the Vistula into Warsaw, the wheat and the oats, and to bring, besides, a considerable quantity of meat.

The next thing thought of was the passage of the great river, which cut the capital in two. The weather, alternately rainy and frosty, continued unsettled, which was the worst of atmospheric conditions in such a country, for the Vistula, without being frozen over, floating down enormous flakes of ice, admitted neither of a bridge being thrown over, nor of crossing upon the ice. Detachments of light cavalry had been sent along the banks of the river, to seize the barks which the enemy had not had time to sink, and in this manner a certain number had been collected at Warsaw. Not yet able to throw a bridge, on account of the ice which the current carried down with violence, the French tried to put some detachments over in boats. It required the boldness which the habit of success had imparted to our soldiers and to our generals to venture upon such operations; for these detachments, being conveyed over one after another, might have been carried off before they were sufficiently numerous to defend themselves. But the Russian general who commanded the advanced guard, seeing this commencement to pass, took the alarm, abandoned the suburb of Praga, and retired upon the Narew, a military line, the direction of which we shall presently describe, and which is a few leagues from Warsaw. The French lost no time in taking advantage of this circumstance; a whole division of Davout's corps was carried across the Vistula, took possession of Praga, and advanced to Jablona. The Vistula appearing somewhat less encumbered with ice, the bridges of boats were re-established, thanks to the seamen of the guard and to the zeal of the Polish boatmen. In a few days, the construction of the bridges of boats being finished, Marshal Davout was enabled to pass with his whole corps to the right bank, to establish himself at Praga, and even beyond, in a strong position on the Narew. The corps of Lannes came to make itself amends in Warsaw for the privations which it had suffered in ascending the Vistula. Marshal Augereau replaced him, and took his position below Warsaw, at Utrata, opposite to Modlin, that is to say, opposite to the conflux of the Narew and the Vistula. His corps suffered much there, and had nothing but the bread which Lannes and Murat sent from Warsaw, with the zeal of good comrades.

While the passage of the Vistula was taking place at Warsaw, Marshal Ney had marched for Thorn, through Griesen and Inowraclaw. The Prussian corps of Lestocq, which was still 15,000 strong, after furnishing garrisons for Graudenz and Dantzig, occupied Thorn by a detachment. Marshal Ney approached that town, which, by a situation quite contrary to that of Warsaw, is on the right bank of the Vistula, and has only a mere suburb on the left bank. A vast bridge, resting upon wooden arches, and supported upon an island, united the two banks; but the enemy had almost destroyed it. Marshal Ney, having advanced with merely the head of a column, made a reconnaissance of the banks of the Vistula, in company with Colonel Savary, commandant of the 14th of the line. Thorn stands upon the boundary separating the Slavonian country from the German country. The two populations, ever inimical to each other, and never more so than then, were ready to come to blows before the arrival of the French. Some Polish boatmen assisted the troops of Marshal Ney, and brought him a sufficient number of boats to carry over a few hundred men. Colonel Savary, with a detachment of his regiment, and some companies of the 69th of the line and of the 6th light, embarked in these boats, and ventured across the wide bed of the Vistula, navigating through the midst of enormous ice-flakes. When he approached a fire of musketry commenced, and was the more annoying, because the ice-flakes, more compact on the banks than in the middle of the river, scarcely allowed the boats to land. The German boatmen prepared to join their efforts to this local obstacle for the purpose of preventing the landing of the French. At this sight the Polish boatmen, bolder and more numerous than the German, fell upon the latter, drove them away, and wading into the water up to their waists, dragged the boats to the shore under the fire of the Prussians. The 400 French, leaping ashore, immediately darted upon the enemy. Presently, boats sent from the other side of the Vistula brought fresh detachments, and Ney's troops were sufficiently numerous in Thorn to make themselves masters of the place.

After this daring act, so happily accomplished, Marshal Ney set about making an establishment in Thorn for himself and for the corps which were coming to join him. The first thing he did was to repair the bridge, which was no difficult matter, as the destruction had been very incomplete. He discovered boats in great number, because the traffic on the Lower Vistula is more active; indeed, it is so extensive, as to send craft to Warsaw, and to the intermediate points, particularly to Utrata, where they were very necessary to Marshal Augereau, for the conveyance of his provisions. He then turned his attention to the conversion of Thorn to the purposes to which Posen and Warsaw had already

been applied, that is to say, to the creation of hospitals, of manufactories for preserving provisions, of establishments of all kinds. Bromberg, which is situated on the Nackel Canal, at a little distance from Thorn, might there pour in part of its vast resources, and which could be done without delay, by means of the navigation. Ney then ranged the seven regiments of his *corps d'armée* around Thorn, disposing them like radii about a centre, and placing his light cavalry at the circumference, to secure himself from the Cossacks—very nimble runners, and very annoying, too.

When Napoleon learned that, through the zeal and boldness of his lieutenants, he was master of the course of the Vistula at the two principal points, Thorn and Warsaw, he immediately suspended his plan of operations till the end of autumn. He was sufficiently acquainted with the state of the country and the action of the rains on its clayey soil to decide on taking his winter quarters. But he intended first to strike the Russians a blow, which, if not decisive, should at least be effective enough to throw them back to the Niemen, and allow him to take his winter quarters quietly along the Vistula. In order to comprehend clearly the movements which he meditated, we must form an accurate idea of the localities and of the position which the enemy had occupied there.

The King of Prussia, driven from the Oder, had retired upon the Vistula. Driven from the Vistula, he had fallen back upon the Pregel, at Königsberg. Having arrived at this extremity of his kingdom, there was left for him to defend, in concert with the Russians, the space comprised between the Vistula and the Pregel. The soil here exhibits the same characters as between the Elbe and the Oder, between the Oder and the Vistula, that is to say, a long chain of sandhills parallel to the sea, retaining the waters, and forming a series of lakes extending from the Vistula to the Pregel. These lakes frequently find a channel to flow off, some directly to the sea, by small rivers which throw themselves into it, and the principal of which is the Passarge, the others into the interior of the country by a multitude of streams, such as the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, which run into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. This singular country comprised between the Vistula and the Pregel has therefore two slopes, one towards the sea, which is German, formerly colonised by the Teutonic Order, and highly cultivated; the other turned towards the interior, thinly inhabited, scantily cultivated, covered with thick forests, and almost impenetrable in winter. You find nothing but resources in approaching the sea, nothing but obstacles, difficulty to subsist, when you penetrate into the interior. At the mouth of the Vistula, and at that of the Pregel, are seated two great commercial cities,

Dantzig on the first, Königsberg on the second, full, at the period of which we are treating, of immense resources, not only the produce of the country, but such as the English had brought and were daily bringing thither. Dantzig, strongly fortified, provided with a numerous garrison, could not be reduced without a long siege. It was a point d'appui for the Russians and Prussians, of great importance, on the Lower Vistula, and rendered our position on the Upper Vistula precarious, by enabling the enemy at all times to pass that river on our left, and to threaten our rear. Königsberg, ill fortified, but defended by the distance, containing the last resources of Prussia in matériel, military stores, money, soldiers, officers, was the principal depôt of the enemy, and his medium of communication with the English. Between Dantzig and Königsberg extends the Frische Haff, a vast lagoon, like the lagoons of Venice and Holland, owing to the cause which has produced all the phenomena of this soil and to the accumulation of the sand, which, thrown up in a long bank parallel to the shore, separates the waters of the rivers from the maritime waters, and thus forms an intermediate sea. It is the same phenomenon that is remarked at the mouth of the Oder, by the name of the Great Haff, and at the mouth of the Niemen, by the name of the Curische Haff. Besides Dantzig and Königsberg, other commercial towns, Marienburg, Elbing, Braunsberg, situated along the Frische Haff, form a belt of wealthy and populous cities. These were the last wrecks of the Prussian monarchy left to Frederick William. That monarch, himself fixed at Königsberg, had his troops scattered between Dantzig and Königsberg, trusting to the Russians on the side towards Thorn. He thus defended the maritime slope with 30,000 men, including garrisons. The Russians, with 100,000, occupied the inland slope, backed upon thick forests, and covered by the Ukra and the Narew, rivers which, uniting before they fall into the Vistula, describe an angle, the apex of which supports itself upon that great river a little below Warsaw.

Two combinations were possible on the part of the allies. They could unite in one mass towards the sea, in order to avail themselves of the numerous points of support which they possessed upon the coast, particularly Dantzig, and, passing the Lower Vistula, oblige us to repass the Upper, if we did not choose to be turned. They could also, leaving to the Prussians the charge of guarding the sea, and communicating together by means of a few detachments placed on the line of the lakes, push forward the Russians in advance of the region of the forests, into the angle described by the Ukra and the Narew, thus forming a sort of wedge, and driving the point of it towards Warsaw. Napoleon was ready for either of these

cases. If the Prussians and Russians operated in one mass toward the sea, his intention was to ascend the Narew by the roads running through the inland country, and then, dropping down to the left, throw the enemy into the sea or into the Lower Vistula. If, on the contrary, leaving the Prussians towards the sea, between Dantzig and Königsberg, the Russians advanced along the Narew and the Ukra upon Warsaw, then, breaking in between the two by Thorn, he had determined to wheel about on his right, the extremity of which would rest upon Warsaw, to bear up with his left, so as to separate the Prussians from the Russians by this rotatory movement, and to fling back the latter into the chaos of the woods and marshes of the interior. He should thus cut them off from the resources of the sea, from the succours of England, and force them to flee in disorder through a horrible labyrinth. This separation effected, the maritime region, defended by a few thousand Prussians, would be easy to conquer, and with it he should take all the material riches of the coalition.

Of the two combinations which we have described, the allies seemed to have adopted the second. The Prussians occupied the maritime region, connecting themselves with the Russians by a detachment placed in the environs of Thorn. The Russians were ranged in masses in the inland region, upon the Narew and its tributaries. General Benningsen, who commanded the first Russian army, had fallen back from the Vistula upon the Narew, on the approach of the French, and had taken position in the interior of the angle formed by the Ukra and the Narew. General Buxhövden, with the second army, composed also of four divisions, was in rear upon the Upper Narew and the Omulew, in the environs of Ostrolenka. General Essen, with the two divisions of reserve, had not yet arrived on the theatre of war. With a view to flatter the passions of the veteran Russian soldiers, there had been given them for commander-in-chief General Kamenskï, an old lieutenant of Suwarrow's, having the energetic roughness of the illustrious Muscovite warrior, but none of his talents. Having at first fallen back before the French, the Russians, regretting the ground lost, were moving forward to recover it; but at sight of our army, fully prepared to receive them, they had resumed their position behind the Ukra and the Narew.

Informed of the situation of the Prussians and Russians, the former established along the sea, the latter crowded together in the inland region, and weakly connected towards Thorn, Napoleon resolved to oppose to them the manœuvre contrived for this case, that is to say, to debouch from Thorn with his left reinforced, to separate the Prussians from the Russians, and to throw the latter into the inextricable difficulties of the

interior. He had already directed Marshal Ney upon Thorn; he also sent thither Marshal Bernadotte, with the first corps and Dupont's division. He pushed forward the corps of Marshal Soult intermediately, by Sempolno upon Plock, ordering him to pass the Vistula between Warsaw and Thorn, and recommended to him to connect himself by his left with Marshals Ney and Bernadotte, by his right with Marshal Augereau. The dragoons mounted at Potsdam having joined the army, Napoleon united them with the portion of the heavy cavalry which had rested itself in Berlin, and thus composed a second reserve of horse, which he consigned to Marshal Bessières, removed for a time from the command of the imperial guard. This second reserve he sent to Thorn. It formed a body of seven or eight thousand horse, which, added to the corps of Marshals Ney and Bernadotte, would compose at the extreme left of the French army a column of from forty to forty-five thousand men, quite sufficient to effect the projected rotatory movement. Marshal Soult, at the head of 25,000 men, formed the centre; Marshals Augereau, Davout, and Lannes formed the right, destined to appuy itself upon Warsaw. All these corps were near enough to co-operate with each other, and to present in a few hours 70,000 men assembled on one point, wherever it might be, at which the enemy should be found in force. Napoleon supposed, therefore, that, his left advancing by rapid marches while his right wheeled round slowly, he might take the Russians in hand by the way, and after he had separated them from the Prussians, drive them from the Ukra to the Narew, from the Narew to the Bug, far from the sea, and bury them in the interior of Poland. If the weather, favouring such designs, should facilitate marches, it was possible that the Russians might be forced back so far from their base of operation, and from the country on which they subsisted, that their rout would become a signal disaster.

Being desirous to wheel round upon Warsaw, but also to be able to move away from it if necessary, in case he should be obliged to follow the movement of his left, and to ascend with it, Napoleon had considerable works constructed in the suburb of Praga. He ordered it to be fortified by means of earthworks, provided with a revêtement in wood, which was equal to a scarp in masonry. This suburb, thus fortified, would serve for a *tête de pont* to Warsaw. Napoleon enjoined Marshal Davout, who had proceeded from the Vistula to the Narew, to throw a bridge over the latter river and to put it into a state of defence. He directed Marshal Augereau, who was preparing to pass the Vistula at Modlin, to establish there also a permanent bridge, and to render it unassailable on both banks. He charged General Chasseloup to mark out the works ordered. He recommended to him to employ earth and timber exclusively for them, to

mount upon them the heavy artillery taken from the enemy, and to draw thither by good wages Polish workmen in great number. Napoleon was desirous that these fortifications of earth and wood, raised to an equality with a permanent fortification, should, on his leaving there the Poles of the new levy and a few French detachments, suffice for their own defence, while the army was pushing onward, if the course of the operations undertaken should require it to do so.

The orders of Napoleon were always punctually executed, unless absolute impossibility prevented, because he paid incessant attention to their execution, and urged it on most perseveringly. General Chasseloup pushed forward the prescribed works with activity, but he had difficulty to procure workmen. The violences committed by the Russians, and the dread of similar violences on the part of the French, had induced the peasants to betake themselves, with their families, their cattle, and their means of conveyance, to the territory of Austrian Poland, the frontier of which, being extremely near, and closed against both the belligerent armies, offered a ready and a safe asylum. The inhabitants of whole villages had fled, headed by their priests, to escape the horrors of war. Hands were not to be procured, even at very high prices. There were some, it is true, at Warsaw, but the construction of ovens, the organisation of the military establishments, which required to be proportioned to an army of 200,000 men, absorbed almost all of them. None at all were left to be employed elsewhere. Soldiers had to supply their place. Unfortunately, the latter began to flag, and to feel the influences of the season, which was hitherto rather wet than cold. They had also to suffer privations. The provisions ordered in Galicia were long in coming, and even at Warsaw there was found some difficulty to subsist. Marshal Lannes was encamped there with his two divisions. Marshal Davout was encamped beyond; that is to say, on the bank of the Narew, which falls into the Vistula a little below Warsaw. It was about eight leagues from Warsaw to the Narew, and in that space there were abundance of heaths, little cultivated land, and few dwelling-houses. Soldiers of Davout's corps, being obliged to eat pork for want of beef and mutton, were attacked with dysentery. They had no bread but what was sent them from day to day. Marshal Davout had his headquarters at Jablona, and his column head on the very bank of the Narew, towards Okunin, opposite to the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. Marshal Davout, in spite of the Russian advanced guards, had passed the Narew, thrown a bridge over that river, with the aid of some boats which had been collected, and had labourers engaged upon defensive works at both extremities of this bridge. He had it in his power,

therefore, to manœuvre on either bank of the Narew. Still, having crossed it below the point where it is joined by the Ukra, he had yet to cross it higher up, or to cross the Ukra itself, in order to penetrate into the angle occupied by the Russians. But they were numerous there, and solidly entrenched on woody, elevated ground, and armed with artillery. It was impossible to attack them without passing the Ukra by main force. Such an attempt must necessarily bring on a battle, which was not to be sought but in the presence of Napoleon.

Marshal Davout's labourers almost gave the hand to those of Marshal Augereau, who was actively engaged in establishing himself upon the Vistula, near Modlin, at the point where the Vistula and Narew join. But he was destitute of the necessary means, for the Russians had destroyed everything in retiring. Twelve boats, picked up above and below Modlin, had served him to put one detachment after another across the river. He set about building a spacious bridge at Modlin, with defensive works on both banks. His troops, amidst the sands which prevail in this part of the country, fared still worse than those of Marshal Davout. He was impatient to remove to Plonsk, beyond the Vistula, opposite to the Ukra, in a more fertile country. Marshal Soult had performed the marches ordered by the emperor, and had begun to pass at Plock, whence he could either join Marshal Augereau at Plonsk, or Marshals Ney and Bernadotte at Biezun, according to circumstances. As for the corps which had Thorn for their base of operation, these were in want of nothing.

These rapid conquerors, who had so speedily overrun Austria last year, and Prussia last month, found their triumphal march slackened by a damp and dreary climate, by a moving soil, alternately sandy and muddy, by the want of provisions, becoming scarcer in proportion as population and cultivation diminished. They were surprised at this, not cast down, indulged in a thousand sarcastic sallies on the attachment of the Poles to such a country, and desired nothing better than to fall in with the enemy of Austerlitz, that they might revenge upon him the annoyances of soil and climate.

On seeing the Russians by turns advance and fall back, then retire for the last time, with all the appearances of a definitive retreat, Napoleon conceived that they were retiring to the Pregel, with the intention of taking up their winter quarters there. He therefore ordered Murat and Bessières to pursue them at the head of 25,000 horse, the one debouching from Warsaw with the first reserve of cavalry, the other debouching from Thorn with the second. But the more accurate reports of Marshal Davout, who, placed at the conflux of the Narew and the Ukra, beheld the Russians solidly established on both rivers, the cor-

responding reports of Marshal Augereau, and in particular of Marshal Ney, who was in the habit of observing the enemy very closely, soon undeceived him, and proved to him that it was high time to march against the Russians, that it was even necessary to do so, if he was not disposed to let them winter in a position too near to that of the French army. Besides, the bridges over the Vistula, which he purposed to make his points d'appui, were finished, provided with a commencement of defensive works, and capable of a sufficient resistance, if some troops were placed in them.

Napoleon therefore left Posen in the night between the 15th and 16th of December, after a stay of nineteen days, passed through Kutno and Lowicz, gave orders everywhere for provisions, and for medical and surgical stores, in case of a retrograde movement, not very probable, but always kept sight of by his prudence; and lastly, superintended the march of his columns for Warsaw, and was particularly attentive to the despatch of the guard and Oudinot's grenadiers for that city.*

He entered the capital of Poland at night, to avoid noisy demonstrations, for it did not suit him to pay for a few popular acclamations by imprudent engagements. Wibiski, the Pole, had preceded him, and exerted all his powers to persuade his countrymen that they ought to devote themselves to him. Many of them had been won by the reasons which he gave them. Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last king, young, brilliant, and brave, a kind of hero lulled to sleep in the lap of voluptuousness, but ready to awake at the first clash of arms, was one of those who had offered themselves to second the plans of Napoleon. Count Potocki, old Malakouski, marshal of one of the last Diets, and others who had come to Warsaw, had collected around the French authorities, to concur in forming a government. A provisional administration had been composed, and all began to go on well, with the exception of the inevitable skirmishes between

* We quote the following letter, as it clearly indicates the state of things at the moment to which the above particulars relate.

"To General CLARKE.

"LOWICZ, 18*th December* 1806, 7 P.M.

"I have arrived at Lowicz. I write to you to relieve you from every kind of uneasiness. There is no news here. The armies are in presence. The Russians are on the right bank of the Narew, and we on the left. Besides Praga, we have two *têtes de pont*, one at Modlin, the other on the Narew, at the mouth of the Ukra. We have Thorn, and an army twenty leagues in advance manœuvring upon the enemy. All this news is for yourself. It is possible that, before the end of eight days, there may be an affair that will put an end to the campaign. Take your precautions, that there may not be a musket left either in Berlin or in the country, that Spandau and Cüstrin are in a good state, and that everybody does good service.

"Write to Mayence and to Paris, merely to say that you are writing, that there is no news. This must be done in general every day, when I have no couriers passing: that baffles unfavourable reports. NAPOLEON."

persons of little experience and strongly inclined to jealousy. Men were raised and battalions organised, either at Warsaw or at Posen. Napoleon, in order to assist the new Polish government, had exempted it from all contribution, on condition of its furnishing provisions in case of emergency. For the rest, the high society of Warsaw paid him extraordinary homage. All the Polish nobility had left their country seats, impatient to see him, to meet the great man, as well as the deliverer of Poland.

Having arrived in the night between the 18th and 19th, Napoleon mounted his horse in the morning, in order to reconnoitre himself the position of Marshal Davout on the Narew. A thick fog prevented him. He made his dispositions for attacking the enemy on the 22nd or 23rd of December. It is high time, he wrote to Marshal Davout, to take our winter quarters; but this cannot be done till we have driven back the Russians.

The four divisions of General Benningsen first presented themselves. Count Tolstoy's division, posted at Czarnowo, occupied the apex of the angle formed by the junction of the Ukra and the Narew. That of General Sacken, also placed in rear towards Lopaczym, guarded the banks of the Ukra. The division of Prince Gallitzin was in reserve at Pultusk. The four divisions of General Buxhövden were at a great distance from those of General Benningsen, and not calculated to render support to him. Two detachments at Popowo observed the country between the Narew and the Bug. Two others were encamped still further off, at Makow and Ostrolenka. The Prussians, driven out of Thorn, were on the upper course of the Ukra, towards Soldau, connecting the Russians with the sea. As we have said, General Essen's two divisions of reserve had not yet arrived. The total mass of the allies destined to enter into action was about 115,000 men.

It is easy to perceive that the distribution of the Russian corps was not judiciously combined in the angle of the Ukra and the Narew, and that they had not sufficiently concentrated their forces. If, instead of having a single division at the point of the angle, and one on each side at too great a distance from the first, lastly, five out of reach, they had distributed themselves with intelligence over ground so favourable for the defensive; if they had strongly occupied, first the conflux, then the two rivers, the Narew from Czarnowo to Pultusk, the Ukra from Pomichowo to Kolozomb; if they had placed in reserve in a central position, at Nasielsk, for example, a principal mass, ready to run to any threatened point, they might have disputed the ground with advantage. But Generals Benningsen and Buxhövden were on bad terms; they disliked to be near each other; and old Kamenski, who had arrived only the preceding day, had neither the necessary intelligence nor spirit for pre-

scribing other dispositions than they had adopted in following each of them their own whim.

Napoleon, who saw the position of the Russians from without only, certainly concluded that they were entrenched behind the Narew and the Ukra, for the purpose of guarding the banks, but without knowing how they were established and distributed there. He thought that it would be advisable to take, in the first place, the conflux, where, it was probable, they would defend themselves with energy, and having carried that point, to proceed to the execution of his plan, which consisted in throwing the Russians, by a wheel from left to right, into the marshy and woody country in the interior of Poland. In consequence, having repeated the order to Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, forming his left, to proceed rapidly from Thorn to Biezun on the upper course of the Ukra, to Marshals Soult and Augereau, forming his centre, to set out from Plock and Modlin, and form a junction at Plonsk on the Ukra, he put himself at the head of his right, composed of Davout's corps, Lannes' corps, of the guard, and the reserves, resolved to force immediately the position of the Russians at the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. He left in the works of Praga the Poles of the new levy, with a division of dragoons, a force sufficient to ward off all accidents, as the army was not to remove far from Warsaw.

Having arrived on the morning of the 23rd of December at Okunin on the Narew, in wet weather, by muddy and almost impassable roads, Napoleon alighted to superintend in person the dispositions of attack. This general, who, according to some critics, while directing armies of 300,000 men, knew not how to lead a brigade into fire, went himself to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, and to place his forces on the ground, down to the very companies of the voltigeurs.

The Narew had been already crossed at Okunin, below the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. To penetrate into the angle formed by those two rivers it was necessary to pass either the Narew or the Ukra above their point of junction. The Ukra, being the narrower of the two, was deemed preferable for attempting a passage. Advantage had been taken of an island which divided it into two arms, near its mouth, in order to diminish the difficulty. On this island the French had established themselves, and they had yet to pass the second arm to reach the point of land occupied by the Russians between the Ukra and the Narew. This point of land, covered with woods, coppices, marshes, looked like one very dense thicket. Further off, the ground became somewhat clearer, then rose and formed a steep declivity, which extended from the Narew to the Ukra. To the right of this natural entrenchment appeared the village of Czar-

nowo on the Narew, to the left the village of Pomichowo on the Ukra. The Russians had advanced guards of tirailleurs in the thicket, seven battalions and a numerous artillery on the elevated part of the ground, two battalions in reserve, and all their cavalry in rear. Napoleon repaired to the island, mounted the roof of a barn by means of a ladder, studied the position of the Russians with a telescope, and immediately made the following dispositions. He scattered a great quantity of tirailleurs all along the Ukra, and to a considerable distance above the point of passage. He ordered them to keep up a brisk firing, and to kindle large fires with damp straw, so as to cover the bed of the river with a cloud of smoke, and to cause the Russians to apprehend an attack above the conflux, towards Pomichowo. He even directed to that quarter Gauthier's brigade, belonging to Davout's corps, in order the more effectually to draw the enemy's attention thither. During the execution of these orders, he collected at dusk all the companies of voltigeurs of Morand's division on the intended point of passage, and ordered them to fire from one bank to the other, through the clumps of wood, to drive off the enemy's posts, while the seamen of the guard were equipping the craft collected on the Narew. The 17th of the line and the 13th light were in column ready to embark by detachments, and the rest of Morand's division was assembled in rear, in order to pass as soon as the bridge was established. The other divisions of Davout's corps were at the bridge of Okunin, awaiting the moment for acting. Lannes was advancing at a rapid pace from Warsaw to Okunin.

The seamen of the guard soon brought some boats, by means of which several detachments of voltigeurs were conveyed from one bank to the other. These penetrated into the thicket, while the officers of the pontonniers and the seamen of the guard were occupied in forming a bridge of boats with the utmost expedition. At seven in the evening, the bridge being passable, Morand's division crossed in close column, and marched forward, preceded by the 17th of the line and the 13th light, and by a swarm of tirailleurs. They advanced under cover of the darkness and the wood. The sappers of the regiments cleared a passage through the thicket for the infantry. No sooner had they overcome these first obstacles than they found themselves unsheltered, opposite to the elevated plateau which runs from the Narew to the Ukra, and which was defended either by abattis or by a numerous artillery. The Russians, amidst the darkness of the night, opened upon our columns a continuous fire of grape and musketry, which did us some mischief. While the voltigeurs of Morand's division and the 13th light approached as tirailleurs, Colonel Lanusse, at the head of the 17th of the line, formed in column of attack on the right, to storm the Russian batteries. He had

already carried one of them, when the Russians, advancing in mass upon his left flank, obliged him to fall back. The rest of Morand's division came up to the support of the first two regiments. The 13th light, having exhausted its cartridges, was replaced by the 30th, and again they marched by the right to the attack of the village of Czarnowo, while, on the left, General Petit proceeded with 400 picked men to the attack of the Russian entrenchments facing the Ukra, opposite to Pomichowo. In spite of the darkness they manœuvred with the utmost order. Two battalions of the 30th and one of the 17th attacked Czarnowo, one by going along the bank of the Narew, the two others by directly climbing the plateau on which that village is seated. These three battalions carried Czarnowo, and followed by the 51st and the 61st regiments, debouched on the plateau, driving back the Russians into the plain beyond it. At the same moment General Petit had assaulted the extremity of the enemy's entrenchments towards the Ukra, and seconded by the fire of artillery kept up by Gauthier's brigade from the other side of the river, had carried them. At midnight the assailants were masters of the position of the Russians from the Narew to the Ukra, but from the tardiness of their retreat, which could be discerned in the dark, it was to be inferred that they would return to the charge, and for this reason Marshal Davout sent the second brigade of Gudin's division to the assistance of General Petit, who was most exposed. During the night the Russians, as it had been foreseen, returned three times to the charge, with the intention of retaking the position which they had lost, and hurling down the French from the plateau towards that point of woody and marshy ground on which they had landed. Thrice were they suffered to approach within thirty paces, and each time the French, replying to their attack by a point-blank fire, brought them to a dead stand, and then meeting them with the bayonet, repulsed them. At length, the night being far advanced, they betook themselves, in full retreat, towards Nasielsk. Never was night action fought with greater order, precision, and hardihood. The Russians left us in killed, wounded, and prisoners about 1800 men, and a great quantity of artillery. We had on our side 600 wounded, and about 100 killed.

Napoleon, who had not quitted the site of action, congratulated General Morand and Marshal Davout on their gallant conduct, and hastened to reap the consequences of the passage of the Ukra, and to give such orders as the circumstance required. The Russians, deprived of the point d'appui which they possessed at the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew, were not likely to be tempted to defend the Ukra, the line of which had just been forced at its mouth. But ignorant as the French were of their real situation, it was to be apprehended that they were in force

at the bridge of Kolozomb, on the Ukra, opposite to Plonsk, the point at which the corps of Marshals Soult and Augereau were to meet. Napoleon directed the cavalry reserve, commanded by General Nansouty in the absence of Murat, who had been taken ill at Warsaw, to ascend the Ukra on both shores, to beat the banks as far as Kolozomb, to give a hand to Marshals Augereau and Soult, to assist them to pass the Ukra if they met with any difficulties, to connect them, in short, with Marshal Davout, who was to march on before, and cross, at about the middle, the country comprised between the Ukra and the Narew. He ordered Marshal Davout to proceed direct for Nasielsk, and despatched the guard and the reserve to support him. Lastly, he gave Marshal Lannes instructions to cross the Ukra at the same place where the passage had just been forced, and to ascend, on the right of Davout's corps, along the Narew to Pultusk. This town became a point of great importance, for the Russians, flung back from the Ukra upon the Narew, had no bridges but those of Pultusk for crossing the latter river. The order already despatched to Marshals Soult and Augereau to march for Plonsk and cross the Ukra there, and to Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières to advance rapidly to Biezun, was, of course, confirmed.

Napoleon, continuing to keep with Marshal Davout, resolved to march the same morning of the 24th for Nasielsk, notwithstanding the fatigues of the night. The precaution was, however, taken to place Friant's division at the head, in order to afford a few hours' rest to Morand's division, fatigued with the action of Czarnowo. About dusk they arrived at Nasielsk, and there found in position Tolstoy's division, the same that had been driven from Czarnowo. It manifested an intention of making some resistance, for the purpose of giving the detachments sent to the Ukra time to join it.

We have already said that General Benningsen's four divisions were: Tolstoy's division at Czarnowo, to defend the conflux of the two rivers; Sacken's division at Lopaczym, to watch the Ukra; Sedmaratzki's division at Zebroszki, to guard the Narew; lastly, Gallitzin's division at Pultusk, to act as reserve, the latter, though at a great distance from the Ukra, having a strong advanced guard on that river, commanded by General Barklay de Tolly—a confused and complicated disposition, which bespoke a very feeble direction in the operations of the Russian army. The natural movement of these divisions, surprised by a vigorous attack on the Ukra, would have been to withdraw their detachments, in order to their retreating upon the Narew. This was in fact the movement which they did adopt, and which their general-in-chief allowed to be executed rather than enjoined.

Count Tolstoy, commandant of the division which had fallen

back upon Nasielsk, had maintained his ground there, till the moment when he saw the detachment charged to guard the Ukra towards Borkowa coming back pursued by the reserve cavalry. However, General Friant, having deployed his division facing the Russians, and marched up to them, obliged them to retire in the greatest haste. The dragoons dashed after them: some hundred men were killed or taken, and cannon and baggage picked up.

On this same 24th, Marshal Augereau, having arrived on the banks of the Ukra, resolved to force the passage. He had the bridges of Kolozomb and Sochoczyn attacked simultaneously. The 14th of the line, under Colonel Savary, who had passed the Vistula at Thorn on the 6th of December,* threw himself upon the scarcely repaired relics of the bridge of Kolozomb, and heroically passed it amidst a tremendous fire of musketry. This brave colonel fell on the other bank, having received several lance wounds. At Sochoczyn, the attack on the bridge having miscarried, the French proceeded to a neighbouring ford and effected the passage. Thus Augereau's corps crossed, on the 24th, to the other bank of the Ukra, and advanced, pushing before it the detachments of the different Russian divisions left to guard that river. They were likewise pursued by the reserve cavalry, under the command of General Nansouty. The French marched towards Nowomiasto, in the direction from the Ukra to the Narew, so as to connect themselves with the corps of Marshal Davout. To the left of Augereau's corps, Marshal Soult was preparing to pass the Ukra, near Sochoczyn. The left, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, continued to ascend by a rapid movement from Thorn towards Biezun and Soldau.

On the morning of the 25th, Napoleon directed his columns upon Strezegocin. The weather had become frightful for an army which had to manœuvre, and above all to execute several reconnaissances, in order to discover the plans of the enemy. A complete thaw, accompanied with melting snow and rain, had soaked the ground to such a degree that in certain places the

* Those readers who recollect having seen the 14th of the line, with its colonel, Savary, distinguishing itself in the passage of the Vistula at Thorn, will find it difficult to comprehend how that same regiment could be, on the 24th of December, under Marshal Augereau at the passage of the Ukra at Kolozomb. The explanation is easy: that regiment, left at Bromberg by Marshal Augereau when he ascended the left bank of the Vistula from Thorn to Modlin, remained for a moment at the disposal of Marshal Ney, and effected under his orders the passage of the Vistula at Thorn.

We should not have added this note, which may appear useless, if some inattentive and ignorant critics had not accused us of making corps figure in different actions in which they had no share. There are attacks about which one ought not to care; yet, out of respect for the impartial reader, we are anxious to prove to him that we have spared no pains to arrive at the strictest accuracy.

men sank up to the knees; and some of them were even found half buried in this soil, suddenly changed into a quagmire. They were obliged to double the teams of the artillery before they could move forward a few paces. They were gainers by this state of things, it is true, as they captured at every step the cannon and baggage of the Russians, many laggards and wounded, and lastly, a considerable number of Polish deserters, who voluntarily stayed behind to give themselves up to the French army. But they lost, on the other hand, the inestimable advantage of celerity, the benefit of the artillery, which they could no longer take with them, and the means of information, which are always proportionate to the facility of communication. Figure to yourself immense plains, covered alternately with mud and thick forests, for the most part thinly peopled, and still more scantily since the general emigration of the inhabitants, armies in pursuit or in flight through this miry desert, and you will have an idea, though inadequate, of the spectacle exhibited at this moment by the French and Russians in this part of Poland.

Napoleon discerning imperfectly the enemy's movements in this flat and woody country, and unable to make amends by repeated reconnaissances for what he could not see, was plunged into the most perplexing uncertainty. It seemed indeed to him that the retreating Russian columns were proceeding from his left to his right, from the Ukra towards the Narew. Accordingly, he had sent Lannes towards Pultusk, and thinking that he could perceive a body of the enemy following Lannes, he had detached Gudin's division from Davout's corps, to follow the pursuers, and to prevent them from attacking Lannes in rear. But a large assemblage appeared in front of him, in the direction of Golymin. Reports were received of the presence of numerous forces, which had arrived upon the rear of the Russian army at this point. It was said that a corps of 20,000 men was retiring from the Ukra towards Ciechanow and Golymin. Amidst this chaos, Napoleon, resolving to fall forthwith upon the nearest enemy, towards whom, besides, all the others seemed to converge, left Lannes, escorted by Gudin's division, to proceed to the right upon Pultusk, and as for himself, he advanced direct towards Golymin, with two of Davout's three divisions, with Augereau's entire corps, with the guard and the reserve cavalry. He, moreover, ordered Marshal Soult, who had passed the Ukra, to go to Ciechanow itself. He enjoined Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, who had left Thorn, to continue their rotatory movement by Biezun, Soldau, and Mlawa, which would bring them upon the flank and nearly upon the rear of the Russians.

In this manner, the troops marched, with the greatest difficulty,

the whole of the 25th and the morning of the 26th, taking two hours, sometimes three, to advance a league.

Meanwhile the different corps of the Russian army had not taken precisely the direction which Napoleon had conjectured. Nearly the whole of General Benningsen's four divisions had fallen back upon Pultusk. Tolstoy's division, driven from Czarnowo to Nasielsk, from Nasielsk to Strezegocin, had followed the road which runs across the middle of the tract between the Ukra and the Narew. On its arrival at Strezegocin, it had borne to the right towards Pultusk, as soon as it was able to rally its scattered detachments. Sedmaratzki's division, posted in the preceding days at Zebroszki, on the bank of the Narew, having but a few steps to go to reach Pultusk, had repaired thither immediately. Gallitzin's division, which, though its headquarters were at Pultusk, had posts on the Ukra, had concentrated itself upon Pultusk. But the detachments of that division which guarded the Ukra, cut off by our cavalry, had sought refuge at Golymin. Lastly, Sacken's division, which particularly guarded the Ukra, and had its headquarters at Lopaczym, being annoyed by the French cavalry, had retired, partly to Golymin, partly to Pultusk. Thus Tolstoy's and Sedmaratzki's two entire divisions, and part of Gallitzin's and Sacken's two divisions, were on the 26th at Pultusk. The other part of Gallitzin's and Sacken's divisions, which had taken refuge in Golymin, had fallen in with one of Buxhövden's divisions, Doctorow's division, which had moved forward, and thus given rise to the report of an assemblage of troops on the rear of the Russian army. Lastly, the Prussians, in flight before Marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, had quitted the Ukra, and were retiring by Soldau upon Mlawa, incessantly striving in their retreat to connect themselves with the Russians.

On the morning of the 26th, Lannes came in sight of Pultusk. He there discovered a mass of forces far superior to that which he had at his disposal. The four Russian divisions, though two of them were incomplete, numbered no fewer than 43,000 men.* Lannes, with General Becker's dragoons, had no more than 17,000 or 18,000. Five or six thousand were coming on his left with Gudin's division. Lannes, however, was but very vaguely apprised of this circumstance, and in the state of the roads, this reinforcement, though at an inconsiderable distance from Pultusk, could not reach the field of battle till very late. Lannes was not a man to be daunted. Neither he nor his soldiers feared to meet the Russians, whatever might be their number, however tried their bravery. Lannes drew up his little army in order of battle, having taken care to send a messenger to Marshal Davout

* Plotho, the narrator, an officer of the Russian army, and an eye-witness likewise sets down the number at 43,000.

to inform him of the unexpected force which he had just met with at Pultusk, and which placed him in a most critical situation.

A vast forest covered the environs of Pultusk. On issuing from this forest, you found yourself on open ground, dotted here and there with clumps of trees, drenched with rain, like all the rest of the country, rising gradually in form of a plateau, and then terminating abruptly in a steep declivity towards Pultusk and the Narew. On this ground General Benningsen had drawn up his army, having its back turned to the town, one of its wings appuyed on the river and the bridge which crosses it, the other on a patch of wood. A strong reserve formed a support to his centre. His cavalry was placed in the intervals of his line of battle and a little in advance. Though they had lost part of their artillery, the Russians took with them so great a quantity ever since the campaign of Austerlitz, that they had sufficient left to cover their front with a line of guns, and to render the approach to that front extremely formidable.

Lannes had to oppose to them only a few pieces of small calibre, which had been dragged through the mud with the greatest exertions and by the united efforts of all the teams of the artillery. He placed Suchet's division in first line, and kept Gudin's division in reserve on the skirt of the forest, to have wherewithal to meet any events which might threaten to become serious, in the uncertainty in which every one was plunged. A few men well directed might suffice to carry this position, and had the advantage of affording less scope to the formidable artillery of the Russians. Lannes debouched, therefore, from the forest with Suchet's single division, formed into three columns; one on the right, under General Claparède, composed of the 17th light, and of General Treilhard's light cavalry; one on the left, under General Reille, composed of the second battalion of the 88th, of the 34th of the line, and of General Becker's dragoons. The plan of Lannes was to attack by his right, and towards the Narew, for if he could but penetrate to the town, he should at once deprive the position of the Russians of all its advantages, and even place them in a disastrous situation.

He moved forward his three little columns, sallying boldly from the woods, and climbing the plateau under a shower of grape. Unfortunately the ground, soaked with rain and rendered slippery, scarcely admitted of that impetuosity of attack which might have made amends for the disadvantage of number and position. Nevertheless, advancing with difficulty, they came up to the enemy, and drove him back towards the abrupt declivities terminating the ground in a kind of fall towards the Narew and Pultusk. The French marched with ardour, and were about to throw the Russian troops of General Bagowout from the plateau into the river, when the general-in-chief, Benningsen, sent in

the utmost haste to the aid of General Bagowout part of his reserve, which took in flank Claparède's brigade, forming the head of our attack. Lannes, who was in the thick of the fray, answered this manœuvre by moving from his centre towards his right Vedel's brigade, composed, as we have just said, of the 64th and the first battalion of the 88th. He himself took in flank the Russians who had come to succour General Bagowout, and driving them one upon the other towards the Narew, he would have put an end to the struggle at this point, and perhaps to the battle, if, amidst a violent squall of snow, the battalion of the 88th, surprised by the Russian cavalry before it could form into square, had not been broken and overturned. But this brave battalion was presently rallied by one of those officers whose character is rendered conspicuous by danger. This officer, named Voisin, recovering himself immediately, and taking advantage, in his turn, of the embarrassments of the Russian cavalry, despatched with the bayonet those horsemen floundering, like our foot-soldiers, in a sea of mud.

Thus, on the right and at the centre, the action, though less decisive than it might have been, turned nevertheless to the advantage of the French, who left the Russians backed to the margin of the plateau, and liable to a dangerous fall towards the town and the river. On the left, our third column, composed of the 34th of the line, the second battalion of the 88th, and General Becker's dragoons, had to contend with the enemy for the patch of trees upon which the centre of the Russians appuyed itself. The 34th, directed by General Reille, and saluted unawares by unmasked batteries, suffered severely. Seconded by the charges of General Becker's dragoons, it carried the patch of wood; but some battalions of General Barklay de Tolly's retook it. Again the French made themselves masters of it, and maintained for three hours an obstinate and unequal fight. At length, on this point, as on the others, the Russians, forced to give way, were obliged to back as closely as possible to the town. Lannes, having got rid of the combat on the right, had moved to the left to encourage the troops by his presence. If at this moment he had been less uncertain what was passing elsewhere, and more assured of being supported, he might have brought Gazan's division into action, and then it would have been all up with the Russians, who would have been hurled down the back of the plateau and drowned in the Narew. But Lannes saw, beyond his right, and at the extreme right of the Russians, Tolstoy's division, bordering the ravine of Moczyn, and forming a hook in rear to cover the extremity of the position. He deemed it more prudent not to engage all his troops, and by his orders Gazan's brave division remained motionless on the skirt of the forest, exposed at the distance of three hundred paces to the

balls of the enemy, but rendering the service of awing the Russians, and deterring them also from fighting with the whole of their forces.

The day was closing when Gudin's division at length arrived upon our left, hidden by the woods from our army, but perceived by the Cossacks, who immediately apprised General Benningsen of the circumstance. Of all its artillery Gudin's division brought but two pieces, which were dragged with great labour to the field of battle. It faced the extreme right of the Russians, and the point of the angle formed by the bending back of their line. General Daultanne, who on that day commanded Gudin's division, after a few rounds of cannon-shot, formed *en échelons* by his left, and marched resolutely up to the enemy, previously apprising Marshal Lannes of his entering into action. His attack produced a decisive effect, and forced the Russians to fall back. But this division, already separated by the woods from Lannes' corps, increased by advancing the interval which parted them. At this instant a squall of wind drove rain and snow into the faces of our soldiers. The Russians, from a superstitious notion of northern people, which caused them to consider tempest as a favourable omen, ran forward with wild shouts. They threw themselves into the interval left between Gudin's division and the corps of Lannes, forced back the one, and turned the other. Their cavalry rushed into the gap, but the 34th on the side next to Suchet's division, the 85th on the side next to Gudin's division, formed into square, and cut short that charge, which was rather a demonstration on the part of the Russians to cover their retreat than a serious attack.

The French, then, had on all points conquered the ground which commands Pultusk, and they had but a last effort to make to throw the Russians into the Narew, when General Benningsen, taking advantage of the darkness, withdrew his army, making it pass over the bridges of Pultusk. While he was giving his orders for retreat, Lannes, full of ardour, in high spirits on account of the arrival of Gudin's division, was deliberating whether he should immediately make a second attack or defer it till the next day. The lateness of the hour, and the difficulty of communicating in this chaos of mud, rain, and darkness, decided him to postpone the combat. Next morning the sudden retreat of the Russians deprived the French of the prize earned by their daring and obstinate conduct.

This hard-fought action, in which 18,000 men had been for a whole day in presence of 43,000, might certainly be called a victory. Owing to their small number and to the superiority of their tactics, the French had lost scarcely 1500 men killed and wounded. We speak from authentic statements. The loss of the Russians, on the other hand, in killed and wounded

exceeded 3000 men. They left us 2000 prisoners and an immense quantity of artillery.

Meanwhile General Benningsen, having returned to Pultusk, wrote to his sovereign that he had just gained a signal victory over the Emperor Napoleon, commanding in person three *corps d'armée*, those of Marshals Davout, Lannes, and Suchet, besides the cavalry of Prince Murat. Now there was not, as the reader may have seen, any *corps d'armée* of Marshal Suchet's, since General Suchet merely commanded a division of the corps of Marshal Lannes; there were on the ground at Pultusk two divisions of Marshal Lannes' corps, and one only of Marshal Davout's, no cavalry of Prince Murat's, and still less any Emperor Napoleon commanding in person.

A great deal has been said about the lying bulletins of the empire; still they were more true than any of the European publications of that period; but what are we to think of such a way of relating one's own acts! The Russians assuredly were brave enough to be veracious.

On that same day, the 26th, the two divisions of Marshal Davout's that were left him, and likewise the two divisions composing Marshal Augereau's corps, arrived opposite to Golymin. This village was surrounded by a belt of woods and marshes, studded with a few hamlets; and beyond this belt the Russians were established, with a strong reserve at the village of Golymin itself.

Marshal Davout, debouching by the right, that is to say, by the Pultusk road, ordered an attack of the woods, which formed, on his part, an obstacle to be overcome before he could penetrate into Golymin. Marshal Augereau, debouching by the left, that is to say, by the Lopaczym road, had to cross the marshes, dotted with a few clumps of wood, and among these marshes to carry a village, that of Ruskovo, through which ran the only practicable road. Marshal Davout's brave infantry repulsed, not without loss, the Russian infantry of the detached corps of Sacken and Gallitzin. After a brisk fire of small arms, the former engaged the latter with the bayonet, and compelled it by hand-to-hand fights to abandon to it the woods on which it supported itself. On the right of these warmly disputed woods, Marshal Davout forced the road from Pultusk to Golymin, and threw upon the Russians part of the cavalry reserve entrusted to Rapp, one of those intrepid aides-de-camp, whom Napoleon kept at hand, to employ them on difficult occasions. Rapp upset the Russian infantry, turned the woods, and thus did away with the obstacle which covered Golymin. But being exposed to an extremely brisk fire, he had an arm broken. On the left. Augereau, crossing the marshes in spite of the hostile force placed at that point, took the village of Ruskovo, and

marched, on his part, for Golymin, the common object of our concentric attacks. The French penetrated into it towards the close of the day, and made themselves masters of it, after a very hot action with the reserve of Doctorow's division. As at Pultusk, a great quantity of artillery and some prisoners were taken, and the ground was strewed with Russian corpses. In fight with them, fewer enemies were taken, but more killed.

On this day, the 26th, our columns were everywhere engaged with the Russian columns, over a space of twenty-five leagues. From an effect of chance, impossible to be prevented when the communications are difficult, while Lannes had found before him twice or thrice as many Russians as he had French, the other corps met with scarcely their equivalent, as Marshals Augereau and Davout at Golymin, or no enemy to fight, as Marshal Soult in his march for Ciechanow, and Marshal Bernadotte in his march for Biezun. Marshal Bessières, it is true, serving for scout to our left wing, with the second cavalry reserve, had come up with the Prussians at Biezun, and taken a good number of prisoners. Marshal Ney, who formed the extreme left of the army, had marched from Strasburg to Soldau and Mlawa, driving Lestocq's corps before him. Arriving on the 26th at Soldau, at the very moment when Lannes was engaged at Pultusk, when Marshals Davout and Augereau were engaged at Golymin, he had directed Marchand's division upon Mlawa, in order to turn the position of Soldau, a necessary precaution, for insurmountable difficulties might have been found there. In fact, the village of Soldau was situated amidst a marsh impassable except by a single causeway, from seven to eight hundred fathoms in length, resting sometimes upon the ground, sometimes upon bridges, which the enemy had taken care to break down. Six thousand Prussians, with cannon, guarded this causeway. A first battery enfiladed it longitudinally; a second, established on a spot judiciously chosen in the marsh, took it obliquely. Ney, with the 69th and the 76th, advanced impetuously along it. They threw planks over the broken bridges; they carried the batteries at a run; they overturned with the bayonet the infantry drawn up in column on the causeway, and entered the village of Soldau pell-mell with the fugitives. A most obstinate conflict with the Prussians took place there. The French had to storm Soldau house by house. This was not accomplished without unparalleled efforts, and not till nightfall. But at this moment the gallant General Lestocq, rallying his columns in rear of Soldau, made his soldiers swear to recover the lost post. The Prussians, treated by the Russians since Jena as the Austrians had been treated since Ulm, determined to avenge their honour, and to prove that they were not inferior in bravery to any nation. And so they

did. Four times, from seven in the evening till midnight, they attacked Soldau with the bayonet, and four times they were repulsed. At last they retired, having sustained an immense loss in killed and wounded and prisoners.

Thus, on this day, over a space of twenty-five leagues, from Pultusk to Soldau, there had been obstinate fighting, and the Russians, defeated wherever they had attempted to resist us, had not escaped without abandoning their artillery and baggage. Their army was diminished by nearly 20,000 men out of 115,000. Great numbers of them were hors de combat or prisoners. Great numbers more, of Polish origin, had deserted. We had picked up more than 80 pieces of cannon, of large calibre, and a considerable quantity of baggage. We had not lost a single prisoner or a single deserter, but the fire of the enemy had deprived us of four or five thousand men killed or wounded.

The plan of Napoleon, tending to separate the Russians from the sea, and to throw them by a rotatory movement from the Ukra upon the Narew, from the rich coast of old Prussia into the woody, marshy, uncultivated interior of Poland, had succeeded on all points, though at none had it led to one of those great battles which always marked conspicuously the scientific manœuvres of that immortal captain. The heroic action of Lannes at Pultusk was a defeat for the Russians, but a defeat without disaster, which was as great a novelty for them as for us. If, however, it had been possible to march on the next and the following day, the Russians would have been obliged to deliver to us the trophies which they could not long withhold from our bravery and our skill. Thrown beyond the Ukra, the Orezyc, and the Narew, into an impenetrable forest, above fifteen or twenty leagues in extent, comprised between Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Ortelsburg, their complete destruction would have been the inevitable effect of the profound combinations of Napoleon, and of the futile or unfortunate combinations of their generals.

But it was impossible to take a step without falling into inextricable embarrassments. Men sank up to the waist in those horrible quagmires, and there stuck fast till assistance came to drag them out. Many had expired in this situation, for want of timely aid.

Napoleon, whose plans had never been better conceived, whose soldiers had never been more valiant, was obliged to halt, after marching on for two or three days, to assure himself thoroughly of the rout of the Russians and of their flight towards the Pregel. A great loss in men and cannon occasioned to the enemy, and safe winter quarters in the heart of Poland, formed a worthy termination to that extraordinary campaign, begun on the Rhine, finished on the Vistula. The state of the weather and of the ground

sufficiently accounted for the circumstance that the results obtained in these last days had neither the greatness nor the suddenness to which Napoleon had accustomed the world. The Russians, no doubt surprised at not having been disposed of so speedily as the Prussians at Jena, the Austrians at Ulm, and themselves at Austerlitz, went off to pride themselves on a defeat less prompt than usual, and to circulate fables respecting their pretended successes: this there was no preventing. This time they would not have been more fortunate, if we had met with frozen lakes instead of bottomless quagmires. But the season, a very unusual one, which brought with it a muddy soil instead of a frozen soil, had saved them from a disaster. It was a freak of Fortune, who had hitherto favoured Napoleon too much for him not to forgive this slight inconstancy: only he ought to have borne this in mind, and to have learned to know her. For the rest, his soldiers encamped on the Vistula, his eagles planted in Warsaw, were a sight extraordinary enough for him to feel gratified, for Europe to remain quiet, Austria awed and affrighted, France confident.

He halted two or three days at Golymin, with the intention of allowing his army a little rest, and on the 1st of January 1807 he returned to Warsaw, to arrange there the establishment of his winter quarters.

Whoever desires to have an accurate notion of the district which he chose for cantoning his troops must figure to himself the conformation of the country beyond the Vistula. That series of lakes to which we have already several times adverted, and which here separate old Prussia from Poland, the German country from the Slavonic country, the maritime and rich region from the inland and poor region, pour the greater part of their waters into the interior by a series of rivers, as the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, which throw themselves into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. And while, by means of the Omulew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra, the Narew receives the waters of the lakes which cannot find an outlet to the sea, and which descend from the west, it receives, by means of the Bug, the waters descending from the east and from the heart of Poland. Uniting with the Bug at Sierock, and increased by all these tributaries, it carries them in a single bed to the Vistula, into which it falls at Modlin.

The Narew, then, presents one common trunk which supports itself on the Vistula, around which the Bug on the right, the Ukra, the Orezyc, and the Omulew on the left, run to attach themselves to it like so many ramifications. It was between these ramifications, and appuying himself upon the principal trunk towards Sierock and Modlin, that Napoleon distributed his *corps d'armée.*

He made Lannes take cantonments between the Vistula, the Narew, and the Bug, in the angle formed by these streams, guarding at one and the same time Warsaw by Suchet's division, Jablona, the bridge of Okunin, and Sierock, by Gazan's division. The headquarters of Lannes were at Sierock, at the conflux of the Bug and the Narew. Marshal Davout's corps was to be cantoned in the angle formed by the Bug and the Narew, his headquarters adjoining to Pultusk, his posts extending to Brok, on the Bug, to Ostrolenka, on the Narew. The corps of Marshal Soult was established behind the Orezyc, having his headquarters at Golymin, uniting the cavalry reserve with his *corps d'armée*, and thus having the means of covering the vast extent of his front by the numerous squadrons placed at his disposal. The corps of Marshal Augereau was cantoned at Plonsk, behind Marshal Soult, occupying the open angle between the Vistula and the Ukra, the headquarters being at Plonsk. Marshal Ney's corps was placed on the extreme left of Marshal Augereau, turned towards Mlawa, about the sources of the Orezyc and the Ukra, near the lakes, protecting the flank of the four *corps d'armée*, which formed radii around Warsaw, and connected themselves with the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, who defended the Lower Vistula. The latter, cantoned close to the sea, was commissioned to guard the Lower Vistula and to cover the siege of Dantzig, which it was indispensably necessary to reduce, in order to render the position of the army secure. This siege, moreover, was destined to form the interlude between the campaign which was just over, and that which was to be opened in the spring.

Each corps had orders, on the first appearance of the enemy, to concentrate itself, that of Marshal Lannes at Sierock, Marshal Davout's at Pultusk, Marshal Soult's at Golymin, Marshal Augereau's at Plonsk, Marshal Ney's at Mlawa, Marshal Bernadotte's between Graudenz and Elbing, towards Osterode; the first four charged to defend Warsaw, the fifth to connect the quarters of the Narew with those of the coast, the last to protect the Lower Vistula and the siege of Dantzig.

With this able disposition of the cantonments were united precautions of admirable forecast. The soldiers, having bivouacked incessantly since the commencement of the campaign, that is to say, ever since the month of October, were at length to be lodged in the villages and to be subsisted there, but so that they could assemble at any time on the first danger. The light cavalry, the cavalry of the line, the heavy cavalry, ranged one behind another, and appuyed on some detachments of light infantry, formed a long screen before the cantonments, to keep off the Cossacks, and to prevent surprises by means of frequent reconnaissances. The troops engaged in this very hard service were sheltered by

hovels, the materials for which were furnished by the woods so abundant in Poland.

Orders were issued to scour the country in quest of the corn and the potatoes hidden under ground by the inhabitants before their flight, to collect the dispersed cattle, and to form with what should be thus got together magazines which, established for each corps, and regularly administered, would be secured from all waste. The corps which were not advantageously placed in regard to alimentary resources were to receive supplies of corn, forage, and butchers' meat from Warsaw. What was to be sent them, embarked on the Vistula, was to descend the river to the nearest point to each corps, to be there landed and carried away by the army equipages, or by vehicles organised in the country. Napoleon had ordered all services to be paid in money, either on account of the Poles, whom he wished to conciliate, or on account of the inhabitants, whom he hoped to attract by the prospect of gain.

It should be remarked that each corps, though cantoned in such a manner as to be able to proceed rapidly to any point that might be in danger, had a base on the Vistula or on the Narew, in order to turn the water transport to account. Thus, Marshal Lannes had at Warsaw, Marshal Davout at Pultusk, Marshal Augereau at Wyszogrod, Marshal Soult at Plock, Marshal Ney at Thorn, Marshal Bernadotte at Marienburg and Elbing, a base on that vast line of navigation. At these different points were to be placed their depôts, their hospitals, their establishments for preserving provisions, their shops for repairs, because to these places the articles necessary for those departments could be brought with the greatest facility.

In the ordinary histories of war, we see only armies completely formed and ready to enter into action; but it can scarcely be imagined what efforts it costs to bring the armed man to his post, equipped, fed, trained, lastly, cured, if he has been sick or wounded. All these difficulties are increased in proportion to the change of climate, or to the distance which the army removes from the point of departure. Most generals or governments neglect this kind of attentions, and their armies melt away visibly. Those only who practise them with perseverance and skill find means to keep their troops numerous and well-disposed. The operation which we are describing is the most admirable example of this sort of difficulties completely overcome and surmounted.

Napoleon desired that, as soon as situations adapted to each cantonment were chosen, and necessaries collected, or such as were deficient brought from Warsaw, ovens should be built, and destroyed mills repaired. He required that, when the regular supply of the troops was ensured, and when, in preparing provisions, a larger stock had accumulated than the quantity

indispensable for the daily consumption, there should be formed a reserve store of bread, biscuit, spirits, not at the place where the depôt was fixed, but at the spot appointed for the assembling of each *corps d'armée* in case of attack. No doubt the reader guesses his motive. He wished that, if a sudden appearance of the enemy called the troops to arms, each corps might have sufficient provisions for seven or eight days' march. He took in general no more time than that to accomplish a great operation and to decide a campaign.

With the money arising from the contributions levied in Prussia, which was first collected on the Oder, and then conveyed to the Vistula in artillery waggons, he caused the troops to be punctually paid, and moreover granted extraordinary aids to the *masses* of the regiments. By *masses* are meant the portions of the pay thrown into a common fund, to feed, clothe, and warm the soldier. It was a method of increasing the comforts of the troops in proportion to the difficulty of subsisting, or to the more rapid consumption of articles of equipment.

The first days of this establishment amidst the marshes and forests of Poland, and during the inclemencies of winter, were most irksome. If the cold had been intense, the soldier, warmed at the expense of the forests of Poland, would have suffered less from the frost than from that soaking wet which drenched the ground, rendered it almost impossible to stir abroad, increased the fatigues of the service, saddened the eye, relaxed the muscles, depressed the spirits. In that country they could not have a worse winter than a rainy winter. The temperature varied incessantly from frost to thaw, never reaching below one or two degrees of cold, and returning to the moist soft temperature of autumn. In consequence, the men longed for frost, as in the fine climates people long for the sunshine and the verdure of spring.

In a few days, however, their situation began to improve. The corps made their abode in the deserted villages; the advanced guards built themselves hovels with branches of fir. A great quantity of potatoes and cattle enough were found. But the soldiers grew tired of potatoes, and sighed after bread. By and by they discovered corn hidden in the woods, and collected it in magazines. They also received some by the Vistula and the Narew, part of that which the ingenuity of the Jews contrived to send down to Warsaw, through the military cordons of Austria. A system of bribery, adroitly practised by these clever traders, had lulled the vigilance of the guardians of the Austrian frontier. Being paid a good price, either in salt taken in the Prussian magazines, or in ready money, the supplies were furnished with tolerable regularity. The ovens were built, and the damaged mills repaired. The reserve magazines began to be organised. The wines necessary for the health of the soldier and for his

good humour, drawn from all the cities of the north, to which commerce carries them in abundance, and conveyed by the Oder, the Warta, and the Netze to the Vistula, arrived also, though with more difficulty. All the corps, indeed, did not enjoy the same advantages. Those of Marshals Davout and Soult, pushed forwarder into the woody region, and far from the navigation of the Vistula, were most exposed to privations. The corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, placed nearer to the great river of Poland, had less to suffer. The indefatigable Ney had by his industry and boldness opened a source of abundance for himself. He had approached very near to the German country, which is extremely rich; nay, he had even ventured to the banks of the Pregel. Sallying forth on daring expeditions, he placed his soldiers on sledges when it froze, and went marauding to the very gates of Königsberg, which indeed he had once well-nigh surprised and carried.

The corps of Bernadotte was very favourably situated for subsisting on the Lower Vistula. But the proximity of the Prussian garrisons of Graudenz, Dantzig, Elbing, annoyed him severely, and prevented him from enjoying the resources of that country so much as he might have done.

After several skirmishes with the Cossacks, they had been obliged to leave the cantonments quiet. It was perceived that the light cavalry was a sufficient guard, and that the heavy cavalry suffered much in the advanced cantonments. Accordingly, Napoleon, enlightened by the experience of a few days, made a change in his dispositions. He brought back the heavy cavalry towards the Vistula. General d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers were cantoned around Thorn; the dragoons of all the divisions from Thorn to Warsaw; General Nansouty's cuirassiers behind the Vistula, between the Vistula and the Pilica. The light cavalry, reinforced by some brigades of dragoons, remained at the advanced posts, but came by turns, two regiments at a time, to recruit itself on the Vistula, where forage abounded. Gudin's division of Davout's corps, which had suffered more than any other in the whole army, because it had borne a part in two of the hottest actions during the war, Auerstädt and Pultusk, was sent to Warsaw, to indemnify itself there for its fatigues and its combats.

The army, it is true, did not fare so well in the recesses of Poland as in the camp of Boulogne, where all the means of France and the space of two years had been devoted to providing for its wants. But it had necessaries, and sometimes more. Napoleon, in reply to Fouché, the minister, who communicated to him the rumours circulated by disaffected persons respecting the hardships endured by our soldiers, wrote as follows:—

"It is true that, the magazines of Warsaw not being largely

stored, and the impossibility of collecting there in a short time a great quantity of corn, have rendered provisions scarce; but it is as absurd to imagine that there is no corn, no wine, no butchers' meat, no potatoes, to be found in Poland, as to say that they are not to be got in Egypt.

"I have at Warsaw an establishment which furnishes me with 100,000 rations of biscuit per day; I have one at Thorn; I have magazines at Posen, at Lowicz, along the whole line: I have sufficient to feed an army for more than a year. You must recollect that, at the time of the expedition to Egypt, letters from the army asserted that we were dying there of hunger. Let articles be written in this spirit. It is natural that we should be short of something when we were driving the Russians from Warsaw; but the productions of the country are such that it is impossible to feel any alarm." (Warsaw, 18th January 1807.)

There was, however, a considerable number of sick, indeed more than usual, in that valiant army. They were seized with fevers and pains, in consequence of the continual bivouacs, beneath a cold sky, upon the wet ground. This was no more than what might be expected from what befell the chiefs themselves. Several marshals, those, in particular, who were called *Italians* and *Egyptians*, because they had served in Italy and Egypt, were seriously indisposed. Murat had not been able to take part in the last operations on the Narew. Augereau, suffering from rheumatism, was obliged to withdraw himself from the contact with a cold damp air. Lannes, taken ill at Warsaw, had been forced to leave the 5th corps, which he could no longer command.

Napoleon crowned the attentions paid to his soldiers by attentions not less assiduous to his sick and wounded. He had caused six thousand beds to be prepared at Warsaw, and an equally considerable number to be provided at Thorn, at Posen, and on the rear, between the Vistula and the Oder. There had been seized in Berlin, wool coming from the domains of the Crown, and tent-cloth; out of these mattresses were made for the hospitals. Having at his disposal Silesia, which Prince Jerome had occupied, and which abounds in linen of all kinds, Napoleon ordered a great quantity to be bought and to be made into shirts. He especially committed the direction of the hospitals to M. Daru, and prescribed a peculiar organisation for those establishments. He determined that in each hospital there should be a chief overseer, always provided with ready money, charged, upon his responsibility, to procure for the sick whatever they needed, under the superintendence of a Catholic priest. This priest, while exercising the spiritual ministry, was also to exercise a sort of paternal vigilance, to make reports to the emperor, to acquaint him with the slightest negligence towards the sick, whose pro-

tector he was thus constituted. Napoleon had intended that this priest should have a salary, and that each hospital should become, in some sort, an itinerant cure in the train of the army.

Such were the infinite pains taken by this great captain whom party hatred represented, on the day of his fall, as a barbarous conqueror, driving men to the slaughter, without giving himself any concern about feeding them when he made them march, or about their cure when he had made cripples of them, and caring no more about them than about the beasts which drew his cannon and his baggage.

After attending to the men with a zeal which is not the less noble because it was interested—for there are generals, sovereigns, who suffer the soldiers, the instruments of their power and their glory, to perish for want—Napoleon directed his attention to the works undertaken on the Vistula, and to the punctual arrival of his reinforcements, so that in spring his army might present itself to the enemy more formidable than ever. He had given orders, as we have seen, for works at Praga, purposing that Warsaw should be able to support itself unaided, with a mere garrison, in case he should move forward. Having examined everything with his own eyes, he resolved upon the construction of eight redoubts, closed at the gorge, with scarp and counterscarp, lined with wood—a species of revêtement, the value of which the siege of Dantzig soon afforded occasion for appreciating—and embracing in their circle the extensive suburb of Praga. He resolved to add to them a work which, placed in rear of these eight redoubts, and opposite to the bridge of boats connecting Warsaw with Praga, should serve at once for an appendage to that species of fortress, and for *tête de pont* to the bridge of Warsaw. At Okunin, where bridges were thrown across the Narew and the Ukra, he ordered a mass of works to cover them, and to secure the exclusive possession of them to the French army. The same thing was prescribed at the bridge of Modlin, which had been thrown at the conflux of the Vistula and the Narew, and where advantage had been taken of an island to ground upon it the means of passage, and to construct a defensive work of the greatest strength. Thus between the three points of Warsaw, Okunin, and Modlin, where so many and so large streams meet, Napoleon secured all the passages to himself, and interdicted them all to the Russians; so that these great natural obstacles, converted into facilities for him, into insurmountable difficulties for the enemy, became in his hands powerful means of manœuvre, and could, above all, be left to themselves, if circumstances obliged him to advance further north than he had yet done. Napoleon completed this system by a work of the same kind at Sierock, at the conflux of the Narew and the Bug. With timber, which abounded on the spot, with money,

which he had at his disposal, he was certain to have both materials and hands to set to work upon them.

Napoleon had drawn from Paris two regiments of infantry, the 15th light and the 58th of the line, a regiment of fusiliers of the guard, and a regiment of the municipal guard. He had also drawn one regiment from Brest, one from St. Lo, and one from Boulogne. These seven regiments were on march, as well as the provisional regiments destined to conduct the recruits of the depôt battalions to the war battalions. Two of them, the 15th light and the 58th, had outstripped the others and joined Marshal Mortier's corps, which was thus increased to eight French regiments, besides the Dutch or Italian regiments, which were to complete its effective. Napoleon, taking advantage of this reinforcement, which at the moment exceeded the wants of the eighth corps, for thus far no enterprise seemed to threaten the shores of the Baltic, detached from it the 2nd and 15th light, forming 4000 men, good French infantry. He joined to them the Baden troops, the eight Polish battalions raised at Posen, the legion of the north, full of veteran Poles who had long been in the service of France, the four fine regiments of cuirassiers which had come from Italy, lastly, two of the four fine regiments of cavalry, which had likewise come from Italy, the 19th and 23rd chasseurs. With these troops he composed a new *corps d'armée*, to which he gave the title of tenth corps, the Germans, who were in Silesia under Prince Jerome, having already received the title of ninth. He entrusted the command of this corps to old Marshal Lefebvre, whom he had brought with him to the grand army, and placed temporarily at the head of the infantry of the guard. He charged him to invest Colberg and to commence the siege of Dantzig. The latter fortress had a particular importance, on account of the position which it occupied on the theatre of the war. It commanded the Lower Vistula, protected the arrivals of the enemy by sea, and contained immense resources, which would place the army in abundance, if we could make ourselves masters of it. Besides, so long as it was not taken, an offensive movement of the enemy towards the sea, pushed beyond the Lower Vistula, might oblige us to leave the Upper Vistula and to fall back towards the Oder. Napoleon was therefore resolved to make the siege of Dantzig the grand operation of the winter.

Napoleon, thus devoting the bad season to the reduction of fortresses, purposed to besiege not only those of the Lower Vistula, which were on his left, but also those of the Upper Oder, which were on his right. His brother Jerome, seconded by General Vandamme, was, as we have seen, to complete the subjection of Silesia by the successive reduction of the fortresses of the Oder. These fortresses, constructed with care by the great

Frederick, to render definitive the valuable conquest which constituted the glory of his reign, presented serious difficulties to surmount, not only in the magnitude and excellence of the works, but also in the garrisons which were charged to defend them. The surrender of Magdeburg, Cüstrin, Stettin, had covered with disgrace the commandants who had given them up, under the empire of a general demoralisation. A reaction had soon taken place in the Prussian army, at first so deeply discouraged after Jena. Indignant honour had spoken to the hearts of all the military men, and they were determined to die honourably, even without any hope of conquering. The king had threatened with terrible punishments those commandants who should surrender fortresses committed to their keeping, till they had done all that constitutes, according to the rules of the art, an honourable defence. It began, moreover, to be understood that the fortresses remaining on Napoleon's left and right would soon acquire a special importance, for they were so many points d'appui needed by his daring march, and which must second the resistance of his enemies. The resolution to defend them energetically was therefore firmly taken by all the commandants of the Prussian garrisons.

Prince Jerome had with him only Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and with these auxiliary troops a single French regiment, the 13th of the line, and a few squadrons of French light cavalry. These German auxiliaries had not yet acquired that military valour which they subsequently displayed on more than one occasion. But General Vandamme, who commanded the ninth corps under Prince Jerome, and General Montbrun, commanding the cavalry, assisted by a young French staff, full of ardour, infused into them in a short time the spirit which then animated our army, and which it communicated to all the troops in contact with it. Vandamme, who had never directed a siege, and possessed none of the qualifications of the engineer, but who made amends for all by a happy instinct for war, had undertaken to proceed in a summary manner with the fortresses of Silesia, though he knew that the governors of those places were resolved to defend them stoutly. He intended to employ the means which had been used at Magdeburg, and to intimidate the inhabitants, in order to impel them to surrender in spite of the garrisons. He began with Glogau, the place nearest to the Lower Oder and to the military routes followed by our troops. The garrison was not numerous, and demoralisation still prevailed in its ranks. Vandamme had several mortars and pieces of heavy artillery placed in battery, and after some threats, followed up with effect, induced the place to capitulate on the 2nd of December. Here were found great resources in artillery and stores of all kinds. Vandamme then ascended the Oder,

and commenced the investment of Breslau, situated on that river, about twenty leagues above Glogau.

It was with the Wurtembergers that Glogau had been taken. They were not enough to besiege Breslau, a city containing 60,000 souls, provided with a garrison of 6000 men, numerous and solid works, and a good commandant. Prince Jerome, who had pushed on to the environs of Kalisch, while the French army was making its first entry into Poland, had returned to the Oder, since Napoleon, solidly established on the Vistula, had no further occasion for the presence of the ninth corps towards his right. Vandamme therefore had, for undertaking the siege of Breslau, the Wurtembergers, two Bavarian divisions, with some French artillerymen and engineers, and likewise the 13th of the line. To carry on a regular siege of so extensive a place appeared to him a long and difficult business. In consequence, he endeavoured, as at Glogau, to intimidate the population. He chose in a suburb, that of St. Nicholas, a site for establishing batteries for red-hot shot. A brisk fire, directed upon the interior of the city, failed of producing the intended result, owing to the vigour of the commandant. Vandamme then turned his thoughts to a more serious attack. Breslau had for its principal defence a bastioned enclosure, bordered by a deep ditch, full of the water of the Oder. But the French engineers perceived that this enclosure was not everywhere lined, and that, at certain points, there was nothing but a scarp of earth. Vandamme resolved to attempt the assault of the enclosure, which, consisting not in a wall of masonry but a mere turf slope, might be scaled by enterprising soldiers. It would first be necessary to cross upon rafts the ditch which was supplied by the Oder. Vandamme caused whatever was requisite for this daring enterprise to be prepared. Unluckily, the preparations were discovered by the enemy; the moon shone brightly during the night of the execution; and from these various causes the attempt miscarried. Meanwhile, the Prince of Anhalt-Pless, who was governor of the province, having collected detachments from all the fortresses, and raised a levy of peasants, which had procured him a corps of 12,000 men, gave the garrison hopes of succour from without. Nothing could have happened more fortunately for the besiegers than to have solved in open field the question of the capture of Breslau. Vandamme hastened to meet the Prince of Anhalt with the Bavarians and the French 13th of the line, beat him twice, put him completely to the rout, and appeared again before the place, now deprived of all hope of relief. At the same time, a sharp frost having set in, he resolved to cross the ditches upon the ice and to scale the earthworks. The commandant, finding himself in danger of being taken by assault, a danger most

alarming for a wealthy and populous city, consented to parley, and surrendered the place on the 7th of January, after a month's resistance, on the conditions granted to Magdeburg, Cüstrin, and the other fortresses of Prussia.

This conquest was not only brilliant, but singularly useful for the resources which it afforded to the French army, by the command, in particular, which it gave us over Silesia, the richest province in Prussia, and one of the richest in Europe. Napoleon congratulated Vandamme upon it, and after Vandamme his brother Jerome, who had shown the intelligence of a good officer and the courage of a brave soldier.

A few days afterwards, the ninth corps made a further conquest, that of Brieg, situated above Breslau, on the Oder. The whole centre of Silesia being reduced, there yet remained to be taken Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neisse, which shut the door of Silesia on the side next to Bohemia. Napoleon ordered them to be besieged one after another, and determined, in as far as he was concerned, upon a rigorous act, but yet conformable to the law of war, namely, to destroy them. In consequence, he ordered the works of those which were already in his power to be blown up. He had a twofold reason for acting thus, one of the moment, the other prospective. At the moment, he wished to avoid scattering his troops by multiplying around him the posts to be guarded: for the future, not reckoning upon Prussia as an ally, perceiving every day that he must not flatter himself to make a friend of Austria, he had henceforth nothing to hope but from the misunderstanding which had always divided those two courts. Silesia, dismantled on the side towards Austria, would become for Prussia an object of uneasiness, an occasion for expenses, and a cause of weakness.

Thus on the rear of the army, on the left as on the right, the visible progress of our operations attested that the enemy could not derange them, since he suffered them to be accomplished. A few partisans, indeed, sallying from the fortresses of Colberg and Dantzig, recruited by Prussian prisoners who had escaped, infested the roads. Several detachments were employed in pursuing them. A slight accident, of little consequence, did, however, excite a momentary alarm for the tranquillity of Germany. Hesse, whose sovereign Napoleon had recently dethroned, whose fortresses he had demolished, whose army he had dissolved, was naturally the worst disposed province of Germany towards the French. Thirty thousand disbanded men, without employ, deprived of pay and of the means of subsistence, were, though disarmed, a dangerous leaven, which prudence cautioned against leaving in the country. Part of them had been induced to enrol themselves, without being informed where they would be

expected to serve. The intention was to employ them in Naples. The secret having transpired, through some indiscretions committed at Mayence, the enrolled men broke into insurrection, saying that the Hessians were about to be sent to perish in the Calabrias. General Lagrange, who commanded in Hesse, had but very few troops at his disposal. The insurgents disarmed a French detachment, and threatened to raise all Hesse. But the forecast of Napoleon had furnished beforehand the means of parrying this unlucky circumstance. Provisional regiments which had set out from the Rhine, and an Italian regiment on march for Marshal Mortier's corps, the fusiliers of the guard drawn from Paris, and one of the regiments of chasseurs coming from Italy, were not far off. They were despatched in the utmost haste to Cassel, and the insurrection was quelled immediately.

Then the immense country extending from the Rhine to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the sea, was brought under subjection. The fortresses surrendered one after another to our troops, and our reinforcements passed quietly through them, performing the police duty there, while marching toward the theatre of war to recruit the grand army.

Meanwhile, the Russian general, Benningsen, had so boldly proclaimed himself victorious, that the King of Prussia at Königsberg, the Emperor Alexander at Petersburg, had received and accepted congratulations. And though the material results, such as the retreat of the Russians upon the Pregel, our tranquil establishment on the Vistula, the sieges undertaken and finished on the Oder, must have answered all these bombasts of an enemy, who fancied himself victorious when he had not sustained a disaster so complete as that of Austerlitz or Jena; people affected, nevertheless, to show a certain joy. That joy was manifested more particularly at Vienna, and in the bosom of the imperial court. Emperor, archdukes, ministers, high personages, alike congratulated one another. Nothing was more natural and more legitimate. There was no fault to be found but with the language held by the cabinet of Vienna in its most recent communications with Napoleon—language which perhaps passed the bounds of the dissimulation allowable in such cases. At any rate, the error which caused the joy of our enemies was not of long duration. M. de Lucchesini, who had left the court of Prussia at the same time as M. d'Haugwitz, was just then passing through Vienna on his way to Lucca, his native city. He was no longer under illusion himself, he had no interest in palming illusion upon others, and in consequence he told the truth relative to the sanguinary encounters of which the Vistula had just been the theatre. The quagmires of Poland, he said, had paralysed vanquished and victors, and enabled the Russians to withdraw

themselves from the pursuit of the French. But the Russians, beaten most soundly everywhere, had no chance to make head against the formidable soldiers of Napoleon. They need but wait till spring, perhaps only till the first frost, to see the latter make an irruption upon the Pregel or the Niemen and put an end to the war by some signal stroke. The French army, added M. de Lucchesini, was neither demoralised nor destitute of resources, as it was alleged: it lived well, accommodated itself to the damp cold climate of Poland, as it had formerly accommodated itself to the dry scorching climate of Egypt: it had, in short, implicit faith in the genius and good fortune of its leader.

This intelligence, from a calm and disinterested observer, dispelled the false joy of the Austrians. The court of Vienna, as well to make Napoleon easy by a friendly proceeding, as to have at the French headquarters an accurate informant, solicited an authorisation to send the Baron de Vincent to Warsaw. The ministers of the foreign courts who had wished to follow M. de Talleyrand to Berlin, some of them even to Warsaw, had been politely shuffled off, as inconvenient and frequently very slanderous witnesses. The mission of M. de Vincent, however, was assented to out of indulgence for Austria, and also to furnish her with a direct medium for being informed of the truth, which it was much more the interest of Napoleon to make him acquainted with than to conceal from him. Accordingly, M. de Vincent arrived towards the end of January at Warsaw.

While Napoleon was employing the month of January 1807 either in consolidating his position on the Vistula, or in augmenting his army by reinforcements from France and Italy, or, lastly, in exciting the east against Russia, holding himself in readiness to meet any immediate attack, though believing that there would be none, the Russians, notwithstanding the severity of the season, were preparing one for him, and a most formidable one. After the affair at Pultusk, General Benningsen being beaten, whatever he might choose to say—for what general retires in the greatest haste when he is victorious?—had passed the Narew, and found himself in the region of heaths, marshes, and woods, extending between the Narew and the Bug. He had there picked up two divisions of General Buxhövden's, most uselessly left by the latter at Popowo, on the Bug, during the late engagements. He ascended the Narew with these two divisions and those of his army which had fought at Pultusk. At this same moment the two demi-divisions of General Benningsen's, which had been unable to join him, rallied to the two divisions of General Buxhövden's which were at Golymin and Makow, and remained on the other bank of the Narew, the bridges of which

had just been carried away by the ice. The two portions of the Russian army, deprived of the possibility of communicating with each other, ascended the banks of the Narew, the separation of which might have been easily overcome, if one could have been informed of their situation, and if, moreover, the state of the roads had allowed us to get at them. But who can know everything in war? The ablest of generals is he who, by dint of application and sagacity, contrives to be a little less ignorant of the enemy's plans than the generality. Under any other circumstances, Napoleon, with his prodigious activity, with his art in following up victory, would soon have discovered the perilous situation of the Russian army, and infallibly destroyed that portion of it which he should have chosen to pursue. But buried in mud, deprived of artillery and bread, he had found it utterly impossible to stir; besides, having led his soldiers from the extremity of Europe, he had considered it as a sort of cruelty to put their attachment to a longer trial.

General Benningsen and General Buxhövden made some attempts to join, but the bridges, several times repaired, were as often broken down again, and they found themselves obliged slowly to ascend the Narew, living as they could, and endeavouring to reach places where a junction would be practicable. They contrived, however, to meet personally, and they had an interview at Nowogrod. Though by no means disposed to come to a better understanding, they agreed to a plan, tending to nothing less than the prosecution of hostilities, in spite of the state of the country and of the season. General Benningsen, who, by dint of asserting that he was victorious at Pultusk, at length believed that he was so, absolutely insisted on resuming the offensive, and decided the immediate continuation of the military operations, by pursuing a totally different course from that which had at first been adopted. Instead of keeping along the Narew and its tributaries, and thus backing upon the woody country, which fixed the point of attack on Warsaw, it was resolved to make an extensive circuit, to turn by a movement in rear the vast mass of forest, then to traverse the line of the lakes, and to bear away towards the maritime region of Braunsberg, Elbing, Marienburg, and Dantzig. In operating on this side they were sure of provisions, owing to the richness of the soil along the coast. They flattered themselves, moreover, that they should surprise the extreme left of the French cantonments, perhaps carry off Marshal Bernadotte, established on the Lower Vistula, easily pass that river, on which they had retained several appuis, and by pushing beyond Dantzig, annul at a single stroke the position of Napoleon in advance of Warsaw.

In fact, if you cast your eye on the line described by the Vistula and the Oder to discharge themselves into the Baltic,

you will remark that they run at first to the north-west, the Vistula as far as the environs of Thorn, the Oder to the environs of Cüstrin, that they then turn abruptly to proceed to the north-east, thus forming a considerable elbow, the Vistula towards Thorn, the Oder towards Cüstrin. It results from this direction, particularly as far as the Vistula is concerned, that the Russian corps passing that river between Graudenz and Thorn would be much nearer to Posen, the base of our operations in Poland, than the French army encamped at Warsaw. The difference was nearly half. It was, therefore, in itself a well-conceived plan to cross the Vistula between Thorn and Marienburg, saving the able execution, on which the result of the best plans always depends. We have, in fact, already demonstrated more than once that, without precision in the calculation of distance and time, without promptness in marches, vigour in encounters, perseverance in following up an idea to its complete accomplishment, every bold manœuvre becomes as mischievous as it might have been fortunate. And here, in particular, if one failed, one would be sure to be turned by Napoleon, cut off from Königsberg, driven back to the sea, and exposed to a real disaster; for, to repeat another truth, already expressed elsewhere, in every great combination you run as much risk as you cause your adversary to incur.

Scarcely had the two Russian generals agreed upon the plan to be adopted, when a resolution taken at St. Petersburg, in consequence of the false statements of General Benningsen, conferred on him the order of St. George, appointed him general-in-chief, and relieved him from the military supremacy of old Kamenski and from the rivalry of General Buxhövden. These two latter were by the same resolution recalled from the army.

General Benningsen, left alone at the head of the Russian troops, naturally persisted in a plan which was his own, and hastened to carry it into execution. He ascended the Narew to Tykoczyn, passed the Bober near Goniondz, at the very spot where Charles XII. had crossed it a century before, and proceeded to traverse the line of the lakes near Lake Spirding, by Arys, Rhein, Rastenburg, and Brischoffstein. The names of the places show that he had reached the German country, that is to say, East Prussia. On the 22nd of January, a month after the last actions of Pultusk, Golymin, and Soldau, he arrived at Heilsberg on the Alle. It is not thus that he must march who hopes to surprise a vigilant enemy. However, concealed by that impenetrable curtain of forests and lakes which separated the two armies, the movement of the Russians was entirely unperceived by the French.

At this period General Essen had at last brought the two divisions of reserve so long announced, which increased the number

of the divisions of the Russian army to ten, exclusively of the Prussian corps of General Lestocq. These two new divisions, composed of recruits, were destined to guard not only the Bug and the Narew, but also the position previously occupied by the two divisions of General Buxhövden which had no share in the operations of the month of December. Sedmaratzki's division was posted at Goniondz, on the Bober, to watch the line of the lakes, to keep up the communications with the corps of General Essen, and to give umbrage to the French on their right. Of the ten divisions, then, General Benningsen retained but seven, to proceed with him to the coast and to the Lower Vistula. After the losses sustained in December, they might form a force of 80,000 men, and of 90,000,* at least, with the Prussian corps of Lestocq.

We have already explained that the waters of the lakes run off, some inland by the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, into the Narew and the Vistula; others through small rivers directly to the sea, and that the principal of these is the Passarge, which falls perpendicularly into the Frische Haff. The French corps, scattered on the right about the Narew and its tributaries, on the left about the Passarge, covered the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to Elbing. Marshals Lannes and Davout had their cantonments, as we have said, along the Narew, from its fall into the Vistula to Pultusk and above it, forming the right of the French army and covering Warsaw. The corps of Marshal Soult was established between the Omulew and the Orezyc, from Ostrolenka to Willenberg and Chorzellen, giving the hand on one side to the troops of Marshal Davout, on the other to those of Marshal Ney, and thus forming the centre of the French army. Marshal Ney, placed more forward at Hohenstein on the Upper Passarge, connected himself with the position of Marshal Soult at the sources of the Omulew, and with that of Marshal Bernadotte behind the Passarge. The latter, protected by the Passarge, occupying Osterode, Mohrungen, Preuss-Holland, Elbing, formed the left of the French army toward the Frische Haff, and covered the Lower Vistula as well as Dantzig.

Marshal Ney, who had the most advanced position, added still more to the distances which separated him from the bulk of the army by the boldness of his excursions. As soon as the frost began to give some consistence to the ground, he put his light troops into sledges, and scampered to the very environs of Königsberg in quest of provisions for his soldiers. In this manner he had made some lucky captures, which had singularly

* Such is the assertion of Plotho, the narrator himself, who, to enhance the merit of the Russian army, lowers that of his own government, by always making a point of reducing the sum total of the forces employed. It was strange indeed not to be able, on their own frontier, to present to an enemy who came from such a distance more than 90,000 men capable of fighting.

contributed to the comfort of his *corps d'armée*. The Alle, whose banks he scoured, has its sources near those of the Passarge, in a group of lakes between Hohenstein and Allenstein, then separates from it at a right angle, and while the Passarge runs to the left towards the sea (or Frische Haff), it proceeds straight towards the Pregel, so that the Alle and the Passarge, the Pregel and the sea, form, as it were, the four sides of an oblong square. Marshal Ney, placed at Hohenstein, at the apex of the angle described by the Passarge and the Alle before they separate, having on his right in rear the cantonments of Marshal Soult, on his left in rear those of Marshal Bernadotte, by turns ascending and descending the Alle in its course to the Pregel, could not fail to fall in with the Russian army in movement.

Napoleon, fearful that he would involve himself in danger, had reprimanded him several times. But the bold marshal, persisting in running further than he was authorised, fell in with the Russian army which had passed the Alle, and was about to cross the Passarge in the environs of Deppen. It advanced in two columns. That which was to cross the Passarge at Deppen was charged to make a digression towards Liebstadt, in order to approach the Lower Vistula and to surprise the cantonments of Marshal Bernadotte.

Marshal Ney, whose indocile temerity had at least had the advantage of giving us timely notice (an advantage which ought not to encourage to disobedience, for it rarely has such beneficial effects), Marshal Ney hastened to fall back himself, to apprise Marshal Bernadotte on his left, Marshal Soult on his right, of the danger which threatened them, and to send intelligence of the sudden appearance of the enemy to the headquarters at Warsaw. He took a well-chosen post at Hohenstein, whence he could proceed either to the assistance of Marshal Soult's cantonments on the Omulew, or to the assistance of Marshal Bernadotte's cantonments behind the Passarge. He pointed out to the latter the position of Osterode, a capital position on plateaux, where the first and the sixth corps united would be able to present thirty and odd thousand men to the Russians in an almost impregnable situation.

But the troops of Marshal Bernadotte, scattered as far as Elbing, near the Frische Haff, had great distances to go in order to rally; and if General Benningsen had marched rapidly, he might have surprised and destroyed them before their concentration was effected. Marshal Bernadotte sent orders to the troops of his right to proceed direct to Osterode, and to the troops of his left to assemble at the common point of Mohrungen, which is situated on the route to Osterode, a little in rear of Liebstadt, that is to say, very near to the Russian advanced guards. The danger was pressing, for, on the preceding day, the enemy's

advanced guard had very roughly handled a French detachment left at Liebstadt. General Markoff, with about fifteen or sixteen thousand men, formed the head of the Russian right column. He was, on the morning of the 25th of January, at Pfarrers-Feldchen, having three battalions in that village, and in rear a strong mass of infantry and cavalry. About noon, Marshal Bernadotte arrived at that place, at but a short distance from Mohrungen, with troops which, having set out in the night, had already marched ten or twelve leagues. He decided upon his dispositions immediately, and threw a battalion of the 9th light into the village of Pfarrers-Feldchen, to take that first point d'appui from the enemy. That brave battalion entered at the point of the bayonet, under a brisk fire of musketry from the Russians, and maintained an obstinate combat in the interior of the village. Its eagle was taken in the fray, but soon recovered. Other Russian battalions having come and joined those which were engaged with it, Marshal Bernadotte sent to its assistance two French battalions, which, after an extremely violent conflict, remained masters of Pfarrers-Feldchen. Beyond, upon a rising ground, was seen the bulk of the enemy's column, appuyed on one side upon woods, on the other upon lakes, and protected in front by a numerous artillery. Marshal Bernadotte, having formed the 8th, the 94th of the line, and the 27th light in line of battle, marched direct towards the Russian position, under a most murderous fire. He attacked it boldly: the Russians defended it with obstinacy. As good luck would have it, General Dupont, arriving from the shore of the Frische Haff by way of Preuss-Holland, made his appearance beyond the village of Georgenthal, on the right of the Russians. The latter, unable to withstand this double attack, abandoned the field of battle covered with slain. This action cost them fifteen or sixteen hundred killed or taken. It cost the French about six or seven hundred killed and wounded. The dispersion of the troops, and the great number of sick, had prevented Marshal Bernadotte from collecting at Mohrungen more than eight or nine thousand men, to fight fifteen or sixteen thousand.

The results of this first encounter were to render the Russians extremely circumspect, and to give the troops of Marshal Bernadotte time to assemble at Osterode, a position in which, when united with those of Marshal Ney, they would have nothing to fear. Accordingly Marshal Bernadotte, having proceeded to Osterode on the 26th and 27th of January, kept close to Marshal Ney, firmly awaiting the ulterior enterprises of the enemy. General Benningsen, whether surprised by the opposition made to his march, or desirous to concentrate his army, assembled the whole of it at Liebstadt, and there halted.

It was on the 26th and 27th of January that Napoleon,

successively informed by intelligence from different quarters of the movement of the Russians, was completely fixed respecting their intentions. He had conceived at first that it was the excursions of Marshal Ney which had brought reprisals upon him, and in the first moment he had felt and expressed very great displeasure. But he was soon enlightened concerning the real cause of the appearance of the Russians, and he could not but discover that they meditated a serious enterprise, having a totally different aim from that of contending for the cantonments.

Though this new winter campaign interrupted the rest which the troops had need of, his regret soon gave place to satisfaction, especially when he considered the new state of the temperature. A sharp frost had set in. The great rivers were not yet frozen, but the stagnant waters were completely; and Poland appeared one vast plain of ice, in which neither guns, nor horses, nor men ran any risk of being engulfed in mud. Napoleon, recovering the freedom of manœuvring, conceived a hope of putting an end to the war by some signal stroke.

His plan was instantly determined, and conformably to the new direction taken by the enemy. When the Russians, threatening Warsaw, followed the banks of the Narew, he had designed to debouch by Thorn with his left reinforced, in order to separate them from the Prussians, and to fling them into the chaos of woods and marshes which the interior of the country exhibits. This time, on the contrary, perceiving them to be decided to skirt the coast for the purpose of passing the Lower Vistula, it was proper for him to adopt the contrary course, that is to say, to ascend the Narew himself, which they were leaving, and proceeding high enough to turn them, then drop down suddenly upon them, in order to drive them to the sea. This manœuvre, in case of success, would be decisive; for if, by the first plan, the Russians, thrust back towards the interior of Poland, were liable to be placed in a difficult and dangerous situation, by the second, backed upon the sea, they would find themselves, like the Prussians at Prenzlau and Lübeck, obliged to capitulate.

In consequence, Napoleon resolved to assemble his whole army to the corps of Marshal Soult, taking that corps for the centre of his movements. While Marshal Soult, collecting his divisions to that of his left, was to march by Willenberg to Passenheim and Allenstein, Marshal Davout, forming the extreme right of the army, was to proceed to the same place by Pultusk, Myszniec, and Ortelsburg; Marshal Augereau, forming the rearguard, was to come thither from Plonsk by Neidenburg and Hohenstein; Marshal Ney, forming the left, was to come from Osterode. It is at this village of Allenstein, chosen by Napoleon for the

general rallying point, that the Passarge and the Alle, after approaching each other for a moment, begin to separate. Having once reached this point, if the Russians persisted in crossing the Passarge, we should be already on their flank, and have almost turned them. It was therefore of importance that to this village of Allenstein the four corps of Marshals Davout, Soult, Augereau, and Ney should be timely brought.

Murat had scarcely recovered from his indisposition, but his ardour made amends for deficient strength: he mounted his horse the same day, and having received the verbal instructions of the emperor, he immediately assembled the light cavalry and the dragoons, to head with them the corps of Marshal Soult. The heavy cavalry, cantoned on the Vistula towards Thorn, was to join him as speedily as possible.

Napoleon, apprised of the presence of General Essen between the Bug and the Narew, consented to dispense with the corps of Marshal Lannes, which was the fifth; and he ordered it to place itself at Sierock, to keep in check the two Russian divisions posted on that side, and to fall upon them at the first movement they should attempt towards Warsaw. Marshal Lannes being absolutely incapable of taking the command of the fifth corps, owing to the state of his health, Napoleon gave it to his aide-de-camp, Savary, on whose intelligence and resolution he placed entire reliance.

He directed his guard, foot and horse, to the rear of Marshal Soult, and as for the reserve of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which had taken its quarters behind the Vistula, between Warsaw and Posen, he deprived himself of it on this occasion, to make it occupy the environs of Ostrolenka, and to form with it an intermediate échelon between the grand army and the fifth corps left upon the Narew. This reserve was charged to succour the fifth corps, if General Essen's divisions should threaten Warsaw; in the contrary case, it was to rejoin the headquarters. These dispositions towards his right being settled, Napoleon took towards his left precautions still more profoundly calculated, and which showed how vast an extent he hoped to give to his movement. He directed Marshal Bernadotte, who was at Osterode, to fall back slowly upon the Vistula, in case of emergency even as far as Thorn, to draw the enemy thither, then to slip away, covering himself with an advanced guard as with a curtain, and to come, by a forced march, to connect himself with the left of the grand army, in order to render the manœuvre by which he meant to thrust back the Russians to the sea and to the Lower Vistula the more decisive.

Napoleon, however, did not stop there. Fearing lest the Russians, if he succeeded in turning them, might imitate the example of General Blucher, who, when separated from Stettin, ran off to

Lübeck, and lest they might post away from the Vistula to the Oder, he provided against this danger by a skilful employment of the tenth corps. That corps, destined to carry on under Marshal Lefebvre the siege of Dantzig, was not yet completely assembled. Marshal Lefebvre had only the 15th of the line, the 2nd light, General d'Espagne's cuirassiers, and the eight Polish battalions of Posen. Napoleon ordered him to remain with these troops along the Vistula and above Graudenz. The fusiliers of the guard, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, the legion of the north, two of the five regiments of chasseurs of Italy, who had already proceeded to Germany, lastly, the Baden troops, were to assemble at Stettin, under General Menard, and, ascending toward Posen, endeavour to join Marshal Lefebvre, who would come to them or let them come to him, according to circumstances, so as to fall all together upon any Russian corps that should attempt to go from the Vistula to the Oder. Lastly, Marshal Mortier had orders to relinquish the blockade of Stralsund, to place the troops indispensable for that blockade in good lines of circumvallation, then to join himself with the others to the assemblage under General Menard, to take the direction of it, if that assemblage, instead of ascending to the Vistula to reinforce Marshal Lefebvre, should, by the circumstances of the pursuit, be brought back towards the Oder.

Napoleon left Duroc at Warsaw, that he might have a trusty person there. Prince Poniatowski had organised some Polish battalions. Those which were most advanced in their organisation were, with the provisional regiments arriving from France, to guard, under the command of General Lemarrois, the works of Praga. Napoleon caused all the vehicles which he had at his disposal to be despatched from Warsaw laden with biscuit and bread, hoping that, the frost facilitating conveyance, his soldiers might not fall short of anything. In consequence of these orders, issued on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of January, the army was to be assembled at Allenstein on the 3rd or 4th of February. It should be remarked that the reinforcements brought with such foresight from France and Italy were still on march; that the 2nd light, the 15th of the line, the four regiments of cuirassiers borrowed from the army of Naples, had alone arrived on the Vistula; that the other corps had not yet reached the line of the Elbe; that Napoleon had scarcely received the first detachments of recruits drawn from the depôts the day after the battle of Jena, which had procured him a dozen thousand men at most, a very inadequate supply to fill the gaps produced either by battle or by the diseases of the season; that most of the corps were reduced a third or a fourth; that those of Lannes, Davout, Soult, Augereau, Ney, Bernadotte, with the addition of the guard, Oudinot's grenadiers, and Murat's cavalry, no longer

formed one hundred and odd thousand men;* and that, leaving Lannes and Oudinot on his right, having but a very uncertain chance of bringing Bernadotte towards his left, he would have 75,000 men at most left to give battle to General Benningsen, who had 90,000 including the Prussians.

Notwithstanding this numerical inferiority, Napoleon, reckoning upon his soldiers and the roads, which seemed to admit of rapid concentrations, took the field with a heart full of hope. He wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès and to M. de Talleyrand, that he had broken up his cantonments, *to take advantage of a fine frost and fair weather;* that the roads were superb; that they must not say a word to the empress, in order *not to give her useless uneasiness,* but that he was in full movement, and that *it would cost the Russians dear, if they did not think better of it.*

Leaving Warsaw on the 30th, he was in the evening of that day at Prasznitz, and on the 31st at Willenberg. Murat, having outstripped him, had collected in all haste the regiments of cavalry, except the cuirassiers scattered along the Vistula, and formed the advanced guard of Marshal Soult, already concentrated upon Willenberg. Marshal Davout had made forced marches to reach Myszniec, Marshal Augereau to reach Neidenburg. Meanwhile, Marshal Ney had collected his divisions at Hohenstein, ready to press forward, as soon as the bulk of the army had passed his right. Marshal Bernadotte, falling back slowly, had come to place himself in rear of the left of Ney, at Löbau, then at Strasburg, and lastly, in the environs of Thorn. Thus far, everything turned out according to wish. The enemy had, with his right column, followed step by step the movement of Marshal Bernadotte, and with the left had scarcely advanced

* Here is the real force of the corps, deduced from a comparison of numerous authentic documents.

Marshal Lannes	12,000 men.
Marshal Davout	18,000 ,,
Marshal Soult	20,000 ,,
Marshal Augereau	10,000 ,,
Marshal Ney	10,000 ,,
Marshal Bernadotte	12,000 ,,
General Oudinot	6,000 ,,
The guard	6,000 ,,
Murat's cavalry	10,000 ,,
Total	104,000 ,,

Deduct from this total of 104,000 men,

12,000 Lannes
6,000 Oudinot } left in the environs of Warsaw.

12,000 Bernadotte, to be left between Thorn and Graudenz.

30,000

There will remain 74,000 men, active troops, capable of being united under the hand of Napoleon.

towards Allenstein. An incomprehensible inaction kept him for some days in that position. General Benningsen, full of boldness when he had to plan a great manœuvre on the Lower Vistula, now hesitated, when it was time to engage in that daring manœuvre, which was far above his faculties and those of his army. In order to venture upon such enterprises, one needs the confidence derived from the habit of victory, and likewise the experience of the sudden turns of fortune through which one is doomed to pass before one arrives at success. General Benningsen, who had neither that confidence nor that experience, floated amidst a thousand uncertainties, giving others and himself the false pretexts with which irresolution covers itself, sometimes alleging that he was waiting for provisions and ammunition—sometimes affecting to believe, or really believing, that the retrograde movement of Bernadotte's corps was common to the whole French army, and that he had obtained the desired result, since Napoleon was preparing to leave the Vistula. For the rest, his hesitation, though ridiculous enough after the pompous announcement of a vast offensive operation, ensured his safety; for, the further he had ventured upon the Lower Vistula, the deeper would have been the abyss into which he would have fallen. This very hesitation, it is true, if continued for two or three days longer, was just as likely to ruin him as a more decisive movement, for during that interval Napoleon was continuing to ascend upon the left flank of the Russian army.

On the 1st of February, Murat and Marshal Soult were at Passenheim, Marshal Davout was advancing upon Ortelsburg, Augereau and Ney were drawing nearer by Hohenstein to the bulk of the army, Napoleon was with the guard at Willenberg. In twenty-four or forty-eight hours more, the French would be, to the number of 75,000 men, on the left flank of the Russians. Napoleon, always careful to guide his lieutenants step by step, had sent a fresh despatch to Marshal Bernadotte, to explain to him for the last time the part which he was to act in this grand manœuvre, to point out to him the manner of stealing away quickly from the enemy, and of rejoining the army, which must render the effect of the present combination more certain and more decisive. This despatch had been consigned to a young officer recently attached to the staff, who had orders to carry it with the utmost expedition to the Lower Vistula.

The troops continued marching on the 2nd and 3rd of February. In the evening of the 3rd, having got past Allenstein, they debouched before an elevated position, which extends from the Alle to the Passarge, well flanked on the right and left by those two rivers and by woods. This was the position of Jonkowo. Napoleon, who had pushed forward on the 3rd to Gettkendorf, not far from Jonkowo, hastened to the advanced

guard in order to reconnoitre the enemy. He found him in greater force than he should have supposed, and drawn up on the ground as if he intended to give battle there. Napoleon immediately made his dispositions for a general engagement on the following day, if the enemy should persist in waiting for him at Jonkowo.

He urged the arrival of Marshals Augereau and Ney, who were ready to join him. He had already at hand, at Gettkendorf, Marshal Soult, the guard, Murat, and at some distance on the right Marshal Davout, who quickened his pace in order to reach the banks of the Alle. Anxious to ensure the success of the morrow, Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to file to the right, along the course of the Alle, to follow the windings of that river, to penetrate into a re-entering angle which it formed behind the position of the Russians, and to pass it by main force at the bridge of Bergfried, whatever resistance he should meet with. This bridge carried, we should possess on the rear of the enemy a débouche, by which we should have it in our power to place him in the greatest danger. Two of Marshal Davout's divisions were directed to this point, in order to render the result infallible.

On the evening of that same day Marshal Soult executed the emperor's order; the village of Bergfried was carried by Leval's division, and then the bridge over the Alle, lastly, the heights beyond. The action was short, but brisk and bloody. The Russians lost 1200 men, the French 500 or 600. The importance of the post was worth such a sacrifice. In the course of the evening Murat's cavalry and Marshal Soult's corps gave each other the hand along the Alle. We were in presence of the Russians, deprived of appui towards their left, threatened even on their rear, and separated from us merely by a small brook, a tributary of the Alle. It was expected that the morrow would be an important day, and Napoleon asked himself how it could be that the Russians were already assembled in such great number, and concentrated so opportunely on that point. He was puzzled to account for this, since, according to all calculations of distance and time, they could not have been informed of the movements of the French army soon enough to take a determination so prompt, so discordant with their first plan of offensive march on the Upper Vistula. At any rate, be the motive that had brought them together what it might, they were in danger of losing a battle, and losing it in such a manner as to be cut off from the Pregel if they waited only till the morrow. On the morrow, in fact, our troops, full of ardour, advanced upon the position. They conceived for a moment the hope that they should come at the Russians, but they beheld their lines gradually move off and vanish. Presently they even

perceived that they had before them nothing but advanced guards, placed as a curtain to deceive them. Napoleon at this moment would have had reason to regret not having attacked the Russians on the preceding day, if on the preceding day his army had been assembled and early in possession of the bridge of Bergfried. But the concentration, which was complete on the morning of the 4th, was not so on the evening of the 3rd; he had therefore no delay to reproach himself with. All that he could do was to march, and to penetrate the secret of the enemy's resolutions.

This secret he soon learned, for the Russians, in their joy at having miraculously escaped certain ruin, proclaimed it themselves upon the roads. The young officer sent to Marshal Bernadotte had been taken by the Cossacks with his despatches, which he had not had the presence of mind to destroy. General Benningsen, apprised by these despatches forty-eight hours earlier than he should have been by the movement of the French army, had had time to concentrate himself in rear of Allenstein, and on seeing Napoleon's preparations at Jonkowo, he had decamped in the night between the 3rd and 4th, either deeming it imprudent to fight in a position where he ran the risk of being turned, or because it was not consistent with his views to accept a decisive battle. Thus this enterprising general, who was to take Warsaw and Poland from us by a single manœuvre, was already retreating upon Königsberg. He hurried back towards the Pregel by the road to Arensdorf and Eylau, parallel to the course of the Alle.

But Napoleon, whom Fortune, twice inconstant in so short a time, had deprived of the fruit of the most admirable combinations, was not best pleased with having left his cantonments for nothing, and with not having an opportunity to pay those who had disturbed his rest for their rash enterprise. The frost, though not very intense, was nevertheless sharp enough to make the roads firm without rendering the temperature insupportable. He determined, therefore, to put the speed of his soldiers again to the test, and to endeavour still to turn the flank of the Russians, for the purpose of giving them battle in a well-chosen position, and such a battle as should put an end to the war.

He took in the utmost haste the way to Arensdorf, marching at the centre and on the principal road, with Murat, Marshal Soult, Marshal Augereau, and the guard, having Marshal Davout's corps on his right towards the Alle, Marshal Ney's corps on his left towards the Passarge. Judging with wonderful sagacity that the Russians, though opportunely rallied through a caprice of Fortune, had been taken too much at unawares not to have left detachments in rear, he sent off Marshal Ney a

little to the left toward the Passarge, and ordered him to break down the bridge of Deppen, predicting that he should there make some good prize if he could intercept the routes leading from the Passarge to the Alle. Lastly, he enjoined Marshal Bernadotte to leave the banks of the Vistula immediately, and since there was now no enemy to trick, to rejoin the grand army as speedily as possible.

The troops advanced, following the order indicated. On this same day, the 4th of February, the Russians halted for a moment at Wolfsdorf, at an equal distance from the Alle and the Passarge, to take some rest, and to see whether the Prussian corps of General Lestocq, which was behind, would find means to rejoin them. But that corps was still so far off that they could not wait for it, and pressed by the French, they continued their march, abandoning Guttstadt, the resources which they had collected there, the wounded, the sick, and 500 men, who were made prisoners.

Though the magazines of Guttstadt were not very considerable, they were valuable to the French, who, outstripping their convoys, had no means of subsistence but what they procured for themselves by the way.

Next day, the 5th of February, they continued to march in the same order, the French having their right to the Alle, the Russians their left, each striving to surpass the other in speed. During this time, Ney, having advanced by the bridge of Deppen beyond the Passarge, in order to cut off the retreat of such of the enemy's troops as were belated, actually fell in with the Prussians on the Liebstadt road. General Lestocq, having no hope of opening a passage for himself through Ney's corps, made up his mind to a sacrifice which had become necessary. He presented to the French a strong rearguard of three or four thousand men, and leaving it to their attack, he sought to steal away by descending the course of the Passarge, with the intention of crossing it lower down. This calculation, which is frequently one of the most cruel necessities of war, saved seven or eight thousand Prussians by the sacrifice of three or four thousand. Ney rushed upon those who were opposed to him at Waltersdorf, cut part of them in pieces, and took the rest. At the conclusion of the fight he had 2500 prisoners. The ground was covered with 1000 dead and wounded, a numerous artillery, and an immense quantity of baggage. Napoleon, who attached more value to beating the Russians by the whole of his collected forces than to picking up prisoners on the roads, recommended to Marshal Ney not to persevere too much in the pursuit of General Lestocq, and not to separate himself from the grand army. In consequence of these instructions, Ney relinquished the pursuit of the

Prussians, striving, however, not to lose sight of them, in order to prevent their junction with the Russians.

On the 6th of February, the Russians, hastening their march, reached Landsberg, incessantly harassed by the French, and abandoning the little town of Heilsburg on the Alle, where they had more magazines, sick, and laggards. Their rearguard having endeavoured to maintain its ground there, Marshal Davout caused it to be briskly pushed, and as he advanced occupying both banks of the Alle, Friant's division encountered this advanced guard, which was running off on the right bank, dispersed it, and killed and took some hundred men.

The Russians purposed to stop for the night between the 6th and 7th at Landsberg. In consequence, they covered themselves by a large detachment placed at Hoff. In the midst of a diversified country, a strong mass of infantry, having a village on its right, woods on its left, protected, moreover, by a numerous cavalry, barred the way. Murat, coming up first, pushed his hussars and his chasseurs, afterwards his dragoons, on the cavalry of the Russians, upset it, but could not make an impression on their solid infantry. General d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers arriving at the moment, were set on in their turn. The first regiment charged first, but in vain, damped as it was in its ardour by a charge of the enemy's cavalry. Murat then rallying the division of cuirassiers, flung it entire upon the Russian infantry. A shout of *Vive l'Empereur !* issuing from the ranks, accompanied and excited the movement of those gallant horse-soldiers. They broke the enemy's line, and cut in pieces a great number of foot, trampled down by the horses. At that instant Legrand's division, belonging to Soult's corps, made its appearance. One of his regiments marched to the village on the left and carried it. The Russians, who attached great value to this position, which ensured their tranquillity for the night, made another attempt upon the village. Surprised in the heat of their conflict with the French infantry by a fresh charge of our cuirassiers, they were definitively overthrown, and beat a retreat after losing two thousand men, sacrificed in this rearguard action.

General Benningsen, pursued in this manner, conceived that it would not be safe for him to pass the night in the town of Landsberg, and retired upon Eylau, which he entered in the daytime on the 7th of February.

He placed a numerous rearguard on a plateau called the plateau of Ziegelhoff, and before which you arrive on issuing from the woods that cover the road from Landsberg to Eylau. Generals Bagowout and Barklay de Tolly were in position on this plateau, ready to renew the action of the preceding day. General Benningsen, fully sensible that he was too closely pressed not to be obliged to fight, made it a particular point to occupy this

plateau, on which the French army, debouching from the woody country, might be received with advantage. He was likewise solicitous to protect the arrival of his heavy artillery, which he had ordered to make a circuit. From all these motives his resistance at this point could not fail to be obstinate.

Murat's cavalry, seconded by Marshal Soult's infantry, debouched from the woods with its usual boldness, and advanced towards the plateau of Ziegelhoff. Levasseur's brigade, composed of the 46th and 28th regiments of the line, followed it resolutely, while Viviès' brigade, filing off to the right, tried to turn the position by crossing the frozen lakes. Levasseur's brigade, urged by the fire of a numerous artillery to hasten the attack, quickened its pace. A first line of the enemy's infantry was first repulsed with the bayonet. But the Russian cavalry, charging opportunely on the left of the brigade, overturned the 28th before it had time to form in square. It cut down many of our foot, and took an eagle.

The combat being soon renewed, was kept up on both sides with great obstinacy. Meanwhile Viviès' brigade having turned the position of the Russians, the latter left it and retired to the town of Eylau itself. Marshal Soult forced his way into it at the same time with them. Napoleon was unwilling that the town of Eylau should be left in their possession, in the uncertain but probable case of a great battle. The French, therefore, entered Eylau at the point of the bayonet. The Russians there defended themselves obstinately from street to street. The town was turned, and one of their columns was found established in a churchyard, which has since become famous for the terrible recollections attached to it, and which was situated outside the town on the right. Viviès' brigade carried this cemetery after the severest struggle. The Russians fell back beyond Eylau. Of all rearguard actions, this had been the most sanguinary, and it had caused Marshal Soult's corps considerable loss. The French threw themselves in some disorder into the town of Eylau, the soldiers dispersing in quest of provisions, and surprising in the houses a great number of Russians, who had not had time to escape.

The first opinion conceived by Murat, and which he transmitted to Napoleon, was that the Russians, having lost the point d'appui of Eylau, would go and seek a more distant one. Meanwhile some officers, who had lost themselves in the fray, perceived the Russians established a little beyond Eylau, and lighting their bivouac fires in order to pass the night there. This observation, confirmed by fresh reports, left no doubt respecting the importance of the fight reserved for the following day, the 8th of February, and such indeed is that which it has acquired, that the memory of it must endure for ages.

It became evident that the Russians, halting this time after the action in the evening, and not employing the night in marching, were resolved on fighting a general battle on the morrow. The French army was harassed with fatigue, greatly reduced in number by rapid marches, pinched by hunger, and suffering from cold. But it was necessary for them to give battle, and it was not on such an occasion that soldiers, officers, generals, were accustomed to feel their hardships.

Napoleon, losing no time, despatched the same evening several officers to Marshals Davout and Ney to bring them back, the one to his right, the other to his left. Marshal Davout had continued to follow the Alle to Bartenstein, and he was not more than three or four leagues off. He replied that he should arrive at daybreak upon the right of Eylau (the right of the French army), ready to fall upon the flank of the Russians. Marshal Ney, who had been directed upon the left, so as to keep the Prussians at a distance, and to be able to rush upon Königsberg in case the Russians should throw themselves behind the Pregel—Marshal Ney was marching for Kreutzburg. Messengers were despatched after him, though it was not so sure that he could be brought back in time to the field of battle, as it was that Marshal Davout would make his appearance there.

Deprived of Ney's corps, the French army amounted at most to fifty and some thousand men, though the Russians raise the number to 80,000 in their relations, and a French historian, in general worthy of credit, to 68,000.* The corps of Marshal Davout, whose effective presented 26,000 men at Auerstädt, considerably diminished by the battles fought since, by disease, by the last march from the Vistula to Eylau, by the detachments left on the Narew, was about 15,000 strong. The corps of Marshal Soult, the most numerous of the whole army, likewise greatly reduced by dysentery, marching, rearguard actions, could not be computed at more than 16,000 or 17,000 men. That of Marshal Augereau, weakened by a great number of stragglers and marauders, who had dispersed in search of provisions, numbered only 6000 or 7000 at the bivouac of Eylau, in the evening of the 7th of February. The guard, better treated, more restrained by discipline, had not left any laggards behind. Still it amounted to no more than 6000 men. Lastly, Murat's cavalry, composed of one division of cuirassiers and three divisions of dragoons, presented scarcely 10,000 men in the ranks. It formed, therefore, a total force of 53,000 or 54,000 men, capable of anything, it is true, but worn down with fatigue and exhausted by hunger. If Marshal Ney were to arrive in

* We should not venture, in the teeth of the false assertions of historians, foreign and French, to advance such a truth, if it were not based on the most authentic documents.

time, it would be possible to oppose 63,000 men to the enemy, all present under fire. No expectation could be entertained of the arrival of Bernadotte's corps, which was thirty leagues off.

Napoleon, who slept that night but three or four hours in a chair, in the house of the postmaster, placed the corps of Marshal Soult at Eylau itself, partly within the town, partly on the right and left of it, Augereau's corps and the imperial guard a little in rear, and all the cavalry upon the wings, till daylight should enable him to make his dispositions.

General Benningsen had at last determined to give battle. He was on level ground, or nearly so, excellent ground for his infantry, not much versed in manœuvres, but solid, and for his cavalry, which was numerous. His heavy artillery, which he had directed to make a circuit, that it might not cramp his movements, had just rejoined him. It was a valuable reinforcement. Besides, he was so closely pursued, that he was obliged to interrupt his march in order to make head against the French. A retreating army must have some start that it may be able to sleep and eat. It ought also not to have the enemy too close to it; for to suffer an attack by the way, with the back turned, is the most dangerous manner of receiving battle. There is then a moment when the wisest thing that can be done is to choose one's ground, and there halt to fight. Such was the resolution adopted by General Benningsen on the evening of the 7th. He halted beyond Eylau, determined to fight desperately. His army, amounting to 78,000 or 80,000 men, and to 90,000 with the Prussians, had sustained considerable losses in the late battles, but scarcely any in marches, for an army in retreat, without being in disorder, is rallied by the enemy that pursues it, whereas the pursuing army, not having the same motives for keeping close together, always leaves part of its effective behind. Deducting the losses sustained at Mohrungen, Bergfried, Waltersdorf, Hoff, Heilsberg, and at Eylau itself,* one may say that General Benningsen's army was reduced to about 80,000 men, 72,000 of whom were Russians and 8000 Prussians. Thus, in case General Lestocq and Marshal Ney should not arrive, 54,000 French would have to fight 72,000 Russians. The Russians had, moreover, a formidable artillery, computed at four or five hundred pieces. Ours amounted to two hundred at most, including the guard. It is true that it

* The Russians had lost 1500 men at Mohrungen.
1000 „ Bergfried.
3000 „ Waltersdorf.
2000 „ Hoff.
1000 „ Heilsberg.
500 „ Eylau.

Total . . 9000 men.

was superior to all the artilleries of Europe, even to that of the Austrians. General Benningsen, therefore, determined to attack at daybreak. The character of his soldiers was energetic like that of the French soldiers, but governed by other motives. The Russians had neither that confidence of success nor that love of glory which the French exhibited, but a certain fanaticism of obedience, which induced them to brave death blindly. As for the quantum of intelligence possessed by the one and by the other, it is superfluous to make any remark on the difference.

Since debouching upon Eylau, the country appeared level and open. The little town of Eylau, situated on a slight eminence, and topped by a Gothic spire, was the only conspicuous point. The ground, gently sloping on the right of the church, presented a cemetery. In front it rose perceptibly, and on this rise, marked by some hillocks, appeared the Russians in a deep mass. Several lakes, full of water in spring, frozen in winter, at this time covered with snow, were not distinguishable in any way from the rest of the plain. Scarcely did a few barns united into hamlets, and lines of barriers for folding cattle, form a point d'appui, or an obstacle, on this dreary field of battle. A grey sky, dissolving at times into a thick snow, added its dreariness to that of the country, a dreariness which seized eye and heart as soon as daylight, which comes very late in this season, had rendered objects perceptible.

The Russians were drawn up in two lines, very near to each other, their front covered by three hundred pieces of cannon planted on the salient points of the ground. In rear, two close columns, appuying, like two flying buttresses, this double line of battle, seemed designed to support it and to prevent its bending under the shock of the French. A strong reserve of artillery was placed at some distance. The cavalry was partly in rear, partly on the wings. The Cossacks, in general scattered, kept on this occasion with the body of the army. It was evident that to the energy and dexterity of the French the Russians had designed to oppose on this open ground a compact mass, defended in front by a numerous artillery, strongly supported in rear, in short, a real wall, pouring forth a shower of fire. Napoleon, on horseback by daybreak, had stationed himself in the cemetery, to the right of Eylau. There, scarcely protected by a few trees, he had a perfect view of the position of the Russians, who, already in battle, had opened their fire by a cannonade which became brisker every moment. It might be foreseen that cannon would be the weapon of that terrible fight.

Owing to the position of Eylau, which stretched itself out facing the Russians, Napoleon could give the less depth to his line of battle, and consequently the less scope to the balls of the artillery. Two of Marshal Soult's divisions were placed at

Eylau, Legrand's division in advance and a little to the left, Leval's division partly on the left of the town, upon an eminence topped by a mill, partly on the right at the cemetery itself. The third division of Marshal Soult's, St. Hilaire's division, was established still further to the right, at a considerable distance from the cemetery, in the village of Rothenen, which formed the prolongation of the position of Eylau. In the interval beween the village of Rothenen and the town of Eylau, an interval left vacant for the purpose of making the rest of the army debouch there, was posted, a little in rear, Augereau's corps, drawn up in two lines, and formed of Desjardins' and Heudelet's divisions. Augereau, tormented with fever, his eyes red and swollen, but forgetting his complaints at the sound of the cannon, had mounted his horse to put himself at the head of his troops. Further in rear of that same débouche came the infantry and cavalry of the imperial guard, the divisions of cuirassiers and dragoons, both ready to present themselves to the enemy by the same outlet, and meanwhile somewhat sheltered from the cannon by a hollow of the ground. Lastly, at the extreme right of this field of battle, beyond and in advance of Rothenen, at the hamlet of Serpallen, the corps of Marshal Davout was to enter into action in such a manner as to fall upon the flank of the Russians.

Thus Napoleon was in open order, and his line having the advantage of being covered on the left by the buildings of Eylau, on the right by those of Rothenen, the combat of artillery, by which he designed to demolish the kind of wall opposed to him by the Russians, would be much less formidable for him than for them. He had caused all the cannon of the army to be removed from the corps, and placed in order of battle. To these he had added the forty pieces belonging to the guard, and he was thus about to reply to the formidable artillery of the Russians by an artillery far inferior in number, but far superior in skill.

The Russians had commenced the firing. The French had answered it immediately by a violent cannonade at half cannon-shot. The earth shook under this tremendous detonation. The French artillerymen, not only more expert, but firing at a living mass, which served them for a butt, made dreadful havoc. Our balls swept down whole files. Those of the Russians, on the contrary, directed with less precision, and striking against buildings, inflicted less mischief upon us than that sustained by the enemy. The town of Eylau and the village of Rothenen were soon set on fire. The glare of the conflagration added its horrors to the horrors of the carnage. Though there fell far fewer French than Russians, still there fell a great many, especially in the ranks of the imperial guard, motionless in the

cemetery. The projectiles, passing over the head of Napoleon, and sometimes very close to him, penetrated the walls of the church, or broke branches from the trees at the foot of which he had placed himself to direct the battle.

This cannonade lasted for a long time, and both armies bore it with heroic tranquillity, never stirring, and merely closing their ranks as fast as the cannon made gaps in them. The Russians seemed first to feel a sort of impatience.* Desirous to accelerate the result by the taking of Eylau, they moved off to carry the position of the mill, situated on the left of the town. Part of their right formed in column, and came to attack us. Leval's division, composed of Ferey's and Viviès' brigades, gallantly repulsed it, and by their firmness left the Russians no hope of success, if they renewed their efforts.

As for Napoleon, he attempted nothing decisive, for he would not endanger, by sending it forward, the corps of Marshal Soult, which had done so well to keep Eylau under such a tremendous cannonade; nor would he risk either St. Hilaire's division or Augereau's corps against the centre of the enemy; it would have been exposing them to dash themselves against a burning rock. He waited for acting till the presence of Marshal Davout's corps, which was coming on the right, should begin to be felt on the flank of the Russians.

This lieutenant, punctual as he was intrepid, had actually arrived at the village of Serpallen. Friant's division marched at the head. It debouched the first, encountered the Cossacks, whom it had soon driven back, and occupied the village of Serpallen with some companies of light infantry. No sooner was it established in the village and in the grounds on the right, than one of the masses of cavalry posted on the wings of the Russian army detached itself, and advanced towards it. General Friant, availing himself with intelligence and coolness of the advantages afforded by the accidents of the locality, drew up the three regiments of which his division was then composed behind the long and solid wooden barrier which served for folding cattle. Sheltered behind this natural entrenchment, he kept up a fire within point-blank range upon the Russian squadrons, and forced them to retire. They fell back, but soon returned, accompanied by a column of nine or ten thousand infantry, It was one of the two close columns which served for flying buttresses to the Russian line of battle, and which now bore to the left of that line to retake Serpallen. General Friant had not more than 5000 men to oppose to it. Still, sheltered behind the wooden barrier with which he had covered himself, and able to deploy without apprehen-

* An expression of Napoleon's, in an account which he gave himself of the battle.

sion of being charged by the cavalry, he saluted the Russians with a fire so continuous and so well-directed as to occasion them considerable loss. Their squadrons having shown an intention to turn him, he formed the 33rd into square on his right, and stopped them by the imperturbable bearing of his foot-soldiers. As he could not make use of his cavalry, which consisted of some horse chasseurs, he made amends for it by a swarm of tirailleurs, who kept up such a fire upon the flanks of the Russians as to oblige them to retire towards the heights in rear of Serpallen, between Serpallen and Klein-Sausgarten. On retiring to these heights, the Russians covered themselves by a numerous artillery, the downward fire of which was unfortunately very destructive. Morand's division had arrived in its turn on the field of battle. Marshal Davout, taking the first brigade, that of General Ricard, went and placed it beyond and on the left of Serpallen; he then posted the second, composed of the 51st and the 61st, on the right of the villages, so as to support either Ricard's brigade or Friant's division. The latter had proceeded to the right of Serpallen, towards Klein-Sausgarten. At this very moment Gudin's division was accelerating its speed to get into line. Thus the Russians had been obliged by the movement of our right to draw back their left from Serpallen towards Klein-Sausgarten.

The expected effect on the flank of the enemy's army was therefore produced. Napoleon, from the position which he occupied, had distinctly seen the Russian reserves directed towards the corps of Marshal Davout. The hour for acting had arrived; for unless he interfered, the Russians might fall in mass upon Marshal Davout and crush him. Napoleon immediately gave his orders. He directed St. Hilaire's division, which was at Rothenen, to push forward and to give a hand to Morand's division about Serpallen. He commanded the two divisions of Augereau's corps, Desjardins' and Heudelet's, to debouch by the interval between Rothenen and Eylau, to connect themselves with St. Hilaire's division, and to form all together an oblique line from the cemetery of Eylau to Serpallen. The result expected from this movement was to overturn the Russians, by throwing their right upon their centre, and thus break down, beginning at its extremity, the long wall which he had before him.

It was ten in the morning. General St. Hilaire moved off, left Rothenen, and deployed obliquely in the plain, under a terrible fire of artillery, his right at Serpallen, his left towards the cemetery. Augereau moved nearly at the same time, not without a melancholy foreboding of the fate reserved for his *corps d'armée*, which he saw exposed to the danger of being dashed in pieces against the centre of the Russians, solidly

appuyed upon several hillocks. While General Corbineau was delivering the orders of the emperor to him, a ball pierced the side of that gallant officer, the senior of an heroic family. Marshal Augereau marched immediately. The two divisions of Desjardins and Heudelet debouched between Rothenen and the cemetery in close columns, then having cleared the defile, formed in order of battle, the first brigade of each division deployed, the second in square. While they were advancing, a squall of wind and snow, beating all at once into the faces of the soldiers, prevented them from seeing the field of battle. The two divisions, enveloped in this kind of cloud, mistook their direction, and bore a little to the left, leaving on their right a considerable space between them and St. Hilaire's division. The Russians, but little incommoded by the snow, which they had at their backs, seeing Augereau's two divisions advancing towards the hillocks on which they appuyed their centre, suddenly unmasked a battery of seventy-two pieces, which they kept in reserve. So thick was the grape poured forth by this formidable battery, that in a quarter of an hour half of Augereau's corps was swept down. General Desjardins, commanding the first division, was killed; General Heudelet, commanding the second, received a wound that was nearly mortal. The staff of the two divisions was soon hors de combat. While they were sustaining this tremendous fire, being obliged to re-form while marching, so much were their ranks thinned, the Russian cavalry, throwing itself into the space which separated them from Morand's division, rushed upon them en masse. Those brave divisions, however, resisted, but they were obliged to fall back towards the cemetery of Eylau, giving ground without breaking, under the repeated assaults of numerous squadrons. The snow having suddenly ceased, they could then perceive the melancholy spectacle. Out of six or seven thousand combatants, about four thousand killed or wounded strewed the ground. Augereau, wounded himself, but more affected by the disaster of his *corps d'armée* than by his personal danger, was carried into the cemetery of Eylau, to the feet of Napoleon, to whom he complained, not without bitterness, of not having been timely succoured. Silent grief pervaded every face in the imperial staff. Napoleon, calm and firm, imposing on others the impassibility which he imposed on himself, addressed a few soothing words to Augereau, then sent him to the rear, and took his measures for repairing the mischief. Despatching, in the first place, the chasseurs of his guard and some squadrons of dragoons which were at hand to drive back the enemy's cavalry, he sent for Murat, and ordered him to make a decisive effort on the line of infantry which formed the centre of the Russian army, and which, taking advantage of Augereau's disaster, began to press

forward. At the first summons Murat came up at a gallop. "Well," said Napoleon, "*are you going to let those fellows eat us up?*" He then ordered that heroic chief of his cavalry to collect the chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, and to fall upon the Russians with eighty squadrons, to try what effect the shock of such a mass of horse, charging furiously, would have on an infantry reputed not to be shaken. The cavalry of the guard was brought forward, ready to add its shock to that of the cavalry of the army. The moment was critical, for if the Russian infantry were not stopped, it would go and attack the cemetery, the centre of the position, and Napoleon had only the six foot battalions of the imperial guard to defend it.

Murat galloped off, collected his squadrons, made them pass between the cemetery and Rothenen, through the same débouche by which Augereau's corps had already marched to almost certain destruction. General Grouchy's dragoons charged first, to sweep the ground, and to clear it of the enemy's cavalry. That brave officer, whose horse fell with him, put himself, on rising, at the head of the second brigade, and effected his purpose of dispersing the groups of cavalry which preceded the Russian infantry. But for overturning the latter, nothing short of the heavy ironclad squadrons of General d'Hautpoul was required. That officer, who distinguished himself by consummate skill in the art of managing a numerous cavalry, came forward with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, followed by the whole mass of the dragoons. These cuirassiers, ranged in several lines, started off, and threw themselves upon the Russian bayonets. The first lines, stopped by the fire, could not penetrate, and falling back to right and left, went to form afresh behind those who followed them, in order to charge anew. At length one of them, rushing on with more violence, broke the enemy's infantry at one point, and opened a breach through which cuirassiers and dragoons strove which should penetrate first. As a river which has begun to break down a dyke soon carries it away entirely, so the masses of the squadrons having once penetrated the infantry of the Russians, finished in a few moments the overthrow of their first line. Our horse then dispersed to slaughter. A horrible fray ensued between them and the Russian foot-soldiers. They went, and came, and struck on all sides those obstinate antagonists. While the first line of infantry was thus overturned and cut in pieces, the second fell back to a wood that bounded the field of battle. A last reserve of artillery had been left there. The Russians placed it in battery and fired confusedly at their own soldiers and at ours, not caring whether they slaughtered friends or foes, if they only got rid of our formidable horse. General d'Hautpoul was mortally wounded by a rifle ball. While our cavalry was

thus engaged with the second line of the Russian infantry, some parties of the first rallied and renewed their fire. At this sight the horse grenadiers of the guard, headed by General Lepic, one of the heroes of the army, came forward in their turn to second Murat's efforts. Dashing off at a gallop, they charged the groups of infantry which they perceived to be still on their legs, and crossing the ground in all directions, completed the destruction of the centre of the Russian army, the wrecks of which at last fled for refuge to the patches of wood which had served them for an asylum.

During this scene of confusion, a fragment of that vast line of infantry had advanced to that same cemetery. Three or four thousand Russian grenadiers, marching straight forward with the blind courage of braver and more intelligent troops, came to throw themselves on the church of Eylau, and threatened the cemetery occupied by the imperial staff. The foot guard, motionless till then, had endured the cannonade without firing a piece. With joy it beheld an occasion for fighting arrive. A battalion was called for: two disputed the honour of marching. The first in order, led by General Dorsenne, obtained the advantage of measuring its strength with the Russian grenadiers, went up to them without firing a shot, attacked them with the bayonet, and threw one upon another, while Murat despatched against them two battalions of chasseurs under General Bruyère. The unfortunate Russian grenadiers, hemmed in between the bayonets of the grenadiers of the guard and the swords of our chasseurs, were almost all taken or killed before the face of Napoleon, and only a few paces from him.

This cavalry action, the most extraordinary, perhaps, of any in our great wars, had for its result to overthrow the centre of the Russians, and to drive it back to a considerable distance. It would have been requisite to have at hand a reserve of infantry in order to complete the defeat of troops which, after being laid upon the ground, rose again to fire. But Napoleon durst not venture to dispose of Marshal Soult's corps, reduced to half of its effective, and necessary for keeping Eylau. Augereau's corps was almost destroyed. The six battalions of the foot guard were alone left for reserve, and amidst the so various chances of that day, still far from its close, it was a resource which it behoved Napoleon to preserve with the utmost care. On the left, Marshal Ney, marching for several days side by side with the Prussians, might reach the field of battle before them or they before him, and eight or ten thousand men, arriving unexpectedly, might bring to one of the two armies a reinforcement which would perhaps be decisive. On the right, Marshal Davout was engaged in an obstinate combat with the left of the Russians, the result of which was yet unknown.

Napoleon, motionless in the cemetery, in which were heaped the bodies of a great number of his officers, graver than usual, but commanding his countenance as well as his soul, having his guard behind him, and before him the chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, formed and ready to devote themselves afresh—Napoleon awaited the event before taking a definitive determination. Never had he or his soldiers been engaged in so hotly contested a fight.

But the time for defeat had not yet arrived, and Fortune, frowning for a moment on that extraordinary man, still treated him as a favourite. At that juncture, General St. Hilaire with his division, Marshal Davout with his corps, justified the confidence which Napoleon had placed in them. St. Hilaire's division, received, like Augereau's corps, and at the same moment, with a murderous fire of grape and musketry, had suffered cruelly. Blinded also by the snow, it had not perceived a mass of cavalry hurrying towards it at a gallop, and a battalion of the 10th light had been overturned under the horses' heels. Morand's division, the extreme left of Davout, uncovered from the accident which had befallen the 10th light, had been obliged to fall back two or three hundred paces. But Davout and Morand had soon moved it forward again. During this interval General Friant was maintaining an heroic struggle at Klein-Sausgarten, and seconded by Gudin's division, it definitively occupied that advanced position on the flank of the Russians. He had even pushed detachments to the village of Kuschitten, situated on their rear. It was the moment when, it being nearly dark, and the Russian army almost half destroyed, it seemed that the battle must terminate in our favour.

But the event which Napoleon dreaded had occurred. General Lestocq, perseveringly pursued by Marshal Ney, appeared on that field of carnage with seven or eight thousand Prussians, eager to revenge themselves for the disdain of the Russians. General Lestocq, only an hour or two ahead of Marshal Ney's corps, had merely time to strike one blow before he was struck himself. He debouched upon the field of battle at Schmoditten, passed behind the double line of the Russians, now broken by the fire of our artillery, by the swords of our horse, and presented himself at Kuschitten in front of Friant's division, which, passing beyond Klein-Sausgarten, had already driven back the left of the enemy upon its centre. The village of Kuschitten was occupied by four companies of the 108th and by the 51st, which had been detached from Morand's division to go to the support of Friant's division. The Prussians, rallying the Russians around them, rushed impetuously on the 51st and on the four companies of the 108th, without being able to break them, though they obliged them to fall back to a

considerable distance in rear of Kuschitten. The Prussians, after this first advantage, pushed on beyond Kuschitten, in order to recover the positions of the morning. They marched, deployed in two lines. The Russian reserves, being rallied, formed two close columns on their wings. A numerous artillery preceded them. In this manner they advanced across the rear of the field of battle, to regain the lost ground, and to beat back Marshal Davout upon Klein-Sausgarten, and from Klein-Sausgarten to Serpallen. But Generals Friant and Gudin, having Marshal Davout at their head, hastened up. Friant's entire division, and the 12th, 21st, and 25th regiments, belonging to Gudin's division, placed themselves foremost, covered by the whole of the artillery of the third corps. To no purpose did the Russians and Prussians exert themselves to overcome that formidable obstacle; they were unsuccessful. The French, appuyed on woods, marshes, and hillocks, here deployed in line, there dispersed as tirailleurs, opposed an invincible obstinacy to this last effort of the allies. Marshal Davout, passing through the ranks till dark, kept up the firmness of his soldiers, saying, "Cowards will be sent to die in Siberia; the brave will die here like men of honour." The Prussians and the rallied Russians desisted from the attack; Marshal Davout remained firm in that position of Klein-Sausgarten, where he threatened the rear of the enemy.

The two armies were exhausted. That day so sombre was every moment becoming more sombre still, and about to terminate in a tremendous night. More than 30,000 Russians, struck by the balls and the swords of the French, strewed the ground, some dead, others wounded more or less severely. Many of the soldiers began to abandon their colours.* General Benningsen, surrounded by his lieutenants, were deliberating whether to resume the offensive, and try the effect of one more effort. But out of an army of 80,000 men, not more than 40,000 were left in a state to fight, the Prussians included. If he were worsted in this desperate engagement, he would not have wherewithal to cover his retreat. However, he was still hesitating when intelligence was brought him of a last and important incident. Marshal Ney, who had closely followed the Prussians, arriving in the evening on our left, as Marshal Davout had arrived in the morning on our right, debouched at length near Althof.

Thus Napoleon's combinations, retarded by time, had nevertheless brought upon the two flanks of the Russian army the forces that were to decide the victory. The order for retreat could no longer be deferred; for Marshal Davout, having maintained himself at Klein-Sausgarten, would not have much to do

* The very expression of Plotho, the narrator.

to meet Marshal Ney, who had advanced to Schmoditten, and the junction of these two marshals would have exposed the Russians to the risk of being enveloped. The order for retreating was instantly given by General Benningsen; but to ensure the retreat, he purposed to curb Marshal Ney by attempting to take from him the village of Schmoditten. The Russians marched upon that village under favour of the night, and in profound silence, in hopes of surprising the troops of Marshal Ney, which had arrived late on the field of battle, when it was difficult to recognise one another. But the latter were on their guard. General Marchand, with the 6th light and the 39th of the line, allowing the Russians to approach, then receiving them with a point-blank fire, stopped them short. He then rushed upon them with the bayonet, and obliged them to renounce all serious attack. From that moment they definitively commenced their retreat.

Napoleon, discerning the real state of things by the direction of Marshal Davout's and Marshal Ney's fires, knew that he was master of the field of battle; nevertheless, he was not sure that he should not have a second battle to fight, either that night or on the morrow. He occupied that slightly rising plain beyond Eylau, having his cavalry and his guard before him and at the centre, on his left, in advance of Eylau, Legrand's and Leval's two divisions of Marshal Soult's corps, on the right, and St. Hiliare's division, which connected itself with the corps of Marshal Davout, pushed beyond Klein-Sausgarten; the French army thus forming an oblique line on the ground which the Russians had possessed in the morning. Considerably beyond, on the left, Marshal Ney, detached, found himself on the rear of the position which the enemy was quitting in the utmost haste.

Napoleon, certain of being victorious, but grieved to the bottom of his heart, had remained amidst his troops, and ordered them to kindle fires, and not leave the ranks, even to go in quest of provisions. A small quantity of bread and brandy was distributed among the soldiers, and though there was not enough for all, yet no complaints were heard. Less joyous than at Austerlitz and at Jena, they were full of confidence, proud of themselves, ready to renew that dreadful struggle if the Russians had the courage and the strength to do so. Whoever had given them at this moment bread and brandy, which they were in want of, would have found them in as high spirits as usual. Two artillerymen of Marshal Davout's corps having been absent from their company during this engagement, and arrived too late to be present at the battle, their comrades assembled in the evening at the bivouac, tried them, and not liking their reasons, inflicted upon them, on that

frozen and bloodstained ground, the burlesque punishment which the soldiers call the *savate.**

There was no great abundance of anything but ammunition. The service of the artillery, performed with extraordinary activity, had already replaced the ammunition consumed. With not less zeal was the service of the medical and surgical department performed. A great number of wounded had been picked up; to others relief was administered on the spot, till they could be removed in their turn. Napoleon, overwhelmed with fatigue, was still afoot and superintending the attentions that were paid to his soldiers.

In the rear of the army so firm a countenance was not everywhere presented. Many stragglers, excluded from the effective in the morning, in consequence of the rapidity of the marches, had heard the din of that tremendous battle, had caught some hourras of the Cossacks, and fallen back, circulating bad news along the roads. The brave collected to range themselves beside their comrades, the others dispersed in the various routes which the army had traversed.

Daybreak next morning threw a light upon that frightful field of battle, and Napoleon himself was moved to such a degree as to betray his feelings in the bulletin which he published. On that icy plain thousands of dead and dying, cruelly mangled, thousands of prostrate horses, an infinite quantity of dismounted cannon, broken carriages, scattered projectiles, burning hamlets, *all this standing out from a ground of snow*,† exhibited a thrilling and terrible spectacle. "This spectacle," exclaimed Napoleon, "is fit to excite in princes a love of peace and a horror of war!" A singular reflection from his lips, and sincere at the moment when he suffered it to escape them!

One singularity struck all eyes. From a propensity for returning to the things of past times, and also from economy, an attempt had been made to introduce the white uniform again into the army. The experiment had been made with some regiments, but the sight of blood on the white dress decided the question. Napoleon, filled with disgust and horror, declared that he would have none but blue uniforms, whatever might be the cost.

The sight of this field of battle abandoned by the enemy gave the army an assurance of its victory. The Russians had retired, leaving upon the ground 7000 dead and more than 5000 wounded, whom the generous conqueror lost no time in removing after his own. Besides the 12,000 dead or dying left at Eylau, they took with them about 15,000 wounded more or

* We borrow these particulars from the military and manuscript memoirs of Marshal Davout.

† An expression of Napoleon's in one of his bulletins.

less severely. They had consequently 26,000 or 27,000 men hors de combat. We had taken 3000 or 4000 prisoners, 24 pieces of cannon, 16 colours. Their total loss then amounted to 30,000 men. The French had about 10,000 men hors de combat, 3000 of whom were killed and 7000 wounded;* a loss far inferior to that of the Russian army, and which is accounted for by the position of our troops posted in extended order, and by the dexterity of our artillerymen and of our soldiers. Thus on that fatal day nearly 40,000 men had perished by fire and sword. It is the population of a large town cut off in a day. Melancholy consequence of the passions of nations!—terrible passions, which we ought to take pains to direct properly, not strive to extinguish!

So early as the morning of the 9th, Napoleon had sent forward his cuirassiers and his dragoons in pursuit of the Russians, to drive them towards Königsberg, and to throw them for the whole winter beyond the Pregel. Marshal Ney, who had not

* It is seldom that one can state the losses sustained in a battle with such accuracy as one is enabled to do for the battle of Eylau. I undertook a careful examination in order to arrive at precision, and here follows the truth, at least as nearly as it is possible to attain it in such a matter. The inspector of the hospitals certified the same evening, at Eylau, the existence of 4500 wounded, and next day, after going his rounds in the adjacent villages, he increased the total amount to 7094. His report has been preserved. The reports of the different corps make the number of men more or less severely wounded amount to not fewer than 13,000 or 14,000. This difference is explained by the manner in which the authors of those reports understand the word wounded. The chiefs of corps include even the slightest contusions, each of them naturally striving to make the most of the sufferings of his men. But half the men set down as wounded never thought of applying for any attendance, and this is proved by the report of the director of the hospitals. A month afterwards a curious controversy was kept up by letter between Napoleon and M. Daru, who could not find more than 6000 wounded in the hospitals of the Vistula. This appeared disputable to Napoleon, who conceived that there must be more, especially if there were included in this number the wounded of the battle of Eylau and those of the actions which preceded it, after the breaking-up of the cantonments. However, after minute examination, there were never found more than six thousand and some hundred, and fewer than six thousand for Eylau itself, which, taking account of the deaths that supervened, agrees exactly with the statement of 7094 furnished by the director of the hospitals. We think, therefore, that we are near the truth in computing the losses of the battle of Eylau at 3000 killed and 7000 wounded. Napoleon, speaking in the bulletin of 2000 killed and 5000 or 6000 wounded, had, as we may see, not warped the truth much in comparison with what the Russians had done. One may even assert that, in the evening after the battle, he was founded in supposing that there were not more.

As for the losses of the Russians, I have adopted their own amounts and those which were certified by the French. We found 7000 dead, and in the surrounding places 5000 wounded. They must have carried away a much greater number. Both, a German, says that they carried to Königsberg 14,900 wounded, who almost all died from the cold. He admits, moreover, that they had 7000 killed, and left 5000 wounded on the field of battle. Add 3000 or 4000 prisoners, and you arrive at a total loss of 30,000 men, which can scarcely be disputed. General Benningsen, always very inaccurate, admitted in his statement a loss of 20,000 men.

had much to do in the battle of Eylau, was charged to support Murat. Marshals Davout and Soult were to follow at a little distance. Napoleon himself remained at Eylau, engaged in healing the wounds of his brave army, in procuring it supplies, and in setting everything to rights on its rear. This was of greater importance than a pursuit, an operation which his lieutenants were perfectly capable of executing themselves.

On marching, the French acquired a still more complete conviction than before of the disaster sustained by the Russians. As they advanced, they found the small towns and villages of East Prussia full of wounded; they learned the disorder, the confusion, the deplorable state, in short, of the fugitive army. The Russians, nevertheless, in comparing this battle with that of Austerlitz, were proud of the difference. They admitted their defeat, but they made themselves amends for this avowal by adding that the French had paid dearly for the victory.

The pursuers did not stop till they reached the banks of the Frisching, a small river which runs from the line of the lakes to the sea, and Murat pushed his squadrons as far as Königsberg. The Russians, who had fled in the utmost haste, some beyond the Pregel, the others to Königsberg itself, showed a disposition to defend themselves there, and had planted a numerous artillery upon the walls. The terrified inhabitants asked themselves if they were to be exposed to the fate of Lübeck. Luckily for them, Napoleon resolved to put an end to his offensive operations. He had sent Murat's horse to the gates of Königsberg, but he had no intention of conducting his army itself thither. It would have required nothing less than that entire army to attempt, with any hope of success, an attack by main force on a large city, provided with some works, and defended by all that were left of the Russian and Prussian troops. An attack, even if successful, on that wealthy city would not be worth the risks that must be incurred if the attempt should miscarry. Napoleon having pushed his corps to the banks of the Frisching, was content to leave them there for a few days, to be fully certified of his victory, and then purposed to retire and resume his cantonments. He had not, indeed, obtained the immense result with the prospect of which he at first flattered himself, and which would certainly not have escaped him if an intercepted despatch had not revealed his designs to the Russians; but he had led them fighting for fifty leagues; had destroyed 9000 of them in a series of rearguard actions; and finding them at Eylau formed into a compact mass, covered by artillery, resolved to desperation, 80,000 strong, including the Prussians, in a plain where no manœuvring was possible, he had attacked them with 54,000, destroyed them with cannon-balls, and parried all the accidents of the engagement with imperturbable coolness, while

his lieutenants were exerting themselves to rejoin him. The Russians on that day had had all their advantages, solidity, immovableness in fire; he had not had all his upon a ground where it was not possible for him to manœuvre; but to their tenacity he had opposed invincible courage, a moral force above the horrors of the most frightful slaughter. The spirit of the soldiers was displayed on that day as strongly as his own. Assuredly he had reason to be proud of this test. Besides, for the 12,000 or 13,000 men whom he had lost during those eight days, he had destroyed 36,000 of the enemy. But he must have been sensible at that moment of all the power of climate, soil, distance, for though possessing more than 300,000 men in Germany, he had not been able to collect more than 54,000 on the ground of the decisive action. After such a victory, he could not fail to make serious reflections, to take more account of the elements and fortune, and to attempt less in future on the invincible nature of things. These reflections he did make, and they induced, as we shall presently learn, conduct the most soberly calculated and the most admirably provident. Would to Heaven that they had remained for ever engraved on his memory!

Though victorious and safe for several months from any enterprise against his cantonments, still he had one thing to fear, namely, the lying reports of the Russians, the effect of those reports on Austria, on France, on Italy, on Spain, in short, on all Europe, which, seeing his progress twice stopped in three months, either by the mud or by the climate, would be led to believe him less irresistible, less fatally successful—would regard as doubtful a victory, nevertheless the most incontestable, the most cruelly efficacious, and might be tempted to disbelieve his fortune.

He resolved therefore to show here the character which he had displayed during the battle of Eylau itself, and certain of his strength, to wait till Europe, more enlightened, should be equally sensible of it. After passing a few days on the Frisching, as the enemy kept close within his lines, he resolved to return and reoccupy his cantonments. The weather was still cold, but the temperature never fell more than two or three degrees below freezing. He availed himself of it to remove his wounded in sledges. More than 6000 endured, without suffering much, this singular journey of forty or fifty leagues to the Vistula. The extreme care taken to seek them all up in the neighbouring villages furnished opportunity for ascertaining their real number. It agreed with that which we have mentioned above. When everything was removed—wounded, sick, prisoners, artillery taken from the enemy—Napoleon commenced on the 17th of February his retrograde movement, Marshal Ney with the sixth corps, Murat with the cavalry, forming the rearguard, the other

corps retaining their accustomed position in the order of march, Marshal Davout on the right, Marshal Soult in the centre, Marshal Augereau on the left; lastly, Marshal Bernadotte, who had rejoined, forming the extreme left along the Frische Haff.

Napoleon having ascended the Alle, nearly to the lakes from which it issues, and from which the Passarge likewise issues, changed his direction, and instead of taking the route to Warsaw, took that of Thorn, Marienburg, and Elbing, purposing thenceforward to appuy himself upon the Lower Vistula. Recent events had modified his ideas respecting the choice of his base of operation. His motives for this change were these.

The position between the branches of the Ukra, the Narew, and the Bug, which he had at first adopted, was a consequence of the occupation of Warsaw. It had the advantage of covering that capital, and if the enemy proceeded along the coast, of allowing him to be more easily outwinged, turned, thrown back to the sea, a plan which Napoleon had just attempted, and which he would certainly have executed but for the taking of his despatches. But this manœuvre once unmasked, it was not probable that the Russians, forewarned, would expose themselves a second time to a danger which they had escaped by a sort of miracle. Thus the position chosen in advance of Warsaw no longer possessed the same advantage, and it had a serious inconvenience, that of obliging the army to extend itself beyond measure, in order to cover at once Warsaw and the siege of Dantzig—a siege which became an urgent operation, to which it was necessary to devote the leisure of winter. In fact, in placing himself at Warsaw, Napoleon was obliged to leave Bernadotte's corps at a great distance, with little chance of rallying it to the main body of the army; and if he marched forward, he should be obliged to leave likewise the fifth corps, that of Lannes, to guard Warsaw. Of course he would have to act with two corps deficient. The distance of Bernadotte's corps would become in future a subject of the greater regret, since it would very soon be necessary to unite with him new forces, in order to second and cover the siege of Dantzig.

Napoleon therefore resolved to keep at a distance from Warsaw, to commit the guard of that capital to the fifth corps, the Poles, the Bavarians—the submission of the fortresses in Silesia having rendered the latter disposable—and to establish himself, with the greater part of his troops, in advance of the Lower Vistula, behind the Passarge, having Thorn on his right, Elbing on his left, Dantzig on his rear, his centre at Osterode, his advanced posts between the Passarge and the Alle. In this position he covered himself the siege of Dantzig, without needing to detach any part of his forces for this purpose. If, in fact, the Russians, designing to relieve Dantzig, were to come and seek a battle, he could

oppose to them all his collected corps, including Bernadotte's, and even part of Lefebvre's troops, which there would be nothing to prevent his calling in to him in case of emergency, as he had done in 1796 when he raised the siege of Mantua to run after the Austrians. His only deficiency on a day of battle would be that of the fifth corps, which, in whatever way he operated, was indispensable upon the Narew, in order to defend Warsaw. This new position, moreover, would furnish occasion for scientific combinations, fertile in great results, combinations unknown to the enemy, whereas he was acquainted with all those having Warsaw for base. Cantoned behind the Passarge, Napoleon would be but fifteen leagues from Königsberg. Supposing that the Russians, encouraged by the apparent loneliness in which Warsaw was left, should advance upon that capital, one might run behind them to Königsberg, get possession of that city, then dropping down by a movement to the right on their rear, throw them upon the Narew and the Vistula into the marshes of the interior, with as much certainty of destroying them as in the case of the movement towards the sea. If, on the contrary, they attacked the cantonments on the Passarge in front, one would have, as we have just observed, in addition to the natural strength of those cantonments, the entire mass of the army to oppose to them. The position, then, was excellent for the siege of Dantzig, excellent for the future operations; for it would give rise to new combinations, the secret of which was not revealed.

It is assuredly an imposing and instructive sight to see that impetuous general, who, as his detractors allege, was fit only for offensive war, carried at a bound from the Rhine to the Vistula, pausing all at once before the difficulties of localities and of seasons, shutting himself up in a narrow space, carrying on cold, slow, methodical war there, disputing petty streams foot by foot, after passing the largest rivers without stopping, confining himself to covering a siege, and placed at so vast a distance from his empire, in presence of Europe, which this new mode of proceeding astonished, and in which doubt began to gain ground, retaining unutterable firmness, not seduced even by the desire of striking a signal blow, and knowing how to defer that blow till the moment when the nature of things rendered it sure and possible: it is, we say, worthy of interest, astonishment, admiration; it is a fine subject for study and reflection for any one who can appreciate the combinations of great men, and who takes delight in meditating upon them.

Napoleon proceeded, then, to place himself between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula; Marshal Bernadotte's corps on the left, on the Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden; Marshal Soult's corps in the centre, between Liebstadt and Mohrungen; Marshal Davout's corps to the right, between Allenstein and

Hohenstein, at the point where the Alle and the Passarge approach nearest to one another; Marshal Ney's corps as advanced guard, between the Passarge and the Alle, at Guttstadt; the headquarters and the guard at Osterode, in a central position, where Napoleon could assemble all his forces in a few hours. He drew General Oudinot to Osterode, with the grenadiers and voltigeurs, forming an infantry reserve of six or seven thousand men. He spread the cavalry on his rear, between Osterode and the Vistula, from Thorn to Elbing, a country abounding in all kinds of forage.

In the enumeration of the corps cantoned behind the Passarge, we have not mentioned Augereau's. Napoleon had pronounced its dissolution. Augereau had left the army, disconcerted at what had befallen him in the battle of Eylau, erroneously imputing his check to the jealousy of his comrades, who, as he said, had not chosen to support him, alleging that he was fatigued, ill, worn out. The emperor sent him back to France with testimonies of satisfaction, which were of a nature to cheer him. But apprehensive lest there might lurk in the seventh corps, half destroyed, a leaven of the discouragement manifested by its chief, he pronounced its dissolution, after lavishing rewards upon it. He divided the regiments between Marshals Davout, Soult, and Ney. Of the 12,000 men composing the seventh corps, there had been 7000 present at Eylau, and two-thirds of those 7000 had been put hors de combat. The survivors, added to those who had lagged behind, furnished the different corps of the army with a reinforcement of seven or eight thousand men.

Napoleon placed the fifth corps on the Omulew, at some distance from Warsaw. Lannes continuing ill, he had sent for the first of his generals, Massena, who had not been able to agree with Joseph at Naples, with regret to deprive Italy of him, but with great satisfaction to have him in Poland. He gave him the command of the fifth corps. The sieges in Silesia advancing, thanks to General Vandamme's energy and fertility of mind, Schweidnitz being taken, and Neisse and Glatz alone remaining to be reduced, Napoleon took advantage of circumstances to bring to the Vistula Deroy's Bavarian division, six or seven thousand strong, and very good troops, which was cantoned at Pultusk, between the position of the fifth corps on the Omulew and Warsaw. The Polish battalions of Kalisch and Posen had been sent to Dantzig. Napoleon assembled those of Warsaw, organised by Prince Poniatowski, at Neidenburg, so as to keep up the communication between the headquarters and the troops encamped on the Omulew. They were there under the command of General Zayonscheck. He also required that a cavalry corps of one or two thousand Poles should be organised, in order to run after the Cossacks. These different Polish troops, destined

to connect the position of the grand army on the Passarge with that of Massena on the Narew, were not capable, it is true, of stopping any Russian army that might have taken the offensive, but they were sufficient to prevent the Cossacks from penetrating between Osterode and Warsaw, and to exercise an active vigilance in that extensive space. Concentrated thus behind the Passarge and in advance of the Lower Vistula, covering in an inassailable position the siege of Dantzig, which was at length about to begin; able, by a threat against Königsberg, to stop any offensive movement upon Warsaw, Napoleon was in a situation not to fear anything. Rejoined by the laggards left behind and by Bernadotte's corps, reinforced by Oudinot's grenadiers and voltigeurs, he could in forty-eight hours assemble 80,000 men on one of the points of the Passarge. This situation was very imposing, especially if we compare it with that of the Russians, who could not have brought 50,000 men into line. But it is a remark worthy of being repeated, though already made by us, that an army of 300,000 men, spread from the Rhine to the Vistula, administered with a skill never equalled by any captain, was incapable of furnishing more than 80,000 combatants on the same field of battle. There were 80,000 or 90,000 men capable of acting offensively between the Vistula and the Passarge, 24,000 on the Narew, from Ostrolenka to Warsaw, including the Poles and the Bavarians, 22,000 under Lefebvre before Dantzig and Colberg, 28,000 under Mortier, Italians, Dutch, and French, spread from Bremen and Hamburg to Stralsund and Stettin, 15,000 in Silesia, as well Bavarians as Wurtembergers, 30,000 in the fortresses from Posen to Erfurt and Mayence, 7000 or 8000 employed in parks, 15,000 wounded of all epochs, 60 and some thousand sick and marauders, lastly, 30,000 to 40,000 recruits on march, which gave nearly 330,000 men to the grand army, 270,000 of whom were French, and about 60,000 auxiliaries, Italians, Dutch, Germans, and Poles.

What will appear singular is the enormous number of 60,000 sick or marauders; a number, it is true, merely approximative,* difficult to be fixed, but worthy of the attention of statesmen who study the secret springs of the power of nations. Of these 60,000 absent men designated as sick, not half were in the hospitals. The others were gone a-plundering. We have already said that many soldiers were absent from the ranks at the battle of Eylau owing to the rapidity of the marches, and that the impressions of this dreadful battle spreading to a distance, cowards and hangers-on had run off as fast as their legs would carry them, crying that the French were beaten. Since then they had been joined by a great number of men, who, on

* The emperor could never fix it exactly, owing to the continual fluctuation of the effective of the corps.

pretext of illness or slight wounds, applied for admission to the hospitals, but took good care not to go into them, as they should be detained, watched, and even receive a great deal more attendance than they liked. They had passed the Vistula, lived in the villages on the right and left of the highroad, so as to escape that general superintendence which kept in order all the parts of the army. In this manner they lived at the expense of the country, which they did not spare, some of them downright cowards, for every army, however heroic, always has a certain quantity of them in its ranks; the others very brave, on the contrary, but plunderers by nature, fond of liberty and disorder, and ready to return to the ranks as soon as they should learn the resumption of the operations. Napoleon, apprised of this state of things by the difference between the number of men reputed to be in the hospitals and the number of those whom M. Daru's expenses proved to be really there, turned his serious attention to this abuse. He employed for its repression the police of the Polish authorities, and then the *gendarmerie d'élite* attached to the guard, as the only body of men sufficiently respected to enforce obedience. Still this leprosy attached to large armies could never be completely destroyed on the line of operation. And yet the army in question was the army of the camp of Boulogne, the steadiest, the best disciplined, the bravest, that ever existed. In the campaign of Austerlitz the marauders had scarcely shown themselves. But the rapidity of the movements, the distance, the climate, the season, lastly, the slaughter, relaxing the ties of discipline, those vermin, deplorable effect of wretchedness in a great body, began to multiply. Napoleon provided against the evil for this time by immense forecast, and by the victories which he soon gained. But defeats can in a few days aggravate an evil of this kind to such a degree as to produce the dissolution of armies. Thus in the very successes of that glorious and terrible campaign of 1807 appeared many of the symptoms of a most fatal and even memorable campaign, that of 1812.

The return into cantonments was marked by some movements on the part of the Russians. Their ranks were exceedingly thinned. They had not 50,000 men capable of acting left. General Benningsen, however, quite proud of not having lost all to the very last man at Eylau, and according to custom proclaiming himself conqueror, was desirous to give his boasts the appearance of truth. He therefore left Königsberg as soon as he learned that the French army was retiring upon the Passarge. He showed strong columns along that river, especially in its upper course, towards Guttstadt, facing the position of Marshal Ney. He went to the wrong person; for that intrepid marshal, deprived of the honour of fighting at Eylau, and impatient to

make himself amends, gave a vigorous reception to the corps that came within his reach, and inflicted on them a considerable loss. At the same moment the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, seeking to establish itself on the Lower Passarge, and being obliged for that purpose to occupy Braunsberg, made itself master of that town, where it took prisoners 2000 Prussians. It was Dupont's division which had the merit of this brilliant expedition. The Russians having, nevertheless, continued to bestir themselves, and manifesting an intention to proceed to the Upper Passarge, Napoleon, in the first days of March, resolved to make an offensive demonstration on the Lower Passarge, so as to alarm General Benningsen for the safety of Königsberg. It was with regret that Napoleon decided on such a movement, for it was revealing to the Russians the risk which they ran in ascending upon our right to threaten Warsaw. Well knowing that an unmasked manœuvre is a lost resource, Napoleon would have chosen not to act at all, or to act in a decisive manner by marching for Königsberg with all his forces. But, on the one hand, it was necessary to oblige the enemy to keep quiet, in order to be so himself in his winter quarters; on the other, he had neither sufficient provisions nor ammunition to attempt an operation of any duration. Napoleon therefore made up his mind to a mere demonstration on the Lower Passarge, executed on the 3rd of March by the corps of Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, who passed that river while Marshal Ney, at Guttstadt, was roughly pushing the enemy's corps proceeding to the Upper Passarge. The Russians lost in these simultaneous movements about 2000 men; and on seeing their line of retreat upon Königsberg endangered, they hastened to retire and to restore tranquillity to our cantonments.

Such were the last acts of that winter campaign. The cold, which had long delayed its coming, began to be severe; the thermometer had fallen to eight and ten degrees below the freezing-point. There was going to be in March the weather that might have been expected in December and January.

It was with the utmost reluctance that Napoleon had given orders for the last operations. Writing to Marshal Soult, he says: "It is certainly one of the inconveniences that I have felt from the present movements that they enlighten the Russians respecting their position. But they pressed me too much on my right. Being resolved to let the bad season pass, and to organise the supplies, I am not otherwise vexed at this lesson given to the enemy. With the spirit of presumption with which I see him animated, we need but to have patience to see him make capital blunders." (Osterode, March 6.)

If Napoleon had then had provisions and means of conveyance to carry along with him sufficient to subsist the army for a few

days, he would have put an end to the war immediately, having to do with an enemy ill-advised enough to come and throw himself upon his quarters. Thus the whole question consisted, according to his notions, in such a supply of provisions as would enable him to recruit his soldiers, exhausted by privations, and to assemble them for some days without being liable to see them die of hunger or to leave half of them behind, as was the case at Eylau.

The towns on the coast, especially Elbing, would be able to furnish him with provisions for the first moments of his establishment, but such resources were not sufficient for him. He purposed, therefore, to bring large quantities either from Warsaw down the Vistula, or from Bromberg by the Nackel Canal, and which should then be carried by land from the Vistula to the different cantonments of the army on the Passarge. To this end he gave the most precise orders for collecting the necessary supplies in the first instance at Bromberg and Warsaw, for next creating the means of transport for completing the journey from the Vistula to the banks of the Passarge. His intention was to begin with serving out to his soldiers the entire ration for each day, and then to form at Osterode, the centre of his quarters, a general magazine, containing some millions of rations of bread, rice, wine, spirits. For this purpose he meant to turn to account the zeal of the Poles, who had hitherto rendered him few military services, and from whom he wished to derive some administrative services at least. As he had M. de Talleyrand at Warsaw, he charged him to arrange with the provisional government which directed the affairs of Poland. He wrote him therefore the following letter, sending him full powers for concluding the bargains, whatever the prices might be.

"OSTERODE, *12th March*, 10 at night.

"I received your letter of the 10th at three this afternoon. I have 300,000 rations of biscuit at Warsaw. It takes eight days to come from Warsaw to Osterode; work miracles, but despatch 50,000 rations to me every day. Endeavour also to send me 2000 quarts of spirits per day. At this moment the fate of Europe and the most extensive schemes depend upon supplies of provisions. To beat the Russians, if I have bread, is mere child's play. I have millions; I do not refuse to give some of them. All that you do will be rightly done, but on the receipt of this letter there must be sent off to me by land, by way of Mlawa and Takroczin, 50,000 rations of biscuit and 2000 quarts. It is a matter of eighty waggons per day, which must be paid for handsomely. If the patriotism of the Poles cannot make this effort, they are not good for much. The importance of what I am desiring of you is greater than all the negotiations in the world. Send for the *ordonnateur*, General Lemarrois, and the most influential persons of the government. Give money; I shall approve whatever you do. Biscuit and brandy—that is all we want. Those

300,000 rations of biscuit and those 18,000 or 20,000 quarts of brandy, which may reach us in a few days—these are the things to foil the combinations of all the powers."

M. de Talleyrand assembled the members of the Polish government, to endeavour to obtain the supplies and waggons which were wanted. Provisions were not scarce in Poland, for by furnishing the Jews with ready money, you would be sure to obtain them. But to organise the means of conveyance was a very difficult task. It was intended to hire them in the country, paying liberally for them; but it was finally decided to buy carts and horses, and thus relays were established from the banks of the Vistula to those of the Passarge. The provisions were sent down the Vistula in boats; being then landed at Warsaw, Plock, Thorn, Marienwerder, they were carried to Osterode, the centre of the cantonments, either in the caissons of the regiments, or in the carriages of the country, or in those which had been purchased and horsed for the purpose. Oxen were bought up throughout all Silesia, and driven on foot to Warsaw. Wines and spirits were sought on the north coast, whither commerce brings them in considerable quantity and of superior quality. They were to be obtained at Berlin, at Stettin, at Elbing, and were despatched by water to Thorn. Napoleon had been particularly solicitous to procure two or three hundred thousand bottles of wine, to cheer the hearts of his soldiers. He had near him a valuable resource of this kind, but it was shut up in the fortress of Dantzig, where there were several millions of bottles of excellent wines, that is to say, sufficient to supply the army for some months. This was no weak stimulus to reduce that fortress.

These assiduous attentions paid to the supply of the army could not produce an immediate effect; but meanwhile the soldiers were living on the Nogath, on Elbing, on the very districts which they occupied, and their industry making up for what was deficient, they had contrived to procure necessaries. Considerable quantities of hidden provisions had been discovered, and these enabled them to wait for the regular arrivals from the Vistula. They were lodged in the villages, and had ceased to bivouac, which was a great relief for troops that had bivouacked for five successive months, from October to February. At the advanced posts they lived in hovels, the materials for which and for fuel were furnished in abundance by the forests of the country. Some wine, some spirits, found at Elbing, and distributed with order, restored to our soldiers some of their gaiety. After the first days they began to like the situation better than that on the Narew; for the country was finer, and they hoped, on the return of the mild season, to compensate themselves for present privations, and to put an end by a day of battle to the terrible struggle in which they were engaged.

The provisional regiments destined to bring the recruits began to arrive on the Vistula. Several of them, already gone to the theatre of war, had been reviewed, dissolved, and distributed among the regiments to which they belonged. The soldiers thus saw their ranks filled up, heard talk of numerous reinforcements which were preparing on the rear of the army, and relied more than ever on that supreme vigilance which provided for all their wants. The cavalry continued to be the object of the most attentive care. Napoleon had formed foot detachments of all the dismounted horse, and had sent them into Silesia in quest of horses, in which that province abounded.

Immense works were in progress on the Passarge and on the Vistula, in order to secure the position of the army. All the bridges over the Passarge had been destroyed, two excepted; one for the use of Marshal Bernadotte's corps at Braunsberg, the other for the use of Marshal Soult's corps at Spanden. Vast *têtes de pont* were added to each of them, to afford facility for debouching beyond, Napoleon repeating incessantly to his lieutenants, that a line was not easy to defend unless one were able to cross it in its turn, to take the offensive against any one who should attack it.* Two bridges over the Vistula, one at Marienburg, the other at Marienwerder, ensured the communication with the troops of Marshal Lefebvre, charged with the siege of Dantzig. Napoleon, therefore, could either go to them or make them come to him, and everywhere present a compact mass to the enemy. Marshal Lefebvre was approaching Dantzig, while awaiting the heavy artillery drawn from the fortresses of Silesia, to commence this important siege, which was to be the occupation and the glory of the winter. The works of the Sierock, Praga, and Modlin, destined to consolidate the position of Warsaw, were likewise prosecuted.

It was at the little village of Osterode that Napoleon directed all these operations. His soldiers having bread, potatoes, meat, brandy, straw to shelter themselves, wood for fuel, were not badly off; but the officers, who could procure no better food and lodging than the soldier, even with their pay punctually paid, were exposed to many privations. Napoleon meant to set them an example of resignation by remaining among them. The officers of each corps, sent to Osterode, could not say that they had found him more comfortably settled than the lowest of them. Accordingly, in answering his brother Joseph, who

* "Neither a river nor any line whatever," he wrote to Bernadotte (6th March, Osterode), "can be defended unless they have offensive points; for when you have only defended yourself, you have run risks without gaining anything. But when you can combine defence with an offensive movement, you cause the enemy to run more risks than he makes the attacking body incur. Let then the works at the *têtes de pont* of Spanden and Braunsberg proceed day and night."

complained of the hardships endured by the army of Naples, he laughed at his complaints, accused him of weakness of mind, and drew the following picture.

"The officers of the staff have not undressed for these two months, and some not for four months past; I have myself been a fortnight without taking off my boots. We are amidst snow and mud, without wine, without brandy, without bread, eating potatoes and meat, making long marches and counter-marches, without any kind of comforts, fighting in general with the bayonet and under grape, the wounded having to be carried away in sledges, exposed to the air, for fifty leagues."

He is adverting here to the march which followed the battle of Eylau, for at Osterode they were better off.

"It is, therefore, a silly joke to compare the places where we are with the fine country of Naples, where you have wine, bread, sheets to your beds, society, and even that of women. After destroying the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against the rest of Prussia, against the Russians, the Calmucks, the Cossacks, and those northern tribes which of old overran the Roman empire. We are waging war in all its energy and its horror. Amidst all these excessive fatigues, everybody has been more or less ill; for my part, I was never better, and I have grown fat." (Osterode, March 1.)

The situation of which Napoleon draws this sketch was already much improved at Osterode, especially for the soldiers. But if we suffered, the Russians suffered far more, and were in extreme distress. Their battalions, which at the commencement of the operations numbered 500 men, were now reduced to 300, 200, 150. Ten had just been taken at once, which fell short of the last number. If the Russians were to attempt to cope with Napoleon, it would be on condition of sacrificing their army; in consequence, they could no longer show themselves in the open field. Word had been sent to Petersburg, in the name of all the generals, that if the forces which were left were not doubled at least, they could not thenceforth do anything but run away from the French. For the rest, all the Russian officers, filled with admiration of our army, sensible that in fact they were fighting much more for England or Prussia than for Russia, longed for peace, and called loudly for it.

Their troops, not supplied, like those of Napoleon, by a superior forecast, were dying of hunger. Weary of war, they had ceased to fight with our men. They met in marauding, almost without attacking one another. They seemed to have instinctively agreed not to add to the hardships of their situation. Sometimes it happened that unfortunate Cossacks, driven by hunger, and expressing themselves by signs, came to beg bread

of our soldiers, giving them to understand that for several days they had not had anything to eat; and our men, always disposed to pity, gave them potatoes, of which they had a great abundance. Singular sight, this return to humanity even amidst the cruelties of war!

Napoleon knew that, while suffering great hardships, he had subjected the enemy to much greater. But he had to combat the false reports accredited at Warsaw, at Berlin, and above all, at Paris. His prodigious glory alone awed minds, always independent in France, always malevolent in Europe, and he could already anticipate that on the first serious reverse he should see one after another desert him. Never, in consequence, had he such efforts to make, such energy of character to exert, in order to control the public opinion. Young auditors sent from Paris to carry to headquarters the despatches of the different ministries, unaccustomed to the scenes that met their view, and officers, either discontented or more deeply impressed than usual with the horrors of that war, sent to France letters full of exaggerations. "Concert with M. Daru," said Napoleon to M. Maret in one of his letters, "about sending back the auditors, who are useless here, who are wasting their time, and who, unused to the events of war, *write nothing but stupid absurdities to Paris.* In future I will have the papers brought by officers of the staff." As for the accounts relative to the battle of Eylau, emanating from certain officers, and which Fouché mentioned to him as the source of the false reports circulated in Paris, Napoleon replied that nothing of the sort was to be believed. "My officers," said he, "know as much about what is passing in my army *as the loungers parading in the garden of the Tuileries know about what is under deliberation in the cabinet* (April 13). *Besides, the human mind is pleased with exaggeration.* The sombre pictures drawn for you of our situation have for their authors *Paris babblers, who are adepts at painting.* Never was the position of France either greater or more glorious. As for Eylau, I have said and repeated that the bulletin had exaggerated the loss; and what are two or three thousand men killed in a great battle? *When I take back my army to France and to the Rhine, it will be seen that not many will be missing at roll-call.* At the time of the expedition to Egypt, the correspondence of the army, being intercepted by the British cabinet, was printed, and led to the expedition of the English, which was silly, which ought to have failed, but which succeeded *because it was decreed by fate that it should succeed.* Then, too, it was said that we were destitute of everything in Egypt, the richest country in the world; it was said that the army was destroyed, and I brought back eight-ninths of it to Toulon! The Russians claim the victory; so they did after Pultusk, after Austerlitz. They were

pursued, on the contrary, at the point of the sword, till they were under the guns of Königsberg. They had fifteen or sixteen generals killed. Their loss was immense. *We made a downright butchery of it.*"

There had been printed some fragments of letters from Major-General Berthier, making mention of the dangers to which Napoleon had been exposed. "They are publishing," he wrote to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, "that I command my advanced posts. . . . what absurdities! I begged you not to allow anything but the bulletins to be inserted in the *Moniteur*. If this is not attended to, you will prevent me from writing at all, and then you will be more uneasy. . . . Berthier writes amidst a field of battle, wearied, and not expecting that his letters will be printed." (Osterode, March 5.)

Thus Napoleon had no desire that his own personal courage should be noticed, for that very courage became a danger. It was acknowledging too plainly that this military monarchy, without past, without future, was at the mercy of a cannon-ball.

The transports caused in France by the wonders of Austerlitz and Jena were succeeded by a sort of uneasiness. Paris was dull and deserted, for the emperor and the chiefs of the army, who constituted a great part of the high society of that reign, were absent. Trade suffered. Napoleon enjoined his sisters and the Princes Cambacérès and Lebrun to give entertainments. He wished to fill up in this way the void created by his absence. He ordered a survey to be made of the movables of the crown at Fontainebleau, Versailles, Compiègne, St. Cloud, and several millions taken from his personal savings to be expended on stuffs in the manufactories of Lyons, Rouen, and St. Quentin. He directed the sums laid out to be proportioned, not to the wants of the imperial residences, but to the wants of the different branches of trade. Though he generally made a point of checking the fondness of the empress and his sisters for expense, on this occasion he recommended prodigality to them. He desired that the Sinking Fund, that is to say, the treasury of the army, should devote a million per month to be lent to the principal manufacturers, on deposit of goods, and he demanded a project for converting that accidental measure into a permanent institution, having for its object, he said, not the creation of a chest for the assistance of bankrupts, but of a provident chest destined to uphold manufacturers employing a great number of hands, whom they would be obliged to discharge if they were not furnished with facilities for paying them.

Lastly, he devised an extraordinary medium for procuring capitals for commerce, and for making, at the same time, a notable improvement in the administration of the finances. At that time, still less than at the present day, was the sum total

of the taxes rigidly levied within the year. Thus the bills of the receivers-general, representatives of the taxes, were not due, for a part at least, till three or four months after the turn of the year, that is to say, till March, April, or May in the following year. It was necessary, therefore, to discount them, a business undertaken by a class of agents who carried on a very active stock-jobbing. It was the floating debt of the time, which was met with the bills of the receivers-general, as it is now met with the *bons royaux*. This discount required a capital of 80,000,000 on the part of the Paris capitalists. Napoleon's idea was to determine that, for 1808, for example, that portion of the bills which should not be due till 1809 should be applied to the service of 1809 itself, and the same in future, so that the service of each year should have for its use only those bills which fell due in that same year. The deficit, answering to the portion of the bills carried back to 1809, would remain to be provided for. This was a sum of 80,000,000 to be raised. Napoleon proposed to furnish it by a loan, which the treasury of the State should obtain from the treasury of the army at a moderate rate. "By this means," he wrote, "my bills would fall due all within twelve months; the public treasury would save 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 in expenses of negotiation; our manufactures and our commerce would make an immense gain, since there would be 80,000,000 idle, which, as they could not find employment at the treasury, would be placed in commerce." (Note to Prince Cambacérès, Osterode, April 1.)

He gave orders for making in Paris itself a considerable quantity of shoes, boots, harness, and gun-carriages, to give employment to the workmen of the capital. The articles made in Paris were of better quality than those made elsewhere. The only question was, how to transport them to Poland. Napoleon devised for this an expedient as simple as it was ingenious. At this period a company of contractors was charged with the transports of the army, and furnished at a fixed rate the caissons which carried the bread, the baggage, everything, in short, that follows the troops, even the most lightly equipped. Napoleon had been struck, amidst the quagmires of Pultusk and Golymin, with the little zeal of those drivers enrolled by private industry, with their want of courage in danger, and as he had determined to organise the artillery-drivers militarily, so he resolved likewise to organise the baggage-drivers militarily; thinking that, the danger being nearly equal for all those who concur in the different services of an army, it was necessary to connect them all by the bond of honour, and to treat them as soldiers, in order to impose on them the duties of soldiers. He had therefore given orders for forming successively in Paris battalions of the train charged with the driving of the equipages, for constructing

caissons, for purchasing draught horses, and when the personal and material establishment of these battalions should be organised, for despatching them to the Vistula. Instead of coming empty, these new military equipages were to bring the articles of equipment manufactured in Paris. These articles might arrive in time on the Vistula, for the journey took two months, and it was possible that the war might last five or six. Napoleon purposed by the whole of these measures to remedy the temporary stagnation of commerce, and to make the war consumption compensate for the deficiency of the peace consumption. The one, in fact, consumes not less than the other; and when money is not scarce, a skilful administration can furnish workmen with the employment that peace would supply, and afford them the means of earning a livelihood even amidst the difficulties of the war.

Such is the multitude of objects to which he directed his attention in the village of Osterode, living in a sort of barn, whence he awed Europe and governed his empire. A more suitable abode was at length found for him at Finkenstein; it was a country house, belonging to one of the employés of the crown of Prussia, and spacious enough to accommodate himself with his staff and his military household. There, as at Osterode, he was in the centre of his cantonments, and had it in his power to repair to any quarter where his presence might be necessary. The portfolios of the several ministries were sent to him every week, and he turned his attention to the most important as well as the most trivial matters. The theatres themselves, at this distance, did not escape his active superintendence. There had been composed in his honour music and verses which he deemed bad. By his order, others were composed, in which he was less praised, but in which elevated sentiments were expressed in suitable language. He directed that the authors should be thanked and rewarded, adding these noble words: *The best way to praise me is to write things which excite heroic sentiments in the nation, in youth, and in the army.* He read the public papers attentively, followed the meetings of the French Academy, desired that the tendencies of the minds of writers should be corrected, and that an eye should be kept upon the orations delivered before the Academy. He considered the attacks made by the *Journal de l'Empire* and the *Mercure de France* upon the philosophers as mischievous. "It is necessary," said he, "to have discreet men at the head of those journals. Those two journals affect religion even to bigotry. Instead of attacking the excesses of the exclusive system of some philosophers, they attack philosophy and human knowledge. Instead of keeping the productions of the age within bounds by sound criticism, they discourage, depreciate, and debase them. I am not adverting to political opinions: one need not be very shrewd to

perceive that if they durst launch into them, they would not be much sounder than those of the *Courrier Français.*"

The French Academy had held a meeting for the reception of Cardinal Maury, recalled to France, and replaced in the chair which he had formerly occupied. The Abbé Sicard, in receiving Cardinal Maury, had expressed himself in unbecoming terms of Mirabeau. The person received had spoken no better of him, and this academical meeting had furnished occasion for a philippic against the Revolution and the revolutionists. Napoleon, disagreeably affected, wrote to Fouché, the minister: "I recommend to you, let there be no reaction in the public opinion. Let Mirabeau be mentioned in terms of praise. There are many things in that meeting of the Academy which do not please me. When shall we grow wiser! When shall we be animated with genuine Christian charity, and when will our actions not have for their object to humble anybody! When shall we abstain from awaking recollections which go to the heart of so many persons!" (Finkenstein, May 20.)

At another time he learned from the correspondence of all kinds, which he paid for liberally and read with care, that intestine quarrels divided the administration of the Opera, and that there was a disposition to persecute a machinist, on account of a change of decoration which had failed. "I will not have wrangling anywhere," he wrote to M. Fouché. "I will not suffer M—— to be the victim of a fortuitous accident; my custom is to support the unfortunate: whether actresses ascend into the clouds or ascend not, I will not allow that to be made a handle for intriguing." (April 12.)

At the same time he showed extreme solicitude about the institutions for education, particularly about that of Ecouen, where the daughters of poor legionaries were to be educated. He wished them, he wrote to M. de Lacepède, to be trained up into women, simple, chaste, worthy of being united to men who should have served him faithfully either in the army or in the civil administration. To render them such, it was requisite, according to him, that they should be brought up in sentiments of solid piety. "I have attached," said he, "but a secondary importance to the religious institutions for the school of Fontainebleau. The object of that is to train young officers; but as for Ecouen, it is a totally different affair. It is there proposed to train up women, wives, mothers of families. *Make believers of them, not reasoners. The weakness of the brain of women, the mobility of their ideas, their destination in the social order, the necessity for inspiring them with a perpetual resignation and a mild and easy charity*—all this renders the yoke of religion indispensable for them. I am desirous that they may leave it, not agreeable women, but virtuous women, *that their agreeable qualities may be*

of the heart, not of the mind." In consequence, he recommended that they should be taught history and literature, that they should be spared the study of the ancient languages and too abstruse sciences; that they should also learn sufficient of natural philosophy to be able to dispel the popular ignorance around them, somewhat of ordinary medicine, of botany, of dancing, *but not that of the Opera*, the art of ciphering, and all sorts of needlework. Their apartments, he added, must be furnished by their own handiwork. They must make their chemises, their stockings, their dresses, their caps, and be able, in case of need, to make clothes for their infants. I want to make these young girls useful women, certain that I shall thereby make them agreeable women. If I were to allow any one to set about making them agreeable women, I should soon have them turned into female coxcombs (*petites maîtresses*). (Finkenstein, May 15.)

Amidst this prodigious activity, sometimes changing from beneficent vigilance to jealous mistrust, which cannot fail to happen with a new and absolute master, Napoleon turned his attention to the police, knew what persons entered Paris and what left it. He was informed that Madame de Staël had returned thither, that she had already visited at several country houses in the environs, and made more than one hostile speech. Alleging that, if he did not interfere, she would compromise good citizens, whom he should afterwards be obliged to treat with severity, he had ordered her, notwithstanding many contrary solicitations, to be expelled from Paris. As he distrusted Fouché, the minister, who was disposed to spare influential persons, he had enjoined him to make her set off without delay, and had recommended to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès to see to the execution of this order. (March 26.) At the same moment he was informed that the police had sent away from Paris an old conventionalist named Ricord. For the latter nobody solicited, no great personage claimed indulgence; all were hurried away by the reaction, and there was neither favour nor humanity for those who were called revolutionists. "Why," wrote Napoleon to Fouché, "why send Ricord the conventionalist away from Paris? If he is a dangerous man, he ought not to have been suffered to return, contrary to the laws of the year VIII. But since he has been permitted to come back, he must be left there. What he did formerly is of little consequence. He conducted himself in the time of the Convention like a man anxious to make his fortune; he joined in the cry of the time. He is now in easy circumstances, and will not involve himself in any scrapes for the sake of a subsistence. Let him then be tolerated in Paris, unless there are strong reasons to prevent his residing there." (March 6.)

By the same pains that he took to inquire about everything,

he learned from MM. Monge and Laplace that a man of science, whom he particularly honoured and cherished, M. Berthollet, was in some pecuniary embarrassment. "I am informed," he wrote to him, "that you are in need of 150,000 francs. I shall give my treasurer an order to place that sum at your disposal, very glad to find this occasion to be useful to you, and to give you a proof of my esteem." (Finkenstein, May 1.)

He then addressed further advice to his brothers Louis and Joseph on the manner of reigning, the one in Holland, the other in Naples. He accused Louis of favouring, from the vanity of an upstart king, the party of the old government, the Orange party; of creating marshals without having an army; of instituting an order, which he gave to all comers; to Frenchmen who were unknown to him, to Dutchmen who had never rendered him any service. He reproached Joseph with being weak, careless, more engaged with ostentatious reforms than with the subjection of the Calabrias; with preceding the suppression of the monks, a measure which he highly approved, by a preamble that seemed to be drawn up by philosophers, not by statesmen. "Such a preamble," he said, "ought to be written in the style of an enlightened pontiff, who suppresses the monks because they are unserviceable to religion, burdensome to the Church. I conceive a bad opinion of a government whose *papers are directed by the mania of fine writing.*" (April 14.) "You live too much," said he, "with literary and scientific men. They are coquettes, with whom one must keep up a commerce of gallantry, but whom one must never think of making one's wife or one's minister." He reproached him with creating illusions respecting his situation at Naples, with flattering himself that he was beloved, when he had reigned but a year at most. "Ask yourself," said he, "what would become of you if there were no longer 30,000 French in Naples. When you have reigned twenty years, and have made yourself *feared and esteemed*, then you may venture to believe that your throne is consolidated." He then drew for him the following sketch of the situation of the French in Poland. "At Naples, you are eating green peas, and perhaps seeking the shade already: we, on the contrary, are still in the month of January. I have had the trenches opened before Dantzig. One hundred pieces of cannon, two hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, are beginning to be collected there. Our works are sixty fathoms from the place, which has a garrison of six thousand Russians and twenty thousand Prussians, commanded by Marshal Kalkreuth. I hope to take it in a fortnight. . . . For the rest, give yourself no uneasiness." (Finkenstein, April 19.)

Such were, amidst the snows of Poland, the various occupations of that extraordinary genius, embracing everything,

superintending everything, aspiring to govern not only his soldiers and his agents, but minds themselves: wanting not only to act, but to think for everybody; most frequently disposed to good, but sometimes, in his incessant activity, suffering himself to be drawn into evil, as it happens to him who can do anything, and who finds no obstacle to his own impulsions; at one time preventing reactions, persecutions, at another in the bosom of immense glory, so keenly sensitive to the sting of an enemy's tongue as to descend from his greatness to persecute a woman, on the same day that he defended a member of the Convention against the reacting spirit of the moment! Let us rejoice that we have at last become subject to the law, to the law equal for all, and which does not expose us to the peril of being dependent on the good or evil movements of even the greatest and the most generous of souls. Yes, the law is better than any human will, whatever it may be! Let us be just, however, to that will, which found means to accomplish such prodigious things, which accomplished them by our hands, which employed its fertile energy in reorganising French society, in reforming Europe, in carrying our power and our principles over the whole world, and which, if, after all that it did with us, it has not left us the power that passes away, has at least left us the glory that is permanent—and glory sometimes brings back power.

BOOK XXVII.

FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

WHILE Napoleon, cantoned on the Lower Vistula, was waiting amidst the snows of Poland for the return of spring to allow him to resume the offensive, and employing the interval of this apparent inaction in laying siege to Dantzig, in recruiting his army, in governing his vast empire, the east, having recently interfered in the quarrel of the west, afforded useful assistance to his arms, and procured signal success for his policy.

We have already made the reader acquainted with Sultan Selim, the nobleness of his character, the high qualities of his mind. We have also shown the embarrassment of his situation between Russia and England, whom he disliked, and France, to whom he was attached from taste, instinct, foresight, for he well knew that she, even in the days of her greatest ambition, would never covet Constantinople. We have yet to relate what had occurred while the French army was fighting in December the battle of Pultusk, and in February that of Eylau.

Sultan Selim, as we have seen, had begun by deposing the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Maruzzi and Ipsilanti, notoriously devoted to the policy of Russia. But M. d'Italinski having soon threatened him with an immediate rupture unless he replaced them in their post, he had yielded to the menaces of this representative of Russia, and made up his mind to commit the government of the provinces of the Danube to two professed enemies of his empire. Russia appealed, in order to extort this concession, to the treaty of Cainardgé, which conferred on her a sort of right to intervene in the government of Moldavia and Wallachia. No sooner had Sultan Selim, impelled much more by the will of his ministers than by his own, complied with the demand, than he wrote to Napoleon, to solicit his indulgence, to assure him that the act to which he had suffered himself to be urged was not a desertion of the alliance of France, but a measure of prudence commanded by the alarming disorganisation of the Turkish forces. Napoleon replied immediately, and far from discouraging him by expressions of displeasure, he had pitied, soothed, cheered, and offered him the twofold

succour of the French army of Dalmatia, which might be sent through Bosnia to the Lower Danube, and of the French fleet at Cadiz, which was ready to sail from Spain for the Dardanelles. That fleet, protected by the straits, as soon as it had passed the Bosphorus, would presently be mistress of the Black Sea, and afford a great support there to the Turks. Meanwhile, till this succour should arrive, Napoleon had ordered several officers, both engineers and artillery, to be despatched from Dalmatia, to assist the Turks in the defence of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. General Sebastiani, employing with skill the means placed at his disposal, had never ceased stimulating the sultan and the divan, to induce them to declare war against the Russians. He expatiated to them on the prodigious success of Napoleon in the plains of the north, his bold march beyond the Vistula, his grand project for reconstituting Poland, and promised, in his name, if the Porte would take arms, to obtain for it the revocation of the treaties which placed it in the dependence of Russia, perhaps even the restitution of the Crimea.

Sultan Selim would willingly have followed the advice of General Sebastiani, but his ministers were divided; one-half of them, sold to the Russians and the English, openly betrayed him; the other half trembled to think of the impotence into which the Ottoman empire had fallen. Though that empire still numbered more than 300,000 soldiers, mostly barbarians, some half-trained, and a fleet of about twenty ships of respectable appearance, these forces, as badly organised as they were commanded, could scarcely be opposed to the Russians and the English unless many French officers, admitted into the ranks of the Turkish army, should come and communicate at length European knowledge to the troops, who were brave, it is true, but whose fanaticism, cooled by time, could not make up as formerly for the want of the resources of military science.

While the Porte was involved in these perplexities, the Russians had put an end to its uncertainty by crossing the Dniester, even after the restoration of the hospodars. That invincible attraction which draws them toward Constantinople had silenced in them all the considerations of prudence. It was, in truth, an egregious blunder, when they had the French army upon their hands, and scarcely 200,000 men to oppose to it, to employ 50,000 of that number against the Turks. But amidst the convulsions of this age, the idea of seizing any occasion to take what they pleased was then the predominant idea of all governments. The Russians therefore said to themselves that the time was perhaps come for them to take possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. The English, on their part, were not sorry to find a pretext for reappearing in Egypt.

If they were not yet agreed upon the immediate partition of the Turkish empire—a subject on which it seemed very difficult for them to come to an agreement—they concurred at least in withdrawing the Porte from the influence of France, and of withdrawing it from that influence by force. The Russians were to cross the Dniester, and the English to pass the Dardanelles. At the same time a squadron was to attack Alexandria.

This explains why the Russians had passed the Dniester, even after the restoration of the hospodars. They had marched in three corps, one proceeding towards Choczin, another to Bender, and the third to Yassi. Their design was to advance upon Bucharest, to give the hand to the revolted Servians. Their active forces amounted to 40,000 men, and to 50,000 including the reserves left in rear.

While the Russians were acting on their side, the English Admiralty had ordered Rear-Admiral Louis to proceed with three ships to the Dardanelles, to pass through them without committing any hostile act, which might be done, as the Turks at that time granted a free passage to the armed ships of England and Russia, merely to reconnoitre the localities, to receive on board the families of the English merchants who should not choose to stay at Constantinople during the events with which it was threatened, and then to return to Tenedos, and wait for two divisions—the one under Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, drawn from the seas of the Levant, the other under Admiral Duckworth from Gibraltar. The three divisions, amounting to eight ships of the line, several frigates, cutters, and bomb-vessels, were to be placed under the command of Admiral Duckworth, and to act on the requisition of Mr. Arbuthnot, the ambassador of England at Constantinople.

When this display of force came to the knowledge of the Turks, either through the march of the Russians beyond the Dniester, or by the appearance of Rear-Admiral Louis at the Dardanelles, they considered war as inevitable, and they met it, some with enthusiasm, others with terror. Though Russia strongly protested her inoffensive intentions, and declared that her troops should come and occupy pacifically the Danubian provinces in order to ensure the execution of treaties, the Porte was not to be deceived, and sent M. d'Italinski his passports. The two straits were immediately closed against the military flag of all the powers. The pachas placed in the frontier provinces were ordered to collect troops; and Mustapha Baraictar, at the head of 80,000 men, was charged to punish the Russians for their contempt of the Turkish army—a contempt carried to such a length as to lead them to invade the empire with fewer than 50,000 men.

M. d'Italinski being gone, there was left at Constantinople

Mr. Arbuthnot, the English minister, whom there was no ground for dismissing, since no hostility had been committed by the British forces. He assumed in his turn a most threatening attitude, insisted on the recall of M. d'Italinski, the expulsion of General Sebastiani, the immediate adoption of a policy hostile to France, the renewal of the treaties which bound the Porte to Russia and England, lastly, the free passage of the straits for the British flag. It was impossible to carry exigency in things, arrogance in language, to a greater length. The ambassador even declared that if his conditions were not accepted forthwith, he should soon follow M. d'Italinski, and that he should go on board the English squadron lying at that moment at Tenedos, and bring it back by main force beneath the walls of Constantinople. This threat threw the divan into the greatest consternation. Little reliance could be placed on the fortifications of the Dardanelles, which had long been neglected; and the Dardanelles once passed, people trembled at the idea of an English squadron, master of the Sea of Marmora, battering with its guns the Seraglio, St. Sophia, and the arsenal of Constantinople.

Thus the disposition to yield was general. But the able ambassador who then represented France at Constantinople, and who had the advantage of being both a diplomatist and a soldier, upheld the sinking courage of the Turks. He pointed out to them all the mischiefs attached under this circumstance to a pusillanimous conduct. He set before their eyes the coincidence of the designs of England and Russia, the concert of their efforts for invading the Ottoman territory by land and sea, the speedy junction of a Russian army and a British fleet under the walls of the capital, the danger of a total partition of the empire, or at least a partial dismemberment, by the simultaneous occupation of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Egypt. He laid great stress on the name of Napoleon, his victories, his presence on the Vistula, and the advantages which would be found in his alliance. He announced the sending very shortly of considerable succours, and promised the restoration of the ancient Ottoman power, if the Turks would but display for a moment the courage of bygone times. These exhortations, reaching the sultan and the different members of the government, sometimes through direct, sometimes through indirect but well-chosen channels, seconded, moreover, by the evidence of the danger, by the tidings successively arriving of the triumphal progress of Napoleon, produced the effect that was to be expected, and the divan, after numerous alternations of exaltation and depression, put an end to this negotiation by refusing to accede to the demands of Mr. Arbuthnot, and by manifesting a firm resolution to allow him to depart.

The English minister left Constantinople on the 29th of January, and embarked in the *Endymion*, to be carried on board

the squadron lying off Tenedos, outside the Dardanelles. For a fortnight Mr. Arbuthnot never ceased threatening the Porte with the thunders of the British squadron, and thus employed in corresponding the time which Admiral Duckworth passed in waiting for a favourable wind. General Sebastiani, on his part, after working up the Porte to an energetic resolution, had a much more difficult task to perform, that of rousing it from its apathy, conquering its negligence, inducing it at length to raise some batteries, either on the straits or at Constantinople. This was not an easy matter with an incapable government, which had long since fallen into a kind of imbecility, and was paralysed at this moment by the fear of the English ships much more than by that of the Russian arms. However, by employing alternate urgency with the sultan and his ministers, assisted by his aides-de-camp, Messrs. de Lascours and de Coigny, he obtained a commencement of arming, which, though very imperfect, was nevertheless sufficient to excite some apprehensions in the English admiral, who wrote to his government that the operation, though not impracticable, would be more difficult than it was imagined in London.

At length, all the correspondence between Mr. Arbuthnot and the Reis-Effendi having proved ineffectual, a south wind, long wished for, having sprung up, Admiral Duckworth made sail on the morning of the 19th of February for the castles of the Dardanelles.

There is not a position in the world so well known even to the persons least versed in geographical knowledge as that of Constantinople, situated amidst the Sea of Marmora, an enclosed sea, to which there is no penetrating but by forcing the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. When, in coming from the Mediterranean, you have ascended the strait of the Dardanelles for fifteen leagues, a strait which, from the closeness of its shores and its continual current, resembles a large river, you enter the Sea of Marmora, about twenty leagues wide and thirty long, and you find seated on a beautiful promontory, washed on one side by the Sea of Marmora itself, on the other by the river of the Fresh Waters, the renowned city, which under the Greeks was Byzantium, under the Romans Constantinople, under the Turks Stamboul, the metropolis of Islamism. Beheld from the sea, it presents an amphitheatre of mosques and Moorish palaces, among which are distinguished the domes of St. Sophia, and quite at the extremity of the promontory which it occupies you perceive the Seraglio, where the descendants of Mahomet, plunged into voluptuousness, slumber over the danger of a bombardment, since their imbecile incapacity is no longer competent to the defence of the Dardanelles, those two doors of their empire, which it is nevertheless so easy to shut.

When you have cleared the Dardanelles, traversed the Sea of Marmora, and passed the promontory on which Constantinople is seated, you arrive at a second strait, narrower, more formidable, seven leagues only in length, and the shores of which are so near to each other, that a squadron must infallibly perish if it were well defended. This strait is that of the Bosphorus, which leads to the Black Sea. The Dardanelles are for the Ottoman empire the door opened towards England, the Bosphorus the door opened towards Russia. But if the Russians have against them the narrow dimensions of the Bosphorus, the English have against them the current setting incessantly from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. It was against this current, which it is impossible to overcome without a favourable south wind, that the English began to beat up on the 19th of February 1807. Admiral Duckworth, having under his command the two rear-admirals, Louis and Sir Sidney Smith, with seven ships of the line, two frigates, and several cutters and bomb-vessels, sailed in column up the strait of the Dardanelles. He had on the preceding day lost one of his ships, the *Ajax*, which had been consumed by fire. By the aid of the wind he had soon cleared the first part of the channel, which runs from west to east, and which is of such width that the possessors have never thought of defending it. From the cape called that of the Barbers, to Sestos and Abydos, the canal turns northward, and it becomes so narrow in that part that it is extremely dangerous to defy its cross-fires. It then turns eastward again, forming an elbow, upon which are formidable batteries. These batteries rake ships fore and aft, so that a squadron daring enough to force the passage, cannonaded on the right and on the left by the batteries of Europe and Asia, is met also by the fire of the batteries of Sestos for the space of above a league. It is at the entrance and at the outlet of this narrow passage that the castles called the Dardanelles are situated. They are constructed of ancient masonry, mounted with heavy, unmanageable artillery, which threw enormous stone balls, formerly the terror of the Christian navies.

The English squadron, in spite of the efforts of General Sebastiani to excite the Turks to defend the Dardanelles, had no great perils to encounter. Not one of its masts was shattered; it got off with a few torn sails, and about sixty men killed or wounded. Having arrived at Cape Nagara, at the entrance of the Sea of Marmora, it found a Turkish division at anchor; it consisted of one ship of 64 guns, four small frigates, and two cutters. This division could not have been placed in a worse or more useless position. To have been of any service, it must have been well posted, well directed, and have added its action to that of the land batteries. But inactive during the passage, and confined

after the passage to an anchorage without defence, it was a prey offered to the English to compensate them for the fire which they had just endured, without being able to return it. Sir Sidney Smith was ordered to destroy it, which was no difficult business, for the crews were for the most part on shore. In a few moments the Turkish vessels were obliged to make for the shore. The English followed them in their boats, and not being sure that they should be able to bring them off on their return, they preferred burning them immediately, which they did, with the exception of one cutter that had been left by them at the anchorage. This second operation, however, cost them about thirty men.

On the morning of the 21st of February they appeared before the city of Constantinople, terrified to see an enemy's squadron whose fire nothing could keep off or counteract. Part of the population insisted trembling on compliance with the demands of the English. The other part, indignant, raised shouts of fury. The women of the Seraglio, exposed first to Admiral Duckworth's fire, disturbed the imperial palace by their lamentations. Alternate fits of weakness and courage recommenced in the bosom of the divan. Sultan Selim was for resisting; but the clamours with which he was assailed, the counsels of some dishonest ministers, alleging, in order to persuade him to yield, a destitution of resources of which they were themselves the guilty authors, contributed to shake his heart, more noble than energetic. Meanwhile the ambassador of France hastened to Selim, strove to make him, his ministers, all about him, blush at the idea of surrendering to a squadron which had not a soldier to land, and which might burn a few houses, and shatter the roofs of some edifices, but which would at last be obliged to retire after useless and hateful ravages. His advice was to resist the English, to gain time by means of a feigned negotiation, to send the women, the court, all who trembled, all who shouted, to Adrianople, then to employ the energetic portion of the population in raising batteries on Seraglio Point, and this done, to treat with the British fleet, with the muzzles of their guns pointed at it.

For the rest, the pretensions of the English were of a nature to second by their harshness and arrogance the counsels of M. Sebastiani. Mr. Arbuthnot, to whom the admiral was subordinate in all that related to politics, had determined to send a preliminary summons to the Porte, demanding the expulsion of the French legation, an immediate declaration of war against France, the delivery of the whole Turkish fleet, lastly, the occupation of the forts of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the English and the Russians. To comply with such demands would be placing the empire, its navy, the keys of its capital, at the discretion of its enemies by land and sea. While awaiting the

answer, the English went and anchored off the Princes' Islands, near the coast of Asia, at some distance from Constantinople.

General Sebastiani did not fail to represent to the sultan and his ministers how disgraceful and dangerous it would be to submit to such conditions. Luckily, just at that moment arrived a courier from the banks of the Vistula, bringing a fresh letter from Napoleon, full of warm exhortations for the sultan. "Generous Selim," said he, "prove thyself worthy of the descendants of Mahomet! The hour is come to release thyself from the treaties which oppress thee. I am near thee, engaged in reconstituting Poland, thy friend and thine ally. One of my armies is ready to descend the Danube, and to take the Russians in flank, while thou shalt attack them in front. One of my squadrons is about to sail from Toulon, to guard thy capital and the Black Sea. Courage, then, for never wilt thou find such an occasion for raising thine empire and shedding glory on thy memory!" These exhortations, though not new, could not come more seasonably. The heart of Selim, cheered by the words of Napoleon and by the urgent importunities of General Sebastiani, was filled with the noblest sentiments. He spoke energetically to his ministers. He assembled the divan and the ulemas, communicated to them the propositions of the English, fired all souls with indignation, and it was unanimously resolved to resist the English fleet whatever it might attempt, but to follow the able counsels of General Sebastiani, that is to say, to endeavour to gain time by parleys, and to employ the time so gained in throwing up formidable batteries around Constantinople.

The first thing that was done was to reply to Mr. Arbuthnot, that, without examining the grounds of his propositions, they could not listen to them till the English squadron had taken a less threatening position, for it was not befitting the dignity of the Porte to deliberate under the enemy's guns. It took at least a day to go from Constantinople to the Princes' Islands and to return from them. It required, therefore, but a small number of communications to gain the few days that were needed. When the answer of the Porte arrived, Mr. Arbuthnot had been suddenly taken ill, but his influence continued to preponderate in the English squadron. The admirals were sensible, like himself, that to bombard Constantinople would be a barbarous enterprise, that having no land troops they should be obliged, if the Turks were determined to resist, to retire after committing useless ravages; that in order to get away they should, moreover, be obliged to force the Dardanelles again, with a perhaps damaged squadron and under batteries probably better defended the second time than the first. They deemed it, therefore, wiser to obtain, by intimidation and without proceeding to a bombardment, all or part of their demands. The

delivery of the Turkish fleet was the trophy of which they were most tenacious. In consequence, Admiral Duckworth, supplying the place of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was ill, replied to the Turks that he was ready to agree to a fit place for negotiating, and desired that it might be immediately fixed, in order that he might send one of his officers thither. The Porte was in no hurry to answer this communication, and on the day after the next it proposed Kadikoï, the ancient Chalcedon, below Scutari, opposite to Constantinople. In the state of exasperation in which the Turks then were, the place was neither the safest nor the most suitable for the English officer ordered to repair thither. Admiral Duckworth remarked this, and desired that some other place might be chosen, threatening to act immediately if the Turks did not make haste to open the negotiations.

A few days had been gained by means of these illusory parleys, and they had been employed at Constantinople in the most active and judicious manner. Several officers of artillery and engineers, detached from the army of Dalmatia, had just arrived. General Sebastiani, seconded by them, encamped himself among the Turks. The whole legation had followed him. The young linguists, hastening to the works, served for interpreters. With the concurrence of the population and of our officers, formidable batteries rose, as by enchantment, on Seraglio Point, and in that part of the city bordering the Sea of Marmora. Nearly three hundred pieces of cannon, drawn by the enthusiastic populace, who at that moment regarded the French as saviours, were placed in battery. Sultan Selim, whom the sight of these preparations, so promptly executed, filled with joy, desired that a tent should be pitched for him beside that of the French ambassador, and required each of his ministers to come and establish himself in one of the batteries. Constantinople assumed from hour to hour a more imposing aspect, and the English saw new embrasures opened, and the muzzles of cannon protruding from them.

After seven or eight days thus employed, the fear which at first withheld the English, that of a useless, perhaps dangerous devastation, followed by a second passage of the Dardanelles more difficult than the first—that fear became every day more founded. Perceiving that he gained nothing by waiting, Admiral Duckworth sent a final summons, in which, having taken care to reduce his demands and to increase his threats, he merely required that the Turkish fleet should be delivered up to him, and declared that he should proceed to Constantinople unless a place fit for negotiation were immediately pointed out to him. This time, everything being nearly completed at Constantinople, the answer given to the English admiral was that, in the state of people's minds, they knew not a place

safe enough for them to venture to guarantee the lives of the negotiators who might be sent thither.

After such an answer, there was nothing further to do but to commence the cannonade. But Admiral Duckworth had only seven ships of the line and two frigates: he beheld a frightful mass of artillery pointed at him, and he was informed, moreover, that through the exertions of the French the passes of the Dardanelles were bristling with cannon. It was therefore certain that he should commit a barbarity on Constantinople alike without aim and without excuse, and arrive with a disabled squadron before a strait which it had become much more dangerous to pass through. In consequence, after staying eleven days in the Sea of Marmora, he weighed anchor on the 2nd of March, appeared in line of battle under the walls of Constantinople, stood in nearly to within gun-shot, and perceiving that he did not intimidate the Turks, who were prepared to defend themselves, he went and anchored at the entrance of the Dardanelles, intending to pass through on the following day.

If mortification and confusion reigned on board the English squadron, boundless was the joy that burst forth in Constantinople at the sight of the enemy's sails disappearing at the horizon in the direction of the Dardanelles. French and Turks congratulated themselves on this happy result of a moment of courage, and in the enthusiasm of success the Turkish squadron, which had been speedily equipped, determined to sail in pursuit of the English. General Sebastiani strove, but in vain, to prevent this imprudence, which might furnish Admiral Duckworth with an occasion to mark his retreat with the destruction of the Turkish fleet. But the people raised such shouts, and the crews were so animated, that the government, not capable of withstanding the outburst of courage any more than that of cowardice, was obliged to consent to the departure of the squadron. The capitan-pacha weighed anchor, while the English, in haste to retreat, fled, without being aware of it, from the triumph that was running after them.

Next day, the 3rd of March, the English squadron entered the narrow and dangerous part of the strait of the Dardanelles. The small number of French officers whom it had been possible to send to the strait had there awakened the zeal of the Turks as successfully as at Constantinople. The batteries were repaired and better served. Unluckily, the heavy artillery, mounted on wretched carriages, was in the hands of inexpert pointers. A certain number of large marble balls, more than two feet in diameter, and which, if well directed, would have been very dangerous, were nevertheless discharged at the English squadron. The English were but an hour and a half in clearing the narrow part of the canal, from Cape Nagara to the

Barbers' Cape, thanks to a north wind which was very favourable to their progress. They behaved with the usual intrepidity of their navy, but sustained this time serious damage. Several of their ships were perforated by those prodigious projectiles, which would have sunk them if they had been hollow and charged with powder like those now used. Most of the ships of the squadron, on leaving the strait, were in a state that required speedy repairs. This second passage cost the English two hundred men, killed and wounded, an inconsiderable loss if compared with the slaughter in great land battles, but not unimportant when compared with what takes place in sea-fights. While the English squadron was leaving the strait, Admiral Siniavin was arriving at Tenedos with a Russian division of six ships. He used the strongest importunities to prevail on Admiral Duckworth to recommence the operation. After the check which had just been sustained, a fresh attempt would have been extravagant; for six Russian ships would not have materially changed the situation or lessened the difficulty.

Such was the end of that enterprise, which miscarried through the inadequacy of the means employed and scruples of humanity not usual at that time with English policy. England appeared singularly affected with this result. In Napoleon it excited a very natural joy, for independently of the moral effect produced in Europe by the affair of Constantinople, an effect entirely in his favour, the quarrel with the Turks became one of the most useful diversions for his arms.

Europe was at this moment deeply moved by the terrible battle of Eylau, which led to comments extremely diverse in spirit. Some rejoiced that a foe had at last been found capable of making head against the French; others, in much greater number, were affrighted at the condition upon which that foe had been able to resist them for a moment—a terrible condition, for it had obliged him to give them an army to slaughter, by throwing it in their way, like a physical obstacle, to destroy. For the first time, it is true, the success obtained by the French had not been so decisive as usual, especially in appearance; but the Russian army had nevertheless lost in that sanguinary fight one-third of its effective; and if General Benningsen, to cloak his defeat, did attempt some presumptuous demonstrations in face of our winter quarters, it was impossible for him to venture upon anything in consequence, or to oppose one of the sieges undertaken before his eyes. Napoleon, who began to be joined by his reinforcements, had for overwhelming him one hundred thousand men present under arms, not including the French troops or allies who, protected by the grand army, were carrying on the siege of Dantzig on the left, and completing the conquest of the fortresses of Silesia on the right. The only

difficulty which prevented Napoleon from putting an end to this campaign, already very long, was, as we have seen, that of transport. Had there been a hard frost, he could have taken with him upon sledges sufficient to subsist the army during an offensive operation; but the alternations of frost and thaw rendered it impossible to carry a supply for a few days. He was therefore obliged to wait for a change of season, and M. de Talleyrand, left at Warsaw, resorted to solicitations, money, promises, even threats, to ensure the transport of indispensable provisions from the Vistula to the Passarge.

In this situation, which might be prolonged for months, there was room for negotiations. Since Napoleon had been made sensible of the force of natural obstacles, and especially since he had observed Poland more closely, that intoxication which had carried him to the Vistula was somewhat dispelled. He had discovered that the Russians, little to be dreaded by French soldiers if one went not to seek them beyond the Danube and the Elbe, when assisted by the climate, became an enemy whom it was difficult and took long to conquer. Struck at first by the enthusiasm which burst forth at Posen, Napoleon had conceived that the Poles might be able to furnish him with a hundred thousand men; but he had soon seen the country people indifferent to a change of government, which left them slaves of the soil under all masters, escaping from the horrors of war by flight into Austrian Poland; the population of the towns enthusiastic, and ready to devote itself without reserve, but the nobility, with more forecast, making conditions, which could not be accepted without imprudence; the officers who had served in the French armies living on bad terms with the nobles who had not quitted their mansions; both adding by their susceptibilities to the difficulties of the military organisation of the country; lastly, the levies, which were to amount to 100,000 men, reduced to 15,000 young soldiers, organised into twenty battalions, destined at a future day to cover themselves with glory under the gallant Poniatowski, but at this moment almost strangers to military habits, and provoking the ridicule of our soldiers. Napoleon had seen all this, and he was less ardent to reconstitute Poland, less disposed, since he was better acquainted with it, to convulse the continent for its re-establishment. Without doubting his own power, he had a more just conception of the obstacles which Nature can oppose to the most heroic army, and a less favourable opinion of the work which had drawn him into the plains of the north. He was therefore rather more inclined to listen to pacific proposals, without departing on that account from any of his pretensions, because he was sure on the return of spring to demolish all the armies that might be brought against him. In a negotiation which should lead to peace he saw nothing but

a saving of time and blood; for as to dangers, he deemed himself capable of surmounting all, whatever they might be.

Since the battle of Eylau, several flags of truce had passed to and fro between Königsberg and Osterode. Under the first impression of that battle, Napoleon had sent word by General Bertrand to King Frederick William that he was ready to restore his dominions, but only as far as the Elbe, which would entail upon that prince the loss of the provinces in Westphalia, Saxony, and Franconia, that is to say, nearly a fourth of the Prussian monarchy, but which would at least ensure to him the restitution of the other three-fourths. Napoleon added that, filled with esteem for the monarch who reigned over Prussia, he would rather grant this restitution to himself than to the intervention of Russia. The unfortunate Frederick William, though the sacrifice was great, though his soldiers had behaved honourably at Eylau, and though he found himself somewhat raised in the estimation of his allies, indulged in no illusion; and that battle of Eylau, which the Russians called almost a victory, was in his eyes but a sanguinary defeat, differing from Jena and from Austerlitz only in having cost the French more blood, and having led, owing to the season, to less decisive results. He was persuaded that in spring the French would put a speedy and disastrous end to the war. But the queen, but the war party, excited by the late military events, by the influence of Russia, to which the Prussian court was unfortunately too near at Königsberg, did not appreciate the situation with so sound a judgment as the king, and in dictating an evasive answer to the friendly message which General Bertrand was commissioned to deliver, prevented any advantage from being derived from the momentarily pacific disposition of Napoleon.

Thus the obstinacy of the struggle with Russia had for an instant brought back Napoleon towards Prussia. Happy had it been if, reconciling himself completely with her, restoring to her not only her provinces beyond the Elbe, but her provinces on this side of it, he had sought to attach her definitively by this act equally generous and politic. But again finding King Frederick William weak, wavering, controlled, he was anew convinced that Prussia was not to be relied on; and from that day he never thought of her but to despise, to maltreat, and to lessen her. Not quite so much intoxicated, however, as after Jena, he was anew led to believe that in order to sway the continent and to exclude English influence from it, in order *to conquer the sea on the land*, he needed not only victories but a great alliance. He had believed this after Marengo and Hohenlinden; he had believed it after Austerlitz and before Jena; after Jena, without believing it the less, he had ceased for a moment to think of it; but he believed it again after Pultusk

and Eylau; and meditating incessantly on his situation amidst the difficulties of this war, he considered what alliance he could obtain. Setting aside Prussia, there were left Russia, with which he was battling, and Austria, which under the appearance of neutrality was preparing armaments upon his rear. Though the court of Russia, excited by the suggestions of England, and by the boasting of General Benningsen, appeared more animated than ever, yet its generals, its officers, its soldiers, who bore the burden of this frightful war, who found themselves reduced one-half by the battles of Czarnowo, Pultusk, Golymin, and Eylau, who, thanks to a barbarous administration, lived on a few potatoes scratched from under the snow with the points of their bayonets, entertained very different sentiments, and held a very different language from the courtiers of Petersburg. Filled with admiration of the French army, feeling towards it none of those national antipathies arising sometimes from neighbourhood or even from a common origin, they asked themselves why they were expected to spill their blood for the benefit of the English, who were in no hurry to support them, and for the Prussians, who were not capable of defending themselves.

The idea that France and Russia, at the distance which parts them from one another, had no ground for quarrel, occurred to the minds of such of the Russian officers as reasoned, and was repeated in all their conversations. Several of our officers, taken prisoners and exchanged, had heard the strongest language on this subject from the lips of even the bravest of the Russian generals, Prince Bagration, who commanded the Russian advanced guards and rearguards by turns, the advanced guards when attacking, the rearguards when retreating.

These particulars, reported to Napoleon, furnished him with subject for reflection. He said to himself, even amidst the horrors of the present war, that it was perhaps with Russia that he ought to seek a reconciliation in order to close the ports and the cabinets of the continent against England. But if that alliance could be conceived, it was not between two battles, when one was obliged to communicate with the advanced posts by means of a trumpet, that one could find means to prepare and conclude it. This actual impossibility forced him to revert to Austria. Calling to mind what the Archduke Ferdinand had said to him at Wurzburg, he was anew led to think of an alliance with the court of Vienna, in spite of the armaments with which she threatened him; especially when he considered that he had now the power to restore to her what half a century before would have filled her with joy—Silesia, that Northern Lombardy, which she had so keenly regretted, which she had made so many efforts to recover, and for the sake of which she had been for thirty years the ally of France. Removed from

the bivouac of Osterode to the mansion of Finkenstein, and there, sometimes making the round of his cantonments, and riding so much as thirty leagues a day, sometimes corresponding with his agents in Poland for the supply of the army, or with his ministers in Paris for the administration of the empire, lastly, sometimes, in the long nights of the north, ruminating upon plans of general policy, after weighing all the alliances, he had ended by reducing himself to two, and concluding that he must choose between that of Russia and that of Austria. In correspondence with M. de Talleyrand, who remained at Warsaw, and who there directed the foreign affairs, he wrote to him: "*All this must end in a system with Russia or in a system with Austria.* Think well of this; fix your ideas; and oblige Austria to come to a definitive explanation with us."

But Austria covered herself with an impenetrable veil. While General Andreossy, our ambassador at Vienna, was daily reporting acts tending to produce uneasiness, such as levies of men, purchases of horses, the formation of magazines, General Baron de Vincent, on the contrary, sent to Warsaw by the court of Austria, was incessantly affirming, with every appearance of frankness, that Austria, exhausted, was incapable of making war; that she was resolved not to break the peace, unless she were subjected to treatment impossible to be borne; that if she was taking some precautions, they must not be regarded as preparations hostile or threatening for France, but as measures of prudence commanded by a terrible war, which embraced the entire circle of her frontiers, and particularly by the state of the Galicias, which were much agitated by the rising in Poland. M. de Talleyrand had suffered himself to be persuaded that he ought instantly to denounce General Andreossy to Napoleon as a dangerous agent, observing and judging wrongly of what was passing around him, and capable, if he were listened to, of embroiling the two courts by means of incorrect and malevolent reports.

Napoleon, though like every other man he was apt to believe what pleased him, though he was fain to think that Austria could not raise herself after the blows which she had received at Austerlitz and Ulm, that she never durst break her word given to him personally at the bivouac of Urschitz—Napoleon, enlightened by danger, put more faith in the reports of General Andreossy than in those of Baron de Vincent. "Yes," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand, "General Andreossy is opinionated, an indifferent observer, probably exaggerating what he sees; but you are credulous, as inclined to allow yourself to be seduced, as you are clever at seducing others. One need but flatter in order to deceive you. M. de Vincent cozens while coaxing you. Austria fears us, but she hates us; she is arming to take advan-

tage of any reverse. If we gain a great victory in spring, she will behave like M. d'Haugwitz the day after Austerlitz, and you will have been right. If the war is merely doubtful, we shall find her in arms upon our rear. Meanwhile we must oblige her to speak out. It is, in fact, a great fault in her not to come to an understanding with us at once, and not to take advantage of a moment when we are masters of Prussia to recover through our means what Frederick formerly wrested from her. She can, if she pleases, indemnify herself in a day for all that she has lost in half a century, and remake the fortune of the house of Austria, so much diminished at one time by Prussia, at another by France. But she must explain herself. Does she want indemnities for what she has lost? I offer her Silesia. Does the state of the east alarm her? I am ready to satisfy her respecting the fate of the Lower Danube, by disposing of Moldavia and Wallachia as she pleases. Is our presence in Dalmatia a subject of umbrage? I am quite disposed to make sacrifices on that point by means of an exchange of territory. Or lastly, is it for war that she is preparing, to try for the last time the power of her arms, taking advantage of the union of the whole continent against us? Be it so—I accept this new adversary. But let her not hope to surprise me. None but women and children can believe that I shall go and penetrate into the deserts of Russia without having taken my precautions. Austria will not find me unprepared. In Saxony, in Bavaria, in Italy, she will meet with armies ready to oppose her. She will see me by a rearward march drop down upon her with my whole weight, crush her, treat her worse than any of the powers that I have ever conquered. I will make a terrible, a striking example of her treachery, of which the present fate of Prussia cannot convey an idea. Let her speak out then, that I may know what I have to depend upon in regard to her dispositions."

Napoleon recommended to M. de Talleyrand not to leave M. de Vincent any rest, but to make incessant attempts to sound the depths of the policy of Austria. M. de Talleyrand, stimulated by the emperor, divided his time between exhortations to the Polish government to furnish provisions and waggons, and interviews with M. de Vincent, to draw from him in a hundred different conversations the secret of his court.

That secret he sought in the most insignificant expressions of the Austrian envoy, in the slightest movements of his countenance. Sometimes he was free and easy with him, and strove to provoke his candour by unbounded communicativeness. Sometimes he endeavoured to surprise and agitate him by laying abruptly before him, with feigned anger, accounts of the armaments received from Vienna. M. de Vincent, whether from art or sincerity, always repeated his story, that people at Vienna

neither would nor could make war, that they were content to guard themselves without thinking of attacking anybody. However, when M. de Talleyrand, proceeding further, talked sometimes of Silesia, sometimes of the provinces of the Danube, sometimes of Dalmatia, as the price of an alliance, the Austrian minister replied that he had no instructions respecting affairs of such importance, and begged leave to refer to his court, which he did by communicating immediately to M. de Stadion the overtures of M. de Talleyrand.

M. de Stadion then directed the foreign affairs of Austria in a spirit still more hostile to France than the Cobenzels had done, but we must do him the justice to admit, without concealing so many hostile sentiments under the mask of cordiality. For the rest, though full of hatred, he could control himself, and maintained a suitable reserve. The secret of M. de Stadion and of his court was easy to penetrate if one would set aside appearances that pleased, and confine one's self to the ground of things which had nothing pleasing in it. Austria was arming to take advantage of our reverses, which in her was but very natural, and it was a great error to suppose that one could conciliate that vindictive power with brilliant offers. She was animated, in fact, by a hatred which would have prevented her from justly appreciating solid and real advantages if they had been offered her, and much more insufficient advantages, such as a portion of Silesia, of Moldavia, or of Dalmatia—advantages far inferior to all that she had lost during the last fifteen years. Still she would have accepted them, no doubt, insufficient as they were, if she had imagined that, in the then state of the world, anything could be given in a solid and durable manner. But amidst the continual changes of the European States, she conceived that there was nothing stable, and she was not disposed to take, in compensation for hereditary provinces, anciently belonging to her house, provinces given by the policy of the moment, liable to be as lightly withdrawn as they were given, and which, besides, would have to be purchased by a war with her usual allies, for the advantage of him whom she accused of being the author of all her calamities. Thus on the part of Napoleon there was nothing that could attract or excite confidence. Her refusal of all offers coming from him was certain beforehand. But pressed with questions, she could not shut herself up either in absolute silence or in a general refusal to listen to any proposal. She therefore bethought her of an expedient, which would furnish her for the moment with a suitable answer, and ensure to her afterwards the means of profiting by events, whatever they might be. In consequence, she conceived the idea of offering France her mediation with the belligerent courts. Nothing could be better calculated for the present or for the future. For the

present, it proved that she was desirous of peace, by labouring for it herself. For the future, she would labour sincerely for this peace, and she would take care to direct its conditions in a spirit conformable to her policy, if Napoleon were victorious. If, on the contrary, Napoleon were vanquished, or only half victorious, she would pass from a modest mediation to an imposed mediation. She would moderate or crush him, according to circumstances. She would reserve for herself, in short, the means of entering into the quarrel at pleasure, and having once entered into it, of conducting herself as Fortune might suggest.

M. de Stadion charged the Baron de Vincent to reply to M. de Talleyrand that the court of Vienna was deeply sensible to the offers of the Emperor of the French, but advantageous as were these offers, it could not accept them, for they would lead to a war either with the Germans, who were its countrymen, or the Russians, who were its allies; and that as for war, it deprecated it for any cause or with any person, for it declared itself incapable of maintaining it—an admission not dangerous at a moment when Austria was making the most imposing military preparations—that it was desirous of peace, peace alone, which it preferred to the most valuable acquisitions; that as a proof of this love of peace it offered to interpose to negotiate it, and that, if France assented, it would undertake to bring into it the cabinets of Berlin, Petersburg, and London; that M. de Budberg, minister of the Emperor Alexander, having been consulted on the subject, had already accepted the good offices of the court of Vienna, and that in London, another cabinet having taken the direction of affairs [that of Castlereagh and Canning], there was a chance of meeting with pacific dispositions in these new representatives of the English policy, for they would probably be delighted to render themselves popular in England, by giving peace on their accession to office. M. de Stadion directed the Austrian envoy to add that the court of Vienna would deem itself happy if the all-powerful Emperor of the French should regard this offer as a pledge of the sentiments of disinterestedness and concord which animated the Emperor of Austria.

The all-powerful Emperor of the French had not less perspicacity than power, and when this answer was sent from Warsaw to Finkenstein, he was not deceived by it. He seized its meaning with as much promptness as he would have discovered the movements of an enemy's army on the field of battle. "This," he immediately replied to M. de Talleyrand, "is a first step of Austria, a commencement of intervention in events. Resolved not to intermeddle at all in the struggle kept up by France, Prussia, Russia, and England, she would not even risk compromising herself by transmitting the words of the one to the others. To offer herself as mediator is to prepare herself

for war, is to secure for herself a decent means of taking part in it, means which she has need of after the declarations from cabinet to cabinet, after the oaths from sovereign to sovereign, by which she has promised to refrain from it for ever. This circumstance," added Napoleon, "is unfortunate, for it forebodes the presence of an Austrian army on the Oder and on the Elbe, while we are on the Vistula. But it is impossible to refuse this mediation. It would be a contradiction to our usual language, which has always represented us as disposed to peace. It would above all expose us to the risk of accelerating the determinations of Austria by a peremptory refusal, which would affront her, and oblige her to take an immediate resolution. We must, therefore, gain time, and answer, that the offer of mediation is too indirect for us to accept it positively; but that, in all cases, the good offices of the court of Vienna will always be received with gratitude and confidence."

M. de Talleyrand, directed by Napoleon, gave the prescribed answer to M. de Vincent, and manifested a certain disposition to accept the mediation of Austria, but seemed at the same time to doubt whether the offer of this mediation was serious. M. de Vincent affirmed, on the contrary, that this offer was perfectly serious, and for the rest, declared that he would refer the matter to his court. He wrote accordingly to M. de Stadion, who, on his part, gave a prompt reply. In a very few days, in fact, the court of Vienna intimated that it was ready to proceed from mere parleys to a formal proposal; that it was certain to get the mediation accepted in Petersburg and London; that it should, moreover, address that same day the positive offer both to France and Prussia, and to Russia and England; and that she awaited the precise expression of the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon on the subject.

This answer, so prompt and so plain, supported by armaments of which there could be no further doubt, appeared to Napoleon an extremely serious act, the drift of which it was impossible to dissemble, to which unfortunately no other reply could be given than by an acceptance, but against the consequences of which it was necessary to provide by means of immediate and imposing precautions. He wrote in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand, and sent him from Finkenstein a draft of the note which will be found below. He intimated to him at the same time that he was about to add to that note new preparations, more formidable than ever, and of which it was necessary to inform Austria immediately, that she might know in what manner her intervention, friendly or hostile, diplomatic or warlike, would be received.

The answer to the offer of mediation was as follows:—

"The undersigned minister of foreign affairs has submitted to

his majesty, the emperor and king, the note delivered to him by M. the Baron de Vincent.

"The emperor accepts for himself and his allies the amicable intervention of the Emperor Francis II. for the re-establishment of peace, so necessary to all the nations. He has but one fear, namely, that the power which hitherto appears to have made a system of founding its power and its greatness on the divisions of the continent, will strive to draw from this step new subjects of animosity and new pretexts for dissensions. However, any way that can encourage a hope of the cessation of bloodshed, and at length bring consolation among so many families, ought not to be neglected by France, which, as all Europe knows, was dragged in spite of herself into the last war.

"The Emperor Napoleon finds, moreover, in this circumstance a natural and signal occasion to testify to the sovereign of Austria the confidence with which he inspires him, and the desire which he has to see those bonds knitted more closely between the two nations, which in other times constituted their common prosperity, and which at this day can more than anything else consolidate their tranquillity and their well-being."

These parleys had occupied the whole month of March. The weather had become severe. The frost, which had been looked for in vain during the winter, came on in spring. The military operations were obliged to be again deferred. Napoleon resolved to avail himself of this delay to give his forces an immense development, and as formidable in appearance as it would be in reality. His intention was, without draining Italy or France too much, to increase his active army by at least one-third, and to form on the Elbe an army of reserve of 100,000 men, in order to be strong enough to crush both the Russians and the Prussians on the very opening of the campaign, and to be able, in case of necessity, to turn against Austria if she decided to take part in the war.

To attain this twofold result, he resolved to call out a new conscription, that of 1808, though it was only March 1807. He had already called out that of 1807 in 1806, and that of 1806 in 1805, in order to procure the young conscripts an apprenticeship of twelve or fifteen months, and to keep his depôts always full. The general effective of the French army, which had been raised from 502,000 men to 580,000 by the conscription of 1807, would be increased by that of 1808 to about 650,000, exclusively of the allies. Owing to the skill with which he managed his resources, Napoleon would find in this increase of effective the means of supplying all his wants and of meeting all events.

But there was some difficulty, after calling in November 1806 for the conscription of 1807, to call in March 1807 for that of 1808. It was making two calls in five months, and raising

150,000 men at once. Napoleon himself drew up the decree, sent it immediately to Cambacérès, the arch-chancellor, who supplied his place at the head of the government, and to M. Lacuée, who was charged with the calls, telling them both that he knew and foresaw the objections to which such measures were liable to give rise, but that they must not stop a moment for them; for a single objection raised in the Council of State, or in the Senate, would weaken him in Europe, and bring Austria upon him; and then it would not be two conscriptions, but three or four, that they would be obliged to decree, perhaps to no purpose, and be vanquished at last. "Things," he thus wrote, "must not be considered in a narrow point of view, but in a wide point of view; they must be considered especially in all their political bearings. A conscription announced and resolved upon, without hesitation, which perhaps I shall not call for, which certainly I shall not send to the active army, for I am not going to wage war with boys, will cause Austria to drop her arms. The least hesitation, on the contrary, would induce her to resume them, and to use them against us. No objection, I repeat, but an immediate and punctual execution of the decree which I send you—that is the way to have peace—to have a speedy, a magnificent peace."

Having despatched this decree to Paris, Napoleon sent it to M. de Talleyrand at Warsaw, desiring him to communicate it to M. de Vincent, with an express recommendation to make him acquainted with the new display of forces which was preparing in France, and to lay before him a statement of the expenses which would thence result for all the belligerent powers and for Austria in particular; to declare to him without circumlocution that the emperor had divined the drift of the mediation, that he accepted that mediation, but with a knowledge of what it signified; that to offer peace was well, but that peace ought to be offered *with a white truncheon in the hand;* that the armaments of Austria, henceforth impossible to be denied, were a very unsuitable accompaniment to an offer of mediation; that, for the rest, he explained himself with this frankness to prevent calamities, to save Austria herself from them; that if she chose to send Austrian officers to France and Italy, an engagement should be given to show them the depôts, the camps of reserve, the divisions on march, and they should see that, independently of the 300,000 French already present in Germany, a second army of 100,000 men was preparing to cross the Rhine, to check any hostile movement on the part of the court of Vienna.

These communications came very seasonably. M. de Vincent could not conceal his emotion when informed of the new increase of our forces, and protested a thousand times more, in the name of his government, that its intentions were most pacific. The movements of troops which were complained of were, he said,

but symptoms of a reorganisation undertaken by the Archduke Charles, in order to render the Austrian army less expensive, and to introduce into it various improvements borrowed from the French armies. If any corps seemed to approach the frontiers of Poland, they were there only by way of precaution respecting the Galicias, extremely agitated by what was passing in their neighbourhood. The offer of mediation ought to be regarded only as a proof of a desire to put an end to a war which was desolating the world; and it must be recognised not as a longing to intermeddle in that war, but as a frank and sincere wish to put a stop to it. For the rest, the emperor would soon be enabled to judge of this matter by the results, and to assure himself of the sincerity of Austria by her persisting in remaining neuter.

The intimations sent by Napoleon to Paris arrived not less opportunely than his communications at Vienna. Though his star still shone in all its splendour, though the marvels of Austerlitz and Jena had not yet lost any of their spell, though people were impressed as deeply as they ought to have been with that grand and prodigious spectacle of a French army wintering quietly on the Vistula, certain detractors, extremely obsequious in the presence of Napoleon, gladly reviling him in his absence, made in very subdued tones some bitter observations on the sanguinary carnage of Eylau, and of the difficulties on the war carried to such a distance; and little persuasion would have been needed to induce minds, always ready in France to seize the weak side of things, to substitute censure for the continued admiration of which Napoleon had never ceased to be the object since he held in his hand the destinies of France. The prudent Cambacérès perceived these symptoms, and dreading everything that was likely to injure the imperial government, he would fain have disarmed censure by sparing the country new burdens. M. Lacuée, judging of the situation from a less elevated point of view, seeing only the material sufferings of the population, feared that two demands of 80,000 men, renewed so soon after one another, the one in November 1806, the other in March 1807, especially after those which had preceded in 1805—demands which called men to the army without giving back one of them—would produce a mischievous effect, by depriving agriculture of hands, families of their supporters. Messrs. Cambacérès and Lacuée were, therefore, both of them disposed to offer some objections, and to desire that these calls might be deferred for a certain time. The sentiment which actuated them was honest and prudent, and well had it been for Napoleon if many men had then possessed the courage to pour into his ear, before it burst forth, the cry of forlorn mothers—a cry which was not yet threatening, but which sometimes, on the news of a great slaughter, like that of Eylau, would

be raised faintly in the heart. However, while telling Napoleon the truth, by way of giving him a profitable lesson for the future, the best thing to be done at that moment was to obey his commands; for there was nothing more serviceable, even to the cause of peace, than the new display of forces which he had just decreed. Thus the objections of the arch-chancellor and M. Lacuée, sent in writing to the headquarters, but soon smothered by subsequent letters despatched from them one after another, produced no postponement of the presentation, adoption, and execution of the decree calling out the conscription of 1808.

Napoleon lost no time in making that use of these new resources which suited his vast designs. Since he entered Poland, he had, as we have seen, drawn from France seven regiments of infantry; from Paris the 15th light, the 58th of the line, the first regiment of the fusiliers of the guard, and a municipal regiment; from Brest the 15th of the line; from St. Lo the 34th; from Boulogne the 19th. He had drawn from Italy five regiments of mounted chasseurs and four regiments of cuirassiers. Most of these corps had recently reached Germany. The 19th, 15th, and 58th of the line, and the 15th light, were approaching Berlin, and going to co-operate in the siege of Dantzig. The 1st regiment of the fusiliers of the guard, and the regiment of the municipal guard, were on march. The four regiments of cuirassiers from Italy were already on the Vistula, under the command of an officer of the most distinguished merit, General d'Espagne. Two of the five regiments of mounted chasseurs, the 19th and 23rd, had joined General Lefebvre below Dantzig. The 15th was remounting in Hanover. The two others were coming with the utmost expedition.

The provisional or marching regiments had already passed through Germany to the number of twelve of infantry and four of cavalry. They had been reviewed on the Vistula, dissolved, and sent to the corps on the Passarge—a sight always very gratifying to the army, which thus saw the gaps made in its ranks filled up, and heard talk every day of the numerous reinforcements that were coming to second it. Whereas in the first days of its establishment on the Passarge it could not have presented more than 75,000 or 80,000 men on one spot, it was now able to oppose 100,000 to any sudden attack. The provisions, brought from all quarters to the Vistula, and carried from the Vistula to the different cantonments by means of waggons organised on the spot, were sufficient for the daily ration, and began to form the reserve stores for unforeseen movements. The army, well warmed, well fed, was in high spirits. The heavy cavalry and the cavalry of the line had been taken to the Lower Vistula, to benefit by the forage which was found in great quantity towards the mouths of that river. The

regiments of light cavalry, left in observation on the front of the camps, went by turns to enjoy rest and abundance on the banks of the Vistula. Napoleon, who had determined to increase the cavalry from 54,000 men to 60,000, then to 70,000, had just given orders for raising the number of the horse to 80,000. The campaign had already consumed 16,000 horses for three or four thousand horse-soldiers put hors de combat. Besides the horses taken from the Prussian and Hessian armies, Napoleon had purchased 17,000 in Germany, and now he ordered 12,000 to be bought in France for the supply of the depôts. The works of Praga, Modlin, and Sierock, quite finished, being constructed of timber, were as solid as masonry. The cantonments on the Passarge were provided with strong *têtes de pont*, which afforded facilities for repulsing an enemy, or for attacking him, if necessary. The situation was not only safe but good, as much so, at least, as the country and the season permitted.

The corps on march, thanks to the depôts of infantry and cavalry established on the route, in which they deposited fatigued men and horses, and took in exchange those previously left by other corps—the corps on march numbered at the end of their route the same effective as at their departure. The regiments of cuirassiers from Naples had arrived entire upon the Vistula. For the troops that came from Italy, Parma, Milan, Augsburg, for those that came from France, Mayence, Wurzburg, Erfurt, for both, Willenberg, Potsdam, Berlin, Cüstrin, Posen, Thorn, Warsaw, were the stations where they found whatever they needed, provisions, arms, articles of clothing, made everywhere, in Paris as well as in Berlin, in the conquered capital as well as in the conquering capital; for Napoleon wished to afford subsistence to the population of both. It was by these continual attentions that he had supplied with necessaries, kept up at its effective at distances from four to five hundred leagues, a regular army of 400,000 men, a chimerical number when given us by antiquity, unless in reference to emigrant populations, never recorded in modern histories, and first reached and exceeded at the time of which we are treating.

Taking advantage of the presence of numerous conscripts in the depôts, Napoleon set about bringing fresh troops from Italy and France, with the twofold intention, as we have said, to augment considerably the active army of the Vistula, and to create an army of reserve on the Elbe. Having it in his power to draw ready-trained conscripts from the depôts, he ordered Marshal Kellermann to increase the number of the provisional regiments of infantry to twenty, and that of the provisional regiments of cavalry to ten. But into these regiments were to be admitted only such conscripts as were perfectly trained and disciplined. He devised another combination for rendering

serviceable those conscripts whose military education had scarcely commenced, that was to organise battalions called garrison battalions, composed of men not yet trained, not even clothed; to send them to Erfurt, Cassel, Magdeburg, Hameln, Cüstrin, where they would have time to get trained, and thus render the old troops left in the fortresses disposable. He fixed the effective of these battalions at about ten or twelve thousand men.

After directing his attention to the provisional regiments destined for recruiting the corps established on the Vistula, Napoleon resolved to add to the seven regiments of infantry and the nine regiments of cavalry already drawn from France and Italy some others, which was possible by having recourse to numerous combinations, of which he alone was capable. There was in garrison at Braunau a superb regiment, the 3rd of the line, comprising three war battalions and 3400 men present under arms. Napoleon ordered it off to Berlin, supplied its place at Braunau by the 7th of the line, borrowed from the garrison of Alessandria, and replaced the 7th in Alessandria by two regiments from Naples, beaten at St. Euphemia, and needing to be reorganised. Resolving to leave none but dragoon regiments in Italy, he sent for the 14th of mounted chasseurs, which was still there, and which would increase the number of cavalry regiments brought from Italy to ten. He ordered a second regiment of the fusiliers of the guard to be formed in Paris, which might be done since there were two conscriptions, that of 1807 and that of 1808, to choose out of. He detached from the camp of St. Lo the 5th light, which was not actually indispensable there. He directed a regiment of dragoons of the guard, encamped at that moment at Meudon, to be despatched from Paris to the Rhine; it was afterwards to be mounted at Potsdam. He gave the same order relative to the 26th chasseurs, which was at Saumur, and which the profound tranquillity of the Vendée rendered disposable. He commanded a battalion of seamen of the guard, very serviceable for the navigation of the Vistula, to be marched off. There were consequently three French regiments of infantry, three French regiments of cavalry, besides a battalion of seamen, which he drew from France and Italy, and which were to concur either in completing the existing corps, or to constitute a new corps for Marshal Lannes. That marshal having been taken ill at Warsaw, had been succeeded in the command of the fifth corps by Massena, and was beginning to recover. When the siege of Dantzig was over, Napoleon purposed to form, with part of the troops which had been engaged in it and the new regiments brought from France, a corps of reserve, which he intended to give to Lannes, and to attach to the active army. The 8th corps under Marshal Mortier, composed of Dutch, Italians, and French,

dispersed from the Hanseatic towns to Stralsund, from Stralsund to Colberg, had hitherto been destined to overawe Germany The Dutch division guarded the Hanseatic towns; one of the French divisions kept in check the Swedes before Stralsund. The other was at Stettin, ready to concur in the blockade of Stralsund or in the siege of Dantzig. The Italian division blockaded Colberg. The sieges once ended, Napoleon had resolved to collect in the 8th corps all the troops that were French, and to unite it with the active army. He would thus have, besides the corps of Marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, Murat, on the Passarge two new corps under Mortier and Lannes, placed between the Vistula and the Oder, and connecting themselves with the second army which he purposed to organise in Germany.

He created the elements of this second army in the following manner. There were in Silesia part of the Bavarians and all the Wurtembergers, finishing, under Prince Jerome and General Vandamme, the sieges in Silesia. There were, on the coast of the Baltic, the Dutch, then belonging to Mortier's corps, the Italians, also belonging to it, the one established, as we have just said, in the Hanseatic towns, the others before Colberg. They were good auxiliaries, hitherto faithful, and beginning to learn something of war in our school. Napoleon thought to augment the number of these auxiliaries, and to unite with them for a support 40,000 French, good veteran troops, so as to form on the Elbe an army of more than 100,000 men.

In the first place, he demanded of the Confederation of the Rhine, grounding himself on the suspicious armaments of Austria, a new portion of the contingent which he had a right to require, and which, as it would amount to 20,000 men, would produce about 15,000. It was giving displeasure to the German governments, our allies, but the present war, if it were complicated by the intervention of Austria, would put their recent aggrandisement in such jeopardy, that he was authorised to demand of them such an effort. For the rest, it was the people, much more than the governments, whom this measure would dissatisfy, and that consideration alone rendered such a requisition matter of regret. Napoleon thought also of demanding of the new kingdom of Italy two of its regiments of infantry and two of its regiments of cavalry. It was not in Italy that the Italian soldiers were likely to find occasion to learn war, but in the north, in the school of the grand army; and, if the Germans could, up to a certain point, complain of being made subservient to interests which were not theirs, the Italians had no complaint of that kind to raise, for the interests of France were certainly those of Italy, and in teaching them to fight, we were teaching them to defend on some future day their national independence.

Napoleon conceived another idea, which at the moment had all the appearance of a jeer; that was to demand troops from Spain. The day before the battle of Jena, the Prince of the Peace, always engaged in some treachery, open or concealed, had published a proclamation calling the Spanish nation to arms, upon the strange pretext that the independence of Spain was threatened. In Spain, in France, in Europe, people asked by whom that independence could be threatened. The answer was easy to give. The Prince of the Peace had believed, like all the adversaries of France, in the superiority of the Prussian army; he had expected the destruction by that army of what was called the common enemy. But the victory of Jena having undeceived him, he had the hardihood to say that his proclamation was designed to raise the Spanish nation, for the purpose of sending it to the assistance of Napoleon, in case he should stand in need of it. The falsehood was too gross to mislead. Napoleon only smiled, and deferred this quarrel till another time. There were, however, along the Pyrenees some thousands of Spaniards, good troops, who had nothing to do there if they were not destined to act against France. There were also some thousands of Spaniards at Leghorn, to guard that port of the kingdom of Etruria, and who were more likely to deliver it up to the English than to defend it. Napoleon, affecting to take the explanation which the Prince of the Peace gave of his proclamation in a serious light, thanked him for his zeal, and requested him to furnish a fresh proof of it by assisting him with twelve or fifteen thousand men, who were absolutely useless either at the Pyrenees or at Leghorn. Napoleon added that he meant to put into their hands Hanover, an English possession, as a pledge for the restitution of the Spanish colonies. Indeed, there needed not reasons so artfully arranged for the meanness of the Spanish government of that period. No sooner had Napoleon's despatch reached Madrid, than orders to march were sent to the Spanish troops. Nine or ten thousand men started from the Pyrenees, four or five thousand from Leghorn. Napoleon sent to all quarters the necessary instructions for receiving them, either in France or in the countries dependent on his arms, in the most friendly and hospitable manner, and desired that they might be abundantly supplied with provisions, clothing, and even money.

He was, therefore, about to have on the Elbe, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch, to the number of 60,000 men at least. The Bavarians and the Wurtembergers, united with the new contingent required from the Confederation of the Rhine, might form about 30,000 men; the Dutch, increased by some troops, 15,000; the Spaniards 15,000; the Italians 7000 or 8000. In order to make very good troops of these

auxiliaries, it would be sufficient to join with them a certain quantity of French. Napoleon devised a method of procuring 40,000 of the better sort, likewise to be drawn from Italy and France. He had taken the precaution a long time beforehand to give orders for the army of Italy to be put on the war footing. Five divisions of infantry were quite organised in Frioul and Lombardy. Napoleon resolved to call from Brescia and Verona the two divisions of Molitor and Boudet, excellent divisions, and which afterwards proved at Essling and Wagram what they were capable of. They formed an effective of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, almost all veteran soldiers of Italy, recruited with some conscripts of the last levies. These divisions received orders to pass the Alps and proceed by Augsburg, the one to Magdeburg, the other to Berlin. Six weeks were sufficient for this journey.

Napoleon thus weakened Italy, but Italy was at the moment of far less importance than Germany. Well covered on his rear while he should be in Poland, certain of being able to throw himself, by Silesia or Saxony, upon Bohemia, and to lay Austria prostrate by a single blow of the back of his sword, he was always sure to disengage Italy if she were temporarily overrun. He calculated, therefore, very ably in preferring to make himself strong in Germany rather than in Italy. It was, however, not without compensation that he weakened the latter country, for he had directed 20,000 conscripts, taken from the classes of 1807 and 1808, to be sent thither, and he ordered, moreover, the companies of élite to be extracted from the depôt battalions to form two new active divisions in Lombardy, which his forecast had rendered easy by keeping the depôts of Italy, like those of France, always full and well exercised. He should therefore soon have, as before, 60,000 men on the Adige, 72,000 with Marmont's corps, 90,000 by drawing a strong detachment from Naples towards Milan.

But 15,000 French were not sufficient on the Elbe to serve for a link and appui to 60,000 auxiliaries, whom he was about to collect there. Napoleon thought to draw from France another valuable resource. He had formed at Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleonville four camps, composed of a certain number of the oldest regiments, of such as had need to rest and recruit themselves, and had abundantly supplied them with all that they needed in men and matériel. These regiments formed a force of nearly 36,000 men. They were to be seconded, as we have seen, by some detachments of national guards, of which 6000 men were at St. Omer, 3000 at Cherbourg, 3000 between Oleron and Bordeaux, by 10,000 seamen of the Boulogne flotilla, by 3000 workmen, regimented at Antwerp, 8000 at Brest, 3000 at Lorient, 4000 at Rochefort, by 12,000 coast-

guards, and by 3000 of the gendarmerie, which might at any time be assembled at one point by calling together that militia for twenty-five leagues round. This would be a force of nearly 90,000 men along the coast, capable of presenting 25,000 or 30,000 men on any point of it that might be attacked. Napoleon designed to supply the place of the regular troops of the camps of Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, Napoleonville by a new creation. He gave orders for the formation of five legions, composed of officers taken out of the army, and of conscripts drawn from the last two conscriptions, commanded by five senators, each six battalions and 6000 men strong, the five comprising thirty battalions and 30,000 men. They were to receive their education while stationed on the coast of the ocean. The permanent state of war since '92 had bred up such a quantity of officers, that skeletons were never wanting for the creation of new corps. The elements of these five legions could not be brought together, it is true, in less than four or five months, that is to say, before the end of May or the beginning of June. But the troops of the camps were not yet going to leave the coast. If in May or June the English were not seen standing for the coast of France, if, on the contrary, they were seen sailing for the coast of Germany, 25,000 veteran soldiers of the camps were to follow the movements of the English squadrons, proceeding simultaneously with them along the shores of the Channel, the North Sea, the Baltic, by Normandy, Picardy, Holland, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and to join in Germany the two divisions of Boudet and Molitor. They had orders to perform this march as speedily as possible, should the conduct of Austria render it necessary; and they had orders, in any case, to leave behind them the five new legions, whose presence might be useful, even before their organisation was completed.

By means of this combination Napoleon was about to have, with Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, with the 25,000 men drawn from Normandy and Bretagne, with the 60,000 or 70,000 auxiliaries, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch, a second army of more than 100,000 men on the Elbe, independently of the two corps of Marshals Mortier and Lannes, whose part it was to connect the army of reserve with the grand active army of the Vistula. Endowed with an admirable talent for moving his masses, he could, by doubling his tail back to his head, or his head back to his tail, his left upon his right, or his right upon his left, carry the bulk of his forces either forward towards the Niemen, or backward towards the Elbe, or to the right upon Austria, or to the left upon the coast. With all that he had brought together, with all that he was to bring together by-and-by, he should number not fewer than 440,000 men in Germany, 360,000 of whom were French, and 80,000 allies. Never had

such means been collected with that power, with that vigour, with that promptness.

Of all these reinforcements, none had yet arrived but the new regiments drawn from France and Italy, the provisional regiments, which came daily to recruit the ranks of the grand army, the Bavarians and Wurtembergers acting in Silesia, the Dutch on the Baltic, and the troops of Mortier spread before Stralsund, Colberg, and Dantzig. Orders were despatched for Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, for the Italian, German, Spanish, and French troops.

Marshal Brune, who was at the camp of Boulogne, as commander-in-chief, and who was still recommended by the remembrance of his conduct at the Helder, was called to Berlin, to be put at the head of the second army assembled in Germany.

Meanwhile the sieges continued. Before we relate the vicissitudes of the most important of all these sieges, that which filled the winter with memorable incidents, we must mention a circumstance which had well-nigh seriously endangered the safety of our rear. Marshal Mortier, commanding the 8th corps, and having under his orders four divisions, one Dutch, one Italian, two French, had placed the Dutch division near the mouth of the Elbe, left Grandjean's French division before Stralsund, posted Dupas' French division at Stettin, and sent the Italian division before Colberg to repress the incommodious partisans thrown by the garrison of that place between the Vistula and the Oder. We should add that, of the six regiments composing the two French divisions, four had been taken, the 2nd light to be sent toward Dantzig, the 12th light to be sent to Thorn, the 22nd and 65th of the line to reinforce the army on the Passarge. The 58th light, arriving from Paris, had been given to Marshal Mortier in compensation, and several other regiments coming from France were destined for him. He had therefore not been able to leave General Grandjean more than two French regiments, the 4th light and the 58th of the line. He had taken with him the 72nd, in order to support the Italians before Colberg.

This was the moment that the Swedes chose for an enterprise upon our rear. They still occupied Stralsund, an important seaport of Swedish Pomerania, which was the place where they usually landed in Germany. This place would have been worth the trouble of a siege, if Dantzig had not deserved the preference before any other conquest of that kind. The King of Sweden, whose disordered reason was destined to cost his family the throne, and his country Pomerania and Finland—the King of Sweden had purposed to start from Stralsund, with an army composed of Russians, English, Swedes, and like another Gustavus Adolphus, to make a brilliant incursion upon the continent of Germany. But Napoleon, absolute master of that continent,

had obliged the Swedish troops to shut themselves up in Stralsund, where they were blockaded, as it were, in a *tête de pont*. The King of Sweden, extremely vehement with friends as well as foes, was sorely displeased with Russia, and still more with England, which sent him not a soldier, and doled out the subsidies with extraordinary parsimony. Thus, shut up in his own territories, since he was no longer permitted to travel on the continent, he lived at Stockholm, dull, secluded, leaving General Essen at Stralsund with a corps of 15,000 good troops. General Essen, apprised of what was passing before him, could not withstand the temptation to force the line of the blockade, which the French defended with too small a force. In the first days of April he marched out at the head of 15,000 Swedes against General Grandjean, who had scarcely 5000 or 6000 men, half of whom at most were French, to oppose to them. General Grandjean, after defending himself bravely before the place, found himself threatened with having his wings turned, and was obliged to retire, first upon Anklam, and then upon Uckermünde and Stettin. He made an orderly retreat, seconded by the valour of the French and Dutch, lost few men on the field of battle, but a great quantity of military effects and some solitary detachments, which could not be picked up, especially in the islands of Usedom and Wollin, which close the Great Haff.

This surprise produced a certain alarm on the rear of the army, especially in Berlin, where a hostile population, deeply mortified, eagerly watching events, sought food for its hopes in every unforeseen circumstance. But the fortune of France, then so brilliant, could leave her adversaries only short joys. At that moment, several regiments coming from France, among others the 15th of the line, and several provisional marching regiments, arrived on the Elbe and the Oder. General Clarke, who governed at Berlin with wisdom and firmness, immediately despatched the 15th of the line to reinforce General Grandjean at Stettin. He added to it a provisional regiment and several squadrons of cavalry in the great depôt at Potsdam which were disposable. Marshal Mortier, on his part, marched back at the head of the 72nd and of several Italian detachments drawn from Colberg. These troops, united with Grandjean's division, were sufficient to punish the Swedes for their attempt. Marshal Mortier formed with them two divisions under General Grandjean and Dupas, put the 72nd, the 15th of the line, and the Dutch in the first, the 4th light, the 58th of the line, and some Italians in the second, left the provisional regiments to cover his left and his rear, and marched to the enemy with that calm resolution which characterised him. He drove the Swedes from position to position, forced them to fall back on the Peene, passed that river in spite of them, and drove them into Stralsund,

with the loss of some hundred killed and 2000 prisoners. The incursion of the Swedes, commenced in the first days of April, was finished on the 18th. General Essen, apprehensive lest all Pomerania should soon be wrested from him, was disposed to save it by an armistice. A flag of truce, sent by him to Marshal Mortier, came and offered to neutralise that province by suspending all kinds of hostilities. As it was impossible for us to besiege Stralsund, nothing could be more convenient to us than to close an inlet by which the English might have been able to penetrate into Germany, and at the same time to render the troops, which must otherwise have been left in Swedish Pomerania, disposable for the siege of Dantzig. Marshal Mortier, knowing the intentions of Napoleon on this point, consented to an armistice, in virtue of which the Swedes promised to observe an absolute neutrality, not to open Swedish Pomerania to any enemy of France, and not to afford any succour either to Colberg or to Dantzig. A resumption of hostilities was to be preceded by ten days' notice. The armistice was sent to Napoleon for his approbation.

Napoleon could not reason in any other way than his lieutenant, for the motive which had caused him to reduce the troops placed before Stralsund to the smallest possible number must dispose him to the acceptance of an armistice which annulled Stralsund, without diverting any part of our forces for the purpose of blockading it. He therefore accepted the proposed armistice, on condition that the notice to be given before the resumption of hostilities should be extended from ten days to a month.

General Essen signed the armistice with this modification, and sent it to Stockholm to obtain the royal ratification. In the meantime, Marshal Mortier was to remain on the Peene with his forces, and then to march them to Stettin, Colberg, and Dantzig, leaving, however, the Dutch to observe the neutralised province.

For the rest, if the Swedes had served us by adopting this armistice, they had likewise served themselves, for the French forces were accumulating in Berlin. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau, and 3400 strong, four or five provisional regiments on march from the Rhine to the Elbe, the 15th chasseurs remounting in Hanover, lastly, the 19th of the line coming from the camp of Boulogne, would soon have been advancing upon Swedish Pomerania. The Swedes would have paid with their total destruction for the time which they would have caused our troops to lose.

During these transactions, Dantzig was invested, and the operations of the siege had commenced. Napoleon had at first intended only to blockade the place. The war being prolonged, he resolved to employ the winter in reducing it. Dantzig was worth the trouble. It commands, in fact, the Lower Vistula,

the fertile plains traversed by that river towards its mouth, comprehends a spacious harbour, and contains the riches of the commerce of the north. Master of Dantzig, Napoleon could not be shaken in his position on the Lower Vistula; he deprived the allies of the means of turning his left; and he obtained possession of immense stores of corn and wine, sufficient to supply the army for above a year. It was impossible, therefore, to make a better use of the winter than in effecting such a conquest. But it required a long siege, as well on account of the works of the place as of the strong garrison charged to defend it. If, at the commencement of the campaign, Napoleon could have suddenly set about such a siege, it is to be presumed that the defences of Dantzig, which were of earth, and in the most neglected state, would have yielded to an unforeseen attack. But Napoleon had not then either disposable troops or heavy artillery, and he had been obliged to blockade Dantzig with German and some Polish auxiliaries, supported by a single French regiment, the 2nd light. The King of Prussia, forewarned, had therefore had time to put into a state of defence a place which was the last bulwark of his kingdom, the principal depôt of his wealth; and as long as it continued in his hands, a serious danger for Napoleon. He had put into it a garrison of 18,000 men, 14,000 of whom were Prussians, and 4000 Russians. He had given it for governor the celebrated Marshal Kalkreuth, at that moment unemployed and grumbling at Königsberg, and well qualified for such a command. It was not to be apprehended that this old warrior, who had just condemned to death the commandant of Stettin for having surrendered the post committed to his keeping, would make a faint resistance to the French. No sooner did he arrive than Marshal Kalkreuth finished burning the rich suburbs of Dantzig, which his predecessor had begun to consign to the flames, set about repairing the works, rousing the spirit of the garrison, and intimidating every one who was disposed to surrender.

Thus Dantzig, in March 1807, was no longer a ruined and neglected place, which it would be possible to take by surprise. Not only had it an excellent governor, a strong garrison, extensive and solid works, but its site was very difficult of approach. Like all great rivers, the Vistula has its Delta. A little below Mewe, about fifteen leagues from the Baltic, it divides into two arms, which embrace a rich and fertile tract, called the isle of Nogath. One of these arms, the right, which goes by the name of Nogath, throws itself into the gulf called the Frische Haff; the left, retaining the name of Vistula, proceeds directly north to within a league of the sea, there meets all at once with a bank of sand, turns off to the west, and after running along this bank of sand for seven or eight leagues, again turns northward, and

at last falls into the Baltic. It is at the mouth of the latter arm of the Vistula, in a flat country, extremely fertile, frequently overflowed, and at the foot of some sandy heights, that the city of Dantzig is situated, at the distance of several thousand paces from the sea.

The long sandbank at which the Vistula turns off to run westward is called the Nehrung. At one end it terminates before Dantzig, running the other way for twenty leagues, forming one of the banks of the Frische Haff as far as Königsberg, with the exception of a cut at Pillau, a natural channel formed by the waters of the Nogath, the Passarge, and the Pregel, in order to discharge themselves from the Frische Haff into the Baltic. It is by Pillau, in fact, that you pass out of the Frische Haff into the Baltic, and that shipping proceeds to and from the important city of Königsberg.

You may then, provided you clear the narrow pass of the Pillau, communicate by land from Königsberg to Dantzig by following the sandbank of the Nehrung, a league broad at most, and generally much less, twenty-five long, without a tree, except near Dantzig, and presenting only a few fishermen's huts.

Dantzig, seated on the left arm of the Vistula, the one which has retained that name, is 2300 fathoms, or about a league, from the sea. The fort of Weichselmünde, regularly built, closes the mouth of the Vistula. To shorten the distance from the place to the sea, a canal, called the canal of Laaken, has been dug. The ground between the river and the canal forms an island, called the Holm. Numerous redoubts, established in this island, command the river and the canal, which are the two outlets toward the sea. Lastly, the place itself, seated on the bank of the Vistula, traversed by a little river, the Motlau, encompassed by their united waters, shut in by a bastioned enclosure of twenty fronts, is most difficult of access, surrounded by an inundation not artificial but natural, which a besieger cannot get rid of at pleasure by draining, and against which the very inhabitants have the greatest difficulty to defend themselves at certain times of the day and of the year. Dantzig, thus surrounded on the north, the east, and the south by inundated grounds, would be inaccessible but for the sandy heights which command it, and which terminate in rapid slopes to the foot of the walls on the western side. In consequence, these heights have not failed to be secured for the advantage of defence, and they have been crowned by a series of works forming a second enclosure. It is from these heights that Dantzig has generally been attacked. In fact, the double enclosure which occupies their summit being once taken, the city may be overwhelmed with a downward fire, to which it is scarcely possible for it to make any resistance. This double enclosure, however, renders the attack of the place

extremely difficult. The works of Dantzig are of earth, and present turfed slopes instead of scarps of masonry. But at the foot of these slopes were then standing strong palisades of enormous dimension (they were fifteen inches in diameter), very close together, and deeply planted in the ground. A ball might sometimes splinter them, sometimes break off their heads, but not knock them down. On the slopes in rear enormous logs, suspended by ropes, were at the moment of an assault to be made to roll from top to bottom upon the besiegers. Then again, at all the re-entering angles of the enclosure (re-entering *places d'armes*) had been erected blockhouses of rough timber: these were covered with earth, and rendered almost impenetrable to ball and bomb. The timber of the plains of the north, for which the city of Dantzig is the great mart, had been lavishly employed in all forms for the purpose of fortifying it, and occasion was soon afforded for discovering its defensive properties, which were not appreciated as they were after that memorable siege. Lastly, ammunition in immense quantity, provisions sufficient to subsist the population and the troops for above a year, continual communications with the city of Königsberg, either by sea or by the Nehrung, communications which gave the besieged garrison the assurance that it should be relieved, and that it could retire whenever it pleased, added to the chances of the defence and to the difficulties of the attack.

Marshal Lefebvre, appointed to the command of the troops which were to be employed in the siege, possessed none of the qualifications requisite for such an operation. There was not in the whole army a soldier more ignorant or more brave. To all the questions of art raised by the engineers he saw but one solution, which was to proceed to the assault at the head of his grenadiers. If Napoleon had selected him in spite of his deficiency, it was because, as we have elsewhere said, he was desirous to give employment to senators; it was because he had no mind to leave in Paris an old soldier, submissive and attached, but who frequently let his tongue run when he was not checked; it was, lastly, because he wished, without entrusting him with a *corps d'armée*, to afford him an opportunity of earning a high reward. The brave Lefebvre, who redeemed his ignorance by a certain natural intelligence, could form a just estimate of himself, and was absolutely frightened when he learned what a task Napoleon had committed to him. Napoleon had cheered him by promising to send him all the resources that he should need, and to guide him himself from his camp at Finkenstein. "Take courage," said he; "why should not you, too, when you get back to France, have something to talk of in the hall of the Senate?"

Overcome by these gracious words, the marshal had cheerfully obeyed. Napoleon had given him for assistants two officers of

the highest merit, Chasseloup the engineer, and the general of artillery, Lariboissière, knowing that it is by means of engineers and artillery that the walls of fortresses are overthrown. It is true that they are apt to differ in opinion, for one is charged to determine the attacks, the other to execute them by means of cannon, and their provinces trench too closely upon one another for them not to disagree. It is for the general commanding in chief to reconcile them. But Napoleon was thirty or forty leagues from Dantzig: he could always resolve difficulties by his daily correspondence, or send one of his aides-de-camp, General Savary or General Bertrand, to put an end in his name to the disputes which Marshal Lefebvre was incapable of comprehending and deciding. This he did several times during the siege.

Napoleon had resolved to commence the first operations with the auxiliaries and one or two French regiments borrowed from the corps of Marshal Mortier; then while the troops brought from France should be passing near the Vistula, to keep them for a time under the walls of Dantzig to reinforce the besieging troops. Marshal Lefebvre had, therefore, to begin with 5000 or 6000 Poles of the new levy, scarcely trained; 2500 of the legion of the north, composed of Poles, and German and Russian deserters, having spirit but not solidity, for want of a sufficient organisation; 2200 Baden troops, unaccustomed to fire and to the fatigues of the trenches; 5000 Saxons, good soldiers, but who, having sided with the Prussians at Jena, could not yet conceive any great affection for us; lastly, 3000 French, namely, the 2nd light, the 23rd and 19th regiments of mounted chasseurs, which had arrived from Italy, and 600 of the corps of engineers, incomparable troops, who, making up for all deficiencies in this famous siege, covered themselves with glory. It was, as we see, with 18,000 men at most, only 3000 of whom were French, that we were about to undertake the regular attack of a place containing a garrison of 18,000 men.

The heavy artillery, of which at least one hundred pieces were required, with immense supplies of powder and projectiles, could be obtained only from the arsenals of Silesia. Water carriage being interrupted, it had to be drawn with great labour along wretched roads from the Oder to the Vistula. It was expected so early as March. But the first thing to be done, before battering the place could be thought of, was to invest it closely, in order to deprive the garrison of reinforcements and of the encouragements which it was receiving from Königsberg. To accomplish this, it would be necessary, on the one hand, to cut it off from the fort of Weichselmünde, and on the other, to intercept the Nehrung, that long sandbank extending, as we have said, from Königsberg to Dantzig, with a single cut at Pillau.

We had arrived by the sandy heights which command Dantzig

on the west, and we perceived before us the outer enclosure constructed on these heights, at our feet the city, on the left the Vistula, throwing itself into the Baltic, amidst the works of the fort of Weichselmünde, on the right the vast tract of land overflowed by the Motlau, in front, stretching further than the eye could reach, the Nehrung, washed on one side by the sea, on the other by the Vistula, and sinking at the horizon towards the Frische Haff. It was a circuit of seven or eight leagues, which it was impossible to encompass with 18,000 men. It is true that, by occupying certain points, the investment might be sufficient. Thus by placing ourselves on the Vistula, between the fort of Weichselmünde and Dantzig, we should intercept the communications by sea. By establishing ourselves on the Nehrung, we should intercept the communications by land. But to possess ourselves of the principal points only, we must first crown the heights, then descend on the left, carry the works of the fort of Weichselmünde on both banks of the Vistula, and in default of this operation, at least bar the river, penetrate into the isle of Holm, and take the canal of Laaken. We must then, after descending on the left, descend on the right also into the inundated plain, cross it upon the dikes, pass the Vistula above Dantzig, as we had passed it below, enter upon the Nehrung, entrench ourselves there, and cut off the land route as well as that by sea. These first difficulties overcome, we might open the trenches before the enclosure. But for this purpose we should have needed eight or ten thousand more good troops, and we had them not. By the advice, therefore, of Chasseloup, commanding the engineers, it was decided to choose from among the various preliminary operations that which appeared most urgent and least difficult. To cross the Vistula below Dantzig, between the fort of Weichselmünde and the place, to penetrate into the isle of Holm under the fire of well-armed redoubts, and in spite of the sallies which might be made either from Weichselmünde or from Dantzig, was too perilous. It was resolved, therefore, to cross above Dantzig, a league or two higher up, at a place called Neufahr, to form a small camp there, in this manner to intercept the Nehrung, then, in proportion as means should be found, to reinforce this camp, to bring it nearer to Dantzig, in order that it might give a hand to the troops which should by-and-by be charged to cross the Vistula between the place and the fort of Weichselmünde.

This operation was entrusted to General Schramm, with a corps of about 3000 men, composed of a battalion of the 2nd light, some hundred Saxon grenadiers, a Polish detachment, infantry and cavalry, and a squadron of the 19th chasseurs. On the morning of the 19th of March, the troops, having got as high as Neufahr, two leagues above Dantzig, were embarked

in boats which had been procured, crossed the Vistula, which is not so broad after it has divided into several arms, and in this operation took advantage of an island situated near the opposite bank. General Schramm, having reached the Nehrung in consequence of this passage, divided his little corps into three columns; one on the left, to fall upon the enemy's troops which defended the position towards Dantzig; one on the right, to repulse those which might come from the Königsberg side; and a third, to act by way of reserve. At the head of each of these columns he had placed a detachment of French, which would set them an example.

No sooner had they landed than General Schramm's troops, hurried on by the battalion of the 2nd light, turned to the left, went to meet the Prussians, and upset them in spite of the most vehement fire. While the principal column, taking the left, pushed them towards Dantzig, the second remained in observation on the Königsberg road. The third, kept in reserve, served to reinforce the first. The enemy, having tried to take advantage of the obstacles of the ground to renew his resistance—for the Nehrung, as it approaches Dantzig, has both hills and woods—the first column, assisted by the third, again repulsed him, and killed and took some men. The Saxons vied on this occasion with the French. Both drove back the enemy to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, from which the troops that defended the Nehrung had come.

The affair seemed to be over when, about seven o'clock in the evening, a column of 3000 or 4000 Prussians was seen debouching from Dantzig, and ascending the Vistula, with drums beating and colours flying. The 2nd light, by a well-directed and well-sustained fire, stopped that column, then charged it with the bayonet, and drove it back upon Dantzig, whither it ran to shut itself up. This day, which put us in possession of a passage over the Vistula above Dantzig, and of a position which intercepted the Nehrung, cost the enemy 200 or 300 men put hors de combat, and 500 or 600 made prisoners. Captain Girod, of the engineers, appointed to direct the expedition, distinguished himself by his intelligence and his coolness. The operation being finished, he had trees felled, epaulements thrown up, a bridge of boats established over the Vistula, with the accompaniment of a strong *tête de pont*. Behind this shelter the troops lodged, and they were guarded by means of posts of cavalry, which on one side pushed on to beneath the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, and on the other ran along the Nehrung, in the direction of Konigsberg.

On the following days, General Schramm, who commanded this detachment, endeavoured to descend as far as Heubude, in order to press the place more closely, and to gain possession of

a sluice, which had the greatest influence upon the inundation. But this sluice, surrounded by water, was not accessible on any side. General Schramm was obliged to relinquish the design of taking it, and to confine himself to bringing down the bridge of boats to Heubude. However, this post of the Upper Vistula, after its removal to Heubude, had six leagues to go in order to communicate with the headquarters, across the inundated lands and along the dikes. In attempting to cut off the communications of the besieged, he therefore ran the risk of losing his own communications.

On the 26th of March the enemy attempted two sorties; one from the place, directed by the Schidlitz and Oliva gates upon our advanced posts, with the intention of completing the burning of the suburbs; the other from the outworks of the fort of Weichselmünde, and directed upon the left of the headquarters by Langenfurth. Both were briskly repulsed. A Polish cavalry officer, Captain Sokolniki, distinguished himself there by his intrepidity and skill. A celebrated Prussian partisan, the Baron de Kakow, was taken there.

Our troops, in driving back the enemy to the foot of the works, approached nearer to the place than they had yet done, so that one could study its configuration. General Chasseloup formed the plan of the attacks with the perspicacity of an equally scientific and practised engineer. The outer enclosure, constructed on the margin of the heights, presented two works, connected with each other, but distinct and separated by a small valley, at the further end of which is the suburb of Schidlitz. The first of these works, that on the right (the right of the besieging army), is called the Bischoffsberg; the second, that of the left, is called Hagelsberg. It was the latter which General Chasseloup chose for the object of the principal attack, reserving the option of directing a false attack upon the Bischoffsberg. The motives which decided him were the following.*

The works of the Hagelsberg appeared less carefully constructed than those of the Bischoffsberg. The Hagelsberg was narrow, inconvenient for the deploying of troops, whether the besieged had to make sorties or to repulse an assault; whereas the Bischoffsberg, spacious and well distributed, admitted of 3000 or 4000 men being drawn up in order of battle, and thrown in a mass upon the besieger. The Hagelsberg could be battered from behind by the Stolzenberg, one of the outer positions;

* We have thought it right to relate with some detail the siege of Dantzig, because it is a fine model of a regular siege, and perhaps the most remarkable of our age; because examples of regular sieges, so frequent and so perfect under Louis XIV., have become very rare in our days; because that of Dantzig had the signal honour to be covered by Napoleon at the head of 200,000 men; because, finally, it is the indispensable episode which connects the winter campaign with the summer campaign in the glorious war in Poland.

the Bischoffsberg could not be from any side. The Hagelsberg was reached over ground undulated, but unbroken. To approach the Bischoffsberg you came to a deep ravine, in which it would not be easy to make paths, and into which also you ran the risk of being flung if you attempted to cross it in proceeding to the assault. Not only was the Hagelsberg easier to take than the Bischoffsberg, but the position when taken was better. You commanded the place from both alike, and could overwhelm it with your fire. But if that fire was not sufficient to reduce it, and it were necessary to descend from the heights to force the second enclosure, you found, on descending from the bastion of Heilige Leichnam to the bastion of St. Elizabeth, a salient front, and which, not being flanked on any side, could present but few difficulties to the besieger. In descending from the Bischoffsberg, on the contrary, from the bastion of St. Elizabeth to the bastion of St. Gertrude, you found on all sides a re-entering flank, and exposed, moreover, to the fire of several very elevated platforms (*cavaliers*). Lastly, a reason deduced from the general situation ought to decide the attack on the Hagelsberg. This attack would bring our principal forces nearer to the Lower Vistula, and it was, in fact, by the Lower Vistula that the besiegers must think of investing the place, by drawing from this point the detached corps of General Schramm, by giving a hand to him for passing into the isle of Holm, and by thus cutting off Dantzig from the fort of Weichselmünde. These reasons were convincing, and convinced Napoleon himself. General Kirgener, placed under General Chasseloup, had conceived the idea of fixing the point of attack still more to the left, towards the Oliva gate, in the low ground between the Hagelsberg and the Vistula, opposite to the isle of Holm. This idea was not adopted; for it would have been necessary, in the first place, to carry the outer enclosure, while exposed on the right to the fire of the Hagelsberg. Such a mode of operating was not admissible.

General Chasseloup, called for several days to Thorn to trace the plan of some defensive works there, left at his departure the plan of the attacks, and orders for the commencement of the operations.

There was no longer any reason for delay, for Marshal Lefebvre had received the reinforcements which had been promised him. The 44th of the line, drawn from Augereau's corps, arrived at that moment from the banks of the Vistula; it was only a thousand men, but of the very best. The 19th, which had set out from France two months before, arrived also from Stettin with a convoy of artillery, which it escorted. This was sufficient, while expecting the other regiments announced, for commencing the operations, and for setting an example to the auxiliary troops.

Without being versed in that fine science which immortalised Vauban, every one knows with what precaution fortresses must be approached. You must burrow under ground, open trenches, throw up the rubbish preceding from those trenches on the side next to the enemy, and advance under the fire of the heavy artillery. In this manner you produce lines which are called *parallels*, because they are parallel to the front which you are attacking. These are then armed with batteries for replying to the fire of the besieged. Having traced the first parallel, you approach, working under ground, by *zigzags*, to the distance at which you intend to form the second parallel, which you arm with batteries like the first. You arrive successively at the third, from which you leap upon the border of the ditch, which is called the *covered way*. You then descend into that ditch with fresh precautions, break down with breaching batteries the walls, called *scarps*, fill the ditch with their rubbish, and lastly, mount upon that rubbish to the assault. Sorties of the enemy to disturb these difficult operations, combats of heavy artillery, mines which blow into the air besiegers and besieged, add animated, and frequently terrible, scenes to this subterranean warfare, in which science vies with heroism for attacking or defending large cities, whose wealth, geographical situation, or military strength render them worthy of such efforts.

To such complicated means one is obliged to resort when a fortress cannot be taken by surprise. This was the case here, for the causes already assigned; and in the night between the 1st and 2nd of April, the trenches were opened facing the Hagelsberg, which was the point of attack fixed upon. Our troops had taken a position on the Zigankenberg. They sought, as usual, to conceal this first operation from the enemy, and by daybreak our soldiers were covered by an epaulement of earth for an extent of two hundred fathoms. The besieged kept up a very brisk fire upon them, but could not prevent them from completing the work in the course of the day. In the night between the 2nd and 3rd of April they got beyond the first parallel by the transverse trenches, called zigzags, and thus gained ground. While part of our men were thus employed, an attempt was made to carry a work that was soon to annoy our operations.

This was the redoubt known by the name of Kalk-Schanze, situated on our left on the very margin of the Vistula, and consequently on the low ground through which the river runs. Though lower than the point which we were crowning with our works, it enfiladed our trenches—a sufficient motive for striving to get rid of it. Soldiers of the legion of the north, daring fellows, as we have said, but not very steady, threw themselves

boldly into the work, and made themselves masters of it. During the same night the enemy made a sortie upon our first trenches, and upon the redoubt which had just been taken. He was at first repulsed, but retook the redoubt, and drove out the soldiers of the legion of the north and the Baden men. No sooner was he established there than he filled the ditches with the water of the Vistula, surrounded the scarps of earth with strong palisades, and rendered himself almost impregnable there.

We were therefore obliged to continue our works notwithstanding the proximity of so incommodious a neighbour, against whom it became necessary for us to protect ourselves by traverses, a sort of epaulements of earth opposed to the flank fire, which circumstance occasioning an increase of labour, was likely to prolong the operations of the siege.

During the following nights and days, from the 4th to the 7th of April, the works of approach were prosecuted under the fire of the place, to which we could not reply, our heavy artillery not having yet arrived. We had only field artillery, placed in some redoubts, to play upon the enemy in case of sortie. The works were attended with more difficulties than occur in most regular sieges. The soil in which they were carried on consisted of a fine, loose, incompact sand, which sunk down when struck by balls, and which the wind, that had become violent on the approach of the equinox, drove into the faces of our men. The weather was bad, alternately snowy and rainy. Lastly, we had no staunch labourers but the French, and these were not numerous, and worn out with fatigue.

In the night between the 7th and 8th a parallel was opened against the Bischoffsberg, with the twofold intention of diverting the enemy by a false attack, and establishing batteries which should take the Hagelsberg from behind, and could even fire upon the city.

In the following days the works, as well for the real as for the false attack, were continued. The besieged, on their part, had undertaken works of counter approach, with a view to gain possession of a hillock which would give them the command of our trenches. In the night between the 10th and 11th, General Chasseloup, who had returned to the camp, made the necessary dispositions for destroying the works directed against ours. At ten o'clock at night four companies of the 44th of the line, with 120 soldiers of the legion of the north, commanded by Rogniat, *chef de bataillon*, crossed a kind of ravine which separated the left of our first parallel from the position occupied by the Prussians, fell upon them, overturned them, took thirteen, and obliged the others to scamper off, throwing away their muskets. The soldiers of the legion of the north were imme-

diately set to work to fill with the shovel the trenches begun by the besieged. Now this destruction of the enemy's works took place within forty fathoms of the fortress, and under a murderous fire of grape and ball. Our labourers of the legion of the north having withstood it for some time, at length ran away one after another, so that the Prussians could return to the abandoned work before it was completely destroyed. At one in the morning, General Chasseloup and Marshal Lefebvre having perceived the return of the enemy, resolved to drive him out again. Four hundred men of the 44th, sent against the work, found there a strong detachment of Prussian grenadiers, attacked them with the bayonet, killed or wounded about fifty, and took about the same number, with a considerable quantity of muskets and tools. A company of Saxons remained till daylight to fill the trenches of the besieged, but when it was light, though seconded by our tirailleurs, they could hold out no longer against the fire of the place, and were obliged to retire.

The Prussians reoccupied the work in the course of the 12th, and threw up in the utmost haste a sort of palisaded redoubt on the hillock to which they attached so much value. It was not possible to leave them thus quietly settled on the left of our trenches. It was decided that in the following night this position should be taken from them for the third time, and that no time should be lost in connecting it with the second parallel which had that day been opened. At nine in the evening of the 12th, Rogniat, *chef de bataillon*, and General Puthod, at the head of 300 Saxon Bevilacqua grenadiers, a company of carabineers of the legion of the north, and a company of grenadiers of the 44th, commanded by the *chef de bataillon*, Jacquemard, resolutely attacked the work. The enemy made a very vigorous resistance. Covered by the palisades, he kept up such a fire of musketry as for a moment staggered our troops. But the grenadiers of the 44th marched right up to the palisades, while the Saxon Bevilacqua grenadiers, led by a brave drummer, finding a way that turned the work on the left, got into it and decided the success. We remained masters of the redoubt, and made haste to connect it with the second parallel.

On the return of daylight, however, the enemy resolved to dispute with us to the last a position which would enable him to stop our works if he could succeed in retaining it, made a sortie in great force, and directed a strong column upon the point so warmly contested. All the guns of the place supported his efforts. He fell upon the redoubt in which the Saxons still were, overwhelmed them by numbers, notwithstanding the most courageous resistance on their part, and having reconquered the work, marched resolutely to our trenches, with the intention to take and to destroy them. He had already entered when Marshal

Lefebvre, who on the first noise of this sally had speedily collected a battalion of the 44th, fell upon the Prussians sword in hand, and amidst a shower of balls, drove them out of the trenches, and followed them with the bayonet to the glacis of the Hagelsberg. Having arrived there, he was obliged to retire under a shower of grape. In this action the Prussians lost about 300 men. It cost us 15 officers and about 100 men, Saxons and French.

From that moment that hillock on the left was relinquished to us by the enemy. It was definitively connected with our trenches, and we then debouched by new traverses beyond the second parallel. The troops worked in like manner at that which had been marked out before the Bischoffsberg, and the object of which we have already specified.

These three days' fighting had greatly retarded the operations of the siege, inasmuch as, our trenches being continually threatened, we were obliged to reserve our best troops to guard them. The following days were employed in finishing the second parallel, in enlarging it, and forming *places d'armes* for lodging the troops who were to guard it, in preparing the sites of batteries while awaiting the arrival of the heavy cannon; and the same pains were bestowed on the parallel of the false attack undertaken before the Bischoffsberg. Two regiments had arrived agreeably to the orders of Napoleon, who was extremely attentive to the operations of this great siege. It was, on the one hand, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, and on the other, the 12th light, temporarily detached from Thorn and sent to Dantzig. At the same time, Napoleon had ordered Marshal Mortier, who had just finished the affair of the armistice with the Swedes, to march his troops by way of Stettin to Dantzig; and he was collecting in the isle of Nogath the elements of the infantry reserve which Marshal Lannes was to command. He was therefore in hopes of being soon strongly appuyed.

The besieging army being provided with two new French regiments, it was fitting to complete the investment of the place, and to continue the operations projected on the Vistula, by bringing General Schramm from the height of Heubude to that of the isle of Holm, which became the more urgent since the enemy was daily communicating by the fort of Weichselmünde with the sea, whence he received succours in money and ammunition. In consequence, on the 15th of April, General Gardanne, who had taken the command of the troops placed in the Nehrung, descended the course of the Vistula with those troops and some reinforcements which had been sent him, and went and established himself along the canal of Laaken, between Dantzig and the fort of Weichselmünde, at the distance of 700 fathoms from the glacis of that fort. He was posted in such a

manner as to intercept the navigation of the canal, and subsequently that of the Vistula itself, when the troops at the headquarters should come and join their fires with his by descending on their left to the bank of the river, which was not at first much opposed, unless by the redoubts on the isle of Holm; but Marshal Kalkreuth, having soon perceived the importance of the enterprise, resolved to make the greatest efforts to maintain his communications with the sea. On the 16th of April three thousand Russians and two thousand Prussians sallied simultaneously, the first from the fort of Weichselmünde, the second from Dantzig, to attack our troops, who had not had time to establish themselves solidly in the Nehrung and at the mouth of the canal. An extremely sharp action took place near Weichselmünde with the Russians, and luckily just before the Prussians had debouchéd from Dantzig. They were driven back to the glacis of the fort, after sustaining considerable loss. No sooner had our troops finished with them than they were obliged to begin again with the Prussians, but that affair was neither difficult nor long, for our auxiliaries, having the 2nd light at their head, behaved gallantly. The enemy lost in the whole five or six hundred men, killed or prisoners. We lost about two hundred.

After this action, our establishment on the Lower Vistula and in the Nehrung appeared safe. Pains were nevertheless taken to consolidate it. A double epaulement of earth was thrown up to protect it at once against the fort and against Dantzig, and it was extended far enough for it to join the river on one side, and on the other the woods which cover this part of the Nehrung. Vast abattis rendered these woods almost inaccessible. A strong blockhouse was placed in the centre of our entrenchments. To these precautions was added a guard of sloops on the canal and the river, for preventing enemy's craft from ascending or descending the Vistula. While these works were going forward on the right bank, the troops from the headquarters on the left bank, descending from the heights to the margin of the Vistula, had thrown up redoubts there, in order to cross their fires with those of the troops established in the Nehrung. They secured themselves on this side by a gabion work two hundred fathoms in length. A brave officer, named Tardiville, having quartered himself with about a hundred men in a house on the bank of the Vistula, maintained himself there in spite of the enemy's projectiles with such obstinacy, that this house was named after him while the siege lasted. The isle of Holm was still left to be conquered before the investment was complete and definitive. Still, however, it was not without difficulty that enemy's vessels got up to Dantzig. Several barks, indeed, had been taken, and a cutter having attempted to ascend the Vistula, had been stopped by the fire from the two shores. The soldiers, led by an officer

of engineers named Lesecq, had leaped from the top of the entrenchments, placed themselves uncovered on the bank of the river, and overwhelming the enemy's vessel with their musketry, had obliged her to sheer off. Captain Lesecq had his sword carried away by a shot, without sustaining any injury himself.

It was the 20th of April. The French had been six weeks before the place, and it was twenty days since the trenches were opened. The heavy artillery had just arrived, part from Breslau, part from Stettin, part from Thorn and Warsaw. Nothing ran short but ammunition. Still there was sufficient for opening the fire of the batteries of the first and second parallel. Every arrangement had been made for commencing on the 20th, when a tremendous equinoxial tempest, bringing a heavy fall of snow along with it, filled the trenches and interrupted the operations in them. It took two days to clear them out, and our soldiers, bivouacking in the open air in that rude climate, rendered still more rude by the lateness of winter, suffered very severely. At length, in the night of the 23rd, fifty-eight pieces, mortars, howitzers, twenty-four and twelve-pounders, fired at once, and continued to batter the place the whole of the 24th. The enemy's artillery, which had reserved its means to oppose ours, replied briskly and with tolerable precision. But after some hours of this fight with great guns, directed with superior skill by General Lariboissière, a great number of the enemy's embrasures were demolished, many of his pieces dismounted, and a fierce conflagration, kindled by the shells thrown in the false attack, raged in the interior of the city. Columns of smoke were seen rising above the highest edifices, melancholy evidences of the ravages which we had caused. Marshal Kalkreuth, nevertheless, succeeded in extinguishing the fire by means of the abundance of water with which the city was provided. He appeared to be unshaken. Next day, the 25th, Marshal Lefebvre, to sound his disposition, sent him word that he was going to fire red-hot balls. He made no reply. The fire of all our pieces then recommenced with still greater energy, and occasioned a new conflagration, which was again extinguished by the united efforts of the garrison and the inhabitants. The violent fire of our artillery, drawing upon it the enemy's projectiles, had produced a diversion serviceable to our works, which, having become more easy, advanced more rapidly. Thanks to the ardour of the engineer troops, digging out the sand amidst balls which demolished the head of the shafts, and carried away gabions and sandbags, the zigzags were carried to the third parallel, opened at length in the night between the 25th and 26th, by *flying sap*.

In the night between the 26th and 27th, great part of that parallel was traced, still by favour of the combat of the two

artilleries. Unluckily we had not a sufficient quantity of pieces or of ammunition. We fired scarcely two thousand shot a day, while the enemy fired three thousand. We had many iron guns which burst in the hands of our artillerymen, and did as much mischief as the enemy's projectiles. Our soldiers, however, made amends for inferiority of number by accuracy of aim. On the 27th, the enemy resolved to resume the offensive by means of sorties. Taking advantage of the works of the third parallel being yet unfinished, he resolved to destroy them, and suddenly suspended his fire about seven o'clock in the evening. This circumstance led to the presumption of an enterprise on the part of the besieged. Companies of the 12th light, recently arrived, were placed on the right and left, behind the epaulements, which concealed them. Six hundred Prussian grenadiers, followed by two hundred labourers, advanced upon the parallel, still imperfect and of easy access. A sentinel, lying on the ground upon his belly, having perceived them, retired to let them enter. The companies of the 12th light then rushed suddenly upon them, attacked them with the bayonet in the ditch, and fought them hand to hand. The combat was sanguinary, but they were driven out, leaving 120 killed or wounded on the spot. A certain number were taken, and the rest driven at the point of the bayonet to the glacis of the place.

Marshal Kalkreuth solicited a suspension of arms, for the purpose of taking away the dead and wounded. With the advice of the directors of the artillery and engineers, who wished for this suspension of arms in order to make some reconnaissances, it was granted by Marshal Lefebvre. Generals Lariboissière and Chasseloup hastened immediately under the walls of the place, to seek positions whence the works of the besieged might be more effectually battered. These reconnaissances being finished, they fell to work again, and set about establishing new batteries at the points which they had chosen, taking care to connect them by branches with our trenches.

In the night between the 28th and 29th, the enemy attempted another sortie with a column of 2000 men, divided into three detachments. He marched as he had done two days before on our third parallel, the works of which he seemed desirous to interrupt at any rate. As soon as the first detachment appeared, two companies of the 19th of the line fell upon it with the bayonet, and pushed it to the glacis of the Hagelsberg, but received there with a very brisk fire from the covered way, and enveloped by the second detachment, which they had not perceived, they lost about forty men. They were, nevertheless, timely succoured and extricated. The enemy, driven back, left us 70 killed and 130 prisoners.

These violent efforts directed against our third parallel did

not prevent us from completing its works, lengthening it on the right and left, and arming it with batteries. New convoys recently arrived had permitted eighty pieces of large calibre to be placed in battery. From that moment the fire of the artillery redoubled, and we debouched at length from the third parallel on two sides, in order to get upon the salients of the Hagelsberg. This work was composed of two bastions, between which there was a half-moon. The French proceeded towards the salient of the left bastion and towards the salient of the half-moon. The works of approach then became extremely destructive. The enemy, who had saved the greatest resources of his artillery for the conclusion of the siege, directed the best part of it against our works. Our soldiers of the engineers saw their shafts destroyed, and the loose sand which they had thrown out dashed back into the trenches by the shock of the numerous projectiles. Their firmness in labouring on amidst all these dangers was unconquerable. Our infantry, on their part, had to endure excessive fatigue; for the nearer we approached the place, the more necessary it became to commit the guard of the trenches to tried soldiers. Out of forty-eight hours they passed twenty-four either in working or in protecting those who were at work. We advanced, therefore, at that moment very slowly. Marshal Lefebvre, who began to lose patience, found fault with everybody, with the engineers, whose combinations he did not comprehend, with the artillery, whose efforts he did not appreciate, and particularly with the auxiliaries, who did him much less service than the French. The Saxons fought well, but showed little willingness, especially for labour. The Baden soldiers were not good for work or fight. The Poles of the new levy had zeal, but no habit of war. The soldiers of the legion of the north, very prompt in attack, dispersed on the slightest resistance. As all these auxiliaries were inclined to desertion, care was taken to supply them from the magazines of the headquarters, that they might not have to run about in the neighbouring villages; so that it was necessary to provide them with better fare than the French, though they were far from doing such good service. Marshal Lefebvre spoke of them in the most abusive terms, saying incessantly that they could do nothing but eat, called all the arguments of the engineers gibberish, declaring that he would do more than they with the breasts of his grenadiers, and absolutely insisting on putting an end to the siege by means of a general assault.

The design was rash; for we were still at a distance from the works of the place, and if we were to leap into the ditch, we should meet with those formidable palisades, which at Dantzig served instead of scarps of masonry. The engineers, as it is usual in sieges, could not agree with the artillery. They

accounted for the slowness of their progress by the loose nature of the soil, by the insufficient protection which they received from the artillery, by the too small number of good labourers. The artillery replied that it had too few guns, too little ammunition to equal the fire of the enemy, and that it could do no better. In consequence, the marshal, to settle all differences, proposed to put an end to the business by an assault, even before the works of approach were finished. The engineers, who lost many men, replied that if the artillery would by a ricochet battery throw down one length of the palisades, they would cheerfully lead our infantry to the assault of the Hagelsberg. As, however, the Russians had in 1724 lost 5000 men before Dantzig in an enterprise of this kind, undertaken from impatience, they durst not risk so rash a proceeding without submitting the matter to the emperor.

Luckily he was about thirty leagues off, and they could have his answer in forty-eight hours. He would even have gone himself to give it in person, if the presence of the King of Prussia and of the Emperor of Russia at the headquarters of Bartenstein had not made him apprehensive of some enterprise on their part against his winter quarters. As soon as he had received Marshal Lefebvre's letter, he lost no time in moderating the ardour of the old soldier by addressing to him a strong reprimand. He reproved him severely for his impatience, his contempt for science which he did not possess, his bad language respecting the auxiliaries. "You can do nothing," said he, "but find fault, abuse our allies, and change your opinion at the pleasure of the first comer. You wanted troops; I sent you them; I am preparing more for you, and you, *like an ingrate*, continue to complain without thinking even of thanking me. You treat our allies, especially the Poles and the Baden troops, without any delicacy. They are not used to fire, but they will get accustomed to it. Do you imagine that we were as brave in '92 as we are now, after fifteen years of war? Have some indulgence, then, old soldier as you are, for the young soldiers, who are starting in the career, and have not yet your coolness amidst danger. The Prince of Baden, whom you have with you [that prince had put himself at the head of the Badeners, and was present at the siege of Dantzig], has chosen to leave the pleasures of the court for the purpose of leading his troops into fire. Pay him respect, and give him credit for a zeal which his equals rarely imitate. The breasts of your grenadiers, which you are for bringing in everywhere, will not throw down walls. You must allow your engineers to act, and listen to the advice of General Chasseloup, who is a man of science, and from whom you ought not to take your confidence at the suggestion of the first *petty caviller* pretending to judge

of what he is incapable of comprehending. Reserve the courage of your grenadiers for the moment when science shall tell you that it may be usefully employed, and in the meantime learn patience. It is not worth while, for the sake of a few days, which, besides, I know not how to employ just now, to get some thousand men killed, whose lives it is possible to spare. Show the calmness, the consistency, the steadiness, which befit your age. Your glory is in the taking of Dantzig; take that place, and you shall be satisfied with me."

Nothing more was needed to pacify the marshal. He was content, therefore, to allow the operations of the siege to be continued according to all the rules of the art. Though the camp of the Nehrung had been removed to the Lower Vistula, and the passage of the canal and the river barred, the investment could not be rendered complete without the reduction of the isle of Holm, and it was only by the reduction of that island, too, that it was possible to nullify a number of redoubts, the Kalk-Schanze in particular, which took our trenches at the back, annoyed them by its fire, and retarded our progress on account of the cross-trenches which it was necessary to add to our works. Though we had not all the troops that we might have desired for pushing the siege briskly, still we had sufficient for making an attempt on the isle of Holm. The night between the 6th and 7th of May was devoted to this enterprise. Orders were given to General Gardanne to concur in it on his part, by proceeding to the canal of Laaken, and endeavouring to pass it on rafts. Eight hundred men, descending from the left of the headquarters to the bank of the Vistula, were to cross that river at twice, and to make the principal attack. At ten o'clock at night twelve barks were brought opposite to the village of Schellmühl, unperceived by the enemy. At one in the morning, these barks, carrying detachments of the regiment of the Paris guard, of the 2nd and 12th light, and 50 soldiers of the engineers, started from the left bank, and reached the isle of Holm. The enemy directed a few rounds of grape at the craft. Our troops leaped ashore in spite of the fire. The grenadiers of the Paris guard ran to the nearest redoubt without firing a shot, and took it from the Russians who defended it. At the same instant 100 men of the 2nd light, and 100 men of the 12th, likewise ran to two other redoubts, the one constructed at the point of the island, the other at a building called the White House. They received a first discharge, but marched so fast that in a few minutes the redoubts were carried and the Russians taken. Our troops fell with the same rapidity upon the other works, and in half an hour had made themselves masters of half the island and taken 500 prisoners. While this operation was so promptly executed, the barks employed in the passage of the Vistula brought a

second column, composed of Baden troops and soldiers of the legion of the north, which turned to the right, and proceeded towards that part of the island which faces the city of Dantzig. These troops, inspirited by the example which the French had just set them, threw themselves boldly upon the enemy's posts, surprised and disarmed them, and took in an instant 200 men and 200 artillery horses. General Gardanne had on his part crossed the canal of Laaken and landed in the island. This important conquest was thus fully secured.

This was a favourable occasion for an attempt to gain possession of the Kalk-Schanze, that annoying redoubt which had been taken and lost at the commencement of the siege. This redoubt, surrounded by water, and open at the gorge on the side nearest to the isle of Holm, owed its principal strength to the support which it received from that island. At the very moment when our two columns were reducing the isle of Holm, a detachment of Saxons and soldiers of the legion of the north, led by the *chef de bataillon*, Roumette, entered the ditches of the redoubt, with the water up to their armpits, threw itself upon the palisades, cleared them, and in spite of a brisk fire of musketry, remained masters of the work, in which were taken 180 Prussians, 4 officers, and several pieces of cannon.

This series of *coups-de-main*, which gave us 600 prisoners and 17 pieces of cannon, and cost the enemy 600 killed or wounded, gained us, above all, the possession of the isle of Holm, which completed the investment of Dantzig, and put an end to the fire so mischievous to our trenches. Owing to the rapidity of the execution, our loss had been very trifling.

Our works of approach had reached the salient of the half-moon. A circular trench, embracing that salient, and turning it both on the right and left, had been opened. The moment for the assault of the *covered way* had arrived. That name is given to the inner side of the ditch along which the besieged move about and defend themselves, under shelter of a range of small palisades. In the night between the 7th and 8th, a detachment of the 19th of the line and of the 12th light, preceded by about fifty men of the engineers, armed with hatchets and shovels, under the direction of Barthelemy and Beaulieu, officers of engineers, and Bertrand, *chef de bataillon* of infantry, debouched from the two extremities of the circular trench, and advanced briskly along the covered way. This detachment was greeted with a shower of balls. The soldiers of the engineers, marching at the head, fell upon the palisades with their hatchets, and cut down some of them. Our foot-soldiers, pushing on after them into the covered way, traversed it amidst the grape poured down from the walls of the place. They then proceeded to the strong blockhouses which had been constructed in the re-enter-

ing angles of the enclosure; but they found themselves exposed to so brisk a fire of musketry, that they were obliged to return to the salient of the half-moon. The covered way, nevertheless, remained in their possession. The miners had meanwhile run about everywhere to satisfy themselves that no mines had been commenced, and, as usual, disposed in such a manner as to blow up the ground conquered by the besiegers. A sergeant of engineers actually discovered a shaft of a mine in the salient of the half-moon. He leaped in, sword in hand, found twelve Prussians at work upon the branches of the mine, and taking advantage of the fright produced by his sudden appearance, made all of them prisoners. He then overturned the whole work. The name of this brave man, which is worthy of being preserved, was Chopot.

The assault of the covered way, always one of the most sanguinary operations of a regular siege, cost us seventeen killed and seventy-six wounded—a rather large loss considering the small number of men employed on so contracted a space. Masters of the covered way of the half-moon, we were established on the margin of the ditch. It would be necessary to descend into it, then to overthrow the range of strong palisades which occupied the bottom of it, next to carry by assault the turfed slopes which supplied the place of scarps of masonry. These were not easy undertakings. It was requisite, moreover, to execute at the salient of the left bastion the same operation that we had just executed at the salient of the half-moon, that we might not be taken in flank by the guns of that bastion when we should attack the half-moon itself.

We established ourselves, then, on the ditch, covering ourselves there with the usual precautions, and continued to proceed towards the left, in order to approach the salient of the bastion. The 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th of May were employed in this work, which had become extremely dangerous, for at this short distance the enemy's balls overturned the saps, penetrated into the trenches, swept off the men, and frequently caused the epaulements which they had laboriously raised to fall down upon them. The effect of the musketry at that distance was not less terrible than that of the artillery. The sand which the soldiers threw out sunk down every moment, and they were obliged to begin the same works several times over. Lastly, the nights, having become very short in May—for everybody knows that the nearer you approach to the Pole, the longer the nights are in winter, the shorter in summer—left us scarcely four hours to work out of the twenty-four. Marshal Lefebvre, growing more and more impatient, was incessantly asking when they would render the assault practicable, by throwing down the line of palisades which fenced the bottom of the ditch. The

engineers told him that it was the province of the artillery to destroy it by ricochet shot. The artillery, apprehensive that the ground was undermined, replied that there was not room for its batteries. The difficulty which we met with here was a proof of the defensive properties of wood; for if, on reaching the edge of the ditch, we had had a wall of masonry facing us instead of a line of palisades, we should have established a breaching battery, demolished that wall in forty-eight hours, filled the ditch with the rubbish, and mounted to the assault. But the balls broke off the head of some of the palisades, in many cases scarcely splintered them, and knocked down none. The decisive moment approached; impatience was extreme. It was almost that moment of a siege when the besieged make the last efforts of resistance, and when the besiegers, to put an end to the matter, are disposed to hazard the most daring attempts.

But all at once a rumour was circulated among the besieged as well as besiegers that a Russian army was coming to the relief of Dantzig. That relief, indeed, had been long promised, and there was reason to be astonished that it had not yet arrived. The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, who were then together at their headquarters, knew in what danger Dantzig was. They were well aware how important it was for them to prevent its fall, for while they retained that place they held Napoleon's left in check, they rendered his establishment on the Vistula precarious, they obliged him to deprive himself of 25,000 men, employed either in a blockade or a siege; lastly, they closed against him the most extensive mart for supplies that existed in the north. If they were sooner or later to resume the offensive, it was worth while to make haste on account of so important a motive. For relieving Dantzig they had two direct courses; either to attack Napoleon on the Passarge, in order to take from him the positions under shelter of which he covered the siege; or to send a considerable corps, either by land, following the Nehrung, or by sea, embarking their troops at Königsberg, and landing them at the fort of Weichselmünde. There was, it is true, a third course, but not dependent on themselves, namely, a landing of 25,000 English, a hundred times promised, a hundred times announced, never executed. It is certain that, if the English had kept their word to their allies, and if, instead of retaining part of their forces in England, as a check upon the camp of Boulogne, sending another to Alexandria to lay hands on Egypt, and a third to the banks of La Plata, to possess itself of the Spanish colonies, they had thrown an army either into Stralsund or into Dantzig, when we had scarcely three or four French regiments dispersed in Pomerania, they might have changed the course of events, or at least have caused us great embarrassment. Napoleon, in fact, would have been forced to

detach 20,000 men from the grand army, and if he had been attacked at the same moment on the Passarge, he would have been deprived of a considerable portion of his forces for making head against the principal Russian army.

But the English had no intention of coming to the assistance of their allies. It was too frightful a thing for them to set foot on the continent. It suited them better to employ their troops in taking colonies. Besides, a change of ministry, to the causes and the effects of which we shall presently advert, rendered all resolutions in London uncertain. The only succour sent to Dantzig was that of three cutters, laden with ammunition, and commanded by intrepid officers, who had orders to ascend the Vistula and penetrate to the place at any rate.

Thus it was from Prussian and Russian troops alone that any efficacious succour could be expected for Dantzig. The two sovereigns, having met at Bartenstein, deliberated on the subject with their generals, and had the greatest difficulty to agree. One reason, the want of provisions, opposed a plan which would have been most suitable, and consisted in resuming active operations immediately. The ground was not yet sufficiently fecundated by the sun to furnish food for men and horses. The allies had few magazines, they could at most supply the men with corn and butcher's meat, and as for the horses, they had nothing to give them but the straw which thatched the cottages of the peasants in Old Prussia. They thought, therefore, of waiting till the grass was high enough to feed the horses. It was the same reason that detained Napoleon on the Passarge. But he had no important fortress to save; every day, on the contrary, brought him strength, and enabled him to take a fresh step towards the walls of Dantzig.

In this situation, the two allied sovereigns resorted to the means of the most slender succour, and resolved to send about ten thousand men, half by the tongue of land called the Nehrung, half by sea and the fort of Weichselmünde. The plan was to force the line of investment, to take the French camp on the Nehrung, by debouching upon that camp either from the fort of Weichselmünde, or from the Nehrung itself by the Königsberg road, then to penetrate into the isle of Holm, to re-establish the communications with Dantzig, to enter the place, and if all these operations should prove successful, to make a general sortie against the besieging corps, for the purpose of destroying its works and obliging it to raise the siege. It would have required for this much more than ten thousand men, and above all, that they should have had able commanders.

A Prussian and Russian corps composed in great part of cavalry, under the command of Colonel Bülow, was to be conveyed in sloops through the pass of Pillau, to land on the point

of the Nehrung, and to proceed over that narrow sandbank for the twenty leagues that separate Pillau from Dantzig. Eight thousand men, mostly Russians, were embarked in transports at Pillau, and escorted by English ships of war to the fort of Weichselmünde. They were commanded by General Kamenski, the son of that old general, who had for a moment commanded the Russian army at the commencement of the winter campaign. Arriving on the 12th of May at the mouth of the Vistula, they were landed on the outer mole, under the protection of the guns of Weichselmünde. At this same time, demonstrations had taken place against all our winter quarters. Before Massena, a feint had been made of passing the Bug, as if it were the intention to act at the other extremity of the theatre of the war. Numerous patroles were sent out facing our cantonments on the Passarge. Lastly, the corps destined to march along the Nehrung moved rapidly towards the detached posts which we had at the extremity of that sandbank, and obliged them to fall back.

The assembling at Pillau of two corps, which were to go by different ways to the relief of Dantzig, had been noted. Reports emanating from the besieged fortress had confirmed the news from Pillau, and this was sufficient to throw Marshal Lefebvre into the greatest uneasiness. He had lost no time in recurring to the emperor, in calling to him General Oudinot, who was in the isle of Nogath, with the division of the grenadiers which was to form part of the corps of reserve destined for Marshal Lannes. He had at the same time written to all quarters, applying for assistance to the commanders of the troops placed in his vicinity.

But Napoleon, whom twenty-four hours sufficed for sending a courier from Finkenstein to Dantzig, had provided beforehand for everything. He reprimanded Marshal Lefebvre, but mildly, for this manner of acting. He cheered him with the intelligence of speedy succours, which, long prepared, could not fail to arrive in time. Napoleon was under little concern about the puerile demonstrations made on his right, for he could too well distinguish in war between a feint and a real design for it to be possible to deceive him. He had, moreover, soon learned to a certainty that one large detachment only would be despatched for Dantzig, either by the Nehrung or by sea, and he had proportioned his precautions to the seriousness of the danger.

Marshal Mortier, having become entirely disposable by the definite conclusion of the armistice with the Swedes, had received orders to hasten his march, and to send off a portion of his troops before him to Dantzig. In consequence of this order, the 72nd of the line had arrived at the camp of Marshal Lefebvre, at the moment of his greatest agitation. The reserve of Marshal

Lannes, prepared in the isle of Nogath, began to be formed, and meanwhile the fine division of Oudinot's grenadiers, which was the nucleus of it, had been placed between Marienwerder and Dirschau, two or three marches from Dantzig. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau, 3400 strong, was also stationed in the isle of Nogath. The resources, therefore, were quite sufficient. Napoleon ordered one of General Oudinot's brigades to proceed to Furstenwerder, to throw a bridge across there, and to hold itself in readiness to pass the arm of the Vistula which separates the isle of Nogath from the Nehrung. The cavalry being dispersed in the pasture grounds of the Lower Vistula, in the environs of Elbing, he ordered General Beaumont to take a thousand dragoons, to proceed to Furstenwerder, to allow the enemy's corps coming over the Nehrung to file away, to cut it off when it should have passed Furstenwerder, and make as many prisoners of it as possible. Lastly, he enjoined Marshal Lannes to march with Oudinot's grenadiers to Dantzig, not to fatigue the troops while there by employing them in the labours of the siege, but to keep them in reserve, in order to throw them upon the Russians as soon as they should attempt to land in the environs of Weichselmünde.

These dispositions, prescribed in time, thanks to a foresight which did everything opportunely, brought around Dantzig more troops than were needed to dispel the danger. The Russians had begun to land on the 12th of May. From the sandy heights which we occupied, they were seen distinctly on the moles of the fort of Weichselmünde. They were not all landed and assembled in advance of Weichselmünde till the evening of the 14th. Repeated advices sent meanwhile to Marshal Lannes caused him to accelerate his march, and on the 14th he arrived under the walls of Dantzig, with Oudinot's grenadiers, excepting the two battalions left at Furstenwerder. The 72nd was already at the camp. Marshal Mortier, with the rest of his corps, was one march behind.

Marshal Lefebvre, made easy by these reinforcements, had sent the regiments of the municipal guard of Paris to General Gardanne, who commanded the camp of the Lower Vistula in the Nehrung, and waited, before he despatched further succours to him, for the design of the Russians to be clearly indicated; for they could debouch from the fort of Weichselmünde, or on the right bank to attack General Gardanne's camp, or on the left bank to attack the headquarters.

On the 15th of May, at three in the morning, the Russians, to the number of seven or eight thousand, sallied from the fort of Weichselmünde, and marched to attack our positions on the Nehrung. These positions commenced at the point of the isle of Holm, the same at which the canal of Laaken joins the Vistula,

extended under the form of a palisaded epaulement to the wood which covers this part of the Nehrung, were protected in that part by numerous abattis, and terminated at the sandhills along the sea. General Schramm, now under the command of General Gardanne, defended that line with a battalion of the 2nd light, a detachment of the regiment of the Paris guard, a Saxon battalion, part of the 19th chasseurs, and some Polish horse under Captain Sokolniki, whom we have already seen distinguishing himself at this siege. General Gardanne kept in rear with the rest of his forces, either to be ready to succour the troops defending the entrenchments, or to oppose a sortie from the place. Marshal Lefebvre, perceiving from the heights of the Zigankenberg the movement of the Russians, had sent him in the morning a battalion of the 12th light. Shortly afterwards, Marshal Lannes had set out himself, with four battalions of Oudinot's division, and marched upon the dikes which ran through the flat country situated on our right, the engineers not having yet been able to construct a bridge towards our left, to communicate directly with the camp of the Nehrung by the Lower Vistula.

The Russians advanced in three columns, one directed along the Vistula facing our redoubts, the second against the wood and the abattis which defended the approach to it, the third composed of cavalry, and destined to keep along the seashore. A fourth had remained in reserve, to assist any of the three that might waver. The English cutters arriving at the same time were, for their part, to ascend the Vistula, to destroy the bridges whch were supposed to exist, to take our works from behind, and to second the movement of the Russians by the fire of sixty pieces of large callibre. But the wind was not favourable for the execution of this plan, and the cutters were forced to remain at the mouth of the Vistula.

The Russian columns marched with vigour to the attack of our positions. Our soldiers, placed behind entrenchments of earth, coolly waited for them, and fired upon them when very close. The Russians were not staggered; they approached to the very foot of the redoubts, but could not get into them. On every repulsed attempt our soldiers leaped from the entrenchments, and pursued the assailants with the bayonet. The column which had proceeded to the abattis having a less solid obstacle to overcome, endeavoured to penetrate into the woods, and to establish itself there. It was stopped, like the first, but it returned to the charge, and engaged in a series of hand to hand fights with our troops. The conflict at this point was long and obstinate. The column of cavalry ordered to march along the shore remained in observation before our detachments of cavalry without making any serious movement. The action lasted for

several hours, and our troops employed in the defence of the works numbering no more than 2000 men against 7000 or 8000, for General Gardanne was obliged with the rest to take care of the débouches of the place, our troops were exhausted, and must at length have succumbed under these repeated attacks, if a battalion of the Paris guard, sent by General Gardanne, and the battalion of the 12th light, which had come from the headquarters, had not brought them decisive succours. These brave battalions, directed by General Schramm, fell upon the Russians and repulsed them. All the troops, animated by this example, rushed upon them, and drove them back to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde.

Meanwhile, General Kamenski had orders to make the utmost efforts to relieve Dantzig. He would not, therefore, shut himself up in the fort till he had made a last attempt. Joining with the troops which had just been fighting the reserve which had not yet been engaged, he again advanced upon our entrenchments, so violently, so ineffectually attacked. But it was too late. Marshal Lannes and General Oudinot had brought General Schramm the reinforcement of four battalions of grenadiers. One of these four battalions was sufficient to put an end to the fight. General Oudinot, at the head of this battalion, rallying around him the mass of our troops, then bringing them forward, overturned the Russians, and drove them with the bayonet at their loins to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, where he forced them to shut themselves up definitively. This action might well be, and it was, the last.

The Russians left 2000 men on the field of battle, most of them dead or wounded, some prisoners. Our loss was about 300 men hors de combat. General Oudinot had a horse killed by a cannon-ball, which, passing between him and Marshal Lannes, missed very little of killing the latter. The moment had not yet arrived when the illustrious marshal was to sink under so many repeated exploits. Fate, before it struck him, still reserved for him some brilliant days.

Thenceforward, Marshal Lefebvre could not entertain any uneasiness, nor Marshal Kalkreuth any hope. Meanwhile the commanders of the cutters sent from England to succour Dantzig were anxious to execute their instructions. The place being chiefly in want of ammunition, the captain of the *Dauntless* was desirous to take advantage of a stiff breeze from the north to ascend the Vistula. But no sooner had he passed the fort of Weichselmünde, and approached our redoubts, than he was assailed by a violent fire of artillery. The troops, leaving the entrenchments, joined the fire of musketry to that of the cannon, and reduced the cutter to such a state, that very soon she would not answer the helm, and struck upon a sand-

bank, where she was obliged to haul down her colours. She contained a great quantity of powder and despatches for Marshal Kalkreuth.

The place, therefore, was absolutely left to itself. Unfortunately, the operations of the siege became every moment more difficult. The troops were lodged on the margin of the ditch; they had already attempted to descend into it; but the nature of that soil, falling down incessantly, and the immense quantity of artillery which the enemy had at his disposal, and which enabled him to overwhelm our trenches with his bombs, rendered the operations as slow as they were perilous. It was necessary, however, cost what it might, to get to the bottom of the ditch, and proceed, hatchet in hand, to cut an opening in the palisades, wide enough to admit our columns of attack. The men began, therefore, to descend into the ditch, making use of the blinded passages, that is to say, advancing under a framework covered with earth and fascines. Several times the enemy's bombs broke through these blinds and crushed the men whom they sheltered. But nothing could daunt our engineer troops. Out of six hundred men of that arm, nearly three hundred had fallen. Half of the officers were either killed or wounded. Among the obstacles that we had to conquer was the blockhouse in the re-entering angle which the half-moon formed with the bastion. It was resolved to blow up by mining this work, which withstood even cannon-balls. A mine which had not been carried near enough to the blockhouse exploded, and covered it with earth, but rendered it still more difficult to destroy. The men then established themselves on the funnel of the mine, cleared under the enemy's fire the ground about the blockhouse, which they set on fire, and thus at last got rid of it.

When they had reached the bottom of the ditch, several soldiers of the engineers tried to go under the very fire of the place to cut the palisades. It took them half an hour to destroy three. Thus the operation could not fail to be very long and very sanguinary. It was now the 18th of May, and forty-eight days since the trenches were opened. There was no fault to be found with the engineer corps, which displayed admirable devotedness. Some detractors laid the blame of the slowness of the siege on General Chasseloup. General Kirgener, who was sub-director of the works, and who had conceived different ideas respecting the choice of the point of attack, was incessantly repeating to Marshal Lefebvre that the Hagelsberg had been ill chosen, and that this was the only cause of the delays that we had experienced. This he repeated so often that Marshal Lefebvre at last believed him, and wrote on the 18th of May to the emperor, complaining of General Chasseloup, and attributing the long resistance of the place to the wrong choice of

the point of attack, alleging that the Bischoffsberg would have presented far fewer difficulties.

Complaints at this moment would have availed nothing had they been as well founded as they were the reverse. But Napoleon, who never ceased to watch the siege attentively, did not make the marshal wait long for an answer. "I really conceived," he thus wrote to him, "that you had more *character and opinion.* Is it at the end of a siege that a man ought to suffer himself to be persuaded by inferiors that the point of attack must be changed, to discourage the army by it, and to discredit your own judgment? The Hagelsberg is judiciously chosen. It is by the Hagelsberg that Dantzig has always been attacked. Give your confidence to Chasseloup, who is the most skilful, the most experienced, of your engineers; take his advice alone and that of M. de Lariboissière, *and drive away all petty cavillers.*"

Marshal Lefebvre was, therefore, obliged to persist in the first choice, and to wait the slow but sure effects of an art, of which he was wholly ignorant. The troops of the engineers, unsparing of themselves, had got on one side to the bottom of the ditch of the half-moon, and on the other to the bottom of the ditch of the bastion, being forced, on account of the narrow space in which they operated, to work under the bombs, and themselves to defend the works against the sorties of the place. Lastly, facing the left bastion, which was attacked at the same time as the half-moon, they had, sometimes with fires of fascines, sometimes with powder-bags, sometimes also with the hatchet, destroyed the palisades for the space of ninety feet. This was sufficient to afford a passage for the columns of assault. That moment was impatiently awaited by the troops. The night of the 21st of May was fixed for the assault. Several columns, to the number of 4000 men, were brought into the ditch, led successively to the foot of the slope of earth which rose behind the palisades, that they might previously see the work that was to be scaled, and learn how to climb it. Filled with ardour at the sight, they demanded with loud cries permission to rush to the assault. Three enormous logs, suspended by ropes at the top of the earth slopes, were ready to roll down upon the assailants. A brave soldier, whose name history ought to record, François Vallé, a chasseur of the 12th light, who several times assisted the working engineers to demolish the palisades, offered to go and cut the ropes which supported these logs, and thus effect their fall before the assault. Seizing a hatchet, he climbed the turfed scarps, cut the ropes, and it was not till he was just finishing that he was struck by a ball; but, we may add, the wound was not mortal.

At length the hour of the assault drew near, when all at once the troops learned to their great regret that Marshal Kalkreuth had desired to capitulate.

Colonel Lacoste, in fact, had gone with a flag of truce to deliver to Marshal Kalkreuth the letters addressed to him which had been found on board the English cutter recently taken. He arrived very opportunely to afford Frederick's lieutenant an honourable opportunity for proposing a capitulation, which had become necessary. The marshal entered into conversation with the colonel, acknowledged the necessity for surrendering, but claimed for the garrison of Dantzig the conditions which the garrison of Mayence had formerly obtained from him, that is to say, liberty to march out without being prisoners of war, without laying down arms, and merely engaging not to serve against France before the expiration of a year. Marshal Lefebvre signed these conditions, for he was sorely afraid of seeing the siege prolonged; but he required time to consult Napoleon. The latter was not in such a hurry, for he held the Russians in check on the Passarge, and he would gladly have sacrificed a few more days to take prisoners a whole *corps d'armée*, making no account of the engagement entered into by the enemy's troops not to serve for a year. He expressed, therefore, a certain regret, but consented to the proposed capitulation, ordering Marshal Lefebvre to tell M. de Kalkreuth that it was out of consideration for him, for his age, for his glorious services, and for his courteous manner of treating the French, that such favourable conditions were granted. The capitulation was signed, and executed on the 26th.

On the morning of the 26th, Marshal Lefebvre made his entry into the fortress. He had proposed to Marshal Lannes and Marshal Mortier, who had arrived a few days before, to enter with him; but they would not dispute with him an honour which belonged to him, and which he had earned, if not by his skill, at least by his bravery and by his perseverance in living for two months in those formidable trenches. He made his entry, therefore, at the head of a detachment of all the troops which had concurred in the siege. The engineers naturally marched first. This distinction was due to them on all accounts, for out of 600 men, about half had been put hors de combat. Accordingly, Napoleon immediately published the following order of the day:—

"FINKENSTEIN, *May* 26, 1807.

"The fortress of Dantzig has capitulated, and our troops entered it to-day at noon.

"His majesty expresses his satisfaction to the besieging troops. The sappers have covered themselves with glory."

This memorable siege had been long, since the place had held out for fifty-one days after the trenches were opened. Various causes contributed to the length of this resistance. The configuration of the place, its vast extent, the strength of the

besieged garrison, nearly equal to that of the besieging army, the tardy arrival and the insufficiency of the heavy artillery, which permitted the enemy to reserve his fire for the moment of the last approaches, the small number of good labourers proportioned to the small number of good troops, the nature of the soil, slipping down incessantly under the projectiles, the defensive qualities of the timber, which could not be battered in breach, but which required to be demolished with pickaxe and hatchet, lastly, the terrible weather, variable as at the equinox, passing from frost to torrents of rain—all these causes, we say, contributed to prolong this siege, which was alike honourable to the besieged and to the besiegers. Marshal Kalkreuth took away with him but a small portion of his originally strong garrison. Out of 18,320 men, only 7120 marched from Dantzig.* There had been 2700 killed, 3400 wounded, 800 prisoners, 4300 deserters. Frederick's old pupil had on this occasion proved himself worthy of that great school of war in which he had been brought up.

Marshal Lefebvre by his bravery, General Chasseloup by his skill, Napoleon by his vast foresight, the engineer troops by their incredible devotedness, had obtained for the army this important conquest. Though there had been a deficiency of heavy artillery, it was a downright miracle, at such a prodigious distance from the Rhine, in such a season, to have been able to draw the matériel necessary for so great a siege from Silesia, Prussia, and Upper Poland. It would, no doubt, have been easy for Napoleon, by detaching one of his *corps d'armée* from the Passarge or the Vistula, to put an end much sooner to the resistance of Dantzig. But he would have obtained this acceleration only at the price of a great imprudence; for, according to all probabilities, Napoleon would be attacked during the siege by the Russian and Prussian armies, and if he had been, the 20,000 men detached to Dantzig would have considerably weakened him. We cannot, then, too much admire the art with which he chose that position of the Passarge, where he covered the siege of Dantzig, and at the same time faced the allied armies which might every moment present themselves—the art, in particular, with which he took advantage of so many regiments on march, as well troops returning from Stralsund as infantry reserve prepared on the Lower Vistula, to keep up around Dantzig a force sufficient for the operations of the siege —finally, the art with which he awaited a result that he might have endangered by endeavouring to hasten it, and that, besides, he would have had no interest in hastening, for not intending to act offensively till June, his not completing the conquest of Dantzig till May was of very little consequence.

* These numbers are taken from statements found in the place.

It was not sufficient to have taken Dantzig, it was necessary to be master of the mouth of the Vistula and the sea approaches, that is to say, the fort of Weichselmünde, which, well defended, would have required a regular attack and occasioned a great loss of time. But the moral effect of the reduction of Dantzig produced the surrender of the fort of Weichselmünde forty-eight hours afterwards. Half of the garrison having deserted, the other half surrendered the fort, desiring to capitulate on the same terms as the garrison of Dantzig. The route of the Nehrung as far as Pillau served both for returning to Königsberg. Besides the advantage of securing a base of operation on the Vistula that was not to be shaken, Napoleon acquired in the city of Dantzig immense supplies. With great wealth, Dantzig contained 300,000 quintals of corn, and above all several million bottles of wine of the best quality, which in this dreary climate would be to the army a subject of joy and a source of health. Napoleon immediately sent his aide-de-camp, Rapp, on whose devotedness he had perfect reliance, to take the command of Dantzig, and to prevent the misapplication of valuable things. He immediately followed him in person, and went to pass two days at Dantzig, wishing to judge from his own observation of the importance of that place, of the works which would be required to render it impregnable, lastly, of the resources which might be derived from it for the subsistence of the army.

He ordered 18,000 quintals of wheat to be conveyed immediately to Elbing, to supply the exhausted magazines of that city, which had already furnished 80,000 quintals of corn. He sent off a million bottles of wine to the quarters on the Passarge. He inspected all the works of the siege, approved all that had been done, highly praised General Chasseloup and the attack by the Hagelsberg, distributed signal rewards among the officers of the army, and promised himself to compensate them soon by magnificent donations for all the booty that he had wisely and nobly withdrawn from them in entrusting General Rapp with the government of Dantzig. He resolved to create Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzig, and to add a superb endowment to the title. He wrote to M. Mollien, desiring him to purchase, with the funds of the army treasury, an estate with a mansion producing a nett income of 100,000 livres, to form the appanage of the new duke. He likewise recommended to M. Mollien to buy about twenty mansions which had belonged to ancient families, and as many as possible situated in the west, for presents to the generals who freely spilt their blood for him, striving thus to renew the aristocracy of France, as he was renewing the dynasties of Europe by the strokes of his sword, transformed in his hand into a sort of magic wand, from which dropped glory, wealth, and crowns.

He gave the necessary orders for the immediate repair of the works of Dantzig. He placed there by way of garrison the 44th and 49th of the line, which had suffered severely during the siege. He desired that all the provisional regiments, which should not have time to reach the army before the resumption of offensive operations, should be assembled there. He assigned to the legion of the north, whose zeal and fatigues had been extreme, and whose fidelity was undoubted, the custody of the fort of Weichselmünde. He directed part of the German troops to be distributed in the Nehrung. He ordered the Saxons, who were good soldiers, but who needed to serve in our ranks that they might become attached to us, to join Lannes' corps, which had already returned to the Vistula, and the Poles, whom he wished to inure to war, to join Mortier's corps, likewise destined to proceed to the Vistula. The Italians were left to blockade Colberg, the rest of the Poles to blockade the little citadel of Graudenz, points of little importance which we had yet to take.

Napoleon, on his return to Finkenstein, made all his dispositions for recommencing offensive operations in the first days of the month of June. The crafty negotiations of Austria had terminated only in rendering a solution by arms inevitable. The offer of mediation made by that court, accepted with mistrust and regret, but with a good grace, by Napoleon, had been immediately transmitted to England, Prussia, and Russia. The new English cabinet, though its policy was far from inclining to peace, could not at its outset proclaim too marked a preference for war. Mr. Canning, as minister for foreign affairs, replied, that Great Britain cheerfully accepted the mediation of Austria, and would follow in this negotiation the example of the allied courts, Prussia and Russia. The answer of the latter was the least amicable of the three. The Emperor Alexander had repaired to the headquarters of his army at Bartenstein, on the Alle. He had there been joined by the King of Prussia, who had come from Königsberg to converse with him. The imperial guard, which had lately left Petersburg, and numerous recruits drawn from the remotest provinces of the empire, had brought the Russian army a reinforcement of 30,000 men, and repaired the losses of Pultusk and Eylau. The ridiculous exaggerations of General Benningsen, pushed beyond the limit that a wish to raise the courage of one's soldiers, one's country, and one's sovereign allows, had deceived the young czar. He almost imagined that he had been conqueror at Eylau, and he was tempted to try once more the fortune of arms. The King of Prussia, on the contrary, whom particular relations with Napoleon, kept up through the medium of Duroc, had enlightened respecting the somewhat more favourable dispositions of the conqueror of Jena, appeared inclined to treat, on

condition that the greater part of his kingdom should be restored to him. He had not deceived himself in regard to the successes obtained by the coalition. He had seen the principal fortress in his dominions taken before the face of the Russian army, powerless to prevent it, and he could not persuade himself that the allies would soon be able to force Napoleon back to the Vistula and the Oder.* He was, therefore, in favour of peace. But the Emperor Alexander, infatuated by his pretended advantages, to which, however, the reduction of Dantzig gave a signal contradiction, affirmed to King Frederick William that very shortly his whole patrimony would be restored to him without the reservation of a single province, that the independence of Germany would be re-established, and that for this purpose it would be sufficient to gain a single battle, that one victory would decide Austria, and that they should thus ensure the ruin of Napoleon and the liberation of Europe. Frederick William, therefore, allowed himself to be led away by new suggestions, very like those which had already seduced him at Potsdam, and the mediation of Austria was refused in reality, though accepted in appearance. The allies replied that they should be delighted to see peace restored to Europe, and restored through the good offices of Austria, but they wished first to know on what bases Napoleon intended to treat with them. This evasive answer left no doubt of the continuation of the war, and it gave great displeasure to Austria, who thus lost the means of entering into the quarrel in order to terminate it as she pleased, either by the concurrence of her arms if Napoleon sustained reverses, or by a peace, of which she should be arbitress if he continued successful. Nevertheless, she would not relinquish the mediation in such a manner as to appear beaten; she communicated the answers which she had received to Napoleon, and begged him to clear up the doubts which seemed to prevent the belligerent powers from opening the negotiations. It was M. de Vincent who was charged with the series of these parleys. He could only carry them on in writing, for while he had remained at Warsaw, M. de Talleyrand had joined Napoleon at Finkenstein.

This conclusion pleased Napoleon, who had viewed the mediation of Austria with great apprehension. Still persisting in not taking upon himself the refusal of peace, he replied that he was ready to adopt the medium of concessions, provided

* It is very difficult to know precisely what passed between these two sovereigns, living in a continual *tête-à-tête*, and not communicating their secret dispositions to those about them. But what passed at headquarters became known from communications of the court of Prussia to several petty German courts, and besides, the assertion which I make here is derived from statements made by the Queen of Prussia herself to one of the most respectable diplomatists of the time.

there were granted to his allies, Spain, Holland, the Porte, restitutions equivalent to those which he was disposed to make. He added that, as soon as a place should be fixed upon for the meeting of a congress, he would sent his plenipotentiaries thither without delay.

But the mediation had miscarried, for it would take several months to bring such parleys to any termination whatever, and he hoped in a few days of fine weather to finish the war.

Everything was ready, in fact, on both sides for resuming hostilities with the greatest energy. The two sovereigns, living together at Bartenstein,[1] had contracted the most solemn engagements towards each other, and promised not to lay down their arms till the cause of Europe was avenged, and the whole of the Prussian dominions restored. They had signed at Bartenstein a convention by which they bound themselves to act only in concert, and not to treat with the enemy but by common consent. The proposed aim of their efforts was not, they said, the abasement of France, but the emancipation of the powers, great and small, abased by France. They were going to fight in order to bring about the evacuation of Germany, Holland, even Italy, if Austria joined them, to establish, in default of the ancient German confederation, a new federative constitution, which should ensure the independence of all the German States and a reasonable influence to Austria and Prussia in Germany. For the rest, the extent of the projected reparations was to depend on the success of the coalition. Other conventions had been signed, as well with Sweden as with England. The latter, more interested in the war than any other, and hitherto profiting by the efforts of the powers without making any herself, had promised subsidies and land troops. Her avarice in regard to subsidies had indisposed the King of Sweden to such a degree as to disgust that prince with the crusade which he had always meditated against France. Still, with the assistance of Russia, there had been wrung from England a million sterling for Prussia, a yearly allowance for the Swedes employed in Pomerania, and an engagement to send a corps of 20,000 English to Stralsund. Prussia had promised on her part to send to Stralsund 8000 or 10,000 Prussians, who, united with the 20,000 English and 15,000 Swedes, would form on the rear of Napoleon a respectable army, and the more to be feared by him as it would cover itself with the veil of the armistice signed with Marshal Mortier.

These conventions communicated to Austria had no influence upon her. Besides, the taking of Dantzig, which attested the impotence of the Russians, was sufficient, with all that was known at Vienna concerning the relative situation of the belligerent armies, to confine that court to its system of expectant politics.

Alexander and Frederick William were, therefore, left to struggle on against the French with the wrecks of the Prussian forces, consisting of about 30,000 men, mostly prisoners who had escaped from our custody, with the Russian army recruited, with the Swedes and a promised corps of English in Pomerania. General Benningsen's troops were still suffering severe distress, and while Napoleon contrived to obtain from an enemy's country the most abundant resources, the Russian administration, amidst a friendly country, with considerable means of navigation, knew not how to find wherewithal to appease the painful cravings of her army. That unfortunate army suffered, complained, but on seeing its young sovereign at Bartenstein it mingled cries of attachment with its cries of pain, and deceived him while promising by its acclamations more than it could perform for the policy and the glory of the Muscovite empire. Though ignorant, it could form a just estimate of the uselessness of that war, but it was desirous to march forward, were it only to conquer provisions. Accordingly, the two sovereigns, repairing, the one to Tilsit, the other to Königsberg, whither they went to await the result of the campaign, had left orders to their generals to take the offensive as soon as possible.

General Benningsen had posted himself on the upper course of the Alle, at Heilsberg, where, in imitation of Napoleon, he had created an entrenched camp, formed some very ill-stocked magazines, and prepared his ground to fight a defensive battle, if Napoleon entered first into action. He could assemble under his hand about 100,000 men. Besides this principal mass, he had at his left a corps of 18,000 men on the Narew, placed at first under the command of General Essen, and afterwards under that of General Tolstoy. He had on his right about 20,000 men, composed of Kamenski's division returned from Weichselmünde, and of the Prussian corps of Lestocq; he had, lastly, some depôts at Königsberg, making a total of 140,000 men scattered from Warsaw to Königsberg, 100,000 of whom were assembled on the Alle, opposite to our cantonments on the Passarge. General Labanof was bringing a reinforcement of 30,000 men, troops drawn from the interior of the empire. But these troops were not likely to be on the theatre of war before the resumption of the operations.

Though this army could present itself with confidence before any enemy, whoever he might be, it could not fight with any chance of success against the French army of Austerlitz and Jena, to which, besides, it had become greatly inferior in number, since Napoleon had had time to extract from France and Italy new forces, of which we have already given a long renumeration. Napoleon, in fact, was about to reap the fruit of his incessant attentions and his admirable forecast. His army, rested, fed,

recruited, was able to face all his enemies, either then declared, or ready to declare themselves on the first event. On his rear, Marshal Brune, with 15,000 Dutch, collected in the Hanseatic towns, with 14,000 Spaniards despatched from Leghorn, Perpignan, and Bayonne, and on march towards the Elbe, with the 15,000 Wurtembergers recently employed in reducing the fortresses in Silesia, with the 16,000 French in Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, which had entered Germany, with 10,000 men of the garrison battalions occupying Hameln, Magdeburg, Spandau, Cüstrin, Stettin, with the new contingent of the Confederation of the Rhine—Marshal Brune had an army of about 80,000 men. This army could, in case of need, be reinforced by 25,000 veteran soldiers, drawn from the coasts of France, which would make it amount to 100,000 or 110,000 men.

The fatigued French troops, and the allied troops on which the least dependence was placed, guarded Dantzig, or continued the blockade of Colberg and Graudenz. Two new corps compensated on the Vistula the dissolution of Augereau's corps; these were, as we have seen, that of Marshal Mortier and that of Marshal Lannes. The corps of Marshal Mortier was composed of the 4th light, of the 45th and 58th of the line, of the Paris municipal regiment, forming Dupas' division, and of part of the Polish regiments recently levied. The corps of Lannes was composed of Oudinot's famous grenadiers and voltigeurs of the 2nd and 12th light, of the 3rd and 72nd of the line, forming Verdier's division. The Saxons were to constitute the third division of Lannes' corps. These two corps were upon the different arms of the Lower Vistula, one at Dirschau, the other at Marienburg. That of Mortier could furnish 11,000 or 12,000 men present under fire, that of Lannes 15,000. Their nominal effective was much more considerable.

Beyond the Vistula, and facing the enemy, Napoleon possessed five corps, besides the guard and the cavalry reserve.

Massena, occupying both the Narew and the Omulew, having his right near Warsaw, his centre at Ostrolenka, his left at Neidenburg, guarded the extremity of our line with 36,000 men, 24,000 of whom were ready to fight. Among the number were 6000 Bavarians.

The corps of Poles recently levied, that of Zayonschek, 5000 or 6000 strong, in great part cavalry, nominally belonging to Mortier's corps, filled the interval between Massena and the cantonments on the Passarge, and sent out continual patroles either in the forests or in the marshes of the country.

Lastly came the old corps of Marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, and Bernadotte, cantoned all four behind the Passarge.

We have already described the Passarge and the Alle, rising near one another, and the numerous lakes of the country, the

first running to our left perpendicularly to the sea, the second right before us perpendicularly to the Pregel, thus forming both of them an angle, one side of which we occupied, and the Russians the other. Each of the two armies was ranged in a different manner on the sides of this angle. We bordered the Passarge longitudinally, that is, for about twenty leagues from Hohenstein to Braunsberg. The Russians, on the contrary, in order to face us, were concentrated on the upper course of the Alle, near Heilsberg.

Marshal Ney, established at the top of this angle, which was rather irregular, like all those of Nature's making, held at once the Alle and the Passarge by Guttstadt and Deppen with his corps of 25,000 men, furnishing 17,000 combatants, incomparable troops, and worthy of their commander. At the same height, but somewhat in rear, Marshal Davout was, like Marshal Ney, between the Alle and the Passarge, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, flanking Marshal Ney, preventing the enemy from turning the army and coming by Osterode to open a passage toward the Vistula. His corps, a model of discipline and bearing, made in the image of him who commanded it, could bring into action 30,000 out of 40,000 men. He it was among all the marshals whose troops always presented the greatest number of men fit for fighting, thanks to his vigilance and his vigour. Marshal Soult, placed on the left of Marshal Ney, guarded at Liebstadt the middle of the course of the Passarge, having entrenched posts at the bridges of Pittehnen and Lomitten. He had an effective of 43,000 men, and 30,000 or 31,000 present under arms. Marshal Bernadotte defended the Lower Passarge from Spanden to Braunsberg with 36,000 men, 24,000 of whom were ready to march. Dupont's fine division occupied the shore of the sea, or Frische Haff.

Lastly, between the Passarge and the Vistula, in a tract interspersed with lakes and marshes, were situated the headquarters of Finkenstein, where Napoleon was encamped amidst his guard, mustering 8000 or 9000 combatants out of an effective of 12,000 men. A little further in rear, and to the left, was spread Murat's cavalry, comprehending all the cavalry of the army, with the exception of the hussars and chasseurs left to each corps as the means of guarding itself. Out of 30,000 horse, it contained 20,000 ready to mount.

Such were the forces of Napoleon. From the Rhine to the Passarge, from Bohemia to the Baltic, in troops on march or which had already reached the theatre of war, in troops guarding his rear or ready to take the offensive, invalid soldiers, wounded or sick, French or allies, he numbered more than 400,000 men. If we take into account those only that were about to enter into action, and exclude the corps of Massena

destined to guard the Narew, we may say that he had at hand six corps, those of Marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, Lannes, Mortier, besides the cavalry and the guard, which composed an effective of 225,000 men,* 160,000 of whom were real combatants. Such is the difficulty of the offensive! The further you advance, the more fatigue, dispersion, the necessity for guarding yourself, diminish the strength of armies. Let us suppose these 400,000 men falling back to the Rhine, not in consequence of defeat, but from a calculation of prudence, every man excepting the sick would have furnished a combatant. On the Vistula, on the contrary, less than half could fight. Let us suppose them to be two hundred leagues further off, not more than a fourth could have presented themselves before the enemy. And yet he who conducted these masses was the greatest organiser that ever existed. Let us be thankful to the nature of things which has decreed that attack should be more difficult than defence!

But the 160,000 men whom Napoleon had at his disposal, after he had sufficiently covered his flanks and his rear, were all in rank. If the same method of counting had been applied to the Russian army, most assuredly there would not have been 140,000 men. Napoleon's soldiers were perfectly rested, abundantly fed, suitably clothed for war, that is to say, dressed and shod, well provided with arms and ammunition. The cavalry, in particular, recomposed in the plains of the Lower Vistula, mounted with the finest horses of Germany, having resumed its exercises for two months past, presented a superb spectacle. Napoleon, wishing to see it altogether in one plain, had gone to Elbing to review it. Eighteen thousand horse, an enormous mass, moved by a single chief, Prince Murat, had, after manœuvring before him for a whole day, dazzled his eyes, though so accustomed to large armies, to such a degree, that writing an hour afterwards to his ministers, he could not help extolling the fine sight which he had just beheld in the plains of Elbing.

From a forecast for which he had great reason to applaud himself, Napoleon had given orders that after the 1st of May all the

	Effective.	Present under arms.
* Ney	25,000	17,000
Davout	40,000	30,000
Soult	43,000	31,000 or 32,000
Bernadotte	36,000	24,000
Murat	30,000	20,000
Guard	12,000	8,000 or 9,000
Lannes	20,000	15,000
Mortier	15,000	10,000
	221,000	155,000

Reckoning Zayonschek's Poles, 5000 for 7000 or 8000, we shall have 160,000 combatants out of a total effective of 226,000 men.

corps should leave the villages in which they were cantoned, and encamp in divisions, within reach of one another, in well-chosen situations, and behind good field-works. This was the right way to prevent being surprised; for the examples of armies attacked unawares in their winter quarters have all been furnished by troops, which had spread themselves for the sake of lodging and provisions. An army vigorously attacked in this position may, before it has time to rally, lose in number half its force, in territory, provinces, and kingdoms. The precaution of encamping, though infinitely prudent, he had great difficulty to obtain from officers and soldiers, for it obliged them to leave good cantonments, where each had comfortably established himself, and thenceforward expect from magazines alone those provisions which they found more surely on the spot. Napoleon, nevertheless, required it, and in ten or fifteen days all the corps were encamped in hovels, covered by earthworks or by immense abattis, manœuvring every day, and having recovered, in consequence of their assemblage in mass, the energy of the military spirit, an energy which is infinitely fluctuating, which rises or sinks, not only from victory or defeat, but by activity or rest, by all the circumstances, in short, which stretch or relax the human mind like a spring.

Nature, so dreary in this climate during winter, but which is nowhere destitute of beauty, especially when the returning sun brings back to it light and life—Nature herself invited the men to motion. Rich pastures afforded food for the horses, and allowed all the means of transport to be devoted to the subsistence of the men. The two armies were in presence, within cannon-shot, sometimes manœuvring before each other's face, reciprocally serving for a sight to one another, but abstaining from firing, certain that this peaceful activity would change soon enough to a sanguinary conflict. On both sides a speedy resumption of the operations was expected, and they kept on their guard for fear of being surprised. One day even, towards Braunsberg, a post occupied by Dupont's division, there was heard at nightfall a confused sound of voices, which seemed to denote the presence of a numerous corps. The officers ran up, conceiving that the attack of the cantonments had at length commenced, and that the Russians were taking the initiative. But on approaching the place whence the noise proceeded, they perceived a multitude of wild swans sporting in the Passarge, on the banks of which they dwell in countless flocks.*

Meanwhile, Napoleon, having returned from Dantzig and Elbing, and having all his means collected between the Vistula and the Passarge, resolved to set himself in motion on the 10th

* These particulars are derived from General Dupont's military memoirs, still manuscript, and replete with the highest interest.

of June, to march to the Alle, to descend its course, to separate the Russians from Königsberg, to take that city before their faces, and to throw them back upon the Niemen. He had given orders that, by the 10th, each *corps d'armée* should be supplied with bread and biscuit for fourteen days, four in the soldiers' knapsacks, ten in the caissons. But while he was preparing to recommence hostilities, the Russians, determined to be beforehand with him, anticipated by five days the movement of the French army.

It might have been expected that they would have defied all the risks of the offensive, when the salvation of Dantzig was at stake. But now, when no pressing interest urged them to haste, to venture to attack Napoleon in long studied, carefully defended positions, merely because the fine season had arrived, was a proceeding conceivable only of a general acting without reflection, obeying vague instincts rather than an enlightened reason. One ought to have been as sure, as one was uncertain, of the due execution of the operations, in then opposing the Russian troops to the French troops, that there would not have been any good plan of offensive against Napoleon, established as he was upon the Passarge. To attack by sea, to attempt to take Braunsberg on the Lower Passarge, and then to dash against the Lower Vistula and Dantzig which we occupied, would be but a series of follies. To attack on the opposite side, that is to say, to ascend the Alle, to pass between the sources of the Alle and those of the Passarge, to turn our right to slip between Marshal Ney and Massena's corps, in the space guarded by the Poles, was all that Napoleon himself desired; for in this case he should ascend by his left, get between the Russians and Königsberg, cut them off from their base of operation, and throw them into the inextricable difficulties of the interior of Poland. In taking the offensive, then, there were but dangers to incur, without a single advantageous result to obtain. To wait for Napoleon on the Pregel, the right to Königsberg, the left to Wehlau, to defend that line stoutly, then, that line being lost, to fall back in good order upon the Niemen, to entice the French into the recesses of the empire, avoiding great battles, opposing to them the most formidable of obstacles, that of distance, and refusing them the advantage of signal victories—such would have been the only rational conduct on the part of the Russian general, and as subsequent experience has unfortunately for us demonstrated, the only wise course.

But General Benningsen, who had promised his sovereign to draw the most brilliant consequences from the battle of Eylau, and soon to gain for him an ample compensation for the loss of Dantzig, could no further prolong the inaction observed during the siege of that place, and thought himself obliged to take the initiative. Accordingly, he had formed the plan of falling upon

Marshal Ney, whose very advanced position was more favourable to surprise than any other. Napoleon, in fact, desirous of keeping not only the Passarge up to its sources, but the Alle itself in the upper part of its course, so as to occupy the apex of the angle described by those two rivers, had placed Marshal Ney at Guttstadt on the Alle. The latter must have appeared in the air to any one not acquainted with the precautions taken to remedy the apparent inconvenience of such a situation. But all the means of a prompt concentration were secured and prepared beforehand. Marshal Ney had his retreat indicated upon Deppen, Marshal Davout upon Osterode, Marshal Soult upon Liebstadt and Mohrungen, Marshal Bernadotte upon Preuss-Holland. If the enemy persisted, they were all to make one march further, to join themselves at Saalfeld with the guard, with Lannes, with Mortier, with Murat, in a labyrinth of lakes and forests, the outlets of which were known to none but Napoleon, and where he had prepared a disaster for the imprudent adversary who should come thither in quest of him.

Without having dived into any of these combinations, General Benningsen resolved to surprise Marshal Ney's corps, and made such dispositions as at first sight seemed calculated to succeed. He directed the greater part of his forces upon Marshal Ney, confining himself to mere demonstrations against the other marshals. Three columns, and even four, reckoning the imperial guard, accompanied by all the cavalry, were to ascend the Alle, to attack Marshal Ney in front by Altkirch, on the left by Wolfsdorf, on the right by Guttstadt, while Platow, hetman of the Cossacks, filling with his horsemen the space which separated us from the Narew, and with the light infantry forcing the Alle above Guttstadt, was to endeavour to slip between Ney's corps and Davout's. Meanwhile, the imperial guard, under the Grand Duke Constantine, was to place itself in reserve behind the three columns destined to attack Marshal Ney, and to proceed to the assistance of any of them that might need it. A column composed of two divisions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Doctorow, had orders to come from Olbersdorf to Lomitten, to attack the bridges of Marshal Soult, and to prevent him from assisting Marshal Ney. Another Russian column, under Generals Kamenski and Rembow, was directed to make a strong demonstration on the bridge of Spanden, which Marshal Bernadotte was guarding, so that the whole course of the Passarge would be threatened at once. The Prussian general, Lestocq, was even directed to show himself before Braunsberg, in order to increase the uncertainty of the French respecting the general plan upon which all these attacks were arranged.

It remained to be seen whether the dispositions of the Russian

general, apparently well calculated, would be executed with the precision requisite for giving success to such complicated operations, and whether they would not find the French so prepared, so resolute, that it would be impossible to surprise them and to force them in their position. The movements of these numerous columns, concealed by the forests and the lakes of that dreary country, escaped our generals, who had no idea that the Russians were ready, but who, knowing that they were ready themselves, and expecting to march every moment, felt neither surprise nor fear at sight of the preparations of the enemy.

Here we may perceive that forecast is all-powerful in war. This formidable attack, directed against Marshal Ney, would infallibly have succeeded, if our troops, scattered in the villages, had been surprised and obliged to run to the rear to rally. But this was not the case, and thanks to the orders of Napoleon, disagreeable orders to all the corps, and which he had been obliged to render absolute in order to enforce their execution, the troops were encamped by divisions, covered by earthworks and by abattis, established in such a manner that they could defend themselves for a long time, and succour one another before they were obliged to give way.

On the morning of the 5th of June, by daybreak, the Russian advanced guard, led by Prince Bagration, advanced rapidly upon the position of Altkirch, one of those occupied by Marshal Ney with a division, and neglected all the petty French posts scattered in the woods, intending to take by turning them. Our troops, which, in consequence of the encampment, slept ready for battle, pleased rather than astonished at sight of the enemy, full of composure, exercised every day in firing, opened a murderous fire upon the Russians, which quickly brought them to a stand. The 39th, placed in advance at Altkirch, did not retire till it had strewed the foot of the entrenchments with slain. Meanwhile the attacks made upon Wolfsdorf on the left, upon Guttstadt on the right, and further still to the right upon Bergfried, were vigorously executed, but luckily without any unity, and in such a manner as to allow Marshal Ney time to effect his retreat. Hastening to the head of his troops, he perceived that the principal effort of the Russian army was concentrated upon him, and that it was time for him to take the road to Deppen, assigned by the foresight of Napoleon as his line of retreat. He had one of his divisions in advance of Guttstadt at Krossen, the other in rear at Glottau. He united them, taking time, however, to collect his artillery, his baggage, his detached posts in the woods, all which he took away with him, excepting two or three hundred men, left at the furthest extremity of the forest of Amt-Guttstadt. He followed the road from Guttstadt to Deppen through Quetz and Ankendorf,

slowly traversing the narrow space comprised between the Alle and the Passarge, halting with extraordinary coolness to give fire with two ranks, sometimes charging with the bayonet the infantry which pressed him too closely, or forming in square, pouring volleys, within point-blank range, upon the innumerable Russian cavalry, in short, filling the enemy with an admiration which they expressed themselves a few days afterwards.* He was unwilling to give up entirely the space of four or five leagues, which separates the Alle at this place from the Passarge, and he halted at Ankendorf. He had had to do with 15,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry; and if the two columns of Prince Bagration and Lieutenant-General Sacken had acted together, if the imperial guard had joined them, opposed to 60,000 men, he could scarcely have failed to experience a terrible disaster. He had lost 1200 or 1500 killed or wounded, but more than 3000 Russians had fallen. At three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy desisted of himself, without any motive, as it frequently happens when a firm and consistent mind does not direct the movements of great masses.

On the same day, the hetman Platow had passed the Alle at Bergfried, and inundated with his Cossacks the marshy and woody tract which separated the grand army from the posts of Marshal Massena. But it was not at all probable that he would venture to attack Marshal's Davout's 30,000 men. The latter, hearing the distant thunder of the cannon, hastily collected his troops between the Alle and the Passarge, and took the road to Alt-Ramten, which permitted him to succour Marshal Ney at the same time that he was approaching Osterode. By a lucky stratagem of war, he sent one of his officers in the direction of the enemy, with despatches announcing his speedy arrival at the head of 50,000 men to support Marshal Ney. On the opposite side, to the left of Ney's corps, the attacks projected against Marshals Soult and Bernadotte were exe-

* Plotho gives the following account of the retreat of Marshal Ney to Deppen:—

"The French, consummate masters in the art of war, resolved on that day this very difficult problem, to execute a retreat that is become indispensable, in the face of an enemy who is much stronger and urgently pressing, and to render it as little prejudicial as possible. They extricated themselves from the situation with the utmost skill. The calmness and order, and at the same time the rapidity, shown by Ney's corps, in assembling at the signal of three cannon-shot; the coolness and attentive circumspection with which it executed its retreat, during which it opposed a resistance renewed at every step, and knew how to avail itself in a masterly manner of every position—all this proved the talent of the captain who commanded the French, and the habit of war carried by them to perfection, as strongly as the finest dispositions and the most scientific execution of an offensive operation could have done. For attacking with success, as well as for opposing a regular resistance in a retreat, there are required rare qualities, virtues difficult to practise, and yet it is necessary that all these should be combined in the same person to form the great captain."

cuted conformably to the plan agreed upon. Lieutenant-General Doctorow, marching with two divisions by Wormditt and Olbersdorf, over the *têtes de pont* which Marshal Soult was guarding, found, in advance of the Passarge, numerous abattis, and behind those abattis brave tirailleurs, who kept up a constant and well-directed fire. He was obliged to fight for several successive hours in order to overcome the obstacles which defended the approaches of the bridge of Lomitten. No sooner had he carried one part of the abattis than companies of reserve, falling upon his troops, drove them out at the point of the bayonet. Detachments of Russian cavalry, having crossed some fords of the Passarge, were obliged by our mounted chasseurs to fall back. The course of the Passarge was everywhere left in the possession of the valiant troops of Marshal Soult: merely the half-burned abattis, in advance of the bridge of Lomitten, had been finally relinquished to the Russians. General Doctorow desisted towards nightfall, exhausted with fatigue, despairing of overcoming such obstacles defended by such soldiers. The Russians, attacking uncovered our troops who were well sheltered, had more than 2000 men put hors de combat, and we had not lost above 1000. Generals Ferey and Viviès, of Carra St. Cyr's division, with the 47th and 56th of the line, and the 24th light, had covered themselves with glory at the bridge of Lomitten.

An action nearly similar had taken place at the bridge of Spanden, which belonged to Marshal Bernadotte. An entrenchment of earth covered the bridge. The 27th light guarded this post, having in rear the two brigades of Villate's division. At the very commencement of the action, Marshal Bernadotte received a wound in the neck, which obliged him to relinquish the command to his chief of the staff, General Maison, one of the most intelligent and energetic officers in the army. The Russians, here united with the Prussians, cannonaded the *tête de pont* for a long time, and when they conceived that they had daunted the troops which defended it, they advanced to scale it. The soldiers of the 27th light had received orders to lie down on the ground, that they might not be perceived. They allowed the assailants to come to the foot of the entrenchment, and then by a point-blank discharge swept down three hundred and wounded several hundred more. The Russians and Prussians, struck with terror, dispersed, and retired in disorder. The 17th dragoons then debouching from the *tête de pont*, rushed upon them at a gallop and cut down a great number.

The attack was not pushed beyond this point. It had cost the enemy not fewer than six or seven hundred men. Our loss was insignificant.

This vigorous manner of receiving the Russians all along the Passarge excited in them a surprise easy to be conceived, and

produced a commencement of hesitation in plans adopted with too little reflection to be prosecuted with perseverance. The Russian and Prussian column of Generals Kamenski and Rembow, beaten at Spanden, awaited ulterior orders before engaging in fresh enterprises. General Doctorow, stopped at the bridge of Lomitten, ascended the Passarge to approach the main body of the Russian army. General Benningsen, surrounded at Quetz by the greater number of his troops, not having been able to take Marshal Ney's corps, but having obliged him to fall back, and not yet aware of all the obstacles which he should have to encounter, resolved to make a new effort on the following day against that same corps, the object of his most violent attacks.

Six or seven hours after these simultaneous attempts on the line of the Passarge, Napoleon received intelligence of them at Finkenstein, for he was scarcely twelve leagues from the most distant of his lieutenants, and he had taken care to regulate his means of correspondence in such a manner as to be informed of the most trivial incident with extreme promptness. He was anticipated by six days only, since his orders had been given for the 10th of June. He was not therefore taken at unawares. His resolutions were formed for all cases: no hesitation, consequently no loss of time, could retard his dispositions. He approved the conduct of Marshal Ney, gave him the praise which he deserved, and enjoined him to retire in good order upon Deppen, and if he could not defend the Passarge at Deppen, to fall back through the labyrinth of the lakes, first to Liebemühl, then to Saalfeld. He ordered Marshal Davout to unite his three divisions immediately on the left flank of Marshal Ney, directing his course to Osterode, which was already done, as we have seen. He enjoined Marshal Soult to persist in defending the Passarge, and to retire upon Mohrungen, and from Mohrungen to Saalfeld, if he was forced in his position or one of his neighbours was forced in his. The same instructions were sent to the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, with indication of the route from Preuss-Holland to Saalfeld as the line of retreat.

While Napoleon was bringing back to Saalfeld his lieutenants placed in front, he was calling to the same point his lieutenants placed in rear. He ordered Marshal Lannes to march from Marienburg to Christburg and Saalfeld, Marshal Mortier, who was at Dirschau, to follow the same route, and both to take with them as large a quantity of provisions as they could. The light cavalry was to assemble at Elbing, the heavy cavalry at Christburg, and to proceed towards Saalfeld. The three divisions of dragoons, encamped on the right at Bischoffswerder, Strasburg, and Soldau, had orders to rally around Davout's corps by Osterode. All were to take their provisions along with them, by

means of conveyances previously provided. It would take forty-eight hours before these different concentrations were effected, and 160,000 men were assembled between Saalfeld and Osterode. Napoleon, moreover, made his guard march from Finkenstein for Saalfeld, and prepared to leave Finkenstein himself on the following day, the 6th, when the movements of the enemy should be more decided, and his designs more clearly indicated. He sent his household to Dantzig, as well as M. de Talleyrand, who was quite unfit for the fatigues and dangers of the head-quarters.

On the 6th, in fact, the Russian columns charged to prosecute the attack commenced on the corps of Marshal Ney were more concentrated, in consequence of the offensive movement which they had made on the preceding day, and Marshal Ney was about to have upon his hands 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. After the losses sustained on the preceding day, he could oppose but 15,000 men to the enemy. But he had provided beforehand for every contingency. He had sent on his wounded and his baggage beyond Deppen, that the road might be free, and that his *corps d'armée* might not meet with any obstacle on its passage. Instead of decamping in haste, Marshal Ney boldly waited for the enemy, the brigades of which his two divisions were composed being ranged *en échelons*, each extending beyond the other. Each échelon before it retired delivered its fire, frequently even charging with the bayonet, and leaving the next échelon to repress the Russians. On open ground, with troops less steady, such a retreat would have ended in a rout. But owing to a skilful choice of positions, owing also to extraordinary firmness in the men, Marshal Ney could take several hours to traverse the space of less than two leagues. Every moment he beheld a multitude of horse rushing en masse upon his bayonets, but all their efforts were foiled by his unyielding squares. Having arrived near a small lake, the enemy committed the blunder of dividing, in order that one part might pass on the right of the lake, the other part on the left. The intrepid marshal, seizing the opportune moment, with equal resolution and presence of mind, halted, resumed the offensive against the divided enemy, charged him with vigour, repulsed him to some distance, and thus obtained time to regain quietly the bridge of Deppen, behind which he should be protected from all attack. On reaching that spot he placed his artillery advantageously in advance of the Passarge, and as soon as the enemy attempted to show himself he riddled him with balls.

This action, which cost us some hundred men, but the enemy twice or thrice as many, heightened the admiration excited in both armies by the intrepidity of Marshal Ney. On our left, along the Lower Passarge, the Russian columns remained motion-

less, awaiting the result of the action going on between Guttstadt and Deppen. On our right, Marshal Davout's corps, on march since the preceding day, had proceeded without accident to the flank of Marshal Ney, in order to support him or to gain Osterode.

With such lieutenants, with such soldiers, the combinations of Napoleon had, besides their merit of conception, the advantage of an almost infallible execution. In the evening of the 6th, Napoleon, having directed all that were behind to Saalfeld, repaired thither himself, to judge of events from personal observation, to rally his lieutenants there if they were repulsed, or to direct upon any one of them the mass of his troops if they had maintained their ground, in order to take the offensive in his turn with an overwhelming superiority of forces. On his arrival at Saalfeld he learned that the greatest tranquillity had prevailed during the day, that on the Upper Passarge the intrepid Ney had effected the most successful retreat toward Deppen, and that Marshal Davout was already on march upon the right flank of Marshal Ney towards Alt-Ramtem. Things could not be going on better. Next day, the 7th, Napoleon resolved to go himself to Deppen, to the advanced posts, and left orders for all the corps marching to Saalfeld to follow him to Deppen. In the evening of the 7th he went to Alt-Reichau, and having again learned that all still continued quiet, he proceeded to Deppen, congratulated Marshal Ney and likewise his troops on their gallant conduct, saw the Russian army motionless as an army whose undecided commander is puzzled what course to pursue, and ordered a strong demonstration, in order to judge of his real intentions. The Russians repulsed it in such a manner as to prove that they were more disposed to fall back than to persist in their offensive march.

General Benningsen, in fact, perceiving the futility of the efforts directed against Marshal Ney's corps, the little success gained on the other points of the Passarge, and above all the rapid concentration of the French army, was soon aware that a more decided movement upon Warsaw, with Napoleon on his right flank, could not lead to anything but disaster. He determined, therefore, to pause. Having passed the 7th at Guttstadt in a perplexity natural under such serious circumstances, he determined at last to recross the Alle and proceed to Heilsberg, for the purpose of occupying the defensive position which he had long since prepared there by means of good field-works. On the 7th, at night, he prescribed to his army a first retrograde movement to Quetz. On the 8th, apprised of the march of most of the French corps for Deppen, he was confirmed in his resolution to retreat, and enjoined all his divisions to descend the Alle and to proceed to Heilsberg. That part of his troops which had advanced further between Guttstadt and Deppen was to

slip away instantaneously by recrossing the Alle forthwith, and gaining Heilsberg by the right bank. Four bridges were thrown over the Alle to facilitate this passage. Prince Bagration was charged to cover this retreat with his division and with the Cossacks. The other columns which had not proceeded so far in that direction were merely to regain the position of Heilsberg by way of Launau, and by the left bank. The most distant of the Russian columns, that of General Kamenski, which, in conjunction with the Prussians, had attacked the *tête de pont* of Spanden, was ordered to retire by Mehlsack, so that it would have to traverse the base of the triangle formed by Spanden, Heilsberg, and Guttstadt. It left the Prussian infantry with General Lestocq, and took their cavalry only along with it. General Lestocq was to fall back in rear to cover Königsberg, with great danger of being cut off from the Russian army; for, following the sea-coast while General Benningsen followed the course of the Alle, he should be from fifteen to eighteen leagues distant from the latter.

In the night of the 8th the Russian army was in full retreat. On the 9th it finished crossing the Passarge about Guttstadt when the French came up. A considerable portion of our troops was in fact collected around Deppen. Lannes, starting from Marienburg, the guard from Finkenstein, Murat from Christburg, and all arriving at Deppen in the evening of the 8th, formed, with Marshal Ney's corps, a mass of fifty to sixty thousand men. They pressed the enemy closely. Murat's cavalry, swimming across the Alle, dashed after Prince Bagration. The Cossacks showed more mettle than usual, kept close together about the Russian infantry, and sustained bravely, for partisans, the fire of our light artillery.

Meanwhile Marshal Soult, crossing by Napoleon's order the Passarge at Elditten, fell in with General Kamenski's corps near Wolsdorf, overturned one of its detachments, and took a great number of prisoners. Marshal Davout, rectified in his direction, since the army, instead of retiring, was marching forward, drew near Guttstadt. Napoleon would have there at hand the corps of Marshals Davout, Ney, Lannes, Soult, besides the guard and Murat, who never quitted him, and likewise Marshal Mortier, who was one march behind. This formed a force of 126,000 men,* exclusively of Bernadotte's corps, which remained on the

* Davout	30,000
Ney	15,000
Lannes	15,000
Soult	30,000
The guard	8,000
Murat	18,000
Mortier	10,000
	126,000

Lower Passarge, and which it was necessary to leave there for two or three days to watch the conduct of the Prussians. But the Prussians once thrust upon the rear by our forward march, Napoleon could draw in to him the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, and thus have at his disposal 150,000 combatants, being deprived of Massena's corps alone, which was indispensable upon the Narew. General Benningsen, on the contrary, separated like Napoleon from the corps left on the Narew (18,000 men), and doomed in descending the Alle to separate himself from Lestocq (18,000 men), would have to face Napoleon with the central mass of his forces only, that is to say, with about 100,000 men, weakened by 6000 or 7000 killed and wounded left at the foot of our entrenchments.

The plan of Napoleon was soon decided upon, for that plan was the very consequence of all that he had foreseen, willed, and prepared for four months past. In fact, since by the skilful disposition of his cantonments between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula, by the strong occupation of Braunsberg, Elbing, and Marienburg, and by the taking of Dantzig, he had rendered himself invincible on his left and toward the sea, he had left no other course for the Russians but to attack his right, that is to say, to ascend the Alle in order to threaten Warsaw. Thenceforward his manœuvre was ready chalked out. He must, in his turn, push forward, turn the enemy's right, separate him from Königsberg, throw him back upon the Pregel, and without stopping, occupy by a detachment that valuable depôt, Königsberg, where the Russians had shut up their last resources, and whither the English had sent the succours promised to the coalition. The more Russians he should find entangled on the upper course of the Alle, the greater must be the result of that manœuvre. They had indeed just stopped abruptly for the purpose of redescending the Alle by the right bank. But Napoleon was about to descend it after them by the left bank, with nearly a certainty of beating them in speed, of arriving as soon as they at the conflux of the Alle and the Pregel, and of inflicting upon them by the way some great disaster, if they attempted to pass that river before him in order to march to the rescue of Königsberg.

Views so long and so deeply reflected upon must very quickly transmute themselves into formal dispositions, and without the loss of a single moment for deliberation. So early as the 9th Napoleon ordered Marshal Davout to join the right of the army immediately, Marshal Ney to rest for a day at Guttstadt from his severe combats, and then to rejoin Marshal Soult, who was a little to the left, near Launau, to march along the Alle to Heilsberg, preceded and followed by Murat's cavalry, Marshal Lannes to accompany Marshal Soult, lastly, Marshal Mortier to

quicken his pace and form his junction with the bulk of the army. He himself, with the guard, followed this movement, and prescribed to Marshal Bernadotte's corps, commanded temporarily by General Victor, to concentrate itself on the Lower Passarge, for the purpose of proceeding beyond it as soon as the designs of the enemy on our left should be more clearly indicated.

Accordingly, on the 10th of June the army marched on the right bank of the Alle for Heilsberg. It was obliged to cross a defile near a village called Beverniken. Here it found a strong rearguard, which was soon repulsed, and debouched from it in sight of the positions occupied by the Russian army.

After so many presumptuous demonstrations, the enemy's general could not but feel a temptation not to run away so swiftly, but to stop and fight, especially in a position where a great many precautions had been taken to render the chances of a great battle less disadvantageous. But it was far from wise, for time became precious, if he wished not to be cut off from Königsberg. Pride, nevertheless, drowning the voice of reason, General Benningsen resolved to wait before Heilsberg for the French army.

Heilsberg is situated on the heights between which runs the river Alle. Numerous redoubts had been erected on those heights. They were occupied by the Russian army, parted in two by the Alle. This very serious inconvenience was redeemed by four bridges constructed in well-sheltered nooks, and allowing troops to be moved from one shore to the other. As, according to all indications, the French would come along the left bank, the greater part of the Russian troops had been concentrated on that side. In the redoubts of the right bank, General Benningsen had left only the imperial guard and Bagration's division, fatigued with the actions fought on the preceding days. Batteries had been disposed to fire from one bank to the other. On the left bank, by which we were to attack, was seen the bulk of the enemy's army, under the protection of three redoubts bristling with artillery. General Kamenski, who had joined on the 10th, defended these redoubts. Behind, and a little above, the Russian infantry was drawn up in two lines. The first and third battalion of each regiment, entirely deployed, composed the first line. The second battalion formed in column behind the former, and in their intervals composed the second. Twelve battalions, placed a little further off, were destined for a reserve. On the prolongation of this line of battle, and forming a hook to the right behind, was the whole of the Russian cavalry, reinforced by the Prussian cavalry, and constituting a mass of squadrons beyond all the usual proportions. Lastly, still further on the right, towards Konegen, the Cossacks

were on the watch. Detachments of light infantry occupied some patches of wood sprinkled here and there in front of the position. Thus the French coming to Heilsberg had to sustain in flank the fire of the redoubts of the right bank, in front the fire of the redoubts of the left bank, besides the attacks of a numerous infantry and the charges of a still more numerous cavalry. But impelled by the ardour of success, persuaded that the enemy was thinking only of flight, and eager to wrest from him some trophies before he had time to escape, they took no account either of number or of positions. This spirit was universal among the soldiers as well as the generals. Napoleon not being yet on the spot to repress their ardour, Prince Murat and Marshal Soult, on debouching upon Heilsberg, attacked the Russians before they were followed by the rest of the army. Prince Bagration, placed at first on the right bank, was rapidly transferred to the left bank to defend the defile of Beverniken, and General Benningsen had ordered General Ouwaroff to support him with twenty-five squadrons. Marshal Soult having forced the defile, had taken care to place 36 pieces of cannon in battery, which had greatly facilitated the deploying of his troops. Carra St. Cyr's division first advanced in column by brigades, and flung back the Russian infantry beyond a ravine descending from the village of Lawden to the Alle. Under favour of this movement, Murat's cavalry was enabled to deploy; but harassed by fatigue, not being yet entirely assembled, and attacked at the moment when it was forming by the twenty-five squadrons of General Ouwaroff, it lost ground, ran to the rear to form anew, again charged, and regained the advantage. Carra St. Cyr's division bordered the ravine beyond which it had flung the Russians. Cannonaded in front by the redoubts of the left bank, in flank by those of the right bank, it had suffered severely. St. Hilaire's division came to supply its place in the fire, passing in close columns through the intervals of our line of battle. That brave division of St. Hilaire's passed the ravine, drove back the Russians, and followed them to the foot of the three redoubts which covered their centre, while Murat's cavalry fell upon the cavalry of Prince Bagration, cut it in pieces, and killed General Koring. During these transactions, Legrand's division, the third of Marshal Soult's, had arrived and taken position on our left, before the village of Lawden. It had driven the enemy's tirailleurs from the patches of wood situated between the two armies, and it too had reached the foot of the redoubts which constituted the strength of the Russians. General Legrand then detached the 26th light to attack that of the three redoubts which was within his reach. That gallant regiment dashed off at a run, carried the redoubt in spite of General Kamenski's troops, and kept possession of

it after an obstinate fight. But the officer who commanded the enemy's artillery having had his guns drawn off at a gallop, quickly removed them to the rear, to a spot which commanded the redoubt, and covered the 26th with grape, which made prodigious havoc. At the same moment the Russian general, Warneck, perceiving the bad plight of the 26th, rushed upon it at the head of the Kaluga regiment, and retook the redoubt. The 55th, which formed the left of St. Hilaire's division, and was next neighbour to the 26th, came to its assistance, but could not mend matters. It was obliged to rejoin its division after losing its eagle. Our soldiers remained thus exposed to the fire of a numerous and powerful artillery without flinching. General Benningsen then resolved to employ his immense cavalry, and had several charges made upon Legrand's and St. Hilaire's divisions. They sustained those charges with admirable coolness, and gave the French cavalry time to form behind them, and in its turn to charge the Russian squadrons. Marshal Soult, placed in the middle of one of the squares, in which were mixed pell-mell French and Russians, foot-soldiers and dismounted horse, kept all to their duty by the energy of his attitude. Napoleon, who was still at a distance from the theatre of this action, as soon as he heard the guns, had given General Savary the young fusiliers of the guard to go to the assistance of the corps which had rashly engaged. General Savary, hastening up, took position between St. Hilaire's and Legrand's divisions. Formed into square, he sustained for a long time the charges of the Russian cavalry, which a terrible fire from the redoubts would have rendered dangerous if our troops had been less firm and not had such excellent officers. The brave General Roussel, who was sword in hand amidst the fusiliers of the guard, had his head carried off by a cannon ball. This imprudent action, in which 30,000 unsheltered French were opposed to 90,000 Russians protected by redoubts, was kept up till the night was far advanced. At length Marshal Lannes appeared at the extreme right, strove to learn something of the enemy's position, but would not attempt any enterprise without orders from the emperor. The booming of the guns soon ceased; the night was rainy, and each, stretching himself on the ground, sought to get a little rest. The Russians, more numerous and closer than we, had sustained a loss far superior to ours. They numbered 3000 killed, and 7000 or 8000 wounded. We had 2000 killed, and 5000 wounded.

Napoleon, arriving late, because he had not supposed that the enemy would pause so soon to resist him, was highly pleased with the energy of his troops, but far less with their eagerness for fighting, and resolved to wait till the morrow to give battle with his collected forces, if the Russians should persist in

defending the position of Heilsberg, or to pursue them to the utmost if they should decamp. He bivouacked with his soldiers on the field of carnage, where lay 18,000 Russians and French, dead, dying, and wounded.

General Benningsen, a prey to acute pain and to great perplexities,* passed the night at the bivouac wrapped in his cloak. It requires a strong mind to defy at once physical pain and moral pain. General Benningsen was capable of enduring both. Divided between the satisfaction of having made head against the French, and the fear of having them all upon his hands on the morrow, he waited for daylight before he decided what course to pursue. Our troops, on their part, were astir by four o'clock in the morning, picking up the wounded, and exchanging musket-shots with the enemy's advanced posts. Our *corps d'armée* successively took their positions. Marshal Lannes had placed himself the evening before on the left of Marshal Soult; the corps of Marshal Davout began to show itself on the left of Marshal Lannes, towards Grossendorf; the guard, foot and horse, deployed on the heights in rear; and everything denoted a decisive attack with formidable masses. This sight, and particularly the appearance of the corps of Marshal Davout, which turned at Grossendorf the Russian army, and which even seemed to be taking the direction of Königsberg, determined General Benningsen to retreat. He was unwilling to lose at once a day and a battle, and to run the risk of arriving perhaps too late, perhaps half destroyed, to the relief of Königsberg. General Kamenski was to start first, in order to gain in time the Königsberg road, and to join the Prussians, with whom he was accustomed to fight. Having withdrawn from Heilsberg all that could be removed, General Benningsen marched himself with his army by the right bank of the Alle in the course of the 11th. He proceeded in four columns for Bartenstein, the first post beyond Heilsberg. His headquarters had long been fixed there. Napoleon spent part of the day in observing that position, and if he did not exert his usual promptness in attacking, it was because he had no great inclination to give battle on such ground, and had no doubt that, by pushing forward his left, he should oblige the Russian army to decamp by a mere demonstration. Things having turned out as he had foreseen, he entered Heilsberg the same evening, and established himself there with his guard. He found in the town considerable magazines, many Russian wounded, to whom he desired the same attention to be paid as to the wounded French, and whose number attested that the enemy's army had lost on the preceding day from ten to eleven thousand men.

* Plotho, the Russian historian, says that General Benningsen was afflicted with the stone.

The battle of Heilsberg could not make any change in the plans of Napoleon. What he had to do was still to tend to turn the Russians, to cut them off from Königsberg, and to take advantage of the first false movement they should make to get at that important place, which was the base of their operation. They had not presented themselves to him this time in a situation that permitted him to crush them, but the favourable opportunity for which he was waiting could not fail to occur soon. For its failure there could have been required nothing less than that General Benningsen, in the difficult position in which he was placed, should not commit a fault.

In order the better to attain his aim, Napoleon somewhat modified his march. On passing Heilsberg, indeed on passing Launau, the Alle turns to the right, making a thousand windings, and forming a very long route if you choose to follow its course—a route which, moreover, carries you away from the sea and from Königsberg. General Benningsen, standing in need of the Alle to appuy himself upon it, was certainly obliged to follow its windings. Napoleon, on the contrary, who wanted only to find his enemy deprived of appui, and who had especial occasion to take an intermediate position between Königsberg and the Alle, whence he could send a detachment to Königsberg without being at too great a distance from that detachment, could leave the banks of the Alle without inconvenience, nay, even with advantage. In consequence, he resolved to strike into an intermediate route, which he had travelled in the preceding winter, that from Landsberg to Eylau, which runs in a direct line to the Pregel. On coming into this road beyond Eylau, that is to say, at Domnau, you find yourself two marches from Königsberg on the left, and on the right one march only from the Alle and the town of Friedland, because the Alle, turning westward again after numerous windings, is nearer at Friedland to Königsberg than in any part of its course. It was there that, with good luck and skill, one must have the best chances of taking Königsberg with one hand, and striking the Russian army with the other.

With this idea, Napoleon despatched Murat with part of the cavalry to Landsberg. He sent after him the corps of Marshals Soult and Davout, destined to form the left wing of the army, and to extend themselves to Königsberg, or to fall back upon the centre if they were wanted for fighting a battle. Napoleon left upon the Alle the rest of his cavalry, composed of chasseurs, hussars, and dragoons, for the purpose of beating the banks of that river and closely pursuing the enemy. He sent through Landsberg for Eylau the corps of Lannes, which he had at hand, that of Ney, which had stopped a day at Guttstadt to rest itself, that of Mortier, still one march behindhand, and made them

advance each by a different track, to avoid encumbering, but so as to be able to collect them in a few hours. Lastly, the Prussians, retreating towards Königsberg, no longer deserving any attention, Bernadotte's corps, left provisionally on the Lower Passarge, had orders to rejoin the army immediately by Mehlsack and Eylau.

These dispositions, and many others relative to the magazines, the ovens, the hospitals, which he purposed to organise at Heilsberg, to the rich supplies of Dantzig, which he never ceased to watch over, to the navigation of the Frische Haff, of which he took care to possess himself by closing the pass of Pillau, and by making the seamen of the guard cruise there in shipping of the country—these dispositions detained Napoleon at Heilsberg the whole of the 12th. During this interval his corps were marching, and it would be easy for him to overtake them on horseback in a few hours.

On the morning of the 13th, Napoleon himself repaired to Eylau. It was no longer that vast, snow-clad, dull and dreary-looking plain, which had been drenched with so much blood on the 8th of February; it was a fertile and smiling country, covered with green woods and beautiful lakes, and studded with numerous villages. The cavalry and the artillery discovered with astonishment that, in the great battle of Eylau, they had galloped on the surface of the lakes then completely frozen. The indications collected respecting the march of General Benningsen were as uncertain as the plans of that general. On the one hand, the light cavalry had followed the main body of the Russian army along the Alle, had seen it between Bartenstein and Schippenbeil; on the other, it had been imagined that detachments of the enemy had been perceived going towards Königsberg, and designing, according to all appearances, to join General Lestocq, in order to defend that city. From the whole of these indications, it could not but be concluded that the Russian army was inclined to proceed to Königsberg, that for this purpose it would quit the Alle, and that in this movement the French would meet with it at Domnau. Napoleon then pushed Marshal Soult and Murat with half the cavalry upon Kreuzburg, and ordered them to march to Königsberg and make a sudden attack on it. He sent after them Marshal Davout, who was to take an intermediate position, so as to join in a few hours either Marshal Soult or the main body of the army according to circumstances. He immediately despatched Marshal Lannes from Eylau for Domnau, joined with him part of the cavalry and of Grouchy's dragoons, with orders to send parties as far as Friedland to learn what the enemy was about, to ascertain if he was or was not quitting the Alle, if he was or was not going to the assistance of Königsberg. Marshal Mortier,

who had arrived at Eylau, was sent off immediately for Domnau, and would arrive there a few hours after Marshal Lannes. Marshal Ney with his corps, General Victor with Bernadotte's, were at that moment entering Eylau. Before he would direct them either upon Domnau or after Marshals Lannes and Mortier, or upon Königsberg after Marshals Davout and Soult, Napoleon waited till further reports of the cavalry should throw a light on the real march of the enemy.

In the evening of the 13th, the reconnaissances of the day left no further doubt that General Benningsen had descended the Alle, and appeared to be taking the road to Friedland, either to continue his march along the Alle, or to leave there the banks of that river, in order to gain Königsberg. It was at Friedland, in fact, that he was likely to be tempted to quit the Alle, because it is the point where that river approaches nearest to Königsberg. Napoleon hesitated not a moment longer. He despatched towards Lannes and Mortier all that part of the cavalry which had not followed Murat, and gave the command of it to General Grouchy. He enjoined Lannes and Mortier to proceed to Friedland, to make themselves masters of that town if they could, and of the bridges of the Alle. He ordered Ney and Victor to advance upon Domnau, to follow Lannes and Mortier at a greater or less distance from Friedland, according to circumstances. He then marched off his guard, and resolved to start himself on horseback at daybreak, to be on the morrow, the 14th of June, at the head of his assembled troops. That day, the 14th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Marengo, reminding him of the most glorious day of his life, filled him with a secret and joyful presentiment. He had not ceased to believe in his good fortune, and that belief was still well founded.

Lannes, arriving at Domnau a few hours before Marshal Mortier, had forthwith sent the 9th hussars on reconnaissance to Friedland. That regiment had penetrated into Friedland, but presently attacked by more than thirty enemy's squadrons, which brought with them a great quantity of light artillery, it had been very roughly handled and obliged to flee to Georgenau, an intermediate post between Domnau and Friedland. On this intelligence, Lannes despatched the light horse and the Saxon cuirassiers to the assistance of the 9th hussars, then set himself in march for Friedland to fling back the enemy's cavalry beyond the Alle, and to close the outlet by which it seemed to be the intention of the Russian army to proceed to the succour of Königsberg. He arrived there about one in the morning of the 14th, and perceiving, as he thought, a considerable quantity of troops amidst the darkness of the night, he stopped at Posthenen, after dislodging a detachment of the enemy that was guarding

that village. He was not strong enough to occupy the town of Friedland itself—a very fortunate circumstance, for by occupying it he would have prevented an egregious blunder of General Benningsen's, and snatched from Napoleon one of his most splendid triumphs.

At this moment, in fact, the whole Russian army was approaching Friedland, preceded by thirty-three squadrons, eighteen of them belonging to the imperial guard, by the infantry of that guard, and by twenty pieces of light artillery. The main body of the army was to enter in a few hours. General Benningsen, aware that there was no time to be lost if he would save Königsberg, or at least save himself behind the Pregel, had marched the whole night between the 11th and the 12th, in order to reach Bartenstein, given a few hours' rest there to his soldiers, resumed his march for Schippenbeil, arrived there on the 13th, and learning that the French had appeared at Domnau, had hastened to reach Friedland, the point where the Alle, as we have just observed, approaches nearer to Königsberg than in any other part of its course. He had taken care to send before him a strong advanced guard of cavalry.

Lannes, established at Posthenen, could not appreciate before daylight the importance of the event that was preparing. In a country so near the Pole, twilight in the month of June commences at two in the morning. It was quite light by three o'clock. Marshal Lannes soon distinguished the nature of the ground, the troops which occupied it, and those which were crossing the bridges of the Alle, for the purpose of disputing with us the road to Königsberg.

The course of the Alle, near the spot where the two armies were about to meet, exhibits numerous windings. We arrived by woody hills, beyond which the ground gradually sinks to the bank of the Alle. The ground at this season is covered with rye of great height. The Alle was seen on our right pursuing its way through the plain in many meanders, then turning round Friedland coming to our left, and thus forming an elbow open on our side, and the further end of which was occupied by the town of Friedland. It was by the bridges of Friedland, placed in this elbow of the Alle, that the Russians came to deploy in the plain opposite to us. They were seen distinctly hurrying across the bridges, passing through the town, debouching from the suburbs, and drawing up in line of battle facing the heights. A rivulet called the Mill Stream, running towards Friedland, there formed a small pond, then threw itself into the Alle, after dividing that plain into two unequal halves. The half situated on our left was the less extensive of the two. It was that on which Friedland was seated, between the Mill Stream and the Alle, at the very corner of the elbow which we have just described.

Marshal Lannes, in his haste to march, had brought with him only Oudinot's voltigeurs and grenadiers, the 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, and two regiments of Saxon cavalry. He could not oppose more than 10,000 men* to the enemy's advanced guard, which, successively reinforced, was treble that number, and was soon to be followed by the whole Russian army. Fortunately the soil afforded numerous resources to the skill and courage of the illustrious marshal. In the centre of the position, which it was necessary to occupy in order to bar the way against the Russians, was a village, that of Posthenen, through which ran the Mill Stream to pursue its course to Friedland. Somewhat in rear rose a plateau, from which the plain of the Alle might be battered. Lannes placed his artillery there, and several battalions of grenadiers to protect it. On the right a thick wood, that of Sortlack, protruded in a salient, and divided into two the space comprised between the village of Posthenen and the banks of the Alle. There Lannes posted two battalions of voltigeurs, which, dispersed as tirailleurs, would be able to stop for a long time troops not numerous and not very resolute. The 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, the Saxon cavalry, amounted to 3000 horse ready to fall upon any column which should attempt to penetrate that curtain of tirailleurs. On the left of Posthenen the line of woody heights extended, gradually lowering to the village of Heinrichsdorf, through which ran the highroad from Friedland to Königsberg. This point was of great importance, for the Russians, desirous to reach Königsberg, would of course obstinately dispute the road thither. Besides, this part of the field of battle being more open, was naturally more difficult to defend. Lannes, who had not yet troops sufficient to establish himself there, had placed on his left, taking advantage of the woods and heights, the rest of his battalions, thus approaching the houses of Heinrichsdorf without being able to occupy them.

The fire, commenced at three in the morning, became all at once extremely brisk. Our artillery, placed on the plateau of Posthenen, under the protection of Oudinot's grenadiers, kept the Russians at a distance, and made considerable havoc among them. On the right our voltigeurs, scattered on the skirt of the wood of Sortlack, stopped their infantry by an incessant tirailleur fire ; and the Saxon horse, directed by General Grouchy, had made several successful charges against their cavalry. The Russians having become threatening towards Heinrichsdorf, General Grouchy, moving from the right to the left, galloped thither, to dispute with them the Königsberg road, the important point for the possession of which torrents of blood were about to be spilt.

* Oudinot, 7000; Grouchy, 1800; 9th hussars, light horse, and Saxon cuirassiers, 1200 : total, 10,000.

Though in these first moments Marshal Lannes had but 10,000 men to oppose 25,000 or 30,000, he maintained his ground, thanks to great skill and energy, and also to the able concurrence of General Oudinot, commanding the grenadiers, and of General Grouchy, commanding the cavalry. But the enemy reinforced himself from hour to hour, and General Benningsen, on arriving at Friedland, had suddenly formed the resolution to give battle—a very rash resolution, for it would have been much wiser for him to continue to descend the Alle to the junction of that river with the Pregel, and to take a position behind the latter, with his left to Wehlau, his right to Königsberg. It would have taken him, it is true, another day to reach Königsberg; but he would not have risked a battle against an army superior in number, in quality, better officered, and in a very unfavourable situation for him, since he had a river at his back, and he was very likely to be pushed into the elbow of the Alle, with all that vigour of impulsion of which the French army was capable. But after losing a great deal of time in gaining Königsberg, General Benningsen was extremely impatient to get thither, stimulated, it is said, by the Emperor Alexander, who had promised his friend, Frederick William, to save the last remnant of the Prussian monarchy. He was, moreover, convinced that the route by Friedland was infinitely shorter, and lastly, he conceived that he should there fall in with a detached, unsupported corps of the French army, and that it might be possible for him to crush that corps before he returned to Königsberg. He persuaded himself that this was an unlooked-for favour offered him by Fortune, of which it behoved him to avail himself, and he resolved not to let it slip out of his hands.

In consequence, he lost no time in having three bridges thrown over the Alle, one above and two below Friedland, in order to accelerate the passage of his troops, and also to furnish them with means of retreat. He lined with artillery the right bank, by which he arrived, and which commanded the left bank. Then, nearly his whole army having debouched, he disposed it in the following manner. In the plain around Heinrichsdorf, on the right for him, on the left for us, he placed four divisions of infantry, under Lieutenant-General Gortschakoff, and the better part of the cavalry under General Ouwarroff. The infantry was formed in two lines. In the first were two battalions of each regiment deployed, and a third drawn up in close column behind the two others, closing the interval which separated them. In the second, the field of battle gradually narrowing the further it extended into the angle of the Alle, a single battalion was deployed, and two were formed in close column. The cavalry, ranged on the side and a little in advance, flanked the infantry. On the left (the right of the French) two Russian divisions, of

which the imperial guard formed part, increased by all the detachments of chasseurs, occupied the portion of the ground comprised between the Mill Stream and the Alle. They were drawn up in two lines, but very near each other, on account of the want of room. Prince Bagration commanded them. The cavalry of the guard was there, under General Kollogribow. Four flying bridges had been thrown across the Mill Stream, that it might interrupt the communications between the two wings as little as possible. The fourth Russian division had been left on the other side of the Alle, on the ground commanding the left bank, to collect the army in case of disaster, or to come and decide the victory if it obtained any commencement of success. The Russians had more than 200 pieces of cannon upon their front, besides those which were either in reserve or in battery on the right bank. Their army, reduced to 80,000 or 82,000 men after Heilsberg, separated at this time from Kamenski's corps and from some detachments sent to Wehlau to guard the bridges of the Alle, still amounted to 72,000 or 75,000 men.

General Benningsen caused the mass of the Russian army to be moved forward in the order just described, so that on getting out of the elbow of the Alle it might deploy, extend its fires, and avail itself of the advantages of number which it possessed at the beginning of the battle.

The situation of Lannes was perilous, for he had the whole Russian army upon his hands. Fortunately the time which had elapsed had procured him some reinforcements. General Nansouty's division of heavy cavalry, composed of 3500 cuirassiers and carabineers, Dupas' division, which was the first of Mortier's corps, and numbered 6000 foot-soldiers, lastly, Verdier's division, which contained 7000, and was the second of Lannes' corps, marched off successively, had come with all possible expedition. It was a force 26,000 or 27,000 men * to 75,000. It was seven in the morning, and the Russians, preceded by a swarm of Cossacks, who extended their rides quite to our rear, advanced towards Heinrichsdorf, where they already had infantry and cannon. Lannes, appreciating the importance of that post, sent thither the brigade of Albert's grenadiers, and ordered General Grouchy to secure possession of it at any rate. General Grouchy, who had just been reinforced by the cuirassiers, proceeded immediately to the village. Without stopping

* Oudinot 7,000
Verdier 7,000
Lannes' cavalry 1,200
Dupas 6,000
Nansouty 3,500
Grouchy 1,800

26,500

to consider the difficulty, he despatched the brigade of Milet's dragoons to attack Heinrichsdorf, while Carrié's brigade turned the village, and the cuirassiers marched to support this movement. Milet's brigade passed through Heinrichsdorf at a gallop, drove out the Russian foot-soldiers at the point of the sword, while Carrié's brigade, going round it, took or dispersed those who had saved themselves by flight. Four pieces of cannon were taken. At this moment the enemy's cavalry, coming to the assistance of the infantry expelled from Heinrichsdorf, rushed upon our dragoons and drove them back. But Nansouty's cuirassiers charged it in their turn, and threw it upon the Russian infantry, which in this fray was obliged to withhold its fire. Thus we remained masters of Heinrichsdorf, in which the grenadiers of Albert's brigade were established.

During these occurrences Dupas' division entered into line. Marshal Mortier, whose horse was killed by a cannon-ball the moment he appeared on the field of battle, placed that division between Heinrichsdorf and Posthenen, and opened on the Russians a fire of artillery which, poured upon deep masses, made prodigious havoc in their ranks. The arrival of Dupas' division rendered disposable those battalions of grenadiers which had at first been drawn up to the left of Posthenen. Lannes drew them nearer to him, and could oppose their closer ranks to the attacks of the Russians, either before Posthenen or before the wood of Sortlack. General Oudinot, who commanded them, taking advantage of all the accidents of ground, sometimes from clumps of wood scattered here and there, sometimes from pools of water produced by the rains of the preceding days, sometimes from above the corn, disputed the ground with equal skill and energy. By turns he hid or exhibited his soldiers, dispersed them as tirailleurs, or exposed them in a mass, bristling with bayonets, to all the efforts of the Russians. Those brave grenadiers, notwithstanding their inferiority in number, kept up the fight, supported by their general, when, luckily for them, Verdier's division arrived. Marshal Lannes divided it into two movable columns, to be sent alternately to the right, to the centre, to the left, wherever the danger was most pressing. It was the skirt of the wood of Sortlack and the village of the same name, situated on the Alle, that were the most furiously disputed. In the end the Russians remained masters of the village, the French of the skirts of the wood. When the Russians attempted to penetrate into that wood, Lannes, making a brigade of Verdier's division sally from it on a sudden, drove them back to a distance. Terrified by these startling appearances, fearing that Napoleon was lying concealed with his army in this mysterious wood, they durst no longer venture to approach it.

The enemy, unable to force our right between Posthenen and

Sortlack, made a vigorous attempt on our left in the plain of Heinrichsdorf, which presented few obstacles. The nature of the ground having induced them to direct the greater part of their cavalry to that side, they had there more than 12,000 horse to oppose to General Grouchy's 5000 or 6000. The latter, studying to compensate inferiority of number by skilful dispositions, deployed in the plain a long line of cuirassiers, and on the flank of that line, behind the village of Heinrichsdorf, he placed in reserve the dragoons, the brigade of the carabineers, and the light artillery. These dispositions completed, he put himself at the head of the deployed line of his cuirassiers, advanced upon the Russian cavalry as if going to charge it, then suddenly facing about he affected to retire at a trot before the mass of the enemy's squadrons. In this manner he enticed them to follow him, till, having passed Heinrichsdorf, they offered their flank to the troops concealed behind that village. Then halting and wheeling round, he led back his cuirassiers upon the Russian cavalry, charged it, overturned it, obliged it to pass back under Heinrichsdorf, whence burst a shower of grape, and from which the dragoons and carabineers in ambush rushed upon it and finished by throwing it into disorder. But the encounters of troops on horseback are never so destructive as to prevent the repetition of them. The Russian cavalry, therefore, returned to the charge, and General Grouchy, practising each time the same manœuvre, drew it beyond Heinrichsdorf, and caused it to be taken in flank and rear in the way that we have already seen, as soon as it was past the village. After several encounters, the plain of Heinrichsdorf remained in our hands, covered with dead men and horses, dismounted riders, and glistening cuirasses.

Thus, on the one hand, the resistance which the Russian infantry met with at the skirts of the wood of Sortlack, and on the other the flank attacks to which their cavalry was exposed, when it passed the village of Heinrichsdorf, kept them at the foot of our positions, and Lannes was enabled to prolong till noon this conflict of 26,000 men against 75,000. But it was high time for Napoleon to arrive with the rest of his army.

Lannes, anxious to apprise him of what was passing, had sent to him almost all his aides-de-camp, one after another, ordering them to get back to him without loss of time if they killed their horses. They found him coming at a gallop to Friedland, and full of a joy that was expressed in his countenance. "This is the 14th of June," he repeated to those whom he met; "it is the anniversary of Marengo; it is a lucky day for us!" Napoleon, outstripping his troops through the speed of his horse, had successively passed the long files of the guard, of Ney's corps, of Bernadotte's corps, all marching for Posthenen.

He had saluted in passing Dupont's fine division, which, from Ulm to Braunsberg, had never ceased to distinguish itself, though never in his presence, and he had declared that it would give him great pleasure to see it fight for once.

The presence of Napoleon at Posthenen fired his soldiers and his generals with fresh ardour. Lannes, Mortier, Oudinot, who had been there since morning, and Ney, who had just arrived, surrounded him with the most lively joy. The brave Oudinot, hastening up with his coat perforated by balls, and his horse covered with blood, exclaimed to the emperor: "Make haste, sire, my grenadiers are knocked up; but give me a reinforcement, and I will drive all the Russians into the water." Napoleon, surveying with his glass that plain where the Russians, backed in the elbow of the Alle, were endeavouring in vain to deploy, soon appreciated their perilous situation and the unique occasion offered him by Fortune, swayed, it must be confessed, by his genius; for the fault which the Russians were committing had been inspired, as it were, by him, when he pushed them from the other side of the Alle, and thus forced them to pass it before him in going to the relief of Königsberg. The day was far advanced, and it would take several hours to collect all the French troops. Some of Napoleon's lieutenants were, therefore, of opinion that they ought to defer fighting a decisive battle till the morrow. "No, no," replied Napoleon, "one does not catch an enemy twice in such a scrape." He immediately made his dispositions for the attack. They were worthy of his marvellous perspicacity.

To drive the Russians into the Alle was the aim which every individual, down to the meanest soldier, assigned to the battle. But how to set about it, how to ensure that result, and how to render it as great as possible, was the question. At the furthest extremity of this elbow of the Alle, in which the Russian army was engulfed, there was a decisive point to occupy, namely, the little town of Friedland itself, situated on our right, between the Mill Stream and the Alle. There were the four bridges, the sole retreat of the Russian army, and Napoleon purposed to direct his utmost efforts against that point. He destined for Ney's corps the difficult and glorious task of plunging into that gulf, of carrying Friedland at any rate, in spite of the desperate resistance which the Russians would not fail to make, of wresting the bridges from them, and thus barring against them the only way of safety. But at the same time he resolved, while acting vigorously on his right, to suspend all efforts on his left, to amuse the Russian army on that side with a feigned fight, and not to push it briskly on the left till, the bridges being taken on the right, he should be sure, by pushing it, to fling it into a receptacle without an outlet.

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Surrounded by his lieutenants, he explained to them, with that energy and that precision of language which were usual with him, the part which each of them had to act in that battle. Grasping the arm of Marshal Ney, and pointing to Friedland, the bridges, the Russians crowded together in front, "Yonder is the goal," said he; "march to it without looking about you; break into that thick mass whatever it costs you; enter Friedland, take the bridges, and give yourself no concern about what may happen on your right, on your left, or on your rear. The army and I shall be there to attend to that."

Ney, boiling with ardour, proud of the formidable task assigned to him, set out at a gallop to arrange his troops before the wood of Sortlack. Struck with his martial attitude, Napoleon, addressing Marshal Mortier, said, "That man is a lion!" *

On the same ground, Napoleon had his dispositions written down from his dictation, that each of his generals might have them bodily present to his mind, and not be liable to deviate from them. He ranged, then, Marshal Ney's corps on the right, so that Lannes, bringing back Verdier's division upon Posthenen, could present two strong lines with that and the grenadiers. He placed Bernadotte's corps (temporarily Victor's) between Ney and Lannes, a little in advance of Posthenen, and partly hidden by the inequalities of the ground. Dupont's fine division formed the head of this corps. On the plateau behind Posthenen, Napoleon established the imperial guard, the infantry in three close columns, the cavalry in two lines. Between Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf was the corps of Marshal Mortier, posted as in the morning, but more concentrated, and augmented by the young fusiliers of the imperial guard. A battalion of the 4th light infantry and the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris had taken the place of the grenadiers of the Albert brigade in Heinrichsdorf. Dombrowski's Polish division had joined Dupas' division, and guarded the artillery. Napoleon left to General Grouchy the duty of which he had already so ably acquitted himself, that of defending the plain of Heinrichsdorf. To the dragoons and the cuirassiers commanded by that general he added the light cavalry of Generals Beaumont and Colbert, to assist him to rid himself of the Cossacks. Lastly, having two more divisions of dragoons to dispose of, he placed that of General Latour-Maubourg, reinforced by the Dutch cuirassiers, behind the corps of Marshal Ney, and that of General La Houssaye, reinforced by the Saxon cuirassiers, behind Victor's corps. The French in this imposing order amounted to no fewer than 80,000 men.† The order was repeated to the left not to

* I got these particulars from Marshal Mortier, with whom I had the honour to be acquainted, and who has often related them to me himself.

† Nothing is more difficult than to compute, with strict accuracy, the force

advance, but merely to keep back the Russians till the success of the right was decided. Napoleon required that before the

of an army on a day of battle. One rarely has authentic statements, and when one can procure such, it is still more rarely that such statements agree with reality. M. Derode, in an excellent paper on the battle of Friedland, has made use of a statement extracted from the work of General Mathieu Dumas, a statement which, though derived from the depôt of war, is incorrect in several particulars. In the offices of the ministry in Paris were drawn up statements, with which the facts occurring on the Vistula did not always correspond. There exist in the Louvre, in the rich depôt of the papers of Napoleon, memorandum books kept by himself, which he always had at hand, and which, renewed month by month, contained an accurate description of each of the corps acting under his command. The leaves of these books have writing on one side only, and on the other are sometimes given in red ink the changes that happened in the course of the month. It is in these little books, but on condition of not taking even them for absolute groundwork, and on condition of incessantly modifying their data, by the appreciation of the circumstances of the moment—it is in these little books, we say, that one may look for the approximative truth. I have not found those for the months of May, June, and July 1807; I have, therefore, been obliged to resort to those for the months of March and August, though that for March is too incomplete, for the army had not then received all the reinforcements which arrived in May and June, and though that of the month of August is too complete, on the contrary, for at that period a considerable portion of forces, on march during the events of June, had joined. But by using these statements, by comparing them, by rectifying them, above all, by Napoleon's correspondence, and by enlightening one's self in regard to the battle of Friedland, by a note in his own handwriting which gives the strength of several of the corps that figure in that battle, one arrives at the following computation, which I believe to be very near the truth. I will add that this approximation to the truth is sufficient; for to judge of a great event like Friedland or Austerlitz, it is of little importance to ascertain whether there were 80,000 or 82,000 men who fought. Two or three thousand combatants more or less make no change either in the character of the event or in the combinations which decided it. If the historian ought not to spare any pains to arrive at the absolute truth, it is because he ought to make a constant habit of it, in order that he may never suffer the scrupulous regard for truth to be relaxed in him; but the important point is the character, not the minute detail of things.

The most probable computation, then, of the force of the French army in the battle of Friedland is as follows :—

The guard, though increased to 9000 men, had not in its ranks either the seamen or the dragoons, and had sustained a considerable loss in fusiliers. It numbered of men present, at most . . .	7,500
The note in the handwriting of Napoleon mentioned above computes Oudinot's grenadiers at, men present	7,000
Verdier's division at	8,000
The Saxon infantry at	4,000
The ninth hussars at	400
The Saxon cuirassiers at	600
The Saxon light horse at	200
Making for the whole corps of Lannes a total of . .	20,200

But the Saxons had been left at Heilsberg, excepting, however, three battalions, which, according to some accounts, were at Friedland. Verdier's division had sustained considerable loss at Heilsberg, and lastly, the troops had marched very fast. I think, therefore, that we shall be about the mark if we set down Lannes' corps as follows :—

Carried forward .	7,500

troops recommenced firing, they should wait for the signal from a battery of twenty pieces of cannon placed above Posthenen.

	Brought forward .	7,500
Oudinot	7,000	
Verdier	6,500	
Saxons	1,200	
Cavalry	1,200	
	15,900	
(The artillery is included in the divisions of infantry.)		
Lannes		15,900
Marshal Ney's corps amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 men present under arms at the moment of taking the field, which is proved by a letter from Marshal Ney to Napoleon. He had lost not fewer than from 2000 to 2500 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the battles of Guttstadt and Deppen. Taking marches into account, it amounted then at most to		14,000
Marshal Mortier, according to the note of Napoleon's already mentioned, had in Dupas' division . .	6,400	
In Dombrowski's division	4,000	
He had a detachment of Dutch horse, the designation of which is uncertain in the note referred to . .	1,500	
	11,900	
When we know from Marshal Lefebvre's letters how the Poles behaved, and how steadily they followed the colours, we cannot set down Marshal Mortier's corps at more than		10,000
The corps of Marshal Bernadotte, commanded by General Victor, had in March, without the division of dragoons, about 22,000 men present under arms. It was afterwards recruited, but had left behind several posts, and if it amounted to 25,000 men, it could not have taken to Friedland above		22,000
The cavalry comprehended General Nansouty's cuirassiers, from whom must be deducted the losses on march, at Heilsberg, &c.	3,500	
General Grouchy's dragoons	1,800	
General La Houssaye's dragoons	1,800	
General Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, forming six regiments	2,400	
The light cavalry of Generals Beaumont and Colbert .	2,000	
		11,500
Thus we find for the total of the army .		80,900

I think, therefore, we may say that the French army was about 80,000 men at the battle of Friedland, 25,000 of whom, as we shall see, never fired a shot. There were further the corps of Marshal Davout, which had not fought, and which amounted to 29,000 or 30,000 men, at the opening of the campaign, to 28,000 if we allow for those left behind on march; Marshal Soult's, which had lost about 5000 men at Heilsberg, and could scarcely exceed 27,000; lastly, Murat, with about 10,000 men, which would make the total of the army in action at the moment:—

At Friedland		80,000
Before Königsberg, or on march for that city	Davout .	28,000
	Soult .	27,000
	Murat .	10,000
	Total .	145,000

This total of 145,000 men in action would correspond well both with the forces existing on the 5th of June, and with the probable losses sustained in the various fights since the 5th of June. Reckoning these losses at 12,000 or

The Russian general, struck by this deployment, discovered the mistake which he had committed in supposing that he had to do with but the single corps of Marshal Lannes; he was surprised, and naturally hesitated. His hesitation had produced a sort of slackening in the action. Scarcely did occasional discharges of artillery indicate the continuance of the battle. Napoleon, who desired that all his troops should have got into line, rested for at least an hour, and being abundantly supplied with ammunition, was in no hurry to begin, and resisted the impatience of his generals, well knowing that, as at this season, in this country, it was light till ten in the evening, he should have time to subject the Russian army to the disaster that he was preparing for it. At length the fit moment appearing to him to have arrived, he gave the signal. The twenty pieces of cannon of the battery of Posthenen fired at once; the artillery of the army answered them along the whole line, and at this impatiently awaited signal, Marshal Ney moved off his *corps d'armée*.

From the wood of Sortlack issued Marchand's division, advancing the first to the right, Bisson's division the second to the left. Both were preceded by a swarm of tirailleurs, who as they approached the enemy fell back and returned into the ranks. These troops marched resolutely up to the Russians, and took from them the village of Sortlack, so long disputed. Their cavalry, in order to stop our offensive movement, made a charge on Marchand's division. But Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, passing through the intervals of our battalions, charged that cavalry in their turn, drove it back upon its infantry, and pushing the Russians against the Alle, precipitated a great number into the deeply embanked bed of that river. Some saved themselves by swimming, many were drowned.* His right once appuyed on the Alle, Marshal Ney slackened its march, and pushed forward his left, formed by Bisson's division, in such a manner as to thrust back the Russians into the narrow space comprised between the Mill Stream and the Alle. When arrived at this point, the fire of the enemy's artillery redoubled. The French had to sustain not only the fire of the batteries in front, but also the fire of those on the right

15,000 men, killed, wounded, prisoners, or laggards, we shall again find the 160,000 men composing the army at the opening of the campaign. Though these numbers are taken from the only documents worthy of credit, documents rectified, modified, by a correspondence of each day, we consider them as approximative, and nothing more. And if we have entered into these details, it is to convey an idea of the difficulty of arriving at strict accuracy in matters of this kind. But, we repeat it, if the historian, in order never to relax in his duty, ought to aspire to the strict truth, posterity in reading him, judging from his efforts, can feel satisfied in regard to numbers and details of the general truth. It is this general truth which is of importance to him, which is sufficient for him, for it is that which constitutes the real character of things and of events.

* Two thousand, says Marshal Ney, in his report.

bank of the Alle, and it was impossible to get rid of the latter by taking them, as they were separated from them by the deep bed of the river. Our columns, battered at once in front and flank by the balls, endured with admirable coolness this terrible convergence of fires. Marshal Ney, galloping from one end of the line to the other, kept up the courage of his soldiers by his heroic bearing. Meanwhile whole files were swept away, and the fire became so severe that the very bravest of the troops could no longer endure it. At this sight the cavalry of the Russian guard, commanded by General Kollogribow, dashed off at a gallop, to try to throw into disorder the infantry of Bisson's division, which appeared to waver. Staggered for the first time, that valiant infantry gave ground, and two or three battalions threw themselves in rear. General Bisson, who from his stature overlooked the lines of his soldiers, strove in vain to detain them. They retired, grouping themselves around their officers. The situation soon became most critical. Luckily General Dupont, placed at some distance on the left of Ney's corps, perceived this commencement of disorder, and without waiting for directions to march, moved off his division, passing in front of it, reminding it of Ulm, Dirnstein, and Halle, and taking it to encounter the Russians. It advanced in the finest attitude under the fire of that tremendous artillery, while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, returning to the charge, fell upon the Russian cavalry, which had scattered in pursuit of our foot-soldiers, and succeeded in the attempt to drive it back. Dupont's division, continuing its movement on that open ground, and supporting its left on the Mill Stream, brought the Russian infantry to a stand. By its presence it filled Ney's soldiers with confidence and joy. Bisson's battalions formed anew, and our whole line, reinvigorated, began to march forward again. It was necessary to reply to the formidable artillery of the enemy, and Ney's artillery was so very inferior in number that it could scarcely stand in battery before that of the Russians. Napoleon ordered General Victor to collect all the guns of his divisions, and to range them in mass on the front of Ney. The skilful and intrepid General Senarmont commanded that artillery. He moved it off at full trot, joined it to that of Marshal Ney, took it some hundred paces ahead of our infantry, and daringly placing himself in face of the Russians, opened upon them a fire terrible from the number of the pieces and the accuracy of aim. Directing one of his batteries against the right bank, he soon silenced those which the enemy had on that side. Then pushing forward his line of artillery, he gradually approached to within grapeshot range, and firing upon the deep masses crowding together as they fell back into the elbow of the Alle, he made frightful havoc among them. Our line of infantry

followed this movement, and advanced under the protection of General Senarmont's numerous guns. The Russians, thrust further and further back into this gulf, felt a sort of despair, and made an effort to extricate themselves. Their imperial guard, appuyed upon the Mill Stream, issued from that retreat, and marched with bayonet fixed upon Dupont's division, also placed along the rivulet. The latter, without waiting for the imperial guard, went to meet it, repulsed it with the bayonet, and forced it back to the ravine. Thus driven, some of the Russians threw themselves beyond the ravine, the others upon the suburbs of Friedland. General Dupont, with part of his division, crossed the Mill Stream, drove before him all that he met, found himself on the rear of the right wing of the Russians engaged with our left in the plain of Heinrichsdorf, turned Friedland, and attacked it by the Königsberg road; while Ney, continuing to march straight forward, entered by the Eylau road. A terrible conflict ensued at the gates of the town. The assailants pressed the Russians in all quarters; they forced their way into the streets in pursuit of them, they drove them upon the bridges of the Alle, which General Senarmont's artillery, left outside, enfiladed with its shot. The Russians rushed upon the bridges to seek refuge in the ranks of the fourteenth division, left in reserve on the other side of the Alle by General Benningsen. That unfortunate general, full of grief, had hurried to this division with the intention of taking it to the bank of the river to the assistance of his endangered army. Scarcely had some wrecks of his left wing passed the bridges, when those bridges were destroyed, set on fire by the French and by the Russians themselves in their anxiety to stop us. Ney and Dupont having performed their task, met in the heart of Friedland in flames, and congratulated one another on this glorious success.

Napoleon, placed in the centre of the divisions which he kept in reserve, had never ceased to watch this grand sight. While he was contemplating it attentively, a ball passed at the height of the bayonets, and a soldier, from an instinctive movement, stooped his head. "If that ball were destined for you," said Napoleon, smiling, "though you were to burrow a hundred feet under ground, it would be sure to find you there." Thus he wished to give currency to that useful belief that Fate strikes the brave and the coward without distinction, and that the coward who seeks a hiding-place disgraces himself to no purpose.

On seeing that Friedland was occupied and the bridges of the Alle destroyed, Napoleon at length pushed forward his left upon the right wing of the Russian army, deprived of all means of retreat, and having behind it a river without bridges. General Gortschakoff, who commanded that wing, perceived the danger

with which he was threatened, and thinking to dispel the storm, made an attack on the French line, extending from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, formed by the corps of Marshal Lannes, by that of Mortier, and by General Grouchy's cavalry. But Lannes, with his grenadiers, made head against the Russians. Marshal Mortier, with the 15th and the fusiliers of the guard, opposed to them an iron barrier. Mortier's artillery, in particular, directed by Colonel Balbois and an excellent Dutch officer, M. Vanbriennen, made incalculable havoc among them. At length Napoleon, anxious to take advantage of the rest of the day, carried forward his whole line. Infantry, cavalry, artillery started all at once. General Gortschakoff, while he found himself thus pressed, was informed that Friedland was in the possession of the French. In hopes of retaking it he despatched a column of infantry to the gates of the town. That column penetrated into it, and for a moment drove back Dupont's and Ney's soldiers; but these repulsed in their turn the Russian column. A new fight took place in that unfortunate town, and the possession of it was disputed by the light of the flames that were consuming it. The French finally remained masters, and drove Gortschakoff's corps into that plain without thoroughfare which had served it for field of battle. Gortschakoff's infantry defended itself with intrepidity, and threw itself into the Alle rather than surrender. Part of the Russian soldiers were fortunate enough to find fordable passages, and contrived to escape. Another drowned itself in the river. The whole of the artillery was left in our hands. A column, the furthest on the right (right of the Russians), fled, and descended the Alle under General Lambert, with a portion of the cavalry. The darkness of the night and the inevitable disorder of victory facilitated its retreat, and enabled it to escape from our hands.

It was half-past ten at night. The victory was complete on the left and on the right. Napoleon in his vast career had not gained a more splendid one. He had for trophies 80 pieces of cannon, few prisoners, it is true, for the Russians chose rather to drown themselves than to surrender, but 25,000 men, killed, wounded, or drowned, covered with their bodies both banks of the Alle. The right bank, to which great numbers of them had dragged themselves, exhibited almost as frightful a scene of carnage as the left bank. Several columns of fire, rising from Friedland and the neighbouring villages, threw a sinister light over that place, a theatre of anguish for some, of joy for others. On our side we had to regret upwards of 7000 or 8000 men killed or wounded. Out of about 80,000 French, 25,000 had not fired a shot. The Russian army, deprived of 25,000 combatants, weakened, moreover, by a great number of men who had lost their way, was thenceforward incapable of keeping

the field. Napoleon had owed this glorious triumph as much to the general conception of the campaign as to the plan itself of the battle. In taking for several months past the Passarge for base, in thus securing to himself beforehand, and in all cases, the means of separating the Russians from Königsberg, in marching from Guttstadt to Friedland in such a manner as constantly to outwing them, he had obliged them to commit a great imprudence in order to reach Königsberg, and had deserved from Fortune the lucky chance of finding them at Friedland backed upon the river Alle. Always disposing his masses with consummate skill, he had contrived, while sending sixty and odd thousand men to Königsberg, to bring forward 80,000 at Friedland. And as we have just seen, there was no need for so many to overwhelm the Russian army.

Napoleon slept on the field of battle surrounded by his soldiers, joyous on this occasion as at Austerlitz and Jena, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* though they had nothing to eat but a piece of bread brought in their knapsacks, and contenting themselves with the noblest of the acquisitions of victory—glory. The Russian army, cut in two, descended the Alle in a clear, transparent night, with soul steeped in despair, though it had done all its duty. Fortunately for it Napoleon had at hand only half his cavalry. If he had had the other half, and Murat himself, the entire Russian corps descending the Alle under General Lambert would have been taken.

So rapid was the march of the Russians that on the following day they were at Wehlau on the Pregel. They cut down all the bridges, and on the morning of the 16th they established themselves a little beyond the Pregel, at Petersdorf, intending not to retire to the Niemen till the detached corps of Generals Kamenski and Lestocq, incapable of defending Königsberg against the French army, had joined them, for the purpose of effecting their retreat together.

On the day after the battle of Friedland, Napoleon lost not a moment in deriving from his victory all the results possible. Having, according to custom, visited the field of battle, shown a warm interest for the wounded, informed his soldiers what rewards his high fortune permitted him to promise and to give, he had set out for the Pregel, preceded by all his cavalry, which ran in pursuit of the Russians while descending both banks of the Alle. But the Russians had twelve hours' start, for it had been impossible to deny a night's rest to soldiers who had marched the whole of the preceding night in order to reach the field of battle, and who had afterwards fought all day, from two in the morning till ten at night. The Russians having thus the advantage of some hours, and retiring with the celerity of an army which cannot find safety but in flight, we could

not flatter ourselves that we should reach the Pregel before them. When we arrived there, all the bridges were broken down. Napoleon lost no time in re-establishing them, and making the dispositions necessary for enabling us to secure between the Pregel and Niemen all the prizes which we had not had time to take between Friedland and Wehlau.

While he was occupied with the Russian army at Friedland, Marshals Soult and Davout, preceded by Murat, had marched for Königsberg. Marshal Soult, falling in with the rearguard of General Lestocq, had taken from it an entire battalion, and had surrounded and taken, near Königsberg itself, a column of 1200 or 1500 men which had not retired in time from the environs of Braunsberg. He had appeared on the 14th under the walls of Königsberg, too well defended for it to be possible to take it by a sudden attack. Davout and Murat, having for their part received orders to return to Friedland, in case the battle should have lasted more than one day, had both left Marshal Soult and proceeded to the right for Wehlau. Having received fresh tidings by the way, and learned the victory of Friedland and the retreat of the Russians, they had directed their march to Tapiau on the Pregel, an intermediate point between Königsberg and Wehlau. Having collected the means of passing the Pregel, they had crossed it in order to intercept as many of the Russian troops as they could on their flight.

On the news of the battle of Friedland, the Prussian and Russian detachments guarding Königsberg no longer hesitated to quit that place, which was not in a condition to sustain a siege like Dantzig. The court of Prussia had already fled to the small frontier town of Memel, the last of the kingdom founded by the great Frederick. Generals Kamenski and Lestocq therefore retired, abandoning the immense stores as well as the sick and wounded of the two armies collected at Königsberg. A battalion left to stipulate the capitulation delivered it to Marshal Soult, who could enter immediately. In Königsberg were found corn, wine, 100,000 muskets sent by England, and still on board the vessels which had brought them, lastly, a considerable number of wounded, who had been there ever since Eylau. Of these, the surrounding villages contained several thousand.

Generals Lestocq and Kamenski, bringing their troops in the greatest haste by the Königsberg road to Tilsit, threw themselves into the forest of Baum, before Marshal Davout and Prince Murat had intercepted the route from Tapiau to Labiau. Still they did not join General Benningsen without leaving 3000 prisoners in the hands of Marshal Davout.

Napoleon having arrived at Wehlau, continued to follow up the Russian army without intermission, and to lay snares for its detached corps with a view to take such as should be behind.

He kept Marshal Soult at Königsberg, to establish himself there, and to commence immediately the attack of Pillau. That little fort taken, the garrison of Königsberg was to give the hand by the Nehrung to the garrison of Dantzig, and moreover to close against the English the Frische Haff, the navigation of which was at this moment performed by the seamen of the guard. He sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to take the command of the citadel of Königsberg, as he had sent Rapp to Dantzig, with the intention of preventing waste of the stores taken from the enemy, and of creating a new depôt. He directed Marshal Davout upon Labiau, the point where the whole inland navigation of these provinces terminates at the Baltic, and gave him a corps of some thousand horse under General Grouchy to pick up the Russian detachments left behind. He sent off Murat with the bulk of the cavalry upon the direct road from Wehlau to Tilsit, and despatched after him the corps of Mortier, Lannes, Victor, and Ney. Davout's corps was, in case of emergency, to rejoin the army by a single march. Napoleon was, therefore, strong enough to crush the Russians if they had the presumption to stop again to fight. On the right he threw out 2000 light horse, hussars and chasseurs, to ascend the Pregel, and to bar the road against all who should retire on that side, wounded, sick, stragglers, convoys.

These skilful dispositions occasioned the capture of several thousand more prisoners and of divers convoys of provisions, but they could not procure us another battle with the Russians. In haste to take refuge behind the Niemen, they arrived there on the 18th, finished crossing on the 19th, and destroyed all the means of passage for a considerable distance. On the 19th, our scouts, after pursuing some parties of Calmucks armed with bows, which highly amused our soldiers, unaccustomed to that kind of enemy, pushed on to the Niemen, and saw the Russian army on the other side of the river, encamped behind that bulwark of the empire which it had been so impatient to reach.

There was destined to end the daring march of the French army, which, setting out from the camp of Boulogne in September 1805, had traversed the continent in its greatest width, and conquered in twenty months all the armies of Europe. The new Alexander was about to pause at last, not on account of the fatigue of his soldiers, ready to follow him whithersoever he should wish to lead them, but on account of the exhaustion of his enemies, incapable of further resistance, and obliged to beg that peace which, a few days before, they had had the imprudence to refuse.

The King of Prussia had left at Memel the queen, his consort, the afflicted instigator of that fatal war, to rejoin the Emperor Alexander on the banks of the Niemen. The modest Frederick

William, though not sharing the silly illusions which the battle of Eylau had excited in his young ally, had nevertheless yielded to his persuasions to refuse peace, and he now foresaw that he should have to pay for that refusal with the greater part of his dominions. Alexander was dispirited, as on the day after Austerlitz. He was angry on account of recent events with General Benningsen, who had promised what he could not perform, and he felt that he had no further strength to continue the war. His army, too, cried out loudly for peace. It was not dissatisfied with itself, for it was aware that it had behaved well at Heilsberg and Friedland; but it considered itself incapable of coping with the army of Napoleon, collected entire since the taking of Königsberg, reinforced by Massena, who had just repulsed Tolstoy's corps at Durczewo, and able to oppose 170,000 men to the 70,000 Russian and Prussian soldiers who were still left. They asked for whom the war was carried on; was it for the Prussians, who could not defend their own country? Was it for the English, who, after so frequently announcing succours, sent none, and thought only of conquering colonies? The contempt expressed for the Prussians was unjust, for they had conducted themselves gallantly of late, and had done all that could be expected from their small number. The Prussians, in their turn, complained of the barbarism, the ignorance, the devastating ferocity of the Russian soldiers. The two agreed in nothing but in regard to the English. These, indeed, by landing either at Stralsund or at Dantzig, might have brought useful succours, and perhaps have changed, or at least slackened, the course of events. But they had shown no activity except in sending expeditions to the Spanish colonies; and about the very subsidies, which, in default of armies, constituted their sole co-operation, they had haggled till they had cooled the King of Sweden and disgusted him with the war. It is a relief under misfortune to be able to complain, and at this moment Russians and Prussians inveighed vehemently against the British cabinet. The Russian officers, in particular, loudly declared that it was for the English, for their paltry ambition, that brave men were set together by the ears, though they had no reason to hate or even to be jealous of each other, since, after all, Russia and France had nothing to envy one another.

The two vanquished monarchs shared the animosity of their soldiers against England, and felt still more than they the necessity of separating from her, and obtaining peace immediately. The King of Prussia, who would have wished for it earlier, and who foresaw how dearly he should pay for having retarded it, was of opinion, without complaining, that they ought to solicit it of Napoleon, and left the business of negotiating it to the Emperor Alexander. He hoped that his friend, who alone had insisted on that fatal prolongation of the war, would defend

him in the negotiations better than on the field of battle. It was therefore agreed that they should propose an armistice, and that, having obtained this armistice, the Emperor Alexander should seek to obtain an interview with Napoleon. It was known by experience how extremely sensible he was to the attentions of hostile sovereigns, how accommodating on the morrow of his victories; and the recollection of what the Emperor Francis had obtained from him at the bivouac of Urschitz, encouraged hopes of a peace less disadvantageous than might be feared, if not for Russia, which had nothing but consideration to lose, at least for Prussia, which was wholly in the hands of the conqueror.

In consequence, on the 19th of June, Prince Bagration transmitted to Murat, at the advanced posts, a letter written to him by the general-in-chief Benningsen, in which the latter, deploring the miseries of war, offered an armistice as the means of putting an end to them. This letter, delivered to Napoleon, who at that moment arrived at Tilsit, was very favourably received; for, as we have said, he began to find how much distance aggravated the difficulties of military operations. It was nearly a year that he had been far away from the centre of his empire, and he felt an urgent desire to return thither, to assemble, in particular, the Legislative Body, the meeting of which he had deferred, not choosing to call it together in his absence. Lastly, in listening to the language held by the Russian army, he was led to think that he should perhaps find in Russia that ally whom he needed for closing the continent against England for ever.

He returned therefore an amicable answer, saying that after so many efforts, fatigues, victories, he desired nothing but a safe and honourable peace, and if this armistice could be the means of effecting that, he was ready to consent to it. Upon this answer Prince Labanoff repaired to Tilsit, had an interview with Napoleon, represented to him the dispositions that were manifested by all about Alexander; and after having received the assurance that, on the part of the French, the wish for peace was not less strong, though less commanded by necessity, he agreed to an armistice. Napoleon required that the Prussian fortresses in Pomerania and Poland, which still held out, such as Colberg, Pillau, Graudenz, should be given up to him. But for this the consent of the King of Prussia would be necessary, and he was then absent from the Russian headquarters. Some resistance was, indeed, apprehended on his part when it should be proposed to him to give up fortresses, the last remaining in his hands. A separate armistice was in consequence stipulated between the French and Russian armies, which was signed on the 22nd of June by Prince Labanoff and the Prince of Neufchatel, and carried to the headquarters of Alexander, who ratified it immediately.

Marshal Kalkreuth then came forward to treat on behalf of the Prussian army. Napoleon received him with many civilities, told him that he was the distinguished and still more the courteous officer, who alone of all the officers of his nation had treated the French prisoners humanely; that on this account he received and granted a suspension of arms, without insisting on the delivery of the Prussian fortresses. It was a pledge that he was generous to leave in the hands of Prussia, and which could not give uneasiness to the French army, too solidly established on the Vistula by Warsaw, Thorn, and Dantzig, on the Pregel by Königsberg and Wehlau, to have anything to fear from such points as Colberg, Pillau, and Graudenz. The armistice was therefore signed with Marshal Kalkreuth, as it had been with Prince Labanoff. The demarcation which separated the belligerent armies was the Niemen as far as Grodno, and then, turning backward on the right, the Bober as far as its influx into the Narew, and lastly, the Narew as far as Pultusk and Warsaw.

Napoleon, never relaxing his usual vigilance, organised himself behind this line, as if he was soon to continue the war and carry it into the heart of the Russian empire. He drew Massena's corps nearer to him, and established it at Bialistock. He united Dombrowski's and Zayonschek's Poles into a single corps of 10,000 men, which was to connect Massena with Marshal Ney. He placed the latter at Gumbinnen, on the Pregel. He collected at Tilsit Marshals Mortier, Lannes, Bernadotte, Davout, the cavalry, and the guard. He left Marshal Soult at Königsberg. He ordered an entrenched camp to be prepared at Wehlau, to concentrate himself there in case of need with his whole army. He gave orders at Dantzig and Königsberg for withdrawing part of the immense stores found in those places, and sending them off to the Niemen. Lastly, he enjoined General Clarke, at Berlin, and Marshal Kellermann, at Mayence, to continue to direct the marching regiments to the Vistula, just as if the war was not interrupted. Of the various measures which he adopted for augmenting his forces in spring, he suspended but one, namely, the calling out of the second portion of the conscription of 1808. He was desirous that this news, accompanying that of his triumphs, should be an additional reason for France to rejoice and to applaud his victories.

In this imposing attitude Napoleon awaited the opening of the negotiations, and invited M. de Talleyrand, who had gone to Dantzig to seek a little safety and quiet, to come immediately to Tilsit, to lend him the aid of his shrewdness and patient ingenuity. According to his custom, Napoleon addressed to his army a proclamation impressed with the twofold greatness of his soul and of the circumstances. It was as follows :—

"SOLDIERS,—On the 5th of June we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army. The enemy had mistaken

the causes of our inactivity. He perceived too late that our repose was that of the lion; he repents of having disturbed it.

"In the battles of Guttstadt and Heilsberg, and in that ever memorable one of Friedland, in a campaign of ten days, in short, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, seven colours, killed, wounded, or made prisoners 60,000 Russians, taken from the enemy's army all its magazines, its hospitals, its ambulances, the fortress of Königsberg, the 300 vessels which were in that port laden with all kinds of military stores, 160,000 muskets which England was sending to arm our enemies.

"From the banks of the Vistula we have come with the speed of the eagle to those of the Niemen. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of the coronation; this year you have worthily celebrated that of the battle of Marengo, which put an end to the war of the second coalition.

"Frenchmen, you have been worthy of yourselves and of me. You will return to France covered with laurels, and after obtaining a glorious peace, which carries with it the guarantee of its duration. It is high time for our country to live in quiet, screened from the malignant influence of England. My bounties shall prove to you my gratitude and the full extent of the love that I feel for you.

"At the Imperial Camp of Tilsit, *June* 22, 1807."

The two vanquished sovereigns were in a still greater hurry than Napoleon to open the negotiations. Prince Labanoff, one of those Russians who wished most sincerely for harmony between France and Russia, returned on the 24th to Tilsit to obtain an audience of Napoleon. It was immediately granted. That Russian noble expressed the strong desire felt by his master to put an end to the war, his excessive disgust for the English alliance, his extreme impatience to see the great man of the age, and to come to a frank and cordial explanation with him. Napoleon desired nothing better than to meet that young sovereign of whom he had heard so much, whose understanding, grace, and seduction, which were highly extolled, excited in him great curiosity and little fear, for when he entered into communication with men he was more certain to win than to be won. Napoleon accepted the interview for the following day, the 25th of June.

He determined that a certain pomp should mark this meeting of the two most powerful princes in the world to confer about terminating their sanguinary quarrel. He had a large raft moored by General Lariboissière of the artillery in the middle of the Niemen, equidistant from and within sight of both banks of the river. Upon one part of this raft a pavilion was constructed with all the rich stuffs to be procured in the little town

of Tilsit for the reception of the two monarchs. On the 25th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon embarked on the river, accompanied by the Grand Duke of Berg, the Prince of Neufchatel, Marshals Bessière and Duroc, and Caulaincourt, grand-equerry. At the same instant Alexander quitted the other bank, accompanied by the Grand Duke Constantine, Generals Benningsen and Ouwaroff, Prince Labanoff, and Count Lieven. The two boats reached the raft at the same time, and the first movement of Napoleon and Alexander on meeting was to embrace one another. This testimony of a frank reconciliation, perceived by the numerous spectators who lined the river, for the Niemen at this place is not wider than the Seine, excited vehement applause. The two armies, in fact, were ranged along the Niemen; the half-savage people of these parts had joined them; and the witnesses of this extraordinary scene, little versed in the secrets of politics, seeing their masters embrace, imagined that peace was concluded, and a stop thenceforward put to the spilling of their blood.

After this first demonstration, Alexander and Napoleon entered the pavilion which had been prepared for their reception.* "Why are we at war?" they asked one another in

* It is very difficult to ascertain precisely what passed in the long conversations which Napoleon and Alexander had together at Tilsit. All Europe has rung with controverted statements relative to this subject; and not only have chimerical conversations been invented, but there have been published a quantity of treaties under the designation of secret articles of Tilsit, which are absolute forgeries. The English in particular, to justify their subsequent conduct towards Denmark, have put forth a great many secret articles of Tilsit, as they are called, some devised after the event by collectors of treaties, others really communicated at the time to the cabinet of London by diplomatic spies, who on this occasion ill-earned the money that was lavished upon them. Thanks to the authentic and official documents which I have been enabled to consult, I shall make known for the first time the real stipulations of Tilsit, both public and secret: I shall furnish, in particular, the substance of the conversations of Napoleon and Alexander. For this purpose I shall have recourse to a very curious collection, probably doomed to remain secret for a long time, but from which I can without indiscretion extract what relates to Tilsit. I allude to the private correspondence of Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt with Napoleon, and the correspondence of Napoleon with them. General Savary remained some months at Petersburg as envoy-extraordinary; M. de Caulaincourt resided there several years in quality of ambassador. The devotedness of the one, the veracity of the other, forbid any doubt of the pains which they took to acquaint Napoleon with the whole truth, and I must say that the tone of sincerity which pervades that correspondence is honourable to both. Fearful of substituting their judgment for that of Napoleon, and anxious to enable him to judge for himself, they were accustomed to annex to their despatches minutes, in question and answer, of their private conversations with Alexander. The one and the other had interviews with him almost every day *tête-à-tête*, in the greatest familiarity, and in reporting word for word what he said, they have drawn, without pretending to do so, a most interesting and certainly a most faithful portrait of him. Many people, and many Russians in particular, in order to excuse this intimacy of Alexander's with Napoleon, place it to the account of policy, and making him more profound than he was, say that he was deceiving Napoleon. This singular excuse would not even be attempted if such persons had read the correspondence in

commencing this conversation. Napoleon, in fact, was warring with Russia only as an ally of England; and Russia, on her part, though justly uneasy about the continental domination of France, was serving the interests of England much more than her own in persevering in this contest with such animosity as she had done. "If your grudge is against England and against her alone," said Alexander to Napoleon, "we shall easily agree, for I have as much reason to complain of her as you have." He then enumerated his grievances against Great Britain, the avarice, the selfishness which she had manifested, the false promises with which she had lured him, the deserted state in which she had left him, with the resentment excited by a disastrous war which he had been obliged to wage single-handed. Napoleon seeking to discover what were the sentiments of the speaker which he ought to flatter, soon perceived that two were then predominant: in the first place, deep spleen against allies, burdensome like Prussia, or selfish like England; and in the next, a very sensitive and deeply mortified pride. He took pains therefore to prove to young Alexander that he had been duped by his allies, that, moreover, he had conducted himself with nobleness and courage. He strove to persuade him that Russia was wrong to persist in patronising ungrateful and jealous neigh-

question. Alexander was dissembling, but he was impressionable, and in these conversations we find him incessantly throwing off all restraint, and saying whatever he thought. It is certain that he attached himself for some time, not to the person of Napoleon, who always excited in him a certain apprehension, but to his policy, and that he served it very actively. He had conceived a very natural ambition which Napoleon suffered to spring up, which he flattered for a while, and which he ended with deceiving. Then it was that Alexander detached himself from France, detached himself before he avowed it, which constituted for a moment that falseness which the Russians place to his credit, but which scarcely was such, so easy was it to discern in his language and in his involuntary movements the change of his dispositions. I should be anticipating the history of later times were I to mention here what was that ambition of Alexander's which Napoleon flattered, and which at last he would not gratify. What I ought to explain at this moment is how the long series of conversations between Alexander and Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt could enable me to clear up the mystery of Tilsit. It was in the following manner that I arrived at this elucidation. Alexander, full of the recollections of Tilsit, was incessantly relating to Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt all that had been said and done in that celebrated interview, and frequently repeated the conversations of Napoleon, the expressions, by turns profound and poignant, which dropped from his lips, and particularly the promises which he said he had received. All this, faithfully transcribed on the very same day, was transmitted to Napoleon, who sometimes disputed, at other times visibly admitted, as not capable of being disputed, what they reported to him. It is from the contradictory reproductions of these recollections that I have derived the particulars which I am about to furnish, and the authenticity of which cannot be questioned. I have obtained, moreover, from a foreign source, equally authentic and official, the communication of very curious despatches containing the private conversations of the Queen of Prussia, on her return from Tilsit, with an old diplomatist, worthy of her confidence, of her friendship. It is with the assistance of these different materials that I have composed the sketch which I am about to submit to the reader, and which I believe to be the only true one among all those that pretend to describe the memorable scenes of Tilsit.

bours like the Germans, or in serving the interests of greedy traders like the English. He attributed this mistake to generous sentiments carried to excess, to misconceptions to which ministers, incompetent or bribed, had given rise. Lastly, he highly extolled the bravery of the Russian soldiers, and told the Emperor Alexander that if they were to unite the two armies which had fought so valiantly against one another at Austerlitz, at Eylau, at Friedland, but which in those battles had both behaved like real giants fighting blindfold, they might divide the world between them, for its own peace and welfare. He then insinuated, but very cautiously, that by waging war with France, Russia was spending her strength without any possible compensation; whereas if she would unite with France in subjecting the west and east, on land and on sea, she would gain as much glory, and certainly more profit. Without explaining himself further, he seemed to take it upon him to make the fortune of his young antagonist much more satisfactorily than they who had led him into a career in which he had hitherto met with nothing but defeats. Alexander, it is true, was under engagements to Prussia, and it was requisite that his honour should get out of that situation unstained. The emperor, therefore, gave him to understand that he would restore to him so much of the Prussian States as would be required to release him honourably from his engagements to his allies, after which the Russian cabinet would be at liberty to follow a new policy, the only true, the only profitable policy, resembling in all respects that of the great Catherine.

This conversation, which had lasted above an hour, and which had touched upon all questions without investigating them thoroughly, had deeply moved Alexander. Napoleon had opened to him new prospects, which is always a pleasing thing to a fickle, and especially to a discontented, mind. Besides, more than once Alexander, amidst his defeats, feeling keenly the inconveniences of that furious war into which he had been led against France, and the advantages of a system of union with her, had said to himself something like what Napoleon had just been saying to him, but not with that clearness, that force, and above all, that seduction of a conqueror who presents himself to the conquered with hands full of presents, with mouth full of caressing words. Alexander was seduced—Napoleon clearly perceived it, and promised himself soon to render the seduction complete.

After flattering the monarch, he resolved to flatter the man. "You and I," said he, "shall understand each other better if we treat directly than by employing our ministers, who frequently deceive or misunderstand us, and we shall advance business more in an hour than our negotiators in several days. Between you and me," he added, "there must be no third

person." It was impossible to flatter Alexander in a more sensible manner than by attributing to him a superiority over those around him, similar to that which Napoleon had a right to attribute to himself over all his servants. In consequence, Napoleon proposed to him to leave the hamlet where he was living, and to establish himself in the little town of Tilsit, which should be neutralised to receive him, and where they might treat of business themselves, in person, at any hour. This proposal was eagerly accepted, and it was agreed that M. de Labanoff should go that day to Tilsit to make the necessary arrangements. They had still to talk of that unfortunate King of Prussia, who was at Alexander's headquarters awaiting what should be done with him and his kingdom. Alexander offered to bring him to that same raft on the Niemen to introduce him to Napoleon, who should address a few soothing words to him. It was necessary, in fact, that Alexander, before he passed from one system of politics to another, should, if he meant not to dishonour himself, have saved some portion of the crown of his ally. Napoleon, who had already taken his determination on this point, and who was well aware that he must grant certain concessions to save the honour of Alexander, consented to receive the King of Prussia on the following day. The two sovereigns then left the pavilion, and passing from serious affairs to testimonies of courtesy, complimented the persons of their respective suites. Napoleon treated the Grand Duke Constantine and General Benningsen in a flattering manner. Alexander congratulated Murat and Berthier on being the worthy lieutenants of the greatest captain of modern times. Parting with fresh demonstrations of friendship, the two emperors again embarked, in sight and amidst the applause of the numerous spectators assembled on the banks of the Niemen.

Prince Labanoff came in the afternoon to the French headquarters to settle everything relative to the removal of the Emperor Alexander to Tilsit. It was agreed that the town of Tilsit should be neutralised; that the Emperor Alexander should occupy one half, the Emperor Napoleon the other; that the Russian imperial guard should pass to the left bank to do duty about its sovereign, and that this change of abode should take place the very next day, after the presentation of the King of Prussia to Napoleon.

Accordingly, on the next day, the 26th of June, the two emperors, conveyed, as on the preceding day, to the middle of the Niemen, observing the same etiquette, repaired to the pavilion where their first interview had taken place. Alexander brought the King of Prussia. That prince had not received any grace from Nature, and misfortune, grief, could not be supposed to have conferred any. He was an honest man, sensible, modest, and awkward. He did not humble himself before the conqueror; he was sad, dignified and stiff. The conversation could not be

long, for he was the prince vanquished by Napoleon, the protégé of Alexander, and if there appeared to be a disposition to restore to him part of his dominions, which was probable, but not certain, from the conversation of the preceding day, it was the policy of Napoleon which granted that restitution for the honour of Alexander; but nothing was done for him, nothing was expected of him, so that there were no explanations to give him. The interview, consequently, could not but be short, and so it really was. The King of Prussia, however, appeared to make a particular point of proving that he had not wronged Napoleon, and that if, after having long been the ally of France, he had become her enemy, it was by the effect of circumstances, and not in consequence of any breach of engagement for which an honest man ought to blush. Napoleon, on his part, affirmed that he had nothing to reproach himself with, and too generous and too sensible to wound an humbled prince, he merely said to him that the cabinet of Berlin, often warned to beware of the intrigues of England, had committed the fault of not listening to this friendly counsel, and that to this cause alone were to be ascribed the disasters of Prussia. For the rest, Napoleon added that France, victorious, did not pretend to draw the very last consequences from her victories, and that in a few days they should probably be so fortunate as to come to an understanding relative to the conditions of an honourable and solid peace.

The three sovereigns parted, after an interview which had lasted scarcely half an hour. It was decided that the King of Prussia also should come to Tilsit to reside with his ally the Emperor of Russia.

At five o'clock the same day Alexander crossed the Niemen. Napoleon went to the bank of the river to meet him, conducted him to the quarters destined for him, and received him at dinner with the highest honours and the most delicate attentions. From that day it was settled that the Emperor Alexander, not having his household with him, should take all his meals with the Emperor Napoleon. They passed the evening together, conversed for a long time in a confidential manner, and their nascent intimacy was manifested on both sides by a familiarity at once dignified and graceful.

Next day, the 27th, they mounted their horses to review the French imperial guard. These old soldiers of the Revolution, by turns soldiers of the republic, of the empire, and always heroic servants of France, showed themselves with pride to the sovereign whom they had vanquished. They had not to display to him the lofty stature, the regular and measured march of the soldiers of the north; but they exhibited that freedom of movement, that assurance of attitude, and that intelligence of look, which accounted for their victories and their superiority over all the armies of Europe. Alexander complimented them

highly. They answered his flatteries with repeated shouts of "*Vive Alexandre ! vive Napoleon !*"

It was forty-eight hours since the two emperors first met, and they were already on such intimate terms that they could speak out freely. Napoleon then laid before the astonished eyes of Alexander the designs in which he would fain associate him—designs suggested to him by recent circumstances.

It was an extraordinary situation, that of Napoleon at this moment. While showing conspicuously the greatness of his genius, the prodigious height of his fortune, it revealed at the same time the weak sides of his policy, an extravagant and variable policy, like the passions which produced it.

We have often adverted to the alliances of France at that period; we have often said that, for realising the alarming phenomenon, happily impossible, of universal monarchy, Napoleon should have done nothing less than strive to number in Europe other than enemies, publicly or secretly leagued against him, and that he should have endeavoured to make himself a friend there—at least one. We have said that Spain, our most ancient and most natural ally, was completely disorganised, and till her entire regeneration, destined to be a burden to those who should unite themselves with her; that Italy was yet to create; that England, uneasy about the possession of India, alarmed to see us established at the Texel, at Antwerp, at Brest, at Cadiz, at Toulon, at Genoa, at Naples, at Venice, at Trieste, at Corfu, as proprietors or sovereigns, was irreconcilable with us; that Austria would be implacable so long as we had not restored or made her forget Italy; that Russia was jealous of us on the continent, as of England on the ocean; that Prussia alone, the natural rival of Austria, a neighbour threatened by Russia, a Protestant, innovating power, enriched by the possessions of the Church, was the only one whose political interests and moral principles were not absolutely incompatible with ours, and that in her was to be sought that strong and sincere friend by whose means all coalitions would be rendered either impracticable or incomplete. But we have seen that Prussia, placed between the two parties which then divided the world, wavering and hesitating, had committed faults of weakness, Napoleon faults of strength; that a deplorable rupture had ensued; that Napoleon had gained the immense military glory, had the immense political misfortune to destroy in a fortnight a monarchy which was our only possible ally in Europe; lastly, that the Russians, coming to the assistance of the Prussians in Poland, as they had done to the assistance of the Austrians in Galicia, he had crushed them at Friedland as at Austerlitz.

Conqueror of the entire continent, surrounded by powers successively beaten, the one ten days before at Friedland, the other eight months before at Jena, the third eighteen months

before at Austerlitz, Napoleon found himself at liberty to choose, not between sincere friends, but between officious, submissive, obsequious friends. If by a concatenation of things, almost impossible to break, the moment for attempting a Russian alliance had not then arrived for him, he would have been able at this moment to control Fate in some measure, to return suddenly into the ways of sound policy, never to leave them again, and he would there have found, with less apparent power, more real strength, and perhaps an everlasting duration, if not for his dynasty, at least for the greatness of France, which he loved as much as his dynasty. For this he must have conducted himself as a generous conqueror, and by an unexpected act, but by no means odd though unexpected, have raised prostrate Prussia, recomposed her stronger, more extensive than ever, saying to her, You have done wrong, you have not been candid with me ; I have punished you for it ; let us forget your defeat and my victory ; I am aggrandising instead of diminishing you, that you may be for ever my ally. Assuredly Frederick William, who had an aversion for war, who daily reproached himself for having suffered others to drag him into it, and who subsequently, in 1813, when Napoleon, half vanquished, presented a prey easy to devour, still hesitated to avail himself of the turn of Fortune, and who took up arms only because his people took them up in spite of him—this king, loaded with benefits after Jena and Friedland, forced to gratitude, would never have formed part of a coalition, and Napoleon, having only Austria and Russia to fight, would not have been overwhelmed. If Napoleon desired a crown in Germany for one of his brothers —an unlucky and unwise desire—he had Hesse, which Prussia would have been too happy to relinquish to him. He would have held the fate of Hanover in suspense, ready to give it to England as the price of peace, or to Prussia as the price of a close alliance. And as for the Emperor Alexander, having nothing to take from him, nothing to restore to him, Napoleon would have left him without a single grievance by reconstituting Prussia on the morrow of the joint defeat of the Russians and the Prussians. He would have constrained her to admire the conqueror, to sign the peace without saying a word, without any more talk about Italy, or Holland, or Germany, the ordinary pretexts at that period for disputes between France and Russia.

What we are imagining here was no doubt a Utopia, not of generosity, for Napoleon was perfectly capable of that unexpected, that dazzling generosity which sometimes springs from a great heart eager after glory, but a Utopia with reference to the combinations of the moment. At that time, indeed, the course of events which leads men, even the most powerful, conducted Napoleon to other resolutions. In regard to alliances, he had, though only in the middle of his reign, already tried all

sorts of them. No sooner had he arrived at the consulship, the period of good, wise, profound thoughts, because they were the first that the sight of things inspired him with long before the corruption which springs from prolonged power, he had turned towards Prussia, and made her his ally. For a moment under Paul I., but as an expedient, he had thought of uniting himself with Russia. For a moment again during the peace of Amiens he had conceived the idea of uniting himself with England, seduced by the advantage of joining the naval powers to the land power, but only in a transient manner, and Prussia had not ceased to be still his intimate confidante, his accomplice in all the affairs of Europe. Having fallen out with Prussia so seriously as to declare war against her, feeling his loneliness, he made Austria overtures, which would have done little honour to his penetration, if the need to have an ally, even amidst his victories, had not justified him in seeking not the most likely. Presently apprised of the treacherous armaments of Austria, intoxicated by Jena, he imagined that he could dispense with everybody. Transported into Poland, and surprised after Eylau at the obstacles which Nature can throw in the way of heroism and genius, he had once more thought of alliance with Prussia. But offended at the answers of that power, answers less eager than he had right to expect of her, and having again proved victorious as ever at Friedland, finally desiring to put an end to a distant war, he had been necessarily led, in turning incessantly in the circle of his thoughts, to that which had not yet had its day to that which was favoured by so many present circumstances, to the thought of an alliance with Russia. Alienated definitively from Prussia, which had not the skill to seize a moment of returning kindness for her, irritated to the highest degree at the crafty conduct of Austria, finding Russia disgusted with allies who had so ill seconded her, conceiving that there would be more sincerity in Russia than in Prussia, because there would be less ambiguity of position, lastly, seduced by novelty, which always misleads to a certain degree even the strongest minds, Napoleon thought to make Alexander an ally, a friend, by acquiring an ascendency over him, by filling his head with ambitious ideas, by placing before his dazzled eyes spells which it was easy to create, to keep up for some time, but not to perpetuate, unless they were renewed by the most dangerous satisfactions. The east naturally presented itself as a resource for procuring young Alexander satisfactions, easy enough to imagine, much less so to realise, but which had all at once been facilitated by an accidental and recent circumstance; so true it is that, when the moment for an event has arrived, everything seems to favour it, even the most unlooked for accidents.

Napoleon had enlisted the Turks in his quarrel by exciting them to dispute the provinces of the Danube with the conquerors

of the Crimea, Egypt with the possessors of India. He had promised to assist them by land against the Russians, by sea against the English, and he had begun by aiding them with his officers to defend the Dardanelles. Lastly, he had engaged not to sign a peace without rendering it common and advantageous to the Ottoman empire. But the unfortunate Selim, hated by the ulemas, whose power he wanted to reduce, by the janissaries, whom he wanted to subject to the European discipline, had expiated his wise and generous designs by a frightful downfall. The ulemas had long manifested a profound defiance of him. The janissaries saw with a sort of frenzy the new troops known by the name of *nizam djedid.* Both only awaited an opportunity to gratify their resentment. The sultan having required the janissaries keeping garrison in the castles of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles to take the costume of the *nizam djedid*, a revolt broke out among them, and spread with the swiftness of lightning among the companies of janissaries that were either at Constantinople or in the towns near the capital. All thronged to Constantinople, assembled riotously in the square of the At-Meidan (the ancient Hippodrome) with their camp-kettles reversed, the usual sign of revolt, denoting that they refused the food of a master who had become odious to them. The ulemas assembling on their part, declared that a prince who had reigned seven years without having posterity, under whom the pilgrimage to Mecca had been interrupted, was unworthy to reign. The janissaries remaining assembled for several days, had successively demanded, obtained, and in some instances taken without their being given to them, the heads of the ministers of the Porte accused of favouring the new system; and at length the revolt becoming more alarming, the mufti had proclaimed the deposition of Selim and the elevation of Mustapha to the throne. The unfortunate Selim, confined in an apartment of the Seraglio, had reason to hope, it is true, for the assistance of his army commanded by a devoted subject, the Grand-Vizier Baraictar. But this assistance would involve serious dangers, for it was to be feared that the appearance of the grand-vizier at the head of faithful soldiers would cause the dethroned sultan to be murdered before he could be rescued. Such was the intelligence which Napoleon received at his headquarters at Tilsit on the 24th of June. According to all probability, the new Turkish government would be inimical to France, merely because the overturned government had been her friend. It was certain, besides, that the anarchy which was undermining this unfortunate empire classed it with Spain among those allies from whom more trouble than service was to be expected, especially when such an ally, placed at the distance which separates Constantinople from Paris, could not be counselled without difficulty or assisted without delay. Napoleon, in whom revolu-

tions of ideas were wrought with the vivacity natural to his genius, all at once viewed the events in the east in a new light. The statesmen of Europe had long considered the Turkish empire as on the eve of dismemberment, and it was in this view that Napoleon had intended to seize beforehand the share of France by taking possession of Egypt. He had for a moment given up this idea, when in 1802 he thought to reconcile France with all the powers. He reverted to it with vehemence on observing what was passing at Constantinople, and said to himself that since it was impossible to keep that empire alive, the best thing that could be done was to benefit by what it had left for the better arrangement of the affairs of Europe, and particularly for the humiliation of England. He had with him, vanquished but still formidable, the sovereign whose young head it was easy to turn by showing him the mouths of the Danube, the Bosphorus, Constantinople, and he thought that, with some of these Turkish spoils, which sooner or later must devolve to Russia, he might obtain, not only peace, which at the moment was no longer doubtful, but a close, an intimate alliance, by means of which he should conquer England, and accomplish those revolutions on the thrones of the west which he meditated.

Having the Emperor Alexander daily at his side, either at reviews or in long rides on the banks of the Niemen, or in his writing cabinet, where the map of the world was spread out, and where he often shut himself up with him after dinner, he mastered the mind of that prince to such a degree as to upset it completely by placing before him, in an almost uninterrupted conversation of several days, the following views.

A dispensation of Providence, said he to Alexander, has just set me at liberty in regard to the Porte. My ally and my friend, Sultan Selim, has been hurled from the throne into confinement. I did think that one might make something of those Turks, restore to them some energy, teach them to make use of their natural courage: 'tis an illusion. It is time to put an end to an empire which can no longer hold together, and to prevent its spoils from contributing to increase the power of England.

Napoleon thereupon unfolded to Alexander the new projects which he had just conceived. If Alexander desired to be the ally of France, her solid and sincere ally, nothing was more easy, nothing would be more advantageous for himself and for his empire. But this alliance must be entire, without reserve, followed by a complete devotedness to the mutual interests of the two powers. In the first place, this alliance was the only one that was suitable for Russia. What, in fact, was France accused of? of wanting to rule Italy, Holland, perhaps Spain; of wanting to create on the Rhine a system which would overthrow the old preponderance of Austria in Germany, and stop

the rising preponderance there of Prussia. But need Russia care about Italy, Spain, Holland? Germany herself, was she not at once jealous of Russia, and her secret enemy? Was it not doing Russia a service to weaken the principal German powers? What, on the contrary, was England accused of? of wanting to rule the seas which are the property of everybody; to oppress neutral flags, to which the flag of Russia belonged; to possess herself of the commerce of nations; to fleece them by making them pay for colonial produce whatever price she pleased; to set foot wherever she could upon the continent, in Portugal, in Denmark, in Sweden; to take or to threaten the dominant points of the globe, the Cape, Malta, Gibraltar, the Sound, in order to impose her laws on the whole trading world. At this very moment, instead of assisting her allies, was she not endeavouring to conquer Egypt? And recently, if she had possessed herself of the Dardanelles, what would she have done with them? Now, about these English cravings one cannot say as about the longings imputed to France—what do they concern Russia? It was the opinion of the great Catherine and of Paul I. that they deeply concerned Russia, since both of them declared war against Great Britain on account of the rights of the neutral flag. The English oppressed the commerce of nations to such a degree that they had monopolised that of St. Petersburg, all the capitals of which they held, and this became in their hands a dangerous source of influence over Russia, for by merely withholding ready money they could instigate to murmuring and to the murdering of emperors. A French army, led by a great captain, could, strictly speaking, come to the Vistula, to the Niemen: would it get to the Neva? An English fleet, on the contrary, after forcing the Sound, could burn Cronstadt, threaten Petersburg, after forcing the Bosphorus, destroy Sevastopol and Odessa. An English fleet could shut up the Russians in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, keep them prisoners in those seas as in a lake. But France and Russia, not touching at any point, having the same enemies, the English on the sea, the Germans on land, having, moreover, a common and pressing object of solicitude, the Turkish empire, ought to be upon good terms, to concert together, and if they chose to do that, they were powerful enough to rule the world between them.

To these grand views Napoleon attached a system of means still more seductive than the general ideas which he had just developed. He was accused of being fond of war for the sake of war. That was not the case, and he would instantly prove it. Be my mediator, said he to Alexander, with the cabinet of London. That character befits your position as the former ally of England and the future ally of France. I have done thinking of Malta. Let Great Britain keep that island in compensation

for what I have acquired since the rupture of the peace of Amiens. But let her in her turn give up the colonies of Spain and of Holland, and at that price I will restore Hanover to her. Are not these conditions just, perfectly equitable? Can I accept others? Can I desert my allies? And when I sacrifice my conquests on the continent, such a conquest as Hanover, to recover the distant possessions of my allies, is it possible to dispute my probity and my moderation?

Alexander admitted that these conditions were perfectly just, and that France could not accept others. Napoleon, continuing, brought that prince to acknowledge that, if England persisted after such proposals, she ought to be forced to submit, as it was not right that the world should be for ever disturbed by her; and he proved to him that they had the means of reducing her by a mere declaration. If, said he, England refuses peace on these conditions, proclaim yourself the ally of France; declare that you will join your forces with hers to ensure a maritime peace. Let England know that, besides war with France, she will have war with the whole continent, with Russia, with Prussia, with Denmark, with Sweden, and with Portugal, which must obey when we signify our will to them, with Austria herself, who will be obliged to speak out in the same spirit, if we declare to her that she shall have war with us in case she does not choose to have war with England on the conditions signified by us. England then, exposed to a universal war, if she will not conclude an equitable peace—England will lay down her arms. All this, added Napoleon, ought to be communicated to each cabinet, and precise and short terms fixed for deciding. If England does not yield, we will act in concert, and we shall find sufficient indemnities to compensate us for this continuation of the war. Two very important countries, one of them in particular for Russia, will perhaps resist. These are Portugal and Sweden, whose maritime position places them under the influence of Great Britain. Relative to Portugal, said Napoleon, I will settle with Spain. You will take Finland as a compensation for the war which you will have been obliged to wage with Sweden. The King of Sweden, it is true, is your brother-in-law and your ally; let him follow the changes of your policy, or let him take the consequences of his ill-will. Sweden, repeated Napoleon several times, may be a relation, an ally of the moment, but *she is a geographical enemy.** Petersburg is too near the frontiers of Finland. *The fair Russians of Petersburg must not again hear from their palaces the cannon of the Swedes.*

Napoleon, after assigning Finland to Alexander as the price of the war against England, held forth to him something still

* These are the very expressions of Napoleon, repeated by Alexander, in relating to M. de Caulaincourt what had passed at Tilsit.

more alluring in the east. "You are to act as mediator with England for me," said he to Alexander, "and as armed mediator who imposes peace. I will act the same part for you with the Porte. I will signify my mediation to her; if she refuses to treat on such conditions as satisfy you in the state of anarchy into which she is fallen, I will unite with you against the Turks, as you will have united with me against the English, and then we shall make a suitable partition of the Ottoman empire."

Here it was especially that the field of hypotheses became immense, and that the imagination of the two sovereigns strayed into infinite combinations. The first wish of Russia was to obtain at once whatever might result from the negotiation with the Porte some portion of the provinces of the Danube. Napoleon assented, in return for the assistance which Russia was to lend him in the affairs of the west. However, as it was probable that the Turks would not give up anything, war would ensue, and after the war the partition. But what partition? Russia might have, besides Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans. Napoleon would naturally wish for the maritime provinces, such as Albania, Thessaly, Morea, Candia. Some indemnities for Austria would be found in Bosnia and Servia, either ceded to her in full property, or made the appanage of an archduke; and thus they would endeavour to console her for those convulsions of the world, from each of which she would come forth lessened, and her rivals aggrandised.

Figure to yourself the young czar, humbled the day before, coming to the camp of Napoleon to solicit peace, feeling of course no uneasiness about his own dominions, the distance of which saved them from the coveting of the conqueror, but expecting to lose a large portion of the territory of his ally the King of Prussia, and to retire disgraced from this war—figure him to yourself, suddenly transported into a sort of world at once imaginary and real, imaginary by its grandeur, real by its possibility, finding himself immediately after a signal defeat in the way to conquer Finland and part of the Turkish empire, and to acquire by a disastrous war more than was formerly acquired by a successful war, as if the honour of having been vanquished by Napoleon was almost equivalent to a victory, and ought to produce the fruits of one—figure to yourself this young monarch, eager after glory, seeking it everywhere for seven years past, sometimes in the precocious civilisation of his empire, sometimes in the creation of a new European equilibrium, and meeting only with unparalleled defeats, then all at once finding that glory so earnestly sought in a system of alliance with his conqueror, an alliance which was to give him a share in the sway of the world, below but by the side of the great man who

was pleased to divide it with him, worth to Russia the brilliant conquests promised by Catherine to her successors, which since Catherine's time had fled into the realm of chimeras—figure him to yourself, we say, passing from such deep dejection to such high hopes, and you will comprehend without difficulty his agitation, his intoxication, his sudden friendship for Napoleon —a friendship which assumed the form of an affection enthusiastic and assuredly sincere, at least in these first moments.

Alexander, who, as we have already said, was mild, humane, intelligent, but fickle as his father, rushed eagerly into the new track opened for him by his wily seducer. Never did he once leave Napoleon without expressing his unbounded admiration. What a great man! he said incessantly to those who approached him; what a genius! what extensive views! what a captain! what a statesman! had I but known him sooner, how many faults he might have spared me! what great things we might have accomplished together! His ministers who rejoined him, his generals who were about him, perceived the influence exercised over him, and they were not sorry for it; for they saw him getting out of a deplorable scrape with advantage and honour, judging at least from the satisfaction that beamed from his countenance.

Meanwhile the unfortunate King of Prussia had come to Tilsit, bringing with him his misfortunes, his affliction, his homely reason, and his modest good sense. Those intoxicating secrets which enraptured Alexander were not adapted for him. Alexander represented his intimacy with Napoleon as the means of obtaining larger restitutions in favour of Prussia. But he concealed from him the new alliance that was preparing, or entrusted him with only the smallest part of the secret. It would have appeared strange, in fact, that one of the two conquered sovereigns should obtain such fine acquisitions, when the other was going to lose half his kingdom. Frederick William, treated with infinite respect by Napoleon, was nevertheless left by himself. On horseback, at the head of troops, he had not the brilliant gracefulness of Alexander, the quiet ascendency of Napoleon. He remained in general behind, lonely as the unfortunate, making his crowned companions wait when they mounted or alighted from their horses, an object, in short, of little interest and even of less esteem than he deserved; for the French believed, from the gossip of the imperial court, that Napoleon had been betrayed by Prussia, and the Russians incessantly repeated that she had fought ill. As for Alexander, all attentions were for him. When he returned from long excursions, Napoleon detained him, lent him even furniture and his linen, and would not let him lose time in going to his quarters to change his dress. A superb dressing-case of gold, used by Napoleon, having appeared to please him, was instantly

offered and accepted. After dinner, which the three sovereigns took together, and always at Napoleon's, they separated early, and the two emperors went and shut themselves up together —a privacy from which Frederick William was excluded, and which was always charged to the same account—the efforts making by Alexander with Napoleon to recover the greater part of the Prussian monarchy.

That, however, was not the subject discussed in those long *tête-à-têtes*, but that immense system by which they were to hold joint rule over Europe. The possible, the probable partition of the Turkish empire was the continual topic of conversation. A first partition had been discussed, as we have seen, but it seemed incomplete. Russia was to have the banks of the Danube as far as the Balkans; Napoleon the maritime provinces, such as Albania and the Morea. The inland provinces, as Bosnia and Servia, were allotted to Austria. The Porte retained Roumelia, that is, the country south of the Balkans, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Egypt. Thus, according to this plan, Constantinople, the key of the seas, and in the imagination of men the real capital of the east—Constantinople, so positively promised to the descendants of Peter the Great by the universal opinion, an opinion formed from the hopes of the Russians and the fears of Europe—Constantinople, with St. Sophia's, was left to the barbarians of Asia!

Alexander reverted to this point several times, and a more complete partition, which should have given Napoleon not only the Morea, but also the islands of the Archipelago, Candia, Syria, Egypt, but Constantinople to the Russians, would have pleased him better. Napoleon, however, who thought that he had done enough, nay, more than enough, to attach the young emperor to himself, would never go so far. To give up Constantinople, no matter to whom, so it were a declared enemy of England, and thus let any one, during his lifetime, make the most brilliant acquisition that it was possible to imagine, could not suit Napoleon. He could, indeed, as in obedience to a natural tendency of things, and to resolve many European difficulties, lastly, to gain a powerful alliance against England—he could certainly permit the torrent of Russian ambition to dash against the foot of the Balkans, especially in the desire of diverting that torrent from the Vistula; but he would not suffer it to pass those tutelary mountains. He would not suffer the most striking work of modern times to be accomplished by any one before his face, or at his side. He was too jealous of the greatness of France, too jealous of occupying alone the imagination of mankind, to consent to such an encroachment upon his own glory.

Thus, notwithstanding his strong desire to seduce his new friend, he never could be persuaded to any other partition than that which should take from the Porte the provinces of the

Danube, too loosely attached to the empire, and Greece, already too much awakened to submit long to the yoke of the Turks.

One day the two emperors, on returning from a long ride, shut themselves up in the writing cabinet, where numerous maps were spread out. Napoleon, apparently continuing a conversation briskly began with Alexander, desired M. de Meneval to bring him the map of Turkey, unfolded it, then resumed the conversation, and suddenly clapping his finger on Constantinople, exclaimed several times, regardless of being heard by his secretary, in whom he had absolute confidence: "Constantinople! Constantinople! never! 'tis the empire of the world!" *

However, Finland, the Danubian provinces, as the price of the concurrence of Russia in the projects of France, held out a prospect sufficiently brilliant to enchant Alexander, for his reign would equal that of the great Catherine if he obtained these extensive territories. It was, in consequence, agreed that France and Russia should form from that moment a close alliance, at once defensive and offensive, should have in future only the same friends, the same enemies, should on all occasions direct their joint land and sea forces towards the same object. The number of men and ships to be employed in each particular case was to be settled afterwards by a special convention. Russia was immediately to offer her mediation to the British cabinet for the re-establishment of peace with France, and if that mediation, on the conditions fixed by Napoleon, were not accepted, she bound herself to declare war against Great Britain. Immediately afterwards they were to force all Europe, Austria included, to concur in that war. If Sweden and Portugal, as it was easy to foresee, should resist, a Russian army was to occupy Finland, a French army Portugal. As for the Turks, Napoleon engaged to offer them his mediation for restoring peace between them and Russia; and if they refused this mediation, it was stipulated that the war of Russia against them should be common to France, and that the powers should afterwards do what they thought fit with the Ottoman empire, with the proviso that dismemberment was to extend no further than the Balkans and the gulf of Salonichi.

These resolutions once adopted in substance, Napoleon undertook to draw up with his own hand the treaties, patent and secret, which were to include them. It was requisite, however, that they should come to an understanding about that unfortunate Prussia which Napoleon had promised not utterly to destroy, and for the honour of Alexander to allow it to subsist,

* I have these particulars from M. de Meneval himself, an eye-witness, and their accuracy is guaranteed, not only by the veracity of that respectable witness, but also by the correspondence of Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt, which proves that, notwithstanding all the efforts of Alexander, the limit of the Balkans was never passed.

at least in part. There were two fundamental conditions which Napoleon had laid down, and from which he would not depart; that is, to take, for the purpose of various combinations, all the German provinces which Prussia possessed on the left of the Elbe, and likewise the Polish provinces which she had acquired by the various partitions of Poland. This was not less than half of the Prussian States, in territory and population. With the provinces of Westphalia, Brunswick, Magdeburg, Thuringia, anciently or recently acquired by Prussia, Napoleon purposed, by uniting them with the grand duchy of Hesse, to compose a German kingdom, which he should call the kingdom of Westphalia, for his brother Jerome, in order to introduce a member of his family into the Confederation of the Rhine. He had already crowned two of his brothers, the one who reigned in Italy, the other in Holland. He should thus establish a third in Germany. As for Hanover, which had belonged for a moment to Prussia, Napoleon intended to keep it as a pledge of peace with England. With respect to Poland, his idea was to commence its restoration by means of the provinces of Posen and Warsaw, which he should constitute into an independent State, in order to repay the services of the Poles, who had been of little assistance to him hitherto, but might be of greater when they should combine the advantage of organisation with their natural courage; in order, likewise, to abolish by its overthrow the principal and most censurable of the works of the great Frederick—the partition of Poland. Napoleon knew not how much time would subsequently permit him to take from Austria, by exchanges or by force, of the Polish provinces retained by that power; and meanwhile he revived the kingdom of Poland by the creation of a Polish State of considerable extent and of real importance. To facilitate this restoration still more, he conceived the idea of reverting to another combination of the past, that was, to give Poland to Saxony. Thus in destroying one of the great monarchies of Germany, Prussia, he designed to substitute for it two new allied monarchies, Westphalia, composed of many fragments, in behalf of his youngest brother, Saxony, so aggrandised to be doubled, and both destined, according to all probability, to remain faithfully attached to him. He intended in this manner to reform a new German equilibrium, and to replace by two alliances the strong alliance of Prussia which he had lost. He assigned, therefore, for limits to the Confederation of the Rhine, the Inn in regard to Austria, the Elbe in regard to Prussia, the Vistula in regard to Russia.

Russia had not many objections to raise against such combinations, especially when once she had determined to associate herself with the policy of France. Excepting the sacrifices imposed on Prussia, excepting the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, she cared but little about these creations, about these dismem-

berments of German States. But the sacrifices imposed on Prussia were embarrassing for the Emperor Alexander, especially when he recollected the oaths sworn over the tomb of the great Frederick, and the demonstrations of chivalrous devotedness lavished on the Queen of Prussia. From nine millions and a half of inhabitants, the Prussian monarchy was reduced to five millions. From a revenue of 120 million francs, it was reduced to 69. Alexander could not therefore consent to such a lessening of his ally without some objections. He submitted them to Napoleon, and was listened to but coolly. Napoleon replied that it was out of consideration for him that he left Prussia so many provinces, that but for the desire to please him he would have reduced her to a third-rate power. He would even have taken Silesia from her, he said, and either given it to Saxony, for the purpose of transferring to the latter all the consequence which Prussia had possessed, or to Austria, in exchange for the Galicias.

This double combination would certainly have been the better of the two. The determination to sacrifice Prussia once taken, it had been better to destroy her entirely than but half. In all cases it is a bad system to overthrow old States in order to create new ones; for old States are apt to revive, new ones apt to die, unless you act decidedly in a manner consistent with the progress of things. The progress of things had brought with it the gradual aggrandisement of Prussia, the gradual destruction of Poland and Saxony. All that might be done in this spirit would have a chance of lasting, all that might be done in the contrary spirit had little chance. To give consistence to the new work, it was requisite that Prussia should at once be made so weak, Saxony and Poland so strong, that the former should have few means of recovering, and the two others numerous means of upholding themselves. Not reconstituting Prussia in her integrity—a reconstruction which would have been preferable to any other—Napoleon had done better to destroy her completely. He thought so himself, and so he told the Emperor Alexander. He went so far as to offer him part of the spoils of the house of Brandenburg, if he would countenance his plans for the more complete re-establishment of Poland. But Alexander refused, for it was evidently impossible for him to accept the spoils of Prussia. It was bad enough not to defend her more strenuously, and to become the interested ally of the conqueror who despoiled her. Independently of the fate inflicted on Prussia, Alexander could not view with pleasure the restoration of Poland. But Napoleon strove to prove to him that, towards the west, Russia ought to stop at the Niemen, that in passing it to approach the Vistula, as she had done in the last partition of Poland, she incurred the suspicion and odium of Europe, acquired subjects long, perhaps even for ever,

refractory, and for the sake of doubtful conquests rendered herself dependent on neighbouring powers, always ready to foment insurrection in her territories; that it was requisite to seek her aggrandisement in other quarters; that she would find it in the north towards Finland, in the east towards Turkey; that in the latter direction in particular, there was opening for her the track of real greatness, of greatness without limits, since India itself was in perspective; that in seeking to aggrandise herself on that side, she would find on the continent friends, allies, France in particular, and that she would have no adversary but England, whose power, reduced to that of her ships, could never dispute with her the banks of the Danube. The reasons of Napoleon were strong, and had they been bad, his auditor was not in a position to contradict them. He had to choose: either to have no share anywhere, not to aggrandise himself in any quarter, without preventing the revival of Poland, the downfall of Prussia; or to aggrandise himself extensively in the direction pointed out by Napoleon. Alexander hesitated not. Besides, he was so seduced, so fascinated, that there was no need of force to decide him. But what puzzled him was how to render his misfortune endurable to Frederick William, who, seeing the two emperors so intimate, might flatter himself that he was the motive of that intimacy, and that he should reap benefit from it. Alexander undertook, embarrassing as was the task, to break the matter to him, and having communicated to Frederick William the resolutions which concerned him, leaving to him the business of arranging with the supreme arbiter, who fixed the boundaries of every power. Frederick William received Alexander's communication very coldly, and promised to confer with Napoleon on the subject. The luckless King of Prussia, to whom Fortune was then so unfavourable, but whom she afterwards compensated, was not capable of negotiating his own business himself. He was neither adroit nor imposing; and if his spirit, heaving off the load of calamity, indulged in some involuntary movements, they were movements of testiness, not well befitting a king without dominions and without army. The town of Memel, where the Queen of Prussia passed her nights and her days in weeping, and General Lestocq's 10,000 or 15,000 men, were all that he had left. That prince had a long explanation with Napoleon, and at the first interview he took great pains to prove to him that he had not deserved his misfortune, for the origin of his quarrel with France dated from the violation of the territory of Anspach; and he affirmed most pertinaciously that, in passing through the province of Anspach, Napoleon had violated the Prussian sovereignty. At the point to which things had now arrived this question was of little importance; but on that subject Napoleon entertained a conviction as strong as that of the king.

In passing through that province of Anspach he had acted with perfect sincerity, and he was as anxious to set himself right on this point as if he had not been the stronger. The two monarchs grew warm, and the King of Prussia, in his despair, was hurried into transports of passion, to be lamented for the sake of his dignity, far from serviceable to his cause, perplexing for Napoleon. Annoyed by his complaints, Napoleon referred him to his ally, Alexander, who had induced him to continue the war when, on the morrow of Eylau, peace would have been possible and advantageous for Prussia. "For the rest," said he, "the Emperor Alexander has the means of indemnifying you—namely, to sacrifice to you his relations, the Princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, whose dominions will furnish a fine compensation for Prussia towards the north and towards the Baltic; he can also give up to you the King of Sweden, from whom you may take Stralsund and that portion of Pomerania which he makes such bad use of. Let the Emperor Alexander consent for you to these acquisitions, not equal to the territories that are taken from you, but better situated, and, for my part, I shall make no objections." Napoleon had good reason for referring Frederick William to Alexander, who could, in fact, have obtained those compensations for Prussia. But Alexander was already in trouble enough, caused by the grief of his Prussian allies, without raising up complaints, reproaches, dismayed faces in his own family. Frederick William would never have even ventured to mention such a thing, and regarded the offer as an evasion. He was, therefore, obliged to make up his mind to the sacrifice of half his kingdom. It was possible, however, to afford him some petty consolations which had considerably soothed his grief. Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia were still left him: the provinces on the left of the Elbe were taken from him, and in taking these extensive portions of his dominions, it was necessary to avoid separating from him too much those that were left him. It was, in fact, by successive encroachments on Poland that Frederick had connected together Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The question was, what portions of Poland should be left to Prussia, for the purpose of binding those provinces properly together. Lastly, and above all, it was necessary to decide whether, in assigning to Prussia the frontier of the Elbe in Germany, the fortress of Magdeburg, seated on the Elbe, a more important place than Mayence, or Strasburg on the Rhine, should be granted to her. Napoleon consented that the boundaries of Poland should be so traced as to connect together as much as possible Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia; but in conceding the Lower Vistula to Frederick William, he insisted on taking Dantzig from him, and constituting it a free city, like Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. With regard to

Magdeburg, he was inflexible. Mayence, Magdeburg, formed the entrepôts of his power in the north; it was not possible for him to part with them. He was therefore peremptory in his resolutions relative to Dantzig and Magdeburg.

The King of Prussia made up his mind to the loss of Dantzig, but he was loth to relinquish Magdeburg; for, situated in the heart of Germany, it was an important *point d'appui*, and the key of the Elbe, which had become his frontier. He urged not this motive, but a reason of ancient affection. In fact, the inhabitants of the duchy of Magdeburg, lying both on the right and on the left of the Elbe, were among the oldest and most loyal subjects of the monarchy. He gained nothing, however, by this new argument. As he was very urgent, sometimes with Napoleon, sometimes with Alexander, the latter conceived the idea of shaking Napoleon by inviting the Queen of Prussia to Tilsit, to try the power of her understanding, her beauty, and her misfortune on the conqueror of Europe. The calumnious reports to which the admiration of Alexander for this princess had given rise, had prevented her from going to Tilsit. Recourse was, nevertheless, had to her intervention as a last expedient, not for coarsely touching Napoleon, but for working upon his most delicate feelings by the presence of a queen, beautiful, accomplished, and unfortunate.

It was late to try such a resource, for the ideas of Napoleon were definitively fixed, and, for the rest, it was not at all probable that, at any time whatever, Napoleon would have sacrificed part of his designs under the influence of a woman, how interesting soever she might be.

Frederick William, therefore, invited the queen to come to Tilsit. She decided to comply, and the negotiations which had already lasted about twelve days was spun out to give that princess time to make the trip. She arrived at Tilsit on the 6th of July. An hour after her arrival Napoleon anticipated her, by calling to pay her a visit. The Queen of Prussia was then thirty-two years old. Her beauty, formerly brilliant, appeared to be slightly affected by age, but she was still one of the finest women of her time. With a superior understanding she combined a certain habit of business, from taking an indiscreet part in it, perfect nobleness of character and dignity of attitude. However, too strong a desire to produce an effect on the great man, on whom she was dependent, was a drawback upon her success. She spoke of the greatness of Napoleon, of his genius, of the misfortune of having mistaken him, in terms not simple enough to touch him. But the energy of character and strength of mind of that princess were soon displayed in that conversation to such a degree as to embarrass Napoleon himself, who, while paying her the utmost attentions and respect, took good care not to drop a single word that could be binding upon him.

She came to dine with Napoleon, who received her at the door of his imperial residence. During dinner she strove to conquer him, to draw from him at least one word from which she could derive hope, especially respecting Magdeburg. Napoleon, on his part, always respectful, courteous, but evasive, disappointed her by a resistance which resembled a continual flight. She divined the tactics of her mighty adversary, and bitterly lamented that he would not, at parting, leave in her soul a recollection which permitted her to join with admiration for the great man's genius, inviolable attachment for the generous conqueror. Perhaps, if Napoleon, less preoccupied with plans for aggrandising ungrateful royalties, or for creating ephemeral royalties, had yielded on this occasion, and conceded not only what was solicited of him, but what he could further have granted without prejudice to his other projects—perhaps he might have attached to himself the warm heart of that queen, and the honest heart of her husband. But to the solicitations of the princess he opposed an invincible respect. He had fixed with his immutable will all that related to Prussia, to Poland, to Westphalia; he had consented to a demarcation between Poland and Pomerania, which, following the banks of the Netze and the canal of Bromberg, ran and joined the Vistula below Bromberg. He made one concession in regard to Magdeburg, namely, that in case Hanover should remain in the possession of France, either because peace was not concluded with England, or because she concluded it without restoring Hanover, there should be ceded back to Prussia, on the left of the Elbe and in the environs of Magdeburg, a territory of three or four hundred thousand souls, including the restitution of the fortress itself.

He would not grant anything more. M. de Talleyrand had orders to confer with Messrs. de Kourakin and de Labanoff, and to settle all disputed points on the 7th, so that the queen, sent for to Tilsit to soften the lot of Prussia, only accelerated the result which it was the intention to prevent, by the very embarrassment which she occasioned Napoleon through the success that she had well-nigh obtained by her solicitations, at once delicate and persevering. The Russian and Prussian negotiators, finding themselves summoned peremptorily to consent or to refuse, at length yielded. The treaty, concluded on the 7th, was signed on the 8th, and assumed the title, which has become famous, of TREATY OF TILSIT.

There are three sorts of stipulations:—

A patent treaty between France and Russia, and another between France and Prussia;

Secret articles added to this double treaty;

Lastly, an occult treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Russia, which the two parties engaged to envelop in absolute secrecy till both should agree to publish it.

The two patent treaties between France, Russia, and Prussia, contained the following stipulations:—

Restitution to the King of Prussia, *in consideration of the Emperor of Russia*, of Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Upper and Lower Silesia;

Cession to France of all the provinces to the left of the Elbe, for the purpose of composing with them and the grand duchy of Hesse a kingdom of Westphalia, in behalf of the youngest of Napoleon's brothers, Prince Jerome Bonaparte;

Cession of the duchies of Posen and Warsaw, for the purpose of forming a Polish State, which, under the title of grand duchy of Warsaw, was to be assigned to Saxony, with a military road across Silesia, affording passage from Germany to Poland.

Acknowledgment by Russia and by Prussia of Louis Bonaparte as King of Holland, of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples, of Jerome Bonaparte as King of Westphalia; acknowledgment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and in general of all the States created by Napoleon;

Re-establishment in their sovereignties of the Princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, but occupation of their territories by the French troops, for the execution of the continental blockade;

Lastly, mediation of Russia, for re-establishing peace between France and England;

Mediation of France to re-establish peace between the Porte and Russia.

The secret articles contained the following stipulations:—

Restitution to the French of the mouths of the Cattaro;

Cession of the Seven Islands, which were thenceforward to belong to France, in full sovereignty;

Promise in regard to Joseph, already recognised as King of Naples in the patent treaty, to acknowledge him as also King of the two Sicilies, when the Bourbons of Naples should be indemnified either by means of the Balearic Islands or Candia;

Promise, in case of the incorporation of Hanover with the kingdom of Westphalia, to restore to Prussia on the left of the Elbe a territory containing three or four hundred thousand inhabitants;

Lastly, annuities for life, settled on the dispossessed heads of the houses of Hesse, Brunswick, and Nassau Orange.

The occult treaty, the most important of all those signed at the moment, and which the parties engaged to envelop in inviolable secrecy, contained an engagement on the part of Russia and France to make common cause in all circumstances, to unite their forces by land and sea in any war which they should have to carry on; to take arms against England if she would not subscribe to the conditions which we have recapitulated; against the Porte, if the latter should not accept the mediation of France, and in this last case to *withdraw*, so said

the text, *the European provinces from the vexations of the Porte, excepting Constantinople and Roumelia.* The two powers engaged to summon jointly Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Austria herself, to concur in the projects of France and Russia, that is to say, to shut their ports against England, and to declare war against her.*

The signature given by the Russians necessarily deciding that of the Prussians, produced strong emotion in the latter. The Queen of Prussia determined to set out immediately. After dining as usual at Napoleon's on the 8th, after addressing to him some complaints full of pride, and some to Alexander full of bitterness, she withdrew, attended by Duroc, who had never ceased to feel a warm attachment to her, and threw herself into her carriage, sobbing. She set out immediately for Memel, whither she went to mourn her imprudence, her political passions, the mischievous influence which they had exercised on public affairs, the fatal confidence which she had placed in the fidelity of chiefs of empires, in their word and in their friendship. Fortune was to change for her country and her husband; but this hapless princess was not destined to witness that change.

Alexander, having got rid of his unfortunate friends, whose sorrows annoyed him, gave himself up wholly to enthusiasm for his new projects. He was conquered, but his armies were honoured; and instead of sustaining losses in consequence of a war in which he had met with nothing but disasters, he left Tilsit with the hope of speedily realising the great designs of Catherine. The thing depended on himself, for he could turn to peace or war the mediation of Russia with the cabinet of Great Britain, and the mediation of France with the Divan. One was to procure him Finland, the other the whole or part of the Danubian provinces. He was delighted with his new ally. They promised to be inviolably attached to one another, to conceal nothing from each other, to meet again soon, to continue those direct relations which had already borne such excellent fruit. Alexander durst not propose to Napoleon to come to see, in the recesses of the north, the capital of an empire yet too young to deserve his notice; but he would go to Paris, visit the capital of the most civilised empire in the world, where was exhibited the spectacle of the best government succeeding the most frightful anarchy, and where he hoped, he said, to learn, by attending the meetings of the Council of State, the great art of reigning, which the Emperor of the French practised in so superior a manner.

On the 9th of July, the very day after the signature of the treaties, the solemn exchange of the ratifications and the parting of the two sovereigns took place, Napoleon, wearing the grand cordon of St. Andrew, went to the house occupied by Alexander.

* I am not giving the text, but a strictly accurate analysis of the treaty, the precise words of which have continued unknown to this day.

He was received by that prince, who wore the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, and who had about him his guard under arms. The two emperors having exchanged the ratifications, mounted their horses and showed themselves to their troops. Napoleon desired that the soldier reputed to be the bravest of the Russian imperial guard should be ordered to step out of the ranks, and gave him with his own hand the cross of the Legion of Honour. Then after conversing for a considerable time with Alexander, he accompanied him towards the Niemen. They embraced each other for the last time, amidst the applause of all the spectators, and parted. Napoleon remained on the bank of the Niemen till he had seen his new friend land on the other bank. Not till then did he retire, and after taking leave of his soldiers, who by their heroism had rendered such wonders possible, he set out for Königsberg, where he arrived on the following day, the 10th of July.

In that city he arranged all the details of the evacuation of Prussia, and directed Prince Berthier to make them the subject of a convention, which should be signed with M. de Kalkreuth. The banks of the Niemen were to be evacuated by the 24th of July, those of the Pregel by the 25th, those of the Passarge by the 20th of August, those of the Vistula by the 5th of September, those of the Oder by the 1st of October, those of the Elbe by the 1st of November, on the condition, however, that the contributions owing by Prussia, both ordinary and extraordinary, should be wholly paid either in specie or in bills accepted by the intendant of the army. The amount was five or six hundred millions, imposed on the Hanseatic towns, on the German States, on the dispossessed princes, on Hanover, and lastly on Prussia properly so called. That sum comprised both what the French or allied troops had consumed in kind, and what was to be paid them in money. The treasury of the army, begun at Austerlitz, would therefore receive considerable augmentation and sufficient resources for rewarding the attachment of heroic soldiers to the most magnificent of all masters.

Napoleon divided the army into four commands, under Marshals Davout, Soult, Massena, and Brune. Marshal Davout, with the third corps, the Saxons, the Poles, and several divisions of dragoons and light cavalry, was to form the first command, and to occupy Poland till it should be evacuated. Marshal Soult, with the fourth corps, the infantry reserve which had belonged to Marshal Lannes, part of the dragoons and of the light cavalry, was to form the second command, to occupy Old Prussia from Königsberg to Dantzig, and to take upon him all the details of the evacuation. Marshal Massena, with the fifth corps, with the troops of Marshals Ney and Mortier, with the Bavarian division of Wrede, was to form the third command, and to occupy Silesia till the general evacuation. Lastly, Marshal Brune,

forming the fourth command, with all the troops left on the rear, was charged to watch the coasts of the Baltic, and if the English should appear there, to receive them as he had formerly done at the Helder. The guard and Victor's, formerly Bernadotte's corps, were marched for Berlin.

Napoleon left Königsberg on the 13th of July, and proceeded straight to Dresden, to pass a few days there with his new ally the King of Saxony, created Grand Duke of Warsaw, and to agree with him what constitution to give to the Poles. That good and wise prince, far from ambitious, but flattered, as well as all his subjects, with the greatness conferred on his family, received Napoleon with transports of delight and gratitude. Napoleon left him to return to Paris, where he was impatiently expected, and which had not seen him for nearly a year. He arrived there on the 27th of July, at six in the morning.

Never had greater lustre surrounded the person and the name of Napoleon; never had greater apparent power been acquired for his imperial sceptre. From the strait of Gibraltar to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the North Sea, from the Alps to the Adriatic, he ruled either directly or indirectly, either personally or by princes, who were some of them his creatures, the others his dependants. Beyond were allies or subjugated enemies, England alone excepted. Thus almost the whole continent was under his sway; for Russia, after resisting him for a moment, had warmly adopted his designs, and Austria found herself forced to suffer them to be accomplished, and even threatened with being compelled to concur in them. England, in short, secured from this vast domination by the ocean, was about to be placed between the acceptance of peace and a war with the whole world.

Such was the external appearance of that gigantic power: it had in it enough to dazzle the world, and it did actually dazzle it; but the reality was less solid than brilliant. A moment's cool reflection would have sufficed to convince one's self of this. Napoleon, diverted from his struggle with England by the third coalition, drawn from the shores of the ocean to those of the Danube, had punished the house of Austria by taking from it, in consequence of the campaign of Austerlitz, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Suabia, and had thus completed the territory of Italy, aggrandised our allies of South Germany, removed the Austrian frontier from ours. So far, so good—for to finish the territorial emancipation of Italy, to secure friends in Germany, to place new spaces between Austria and France, was assuredly consistent with sound policy. But in the intoxication produced by the prodigious campaign of 1805, to change arbitrarily the face of Europe, and instead of being content to modify the past, which is the greatest triumph given to the hand of man, instead of keeping up for our profit the old rivalship of Prussia and

Austria by advantages granted to the one over the other—to wrest the Germanic sceptre from Austria without giving it to Prussia; to convert their antagonism into a common hatred of France; to create, by the title of Confederation of the Rhine, a pretended French Germany, composed of French princes, to whom their subjects had a natural antipathy, of German princes unthankful for our gifts, and after rendering by this unjust displacement of the boundary of the Rhine war with Prussia inevitable, war impolitic as it was glorious, to suffer one's self to be carried by the torrent of victory to the banks of the Vistula, and on arriving there to attempt the restoration of Poland, having on one's rear Prussia, vanquished but fuming, Austria secretly implacable—all this, admirable as a military work, was, as a political work, imprudent, extravagant, chimerical.

With the aid of his genius Napoleon upheld himself at these perilous extremities, triumphed over all obstacles, distances, climate, mud, cold—and completed on the Niemen the defeat of the continental powers. But at the bottom he was anxious to put an end to this daring expedition, and his whole conduct at Tilsit betoken that situation. Having estranged for ever the heart of Prussia, which he had not the good idea to attach to himself for ever by a signal act of generosity, enlightened respecting the sentiments of Austria, feeling how victorious soever he might be the necessity for making himself an alliance, he accepted that of Russia, which presented itself at the moment, and conceived a new system of policy founded on a single principle—the concurrence of two ambitions, Russian and French, to do whatever they pleased in the world—a mischievous concurrence, for it behoved France not to allow Russia to do everything, and above all not to allow herself to do everything. After having aggravated by the treaty of Tilsit the deep ranklings of Germany, by creating in her bosom a French royalty which must cost us in men, money, animosities to overcome vain counsels, all that those of Naples and Holland already cost us; after having half reconstituted Prussia, instead of restoring or destroying her entirely; after having, in like manner, half reconstituted Poland, and done everything in an incomplete manner, because at these distances time pressed, the strength began to fail, Napoleon made irreconcilable enemies, impotent or doubtful friends, raised, in short, an immense edifice, in which everything was new from bottom to top, an edifice run up so rapidly that the foundation had not had time to settle, the mortar to harden.

But if everything is censurable in our opinion in the political work of Tilsit, brilliant as it may appear, all is admirable, on the contrary, in the conduct of the military operations. That army of the camp of Boulogne, which, carried with incredible despatch from the strait of Calais to the sources of the Danube,

enveloped the Austrians at Ulm, drove back the Russians upon Vienna, finished by crushing both at Austerlitz, having then rested some months in Franconia, soon recommenced its victorious march, entered Saxony, surprised the Prussian army in retreat, broke it up by a single stroke at Jena, pursued it without intermission, turned it, took it to the last man on the shores of the Baltic; that army which, diverted from north to east, ran to meet the Russians, hurled them into the Pregel, then exhibited the unheard-of spectacle of a French army quietly encamped on the Vistula, then suddenly disturbed in its quarters left them to punish the Russians, reached them at Eylau, fought, though perishing with cold and hunger, a bloody battle with them, returned after that battle to its quarters, and there, encamped again upon snow in such a manner that its repose alone covered a great siege, fed, recruited during a long winter at distances which baffle all administration, resumed its arms in spring, and this time, Nature assisting genius, placed itself between the Russians and their base of operation, compelled them in order to regain Königsberg to cross the river before its face, flung them into it at Friedland, and thus terminated by a splendid victory, and on the banks of the Niemen, the longest, the most daring expedition, not through defenceless Persia or India like the army of Alexander, but through Europe, swarming with soldiers as well disciplined as brave—this is unparalleled in the history of ages, this is worthy of the everlasting admiration of men, this combines all qualities, celerity and slowness, daring and prudence, the art of fighting and the art of marching, the genius of war and that of administration, and these things, so diverse, so rarely united, always opportune, always at the moment when they were needed to ensure success. Every one will ask himself how it was possible to display so much prudence in war, so little in politics. The answer will be easy—in war Napoleon was guided by his genius, in politics by his passions.

We shall add, in conclusion, that the edifice so hastily constructed might have stood for some time, had not new weights, accumulated on its already overladen foundations, occasioned its downfall. The fortune of France, though endangered at Tilsit, was not, therefore, inevitably ruined, and her glory was immense.

END OF VOL. IV.

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